1 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.M.M.O. Nos. 901 & 902 of 2024 Reserved on: 07.08.2025 Decided on: 18.08.2025 1. Cr.M.M.O. No.901/2024 Pardeep Kumar ...…. Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another …...Respondents 2. Cr.M.M.O. No.902/2024 Surya Rashmi Rawat ……. Petitioner. Versus State of H.P and another ….. Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner(s): Ms. Sheetal Vyas, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Lokender Kutlheria, Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1-State. M/s Munish Datwalia and Ram Kumar, Advocates, for respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge Since both these petitions have arisen out of the common F.I.R.; therefore, they are being taken up together for disposal. 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?No 2 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) 2. The present petitions have been filed for quashing of F.I.R. No.98/2024 dated 23.05.2024, registered at Police Station, Dharamshala, H.P for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 504, and 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 92(a), 92(b) and 92(e) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (Disabilities Act). 3. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petitions are that the respondent No.2/informant made a complaint to the police that he was called on the pretext of inquiry on 22.05.2024. He appeared before the Committee consisting of Pardeep Kumar, the petitioner, Surya Rashmi Rawat, the petitioner, Professor Pardeep Nair and Professor Sunil Kumar. Professor Pardeep Kumar used abusive, insulting and intimidating words. He also assaulted the informant. The informant called his father Vasudev Sharma. Pardeep Kumar threatened to suspend the informant in case any complaint was made. The informant approached the Registrar, but he did not help him. Hence, it was prayed that an action be taken in the matter. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of F.I.R., the petitioners have filed the present petitions asserting that a 3 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) complaint was received against the informant stating that the complainant had prepared his research paper with the informant because the informant was a member of the editorial team of the International Journal of Society and Education. However, the informant published the paper in his name by adding two more authors. The informant had stolen the work of the complainant and published it in his name. The Registrar of the University formed a Committee of five members to make inquiries into the allegations. The Chairman called the informant and other members of the Committee on 22.05.2024. The Committee proposed that the complainant should be called upon to appear before the Committee on 28.05.2024. The informant misbehaved with the Chairman of the Committee and Professor Surya Rashmi Rawat. He threatened to take them to the police. He also hurled abuses. The informant scratched his arm and claimed that the injuries were inflicted by the petitioners. The informant called his father and created a ruckus. The Committee decided that an action should be taken against the informant. The university lodged a complaint with the Police Station, Dharamshala, against the informant. The Registrar also issued a show cause notice to the informant. The informant lodged a false F.I.R. against the petitioners to save his 4 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) skin. He also wrote a letter to withdraw the publication on the pretext that the articles contained some errors. His allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute the commission of any offence. There was no intention to insult and humiliate a person with disability. The informant holds a valid licence to drive a light motor vehicle, which falsifies his plea that he is a person with disability. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 5. The petitions are opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply, reproducing the contents of the F.I.R. It was asserted that the contents of the complaint disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence. The police conducted the investigation and found sufficient material to file the charge sheet. The matter was listed before the learned Trial Court on 25.10.2024 for the presence of the accused. The allegations in the F.I.R. show the commission of cognizable offences, and this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and the petitioners can raise their grievances before the learned Trial Court. This Court should not appreciate the evidence while 5 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) exercising inherent jurisdiction. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 6. A separate reply was filed by the respondent No.2, the informant, making a preliminary submission regarding the informant being a permanently disabled person. The contents of the petitions were denied on merits. It was asserted that the complaint was made to the publisher and not to the university. The complainant did not disclose plagiarism as defined under Section 2(1) of the University Grant Commission (Promotion of Academic Integrity and Prevention of Plagiarism in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2018. The Registrar modified the complaint and wrongly constituted a Committee. The petitioners insulted and assaulted the informant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Rejoinder denying the contents of the reply filed by respondent No.2 and affirming those of the petitions was filed. 8. I have heard Ms. Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1 and M/s Munish Datwalia and Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent No.2- informant. 6 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) 9. Ms. Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are false. They are maliciously made with the intent to harass and humiliate the petitioners, who were the members of the Committee constituted to probe into the allegations made by the complainant against the informant regarding plagiarism. The informant is not a person with disability as a driving licence has been issued in his favour. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, she prayed that present petitions be allowed and F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 10. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. constituted the commission of a cognizable offence. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. Sufficient material was found during the investigation to submit the charge sheet. The police have filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court, and the learned Trial Court has closed the matter. The petitioner had no authority to assault and abuse the informant while carrying out an inquiry into allegations made against him. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 7 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) 11. Mr. Munish Datwalia and Mr.Ram Kumar, learned counsel for respondent No.2-informant, adopted the submission of Mr.Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General and prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 12 I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process 8 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion 9 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under 10 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 14. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 15. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) 16. A perusal of the contents of the F.I.R. shows that the petitioner Pardeep Kumar threatened, abused and assaulted the informant, who is a physically disabled person. This was done in a public place, namely, the university. Therefore, prima facie, the ingredients of Sections 92(a), 92(b), and 92(e) of the Disability Act are satisfied. 17. It was submitted that the offences under the Disabilities Act are non-cognizable and the Court cannot take cognizance of their commission without the approval of the State Government. This submission is not acceptable. Section 94 of the Disabilities Act reads as under: 94. Previous sanction of appropriate Government.—No Court shall take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed by an employee of the appropriate Gov- ernment under this Chapter, except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government or a complaint is filed by an officer authorised by it in this behalf. 18. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that the previous sanction is required when the offence is committed by an employee of the appropriate government. In the present case, the petitioners are the employees of the Central University, which is an autonomous body having a perpetual succession and common seal capable of suing and being sued in its name as per Section 3 (7) of the Central 12 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) Universities Act, 2009. Hence, the provisions of Section 93 of the Disabilities Act will not apply to the petitioners. 19. It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false and that they were made maliciously to wreak vengeance upon the petitioners. These submissions will not help the petitioners. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 20. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to 13 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is 14 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 21. The informant has filed a copy of the disability certificate (Annedure R-1) issued by the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh, showing that he has 60% permanent disability in relation to his both eyes, and he is a case of blindness. He was diagnosed as both eyes high myopia with left isometropic amblyopia. 22. Section 2(s) of Disability Act defines a person with disability as a person with long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders their full and effective participation in society equally with others. The schedule of the Act defines the specified disability and includes visual impairment as blindness. The disability certificate also shows that the informant is a case of blindness. Hence, prima facie, the plea taken by the petitioners that the informant does not fall within the definition of Disability Act cannot be accepted. 15 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) 23. It was submitted that the informant had himself created a ruckus. He scratched himself and claimed that the injuries were caused by the petitioners. This is a factual dispute which cannot be adjudicated during the present proceedings. Prima facie, the plea taken by the petitioners shows that the informant had sustained injuries. Hence, his plea that he was assaulted by the petitioners has to be accepted prima facie correct at this stage. 24. It was submitted that the F.I.R. was lodged to wreak vengeance and is malicious. Therefore, the same should be quashed. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for 16 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 25. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground that it is mala fide. 26. It was undisputed that a charge sheet had been filed before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that 17 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because, even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 27. It was submitted that the driving licence was issued in favour of the informant, which falsifies his plea. The photocopy of the driving licence issued in the name of V*S*V M*H*N has been filed. This document does not contain the details of the holder and cannot be correlated to the informant. Therefore, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed based on this document. 28. No other point was urged. 29. In view of the above, the present petitions fail and the same are dismissed. The observations made herein before 18 ( 2025:HHC:27644 ) shall remain confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18 August 2025. (yogesh)