1 / 7 2025:CGHC:21713 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 3209 of 2025 Order reserved on 08.05.2025 Order delivered on 09.05.2025 1. Dr. Parikshit Charan S/o Shri Mool Singh Charan Aged About 50 Years R/o Flat No.5, Block-1, Faculty Residence, IIM Raipur, Dist Raipur (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1. Indian Institute Of Management Raipur Through The Director, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, Raipur C.G. 2. Shri Ram Kumar Kakani, Director, Indian Institute of Management, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, Raipur C.G. 3. Board Of Governors, Through The Chairman Shri Puneet Dalmia, Dalmia Bharat Limited, R/o 11 &12 Floor, Hansalaya Building, 15 Barakhamba Road, New Delhi 110001. ... Respondents (Cause title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Sudeep Johri, Advocate For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Senior Advocate with Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate and Dr. Shiv Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate C A V Order By Bibhu Datta Guru, J. 2 / 7 1. By the present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking quashment of the order dated 28/04/2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent No.2 whereby the petitioner has been placed under suspension. 2. (i) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that initially the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Professor in the Indian Institute of Management, Raipur on 27/05/2013. Subsequently, he was appointed as Associate Professor on 01/07/2019. Learned counsel would submit that when in the month of July, 2023, his candidature was not considered for promotion to the post of Professor he approached the authorities however, the authorities denied the claim of the petitioner on the basis of bogus complaint and issued the charge sheet against the petitioner and even the petitioner was placed under suspension. Against the said charge sheet and the suspension order, the petitioner approached this Court by filing WPS No.2832/2024 and WPS No.218/2025 which were allowed by this Court by common order dated 24/04/2025. (ii) According to the learned counsel, when the petitioner submitted the copy of the order of this Court, the respondent No.2 again placed the petitioner under suspension by the order impugned dated 28/04/2025 by referring the charge sheet dated 18/04/2024, despite the fact that the said charge sheet has already quashed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petitions. Learned counsel would submit that the order impugned has been passed by an incompetent and an unauthorized person. In fact, the respondent No.2 has no authority or jurisdiction to place the petitioner under suspension. 3 / 7 (iii) Learned counsel would submit that the impugned action is contrary to the provisions of Section 11(2)(i) of the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017 (henceforth ‘the Act, 2017’) and Regulation 10 of the Indian Institute of Management Raipur Regulation, 2021 (henceforth ‘the Regulation, 2021’), which empowers the respondent No.3/Board of Governors (BoG) to appoint the employees for academics which includes the Director, Professor, Associate Professor and Assistant Professor and such other permanent academic posts. Thus, the respondent No.2 has no authority to pass impugned suspension order. He would lastly submit that the impugned order is contrary to the order passed by this Court on 24-4-2025 because this Court has already quashed the charge sheet, earlier suspension order and disciplinary proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the respondent No.2/Director of the IIM. 3. (a) Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, per contra, would oppose the aforesaid contention raised by the petitioner. Learned counsel would submit that in the case at hand, the Director of the IIM is not only the appointing authority but also the disciplinary authority and, as such, there could not be a doubt about competency and capacity of the Director of IIM to pass the impugned order of suspension. Learned counsel would submit that the BoG has been envisaged as the principal executive body of the Respondent IIM in terms of Section 10 of the Act, 2017 and in terms of Section 11 the BoG has been entrusted with the responsibility for the general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the institute. 4 / 7 (b) Learned counsel would submit that under the provisions of the Act, 2017 the BoG is empowered to delegate its power and functions to the Director and once so done, the Director can steps in the shoes of the BoG to the extent of delegation of power and function. By referring minutes of 17th Board of Governors Meeting, learned counsel would submit that the BoG approved the HR Policy & Service Rules, 2014 with minor amendments. The HR Policy & Service Rules will be implemented in the next financial year 2015-16 w.e.f. 1st April, 2015. Clause 4.5 of the HR Policy speaks about the Delegation of Powers to the Director. Sub-clause (iii) of clause 4.5 provides for faculty appointments. According to the learned counsel, as per clause 4.5(iii)(i) the Director is competent to appoint Full, Associate and Assistant Professors against sanctioned posts. As per clause 4.5(iv)(i) of the HR Policy, the Director, as the Executive Head of the organization, is vested with full powers to uphold general discipline and ensure the proper conduct of the employees of the institute. He shall be the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority in respect of all employees. Learned counsel would submit that from the aforesaid provisions of the HR Policy, it is crystal clear that the Director is the competent authority to pass impugned suspension order. He would submit that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents. 5. It is noteworthy to mention here that earlier the petitioner preferred two writ petitions before this Court bearing WPS No.2832/2024 and WPS 5 / 7 No.218/2025 wherein he sought a relief for quashment of the charge sheet, disciplinary proceedings as also the earlier suspension order. The said writ petition were allowed by common order dated 24-4-2025 observing thus at paras 8 to 12 : 8) Section 11 of the Act, 2017 speaks about 'Powers and Function of the Board', subject to the provisions of the Act, the Board of every institute shall be responsible for the general superintendence, directions and control of the affairs of the institute and shall have the power to frame or amend or modified or rescind the regulation governing the affairs of the institute to achieve the objects of the Institute specified in Section 6. Section 11 (2) (i) of the Act, 2017 provides that the Board shall have the power to create academic, administrative, technical and other posts and to make appointments thereto. From the said provisions, it is crystal clear that the BOG is the appointing authority of the petitioner. Thus, the charge- sheet can only be issued upon approval of the BOG, but the same has not been followed in the case in hand. Even, the respondents failed to show that the powers delegated by the BOG upon the Director. The charge-sheet issued by the other authority than the specified authority was wholly without jurisdiction and vitiated the whole disciplinary proceedings. 9) Such procedure adopted by the Director would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311 (2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Such a charge sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority, in the case at hand, it is BOG, not the Director. (See: Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath & Others). 10) It is well settled proposition of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. (See: Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Others). 11) As far as the HR Policy is concerned, the same is nothing but internal arrangement of the establishment. Even otherwise, the policy/guidelines cannot supersede the statutes i.e. the Act, 2017. Even the respondents failed to show that the provisions of the Act, 2017 will not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 6 / 7 12) Guidelines/policy per se do not partake to the character of statute. Such guidelines/policy in absence of the statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. This is because guidelines, by their very nature, do not fall into the category of legislation, direct, subordinate or ancillary. They have only an advisory role to play and non-adherence to or deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly permissible if the circumstances of any particular fact or law situation warrants the same. Judicial control takes over only where the deviation either involves arbitrariness or discrimination or is so fundamental as to undermine a basic public purpose which the guidelines and the statute under which they are issued are intended to achieve. (See: Poonam Verma & Others v. Delhi Development Authority). 6. On going through the pleadings and documents, it is manifest that the respondents completely placed reliance upon the HR Policy of the IIM whereas Section 39(1)(c) of the Act, 2017 categorically provides that until the first regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye- laws of each Institute as in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 7. Bare perusal, it is quite vivid that as per Section 11(2)(i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the appointing authority of the petitioner and the disciplinary action including passing of suspension order can only be issued upon approval of the BoG, but the HR policy relied upon by the respondent is inconsistent with the Act, 2017. Thus, as far as the provision regarding the appointing authority is concerned, the Act, 2017 will prevail as per Section 39(1)(c). Despite the said fact, in the case at hand, the authorities have not followed the provisons of the Act, 2017 in its true perspective. By applying the provisions of the Act, 2017, the earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioner were allowed and granted liberty to the IIM to take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the provisions 7 / 7 contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised. Despite granting the said liberty, again without following the provisions of the Act, 2017 on the strength of the HR Policy the impugned suspension order has been passed by the respondent No.2. 8. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petition is allowed and the order dated 28-4-2025 (Annexure-P/1) is hereby quashed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the IIM to proceed against the petitioner as per the provisions of the Act, 2017, if so advised. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri K GOWRI SANKARA RAO Digitally signed by K GOWRI SANKARA RAO Date: 2025.05.09 16:57:52 +0530