APHC010294992007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] TUESDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 619/2007 Between: Kuppili Jaya Sri ...PETITIONER AND Kuppili Narasimha Murthy Rep by P.P and others ...RESPONDENT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. Palaparthi Prabhakar 2. Legal Aid Counsel for the Respondent(S): Public Prosecutor (AP) The Court made the following: ORDER: A report from the Inspector of Police, I Town Police Station, Vizianagaram, is received stating that the whereabouts of the respondent Nos.1 and 2/Accused Nos.1 and 2 are not known. 2. Smt. Ganta. Sridevi, is requested to assist the Court as Legal Aid Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2. In this regard, the Secretary, High Legal Services Committee, is directed to issue necessary proceedings. 2 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 3. Heard the Legal Aid Counsel and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 4. The criminal revision case has been preferred by the de-facto complainant under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C’), challenging the judgment dated 13.02.2007 in Crl.A.No.40 of 2000 on the file of the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Vijayanagaram, allowing the criminal appeal by setting aside the judgment dated 31.03.2003 in C.C.No.227 of 2000 on the file of the learned I Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Vijayanagaram. 5. Sri Palaparthi Prabhakar, the learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the grounds of the revision, has submitted that the learned Appellate Court failed to see the evidence of P.W.1, who stated categorically about the cruelty and demand for additional dowry and that the evidence was supported by P.Ws.2 to 4 and 5, who are mediators and independent witnesses. It was also further submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the fact that on 19.03.2000, a mediation was held in which the respondent No.1 and 2 were present, and they demanded Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Only) and half of the property of the P.W.2. The judgment of the learned Appellate Court is perverse and suffers from illegality and urged to set aside it and uphold the conviction given by the learned Trial Court. 6. On the other hand, Ms. P. Akila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor/respondent No.3-State, vehemently argued that the learned 3 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 Appellate Court rightly appreciated the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution and disbelieved the evidence of P.W.1 and other witnesses who supported her and found that the judgment of the learned Trial Court was not consistent with the principles of ‘the Evidence Act 1872 (for brevity ‘the Act’) and set aside the conviction rightly, and urged to dismiss the revision case as there is no scope for re-appreciation of the evidence. 7. Sri. 7. Sri. Ganta Sridevi, the learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2, supports the judgment of the learned Appellate Court and submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution and disbelieved their evidence and acquitted the respondent Nos.1 and 2, and urged to dismiss the criminal revision case. 8. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, respondent Nos.1 and 2 and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 9. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.40 of 2003 dated 13.02.2007 passed by the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Vijayanagaram, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 10. While deciding a Criminal Revision Case filed against acquittal of accused, it is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari 4 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 Prasad Singh v State of Bihar1 wherein at Paragraph No.13 it is held as under: “13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla2 at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3, at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate 1(2002) 6 SCC 650 2AIR 1951 SC 196 3AIR 1962 SC 1788 5 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 13. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v Sarju Singh4, at paragraph Nos.7 and 8 it is held as under: “7. In revision, the learned Judge in the High Court went into the evidence very minutely. He questioned every single finding of the learned Sessions Judge and gave his own interpretation of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. He discounted the theory that the weapon of attack was a revolver and suggested that it might have been a shot gun or country made pistol which the villagers in the position of Kuldip and Sarju could not distinguish from a revolver. He then took up each single circumstance on which the learned Sessions Judge had found some doubt and interpreting the evidence de novo held, contrary to the opinion of the Sessions Judge that they were acceptable. All the time he appeared to give the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution. The only error of law which the learned Judge found in the Sessions Judge's judgment was a remark by the Sessions Judge that the defence witnesses who were examined by the police before they were brought as defence witness ought to have been cross-examined with reference to their previous statements recorded by the police, which obviously is against the provisions of the Code. Except for this error, no defect of procedure or of law was discovered by the learned judge of the High Court in his appraisal of the judgment of the Sessions Judge. As stated already by us, he seems to have gone into the matter as if an appeal against acquittal was before him making no distinction between the appellate and the revisional powers exercisable by the High Court in matters of acquittal except to the extent that instead of convicting the appellant he only ordered his retrial. In our opinion, the learned judge was clearly in error in proceeding as he did in a revision filed by a private party against the acquittal reached in the Court of Session. 8.The practice on the subject has been stated by this Court on more than one occasion, In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951 SCR 254 = (AIR 1951 SC 196), only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as 4AIR 1968 SC 707 6 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 = (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” 14. In Ram Kishan v. Harmit Kaur5, at paragraph No.9 it is held as under: “9. It is true that the High Court as an appellate Court can set aside an order of acquittal. In doing so, the High Court has to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The High Court is to consider the views of the trial Judge as to credibility of the witnesses. The High Court is also to keep in view the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the right of the accused to the benefit of doubt. Finally the High Court is to give reasons that the acquittal was not justified. The acquittal by the Sessions Judge cannot be said to be against the evidence 5AIR 1972 SC 468 7 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 or in disregard of evidence. Nor can the acquittal be said to be in violation of the principles of criminal jurisdiction.” 15. In Kotaiah v. G. Venkateshwara6, at paragraph Nos.19, 20 & 21 it is held as under: “19. We are of the opinion that the entire approach made by the High Court in dealing with the Criminal Revision filed against acquittal by the private party is contrary to the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above. Notwithstanding the fact that sub-section (4) of Section 439 does not authorise the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it has in fact contravened this provision by recording a finding of guilt against the accused and directing the Trial Court to convict them after a retrial. There is no question of lack of jurisdiction in the Trial Court to try the case; nor was any attack made that any evidence has been shut out at the trial. Whether the dying declaration, Ext. P. 15, by Ratnababu can be taken into account regarding the attack on Koteswara Rao, is a matter which the Trial Court was entitled to decide one way or the other. If its view was wrong, the High Court could have gone into that aspect and differed from this opinion of the Sessions Court if the State had filed an appeal against acquittal. Further the mere fact that the learned Trial Judge held that this piece of evidence is not relevant, while considering the attack on Koteswara Rao, does not amount to shutting out of evidence at the trial. In fact that evidence had already come on record. Therefore, in this case there has been no shutting out at the trial of any evidence which the prosecution wanted to adduce or the defence wanted to lead. All available evidence has been let in by both the prosecution and the accused. 20. Nor can it be stated that there has been any glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law and consequently leading to a flagrant miscarriage of justice. As mentioned earlier, sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction by an indirect method of ordering retrial when the High Court itself cannot directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. The High Court, in our opinion, has missed these very important limitations on its power to set aside the finding of acquittal in revision which could be done only in very exceptional circumstances. In the case on hand, the High Court was not justified in considering the evidence in such detail if it was really going to order a retrial. Such a detailed consideration of evidence and an expression of opinion about the guilt of the accused, in our opinion, has really loaded the dice against the accused when the 6AIR 1973 SC 1274 8 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 case goes back for retrial. Much stress has been laid by the High Court that though substantive charges had been framed against the accused read with Section 34 or alternatively with Section 149 I.P.C. the Trial Court has not recorded any finding in this regard. Here again, the High Court's view is erroneous. We have already referred to the finding recorded by the Trial Court that in view of the definite case of the prosecution and the nature of the evidence, none of the accused can be held constructively liable. It is on that ground that the Trial Court has not found the accused constructively guilty. 21. We have indicated the reasons, which promoted the High Court to order a retrial. The consequence of this will be to put considerable strain on the accused who have already gone through a trial at considerable stress and expense. After going through the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, we cannot certainly say, particularly in view of the evidence on record that either the acquittal of the twenty-two accused or the acquittal of the eight convicted accused of the rest of the charges was not justified. At any rate, it may be safely stated that the learned Sessions Judge has taken into account all the relevant circumstances. It may be that there are slight mistakes in some of the reasons given by him but the judgment asa whole shows that he has really applied his mind to the various pieces of evidence before passing the order of acquittal in the manner he has done. In the particular circumstances of this case, the interference in revision by the High Court at the instance of the private party was not justified. The two appeals filed by the convicted accused, namely, Criminal Appeals Nos. 201 and 202 of 1969 have not been dealt with by the High Court on merits. The appellants therein have a right to have those appeals heard and disposed of by the High Court according to law.” 16. In Akalu Ahirv. Ramdeo Ram7, at paragraph No.10 it is held as under: “10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a re-trial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court.” 7AIR 1973 SC 2145 9 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 17. In Ramesh Chandra v. A.P. Jhaveri8, at paragraph Nos.6 and 7 it is held as under: “6. In the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1963) 3 SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788) this Court mentioned the circumstances under which an order of acquittal can be set aside in revision by the High Court and observed in this context: "We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4)." It would follow from the above that where an acquittal is based on the compounding of an offence and the compounding is invalid under the law, the acquittal would be liable to be set aside by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers. As the acquittal of the appellant by the trial court in the present case was based upon the compounding of an offence which was not compoundable, the High Court in our view rightly set aside the acquittal of the appellant. 7. It is no doubt true that the High Court acted suo motu in setting aside the acquittal of the appellant, but that fact would not show that there was any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the High Court. The opening words of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, viz., "in the case of any proceedings the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders or which otherwise comes to its knowledge", as observed by this Court in the case of The State of Kerala v. Narayani Amma Kamala Devi, (1962) Supp 3 SCR 943 = (AIR 1962 SC 1530) produce the result that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court by being moved either by the convicted person himself or by any other person or suo motu on the basis of its own knowledge derived from any source whatsoever without being moved by any person at all. All that is necessary to bring the High Court's powers of revision into 8AIR 1973 SC 84 10 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 operation is such information as makes the High Court think that an order made by a Subordinate Court is fit for the exercise of its powersof revision.” 18. In Amar Chand v. Shanti Bose 9 at Paragraph No.20 it is held as under: “20. Even assuming that the High Court was exercising jurisdiction under Section 439, in our opinion, the present was not a case for interference by the High Court. The Jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised normally under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, only in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of the justice. The High Court has not found any of these circumstances to exist in the case before us for quashing the charge and the further proceedings.” 19. In SatyendraNath v. Ram Narain10 at Paragraph No.16 it is held as under: “16. The High Court has thus transgressed the narrow limits of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment of the Sessions Court did not suffer from any manifest illegality and the interests of justice did not require the High Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court. Any fair assessment of the evidence of the eye-witnesses would show that the acquittal of the appellants led to no miscarriage of justice.” 20. In Pathumma v. Muhammad11 at Paragraph No.6 it is held as under: “…We are afraid, the learned Judge of the High Court, committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence and coming to a finding that the appellant No. 2 was not the illegitimate child of the respondent. We have ourselves considered the evidence on record and we agree with the learned Magistrate, who had taken much pains in analysing the evidence, that the appellant No. 2 was the illegitimate child of the respondent. The High Court in its revisional jurisdiction was not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact.” 9AIR 1973 SC 799 10AIR 1975 SC 580 11AIR 1986 SC 1436 11 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 21. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case without there being any iota of re-appreciation of evidence by sitting like a Second Appellate Court. Therefore, appreciation of the evidence is not practically possible and feasible. 22. The learned Trial Court examined P.Ws.1 to 11 and marked Exs.P1 and P2 for the prosecution and Ex.D1 for defence. The learned Trial Court after examining both documentary and oral evidence of the prosecution thoroughly discussed the veracity of the evidence of the prosecution. The learned Trial Court believed the version of the witnesses of the prosecution and convicted the unofficial respondents. Whereas, the Appellate Court after thorough evaluation of the judgment of the learned Trial Court on re-appreciation of the evidence in the appeal found the unofficial respondents have not committed offence and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. 23. As seen from the impugned judgment, there is no material irregularity, no flagrant miscarriage of justice caused. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy and others 12, at Para No.12, held that in a revision case against acquittal, it is not permissible for the High Court to convert acquittal into one of conviction because it is clearly barred under sub- section (3) of Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C’. It is further held that although this Court has revisional power to examine whether there is any error of law or 12 (2002) 13 SCC 115 12 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 procedure etc., after giving its own findings on the findings recorded by the Court acquitting the accused and after setting aside the order of acquittal, the High Court has to remit the matter to the learned Trial Court or the first Appellate Court, as the case may be. 24. In fact, appreciation of the witnesses of the prosecution is not feasible and proper as per the Sections 397 and 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C’. On careful perusal of the judgment impugned of the learned Appellate Court, there are no material irregularities. There is no flagrant miscarriage of justice. No perverse findings. The impugned judgment of the learned Appellate Court is not illegal, invalid and unsustainable. Hence, this criminal revision case has to be dismissed. 25. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the criminal revision case is dismissed. 26. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 01.07.2025 KMS 13 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.619 of 2007 Dated 01.07.2025 193 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 619/2007 01.07.2025 W KMS