2025:JHHC:27411 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No.3694 of 2010 ------- Brij Bhushan Singh Yadav Son of Late Murli Yadav, Overman, Sirka Colliery, C.C.L. Argada Area, R/o- Sirka Colliery, C.P.L. Office, P.S- Ramgarh, P.O- Argada, Dist- Ramgarh (Jharkhand). …… Petitioner Versus 1. Central Coalfield Limited (A subsidiary of Coal India Ltd.) having its registered office at Darbhanga House, through its Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Ranchi, Dist-Ranchi. 2. Director Personnel Central Coalfield Limited, Darbhanga House, Ranchi, Dist- Ranchi. 3. General Manager (A) Sirka, Central Coalfield Limited, P.O-Argada, Dist- Ramgarh. 4. Personnel Manager, Sirka, OCP, Central Coalfield Limited, P.O- Argada, Dist- Ramgarh. 5. Project Officer (S.G) Sirka, Central Coalfield Limited, P.O- Argada, Dist- Ramgarh. .……Respondents ------- CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ------- For the Petitioner : Mrs. M. M. Pal, Sr. Adv. : Mrs. Mohua Palit, Adv. For the Respondents: Ms. Swati Shalini, Adv. ------- CAV ON:26.08.2025 Pronounced On:-09/09/2025 2025:JHHC:27411 2 Heard Mrs. M. M. Pal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Swati Shalini, appearing for the respondents. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for the following reliefs:- (A) The appellate order dated 05.05.2010 passed by the Director (P) CCL (Ann-11) be quashed. (B) The dismissal order dated 11.02.2009 issued by the Project Officer, Sirka Colliery, CCL (Ann-5) be quashed. (C) The Respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner with back wages and with all consequential benefits. (D) The Respondents be directed not to give effect to the appellate order dated 05.05.2010 as also dismissal order dated 11.02.2009 and to allow the petitioner to continue his original post till his age of superannuation. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the Petitioner was appointed to the post of piece rated employee. He was appointed under the provisions of employment of a Male Dependent in case the male employee applied for the VRS. Petitioner's Father-in-Law Sri Bharat Munda applied for the VRS with the condition to give employment to his Son-in-Law i.e., the Petitioner in the instant case. The Petitioner was charged for fraudulently entering into the services of CCL by declaring himself as Son-in-Law of the ex-employee though as per the respondent-Company he was never married to the daughter of the ex-employee and have since then been illegally on the pay roll of the company in connivance 2025:JHHC:27411 3 with Sri. Bharat Munda and the then officers of the Sirka Colliery. Accordingly, charges were constituted under the clauses of the certified standing orders as follows:- (i) 17(1)(a)- Theft, Fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property. (ii) 17(1)(o)- Giving false information regarding one's name, age, father's name, qualification or previous service at the time of the employment. On 16.12.1998, reply to the chargesheet was submitted by the Petitioner. On 18.12.2006, the Inquiry officer submitted his report and held that the charges against the Petitioner have not been proved. On 28.03.2008, the Disciplinary Authority served the 2nd Show Cause notice upon the Petitioner along with the enquiry report and explaining the reasoning for dissenting with the findings of the Inquiry officer. On 06.10.2008, the Petitioner replied to the 2nd Show-Cause notice served upon him along with the complete enquiry report. On 11.02.2009, after considering the reply filed by the Petitioner to the 2nd Show Cause, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the Petitioner from his services. On 16.02.2009, the Petitioner preferred the Departmental Appeal against his dismissal Order. On 05.05.2010, after considering the departmental appeal 2025:JHHC:27411 4 preferred by the Petitioner, a detailed appellate order was passed by the Appellate authority which is also under challenge in the instant writ application. 4. Mrs. M.M. Pal Ld. Sr. Counsel for the Petitioner submits that in the instant case, the Inquiry officer has exonerated the Petitioner from the charges and the Disciplinary authority while dissenting with the opinion of the Inquiry officer, has not given a separate show cause notice only on the ground of dissenting and asking reply. Ld. Sr. Counsel contended that the Division Bench of this Court has categorically stated that if the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, he must record his distinct opinion and serve a copy of notes of disagreement upon the delinquent employee so as to provide him an opportunity to represent. She further contended that the Division Bench of this court has categorically held in the said judgment that second show cause notice is at a distinct stage in the disciplinary proceeding. She further draws attention of this Court towards order dated 2/5/2022 and submits that the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.541 of 2017 has been assailed by the 2025:JHHC:27411 5 Respondents in a Special leave to appeal (C) No. 26722 of 2019, and as a matter of fact, the pendency of the appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court was the ground for delay in disposal of the instant case. She specifically draws attention of this Court towards the order dated 2/5/2022, when the Counsel for the Respondents had submitted that the Special Leave Petition bearing No. 26722 of 2019 filed by the Central Cold Fields Limited is still pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court. Ld. Sr. Counsel clarifies that the purpose of referring the order dated 02.05.2022 is that, only due to pendency of the case before the Apex Court, this matter has lingered. However, finally, on 27.2.2024, the said appeal was dismissed; as such, the order passed in LPA No. 541 of 2017 has attained its finality, and since the instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment, the impugned order may be quashed and set aside. 5. Ms. Swati Shalini, Ld. Counsel for the Respondents submits that the Petitioner has never raised the ground of principle of natural justice in the disciplinary proceeding, and the entire departmental proceeding has been conducted in accordance with law and following principles of natural justice. 2025:JHHC:27411 6 She reiterated that the contention raised by the Sr. Counsel was never taken by the Petitioner during entire departmental proceeding. She further contended that the charge was very grave in nature and the Disciplinary authority has dissented with the view of Inquiry Officer and in the second show cause notice itself, he has given the finding and reasons for not agreeing with the Inquiry Officer. However, Ld. Counsel could not dispute the fact that in LPA No. 541 of 2017, similar issue was raised and the same has attained finality. She lastly submits that even if the Court interferes with the orders impugned, the Petitioner is not entitled for any back wages. 6. Having heard Ld. Counsel for the parties, and after going through the documents available on record, it appears that a departmental proceeding was initiated against the Petitioner, and the Inquiry officer submitted his report and held that charges against the Petitioner has not been proved (Annexure-3). However, vide annexure-4, the Disciplinary Authority served second show cause notice upon the Petitioner, along with enquiry report, explaining the reasons for dissenting with the finding. 2025:JHHC:27411 7 7. The only issue which has been raised by the Ld. Sr. Counsel is that in such type of cases where the Inquiry Officer exonerate the delinquent, there shall be two stages of notice. Firstly, at the stage when the Disciplinary authority disagrees with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, he must record his tentative opinion and serve a copy of the notes of disagreement upon the delinquent and the second stage is of 2nd show cause notice for punishment. She contended that the 2nd Show cause notice is at distinct stage in the disciplinary proceedings. 8. In order to decide the contention of the Ld. Sr. Counsel, it would be profitable to refer to the Division Bench judgment rendered in LPA No. 541 of 2017; CCL v. Anguri Khatoon reported in 2019 (3) JBCJ 179. For brevity, relevant paragraphs are extracted here in below;- “9. A careful reading of the decisions on supply of notes of dis- agreement, which is the issue involved in this case, would indicate that after the enquiry report is submitted and before the disciplinary authority passes the final order, at two stages separate notices have to be given to the delinquent employee. If the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the enquiring officer he must record his tentative opinion and serve a copy of the notes of dis-agreement upon the delinquent employee so as to provide him an opportunity to represent. Second show-cause notice is a distinct stage in the disciplinary proceeding. It is a requirement under the first provise to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. It has been held mandatory in "Union of India vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan" (1991) 1 SCC 588. There a question arose whether in view of the 42nd Amendment it is necessary to give a second show-cause notice to the delinquent employee, that is, another show-cause notice on the proposed punishment. Before the disciplinary authority passes a final order, either imposing punishment or exonerating the delinquent employee, he has to apply his mind at two intermediate stages and to form two opinions; whether the charge has been proved or not, and the 2025:JHHC:27411 8 proposed punishment. Both are two distinct stages and at both the stage the opinion formed by the disciplinary authority is considered tentative. It is not linal because the delinquent employee has a right to represent persuade the disciplinary authority to take a favourable view in the matter. After the 42nd Amendment, the requirement to give notice on the proposed punishment has been done away with but another dimension to the departmental enquiry has been added by the decision in "Kunj Behari Misra". It has been held that if the disciplinary authority dis-agrees with the enquiry report exonerating the delinquent employee of the charges framed against him, the disciplinary authority must record the reasons and give a copy of the notes of dis-agreement to the delinquent employee so as to provide him an opportunity to represent against the tentative discordant note struck by the disciplinary authority. 10. What has been done by the disciplinary authority in the present case is that he has recorded his dis-agreement with the enquiry report in the second show-cause notice itself. 11. Supply of notes of dis-agreement and an opportunity of hearing must be distinguished from the second show-cause notice.” 9. Thus, the fact of this case is squarely same and similar with that of the case of Anguri Khatoon (Supra) and as stated herein above, the order passed by the Division Bench has been upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave of Appeal (C) No. 26722 of 2019. 10. Moreover, even the Respondents have admitted that the issue in the instant case is same and similar, inasmuch as, on 2/5/2022, they themselves have submitted before this Court that the said SLP is pending for disposal. 11. Respectfully, agreeing with the aforesaid finding, on the issuance of second show cause notice and non-compliance of principle of natural justice, the instant writ application deserves to be allowed and accordingly appellate order dated 05.05.2010 passed by the Director (P) CCL (Annexure-11) and dismissal order 2025:JHHC:27411 9 dated 11.02.2009 issued by the Project Officer, Sirka Colliery, CCL (Annexure-5), are hereby, quashed and set aside. 12. However, so far as back wages as prayed by the Petitioner is concerned, there is absolutely no pleadings in the entire writ application w.r.t. the back wages and that the Petitioner was not gainfully employed after his date of dismissal till the date he attained the age of 60 years. Only in the prayer portion the prayer for back wages have been made; however not a single pleading/ averment have been made by the Petitioner in the entire writ application and on this ground itself the prayer for the back wages is unsustainable and liable to be rejected. In this regard reference be made to the case of Mulin Sharma Vs. State of Assam and ors., reported in (2016)14 SCC 208 and Mahendra Vs. CCL, W.P.(S) No.3408 of 2020 order dated 18.03.2025. 13. Accordingly, since the impugned order of dismissal and also the appellate order, are quashed and set aside, the Respondents are directed to regularize the services of the Petitioner by treating him reinstated from the date of termination and giving all other benefits, except back wages, from the date of termination till the date of superannuation and pass an appropriate order, 2025:JHHC:27411 10 and all the consequential benefits be extended to the Petitioner. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 14. Consequently, the instant writ application, is hereby, allowed in the manner indicated hereinabove. Pending I.As., if any, is also closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Fahim/- AFR/NAFR