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2025 DAILYLAW 21094 (AP)

G PADMAVATHI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

WP/15117/2025 · 2025-09-02

V Sujatha

body2025

Judgment text

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APHC010297082025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3333] WEDNESDAY,THE THIRD DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA WRIT PETITION NO: 15117/2025 Between: 1. G PADMAVATHI, W/O G.SIDDANNA GOUD, AGE ABOUT 43 YEARS, OCC F.P.SHOP DEALER, R/O H.NO.4- 48, HAIVI VILLAGE, KOWTHALAM MANDAL, KURNOOL DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER AND 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, CIVIL SUPPLIES DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT BUILDINGS, VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATHI. 2. THE JOINT COLLECTOR, KURNOOL DISTRICT AT KURNOOL.2. 3. THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, , ADONI REVENUE DIVISION AT ADONI, KURNOOL DISTRICT. 4. THE TAHSILDAR, , KOWTHALAM MANDAL AT KOWTHALAM, KURNOOL DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased topleased to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus 2 VS,J W.P.No.15117 of 2025 declaring the action of the 3rd respondent in issuing the impugned proceedings, suspending the petitioner's authorisationi of FP.Shop No. 1301009 of Haivi village, Kowthalam Mandal, Kurnool District, as illegal, arbitrary, unjust and violation of principles of natural justice and consequently set aside the impugned proceedings vide Rc.(M). 1074/2025, dated 30-04-2025, issued by the 3rd respondent and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to suspend the impugned proceedings vide Rc.(M). 1074/2025, dated 30-04-2025, of the 3rd respondent, pending disposal of the above writ petition and to pass Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. U RAMANJANEYULU Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. GP FOR CIVIL SUPPLIES The Court made the following: 3 VS,J W.P.No.15117 of 2025 ORDER: This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief: “..to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the 3rd respondent in issuing the impugned proceedings suspending the petitioner’s authorization of FP Shop No.1301009 of Halvi village, Kowthalam Mandal, Kurnool District, as illegal, arbitrary, unjust and violation of principles of natural justice and consequently set aside the impugned proceedings vide Rc.(M).1074/2025, dated 30.04.2025 issued by the 3rd respondent and pass such other order or orders…” 2. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is as follows: a. The petitioner was appointed as a Fair Price Shop dealer for Shop No.1301009 of Halvi Villae, Kowthalam Mandal, Kurnool District, on a permanent basis in the year 2018. Since the date of the said appointment, the petitioner has been distributing essential commodities to the cardholders without there being any complaint either from the cardholders or from the concerned authorities. b. While the matter being so, on 21.04.2025, the 4th respondent has conducted an inspection over the petitioner’s shop and found variation in the stock. Basing on the report given by the 4th respondent, the 3rd respondent issued a show cause notice dated 26.04.2025 to the petitioner calling for an explanation within a period of 4 VS,J W.P.No.15117 of 2025 three days. In response, the petitioner has submitted an explanation on 29.04.2025. In spite of the same, the 3rd respondent has suspended the petitioner’s authorization on 30.04.2025. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 3. Heard Sri U.Ramanjaneyulu, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies appearing for the respondents. 4. During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the order of suspension has been in force for more than 90 days, till date, the enquiry has not been commenced and concluded. 5. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies has submitted that the respondents did not commit any error in passing the impugned suspension order and requested to dismiss the present writ petition. 6. As the enquiry was not completed within 90 days from the date of suspension, the present writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Joint Collector, 5 VS,J W.P.No.15117 of 2025 Kurnool vs. A. Neelima1 , wherein a Division Bench held as follows: 2. We have gone through the impugned judgment which is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab (1) AIR 1982 (S.C.), 1965. In that case, the prescribed form of licence contained the clause for the period of suspension to be maximum for 90 days. A perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge shows that in essence and substance what was meant by him is that the period of 90 days is a reasonable period to conclude the enquiry and the continuance of it beyond 90 days would be unreasonable and shall be, hence, taken as quashed. As we see it was in the nature of a direction to complete the enquiry within 90 days than laying down a general proposition of law that the maximum period of suspension could be only for 90 days. We agree with the view of the learned Single Judge that the order of suspension cannot be used as a pretext for indefinite postponement of the operation of the fair price shop dealership making it in effect cancellation of the dealership. An order of suspension, like every executive and administrative act, has to be founded upon fair play and lack of arbitrariness. The continuation of order of the suspension indefinitely is whole arbitrary and cannot be countenanced. But we must also rush to add that what is reasonable period of suspension will vary from case to case depending upon various factors, though more often than not, a period of 90 days should ordinarily be sufficient to conclude the enquiry. 7. In the present case, though the impugned order was passed on 30.04.2025 suspending the authorization of the petitioner for an indefinite period and even after an elapse of 90 days, there has been no commencement of operation of the enquiry against the petitioner. In the 1 1996 LawSuit (AP) 956 6 VS,J W.P.No.15117 of 2025 light of the observations made in the aforesaid judgments and in the considered opinion of this Court, as the enquiry is not completed by the Respondents in the present case within the “reasonable period” i.e. 90 days, this Court affirms that that the 2nd respondent failed to conclude the enquiry within “reasonable period” and the suspension order dated 30.04.2025 shall be revoked and the authorization of the petitioner shall be restored. 8. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed directing the 2nd respondent to revoke the suspension order dated 30.04.2025 issued against the petitioner and restore the authorization of the petitioner and continue the petitioner as fair price shop dealer. However, this order will not preclude the respondent authorities from conducting enquiry in accordance with the law, uninfluenced by the observations made hereinabove. The 2nd respondent is further directed to complete the enquiry as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. ________ ___ V. SUJATHA, J Dt.03.09.2025 JLV