( 2025:HHC:29483 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr.MP(M) No:2040 of 2024 Reserved on: 22.08.2025 Decided on : 30.08.2025 __________________________________________________________ Heera Lal Mehto ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the petitioner : Mr. Anirudh Sharma & Mr. Pavinder, Advocates. For the respondents : Mr. Gobind Korla, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State. Ms. Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel, for victim-[X]. Ranjan Sharma, Judge Bail petitioner, Heera Lal Mehto, who is in custody since 19.05.2023, has come up before this Court, seeking regular bail under Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS'], originating from FIR No.15 of 2023, dated 13.04.2023, under Sections 363, 366, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 2 - 6 of the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [hereinafter referred to as 'POCSO Act'] registered at Women Police Station Baddi, District Solan, [HP]. FACTUAL MATRIX IN INSTANT BAIL PETITION: 2. Learned counsel for the bail petitioner states that a false case has been registered against the petitioner in which he has been arrested on 19.05.2023. It is further averred that the bail petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the offence. It is averred that the bail petitioner had moved an application for bail before the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Special Court [POCSO], Solan, District Solan, [H.P.] and the same was dismissed on 23.04.2024 [Annexure P-1] and thereafter bail petitioner has filed the second bail application before this Court i.e Cr.MP(M) No.1000 of 2024, which was withdrawn on 30.05.2024. [Annexure P-2]. It is averred that five PWs have been examined and deposition of PWs also reveal that no case is made out against the bail petitioner. It is ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 3 - further averred that trial is not likely to complete in the near future and shall take considerable time. It is further averred that there is no likelihood of the bail petitioner absconding or jumping over the bail and he undertakes to appear in the trial, as and when required to do so. Bail petitioner has given an undertaking that he shall not cause any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the case and shall not dissuade them in any manner shall not temper with the prosecution evidence in any manner. It is further averred that bail petitioner has no past criminal antecedents and he is ready and willing to furnish bail bonds and surety bonds as may be directed by this Court. It is averred in Para 13 of the bail petition that the bail petitioner will not leave the jurisdiction of this Court without the permission of the Court. Instant bail petition has been filed through his father, namely Satya Narayan Mehto, with the prayer for releasing the petitioner on bail. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT: ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 4 - 3. In the instant bail application notice was issued by this Court on 13.09.2024, directing the State Authorities to file the status report. Registry of this Court was directed to inform the victim of filing of instant bail application with the direction to file the objections, if so desired. The matter was listed on 30.09.2024, when, the victim was represented by a Legal Aid Counsel, who prayed for time to file objections to the bail application. The status report dated 29.09.2024 filed by the State Authorities was taken on the record and the copy of the same was supplied to Learned Counsel for the bail petitioner, who prayed for time to go through the status report and make submissions. On 24.10.2024, the victim filed the objections to the bail application and upon listing of the matter on 08.11.2024, the counsel for the bail petitioner prayed for time to file response to objections submitted by Learned Counsel for the victim. Since the petitioner did not file response to the objections, therefore, as prayed, the matter was adjourned on couple of occasions and on the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 5 - request of Learned Counsel(s) appearing for the parties, the matter was taken up on 10.01.2025 and then for 28.02.2025 after winter vacations. Upon listing of matter on 07.03.2025, Learned State Counsel stated that since trial had advanced therefore, a Fresh Status Report may be permitted to be filed in the instant matter. Accordingly, as prayed by Learned State Counsel filed Fresh Status Report dated 08.04.2025, was taken on record and the copy thereof was furnished to Learned Counsel for the petitioner, who prayed for an adjournment. Notably, in terms of earlier orders, the State Counsel prayed for time to place on record additional material to show age of the victim and these additional documents were placed on record by Learned State Counsel on 04.07.2025 and likewise Learned Counsel for the victim had also placed on record, some additional documents by way of an application. Accordingly, as prayed for by Learned Counsel for bail petitioner, time was granted to file response to additional documents which was duly filed, objecting that since the aforesaid documents ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 6 - were not part of Police Report/Challan, therefore, they could not be made the subject matter of instant proceedings and could not be looked into by this Court. Accordingly, the matter was finally heard and the judgment was reserved in the instant case. STAND OF THE STATE AUTHORITIES IN THE STATUS REPORT(S): 4. Perusal of the Status Report(s) dated 29.09.2024 and the Fresh Status Report dated 08.04.2025 contained pari materia averments. Perusal of Status Report(s) indicate that on 13.04.2023 the father of the victim had submitted a complaint to the police stating that he was residing along with his wife and two children in Village “X”, Near Sabzi Mandi, Baddi, in house of ‘XYZ’ and his daughter ‘H’ aged about 13 years had been missing since 07.04.2023 with averment that her daughter had been allured and enticed by an unknown person for which the matter may be investigated and action may be taken. 4(i). Pursuant to the complaint FIR No.15 of 2023 was registered on 13.04.2023 initially under ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 7 - Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and offences under Sections 366, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, were also added thereto lateron. 4(ii). Status report(s) indicate that on receipt of secret information, the police authorities went to Village “Y”, Noida, Sector 5, Uttar Pradesh along with complainant i.e. father of victim. After reaching the house of one “YA”, the bail petitioner-accused and the victim were traced by the police from a room in said house. Upon search, the victim narrated the entire story to the police stating that the bail petitioner had allured and brought her to this place under the pretext of marrying her and both resorted to unwarranted acts on various occasions. Status Report(s) further indicates that the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded by police, at the place/house, where the accused and the victim were found. Based on the statement and evidence recorded during investigation, the offences under Sections 366, 376 of the Indian Penal Code ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 8 - and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, were added and the bail petitioner was arrested on 19.05.2023. After his arrest he was taken for medical examination before CHC Baddi. Likewise, the victim was taken for medical examination before CHC Nalagarh by the police authorities. Status Report(s) further indicate that on 20.05.2023, the statement of victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded before Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nalagarh. Status Report(s) further indicate that upon medical examination, samples collected by medical experts were sent to SFSL Junga for analysis. 4(iii). Status Report(s) further indicates that during investigation the police collected the School Leaving Certificate and Admission & Withdrawal Register, which revealed the date of birth of the victim “H” as 26.07.2009. Status Report further indicates that after completing the investigation, the Police Report/Challan was presented before competent Court on the 12.06.2023 and Supplementary Challan dated 04.12.2023 was also ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 9 - submitted before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Special Court [POCSO], Solan, District Solan. Status Report indicates that 26 PWs were to be examined by prosecution, out of which 15 PWs, were examined on the date of submitting the Fresh Status Report. However, upon listing of case today, Learned State Counsel submits that as on day 20 PWs have been examined. In this background the State had submitted the status report for consideration of this Court. 5. Heard Mr. Anirudh Sharma & Mr. Pavinder, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Gobind Korla, Learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1 as well as Ms. Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel for the victim and have gone through the available material on record. MANDATE OF LAW ON BAIL: 6. Broad parameters have been mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regulating the claim for bail in the cases of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia versus State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565, Ram Govind ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 10 - Upadhyay versus Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar versus Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar versus Ashish Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496; reiterated in P. Chidambaram versus Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24, Sushila Aggarwal versus State- NCT Delhi, (2020) 5 SCC 01; CBI versus Santosh Karnani (2023) 6 SCALE 250; which have been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana versus Dharamraj, 2023 SCC Online SC 1085, that after taking into account the accusation, gravity, status, position in society claim for bail is to be examined. While considering claim for bail, allegations being frivolous or groundless is to be seen. Depending upon the facts of each case, the bail can be refused, in case, prima facie case or reasonable grounds exits and if an offence is serious. Severity of punishment including reasonable apprehension of fleeing away from investigation and trial and the character, past antecedents, behavior, means, position and standing ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 11 - of an accused; likelihood of offence being repeated; reasonable apprehension based on cogent and convincing material that the accused may thereafter threaten the witnesses or the victim may be examined and danger of justice being thwarted by grant of bail etc. are relevant factors for denying the concession of bail. It is mandated that bail can neither be by way of a punishment nor can it be preventative, as prolonged incarceration or accusation curtails the personal liberty of an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, while examining the claim for bail, a balance has to be carved between the personal liberty of an accused under Article 21, vis-à-vis the rights of victim and societal interests also. 6(i). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 3840 of 2023, Saumya Churasia versus Directorate of Enforcement, decided on 14.12.2023 held that the claim for bail, is to be examined by a Court, without delving into the evidence on merits but by forming a prima-facie opinion on totality ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 12 - of facts in the light of broad-parameters referred to above. 6(ii). While dealing with the claim for bail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the principles for grant of bail in Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528–3534 of 2025 (Arising from SLP (Crl.) Nos. 516–522 of 2025), in State of Karnataka versus Sri Darshan, etc. has mandated that while considering claim for bail neither a detailed examination of the evidence nor any findings touching the merits of the case is to be resorted to. In backdrop of above parameters, this Court proceeds to analyze the claim for bail in the instant case. ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FOR BAIL IN INSTANT CASE: 7. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances and the material on record as is borne out from the status report(s), this Court is of the considered view, that the bail petitioner [Heera Lal Mehto], is entitled to be enlarged on bail, ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 13 - for the following reasons: PRIMA FACIE ACCUSATION AGAINST BAIL PETITIONER DOUBTFUL: 7(i). Status Report(s) indicate that pursuant to complaint dated 13.04.2023 submitted by father of the victim, the police authorities went to village “Y”, Noida, Sector 5, Uttar Pradesh and found the bail petitioner and the victim in a Room on 17.04.2023. Status report(s) and material on record indicate that the victim herself stated that on being called by petitioner-accused, she sent to the place asked for wherefrom she went with the petitioner to place “Y” at Noida, where the petitioner herein resorted to wrongful acts during her stay at Village “Y”, [Noida in UP]. The victim narrated to the police that even earlier she had relations with the bail petitioner and both had resorted to unwarranted/ uncalled for acts during her stay at Village ‘X’ [in H.P.], being neighbourers, when, her parents went away for job. Perusal of Status Report(s) indicate that ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 14 - once the victim had relations with bail petitioner during their stay at ‘X’ [in H.P.] and later on after being taken to “Y” at Noida [in U.P] and these facts were neither resisted nor brought to the notice of either the parents or the police then, prima facie accusation appears to be doubtful, at this stage. In these circumstances, since the trial is underway, the accusation under Sections 363, 366, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, is to be examined, tested and proved during the trial and bail cannot be denied by presuming the guilt at this stage. CONTENTION REGARDING AGE-DATE OF BIRTH: 8. Learned Counsel for petitioner states that once the Radiologist has given the age of the victim to be between 13½ years to 17 years, and there is margin of error of two years on either side and based on this, it is contended that the ‘victim’ does not fall within the ambit of POCSO Act and the accusation under Section 5 of the Act was uncalled ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 15 - for. The above contention is misconceived for the reasons, firstly, that the perusal of the Status Report dated 07.04.2025 indicates that during the course of investigation, the Police Authorities have procured the School Leaving Certificate and Admission & Withdrawal Register revealing the age of the victim to be 26.07.2009 and based on Section 94(2)(i) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the age borne out from the birth certificate from School has precedence over other certificates, i.e. records-certificates under Section 94(2)(ii) and it is only, in absence of the Certificate(s) in Clause 94(2)(i) and 94(2)(ii) that the ossification test can be made basis for determining the age of the victim. In this background, in instant case once the age based on School Certificate as in Section 94(2)(i) is available, then, the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that the report of the Radiologist and the margin of error of two years thereupon should be extended in favour of the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 16 - accused and against the victim does not hold good; secondly, based on the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 772 of 2025, Dilip Paswan @ Dilip Kumar and others versus State of Bihar and others, decided on 17.02.2025 and the facts of instant case, the plea for determination of age-date of birth could only be examined by the trial Court concerned and no definite opinion with respect to the age of the victim- girl can be formed in bail proceedings, as under:- 5. As may be seen, the solitary issue that arises for consideration is whether the victim girl – daughter of respondent no.4 was minor as on 06.03.2021 when the alleged marriage in a temple is claimed to have been solemnized? If so, what is the legal effect of the statement made by her on 17.08.2021 to the effect that she was 17 years old only? and whether she could willfully marry appellant no.1? 6. The appellants rely upon some documents, including the alleged matriculation certificate of the victim girl. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned State counsel and are satisfied that no definite opinion with respect to the age of the victim girl can be formed in these proceedings. It would be in the interest of justice to direct the Investigating Officer of FIR No.128/2021, Police Station Gaunaha, Bihar to hold further investigation in the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 17 - matter and submit a supplementary report, if so required, before the Trial Magistrate only with respect to the age of the victim girl as on 06.03.2021. Learned Judicial Magistrate shall consider such report and the necessary consequences will follow. 8(i). While dealing with the issue regarding birth/age of the victim, the birth certificate from the school shall have precedence over the birth certificate given by the Corporation or the Municipal Authority or Panchayat. It is, only in case, the birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate is not available then the birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority or Panchayat is to be resorted to. Moreover, in absence of birth certificate or in case of non-availability of birth certificate as referred to above, then only, the ossification test under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is to be believed in view of the provisions of Section 94 (2) (i) (ii) & (iii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The principles for determining the age of a Child, [being major] has ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 18 - been outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rishipal Singh Solanki versus State of U.P., (2022) 8 SCC 602 and then in P.Yuvaprakash versus State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846 and recently in Criminal Appeal No.603 of 2025 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.11233 of 2022), titled Rajni versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., decided on 20.05.2025 in the following terms:- 25. Section 94 deals with presumption and determination of age. Section 94 reads thus: 94. Presumption and determination of age.— (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under Section 14 or Section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 19 - examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person. 25.1. Thus the process of age determination is provided in sub-section (2) of Section 94 which is identical to the procedure prescribed under sub- rule (3) of Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007. Sub- section (2) of Section 94 says that to undertake the process of age determination, the child welfare committee or the JJB shall seek evidence in the following manner: (i) the date of birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned Board, if available; (ii) in the absence thereof, the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) in the absence of (i) and (ii), the age shall be determined by an ossification test or by any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the child welfare committee or the JJB. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 20 - necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Evidence Act viz. Section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015. 8(iii). The contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that admissible margin of error of two years may be granted over and above the report of Radiologist showing age to be between 13½ years to 17 years cannot be gone into in bail proceedings as per the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dilip Paswan @ Dilip Kumar (supra). In addition, once the age-date of birth of victim as borne out from School Certificate, collected by Police during investigation, reveals the age-date of birth of victim ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 21 - to be 26.07.2009, then this record has precedence under Section 94(2)(i), over the other Certificates under Section 94(2)(ii) and also over the ossification test under Section 94(2)(iii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. In this background, the plea of two years margin is untenable in these proceedings in facts of instant case. However, this Court leaves it open for Learned Trial Court to test and examine such plea, if raised, in accordance with law. INFRINGMENT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: 9. While reiterating the principle that bail is a rule and jail is an exception and no accused can be deprived of personal liberty on mere accusation and an accused is to be treated as innocent in the eyes of law, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has outlined the object of bail, in Guddan alias Roop Narayan Versus State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1242, in the following terms:- “11. In the case of Sanjay Chandra V. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40, while hearing a bail Application in a case of ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 22 - an alleged economic offence, this court held that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. It was observed as under: "21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. 23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson. 25. 25. The provisions of Cr PC confer discretionary jurisdiction on criminal courts to grant bail to the accused pending trial or in appeal against convictions; since the jurisdiction is discretionary, it has to be exercised with great care and caution by balancing ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 23 - the valuable right of liberty of an individual and the interest of the society in general. In our view, the reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge, which is affirmed by the High Court, in our opinion, is a denial of the whole basis of our system of law and normal rule of bail system. It transcends respect for the requirement that a man shall be considered innocent until he is found guilty. If such power is recognised, then it may lead to chaotic situation and would jeopardise the personal liberty of an individual. 27. This Court, time and again, has stated that bail is the rule and committal to jail an exception. It has also observed that refusal of bail is a restriction on the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution." 12. Further, in the case of Sandeep Jain v. National Capital Territory of Delhi, (2000) 2 SCC 66, this Court, while hearing a bail application held that conditions for grant of bail cannot become so onerous that their existence itself is tantamount to refusal of bail. This Court held as under: "We are unable to appreciate even the first order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate imposing the onerous condition that an accused at the FIR stage should pay a huge sum of Rs. 2 lakhs to be set at liberty. If he had paid it is a different matter. But the fact that he was not able to pay that amount and in default thereof he is to languish in jail for more than 10 months now, is sufficient indication that he was unable to make up the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 24 - amount. Can he be detained in custody endlessly for his inability to pay the amount in the range of Rs.2 lakhs? If the cheques issued by his surety were dishonoured, the Court could perhaps have taken it as a ground to suggest to the payee of the cheques to resort to the legal remedies provided by law. Similarly if the Court was dissatisfied with the conduct of the surety as for his failure to raise funds for honouring the cheques issued by him, the Court could have directed the appellant to substitute him with another surety. But to keep him in prison for such a long period, that too in a case where bail would normally be granted for the offences alleged, is not only hard but improper. It must be remembered that the Court has not even come to the conclusion that the allegations made in the FIR are true. That can be decided only when the trial concludes, if the case is charge-sheeted by the police." GRANT OF BAIL BY HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN IDENTICAL CASES: 10. While dealing with the claim for bail originating from F.I.R. under Sections 363, 366-A, 342, 376-D of IPC and under Sections 5g, 51 and 6 of POCSO Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 3931/2022, Ankit versus The State of Rajasthan, decided on 15.12.2022 has enlarged the accused on bail, ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 25 - taking into account the facts that chargesheet was filed, trial has commenced and the accused was behind the bars for almost 2 years and 4 months, in the following terms: This is a petition seeking bail. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposes the petition. Taking into consideration the nature of allegations and further that the chargesheet is filed and the trial has commenced and the petitioner is behind the bars for almost two and a half years, we are inclined to allow the prayer for bail. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to be released on bail in connection with FIR No. 123/2020 dated 06.04.2020 registered at Police Station Sadar Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar, Rajasthan, on such terms and conditions as may be deemed fit and appropriate by the learned Trial Judge. The special leave petition is, accordingly, disposed of Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. 10(i). While dealing with a similar fact-situation coupled with the aspect of consensual relationship and prolonged incarceration of about six months, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2024 SCC Online SC 2709, titled Deshraj alias Musa v. State of Rajasthan and Another, decided on 21.11.2024 ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 26 - has allowed the concession to the petitioner therein in following terms: “4. The appellant/accused was arrested on 08.05.2024 and the chargesheet was filed before the POCSO Court, Sikar on 05.06.2024. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant has been in jail since May, 2024 that in fact he was only eighteen and a half years at that time of the alleged commission of the offence whereas the victim was about sixteen years, that there was a consensual relationship between the parties. The chargesheet was filed on 05.06.2024 and there are as many as twelve witnesses to be examined; that the trial will be prolonged and having regard to the fact that the parties were in a consensual relationship, the High Court was not right in sustaining the order of rejection of bail by the Trial Court. 12. Considering the facts on record, in our view, the case for bail is made out.” BAIL GRANTED BY THIS COURT IN IDENTICAL FACTS-SITUATION:- 11. While dealing with the claim for bail in case of accusation under Section 376 IPC read with Section 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, Coordinate Benches of this Court have enlarged the accused on bail, taking into account the prolonged incarceration and the fact that the accused had no past criminal history and the fact that the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 27 - detention cannot be by way of punishment and other grounds in the following cases:- 11(i). In Cr.MP(M) No.2409 of 2023, titled Naveen Thapa v. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 28.09.2023, the Co-ordinate Bench held as under: 14.1. As per the complainant, on 26th January, 2023, the child victim had gone to the school to participate in the Republic Day Function, but, did not turn back. Efforts were made to search her, but, she was not found. According to her, the child victim is having mobile phone No. XXX (details withheld). It was apprehended by the complainant, in the complaint, that the child victim has been enticed away by some one and a prayer was made to take action. 14.6. Thereafter, the child victim was produced before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahaul & Spiti, for recording her statement, under Section 164 CrPC. In the said statement, she has alleged against applicant-Naveen Thapa, by saying that he had ravished her, upon which, the provisions of Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act were added. 16. The applicant, in this case, has annexed the statements of the child victim, as well as, her mother (complainant), who have been examined as PW-2 and PW1, respectively, before the learned trial Court. Perusal of the said statement shows that both of them have not supported the case of the prosecution. 20. The bail application cannot be rejected as a matter of punishment, as, the accused is presumed to be innocent, till the conclusion of the trial. The dismissal of the bail application is nothing, but, punishing the applicant before the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 28 - conclusion of the trial, which is prohibited under the law. 21. At the time of deciding the bail application, the detailed discussion of the evidence, so collected and produced by the prosecution, should be avoided, as, it may cause prejudice either to the case of the prosecution or to the case of the accused (applicant). 22. However, it can be considered, at this stage, that the star witnesses of the prosecution have already been examined, as such, the apprehension of the allurement of the witnesses can be said to be unfounded, at this stage. Even otherwise, for those apprehensions, reasonable conditions can be imposed on the applicant, in case, he is ordered to be released on bail. 23. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. 11(ii). In Cr.MP(M) No.459 of 2024, titled Abhishek Chauhan v. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 29.04.2024, the Co-ordinate Bench held as under: 4. The victim/daughter informed the father that the petitioner had taken her to his rented accommodation. At the rented accommodation according to the victim/daughter, the bail petitioner had sexually abused the victim. 5. The bail petitioner was arrested on 25.12.2023. In the case at hand, Challan has been presented on 30.01.2024. As per the status report, the SFSL report is still awaited. The date of birth of the victim/daughter is 19.01.2009. Therefore, ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 29 - on the date of incident, she was approximately 15 years of age. As per status report, age of the petitioner is about 18 years. 6. At the time of deciding the bail application, a detailed discussion of the evidence, so collected, produced by the prosecution should be avoided as it may cause prejudice either to the case of the prosecution or to the case of the accused/bail petitioner. 7. From the perusal of the facts, it is evident that the victim has nowhere alleged that the petitioner has used force or deceit or any other alike means to take her to his rented accommodation. The same is being noticed only to assess gravity, seriousness of allegations against the petitioner. Real life considerations, when the victim and the accused are at an age of innocence, as in the case at hand, cannot be lost sight of and an innocent though un-holy “physical alliance” may be looked at with less severity. 8. POCSO Act does not impose any special prohibition for grant of bail in offence(s) committed under the Act, rather Section 31 thereof 3 makes provisions of Cr.P.C. including provisions as to bail and bonds applicable to the proceedings therein. 9. Petitioner is in custody since 25.12.2023. The trial is going to take time before conclusion. The charges against the petitioner are yet to be proved. Pre-trial incarceration is not the rule. No past criminal history has been attributed to the petitioner. Further detention of the petitioner in judicial custody will not serve any fruitful purpose rather may prove pre- judicial to the rights of the petitioner, who is in early years of life. 10. Petitioner is a permanent resident Village Dhar Bharaingi, Post Office Jehar, Tehsil ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 30 - Pachhad, District Sirmour, HP and the respondent/State has not expressed in any apprehension regarding his fleeing from course of justice and adversely affecting the trial. In any case, petitioner can be put to the terms for the purpose of safe, secure and unobstructed completion of trial. 11. Needless to say, object of bail is to secure attendance of the accused in the trial and the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question, whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to face the trial. Otherwise, bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. Bail is normal rule and the jail is an exception. 12. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances of the case, application is allowed and petitioner is ordered to be released on bail. 11(iii). In Cr.MP(M) No.1477 of 2025, titled Mohit Sharma @ Moti v. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 06.08.2025, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court held as under: 3. Brief facts giving rise to the case at hand are that on 20.10.2023, the maternal uncle of the victim, in the case at hand, had filed a complaint before Police Station, Baddi. In the same, it was informed that the victim, in the case at hand, is aged about 17 years old and she has been living with the complainant, i.e., maternal uncle, after having completed her matriculation. On 26.09.2023 at about 6:00 a.m., when all the family members were sleeping, the victim was found missing. All efforts to search her proved futile. The complainant suspected foul-play on the part of the present petitioner. ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 31 - 5. Speedy trial is one of the facets of right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Speedy trial is an essential ingredient of “reasonable, fair and just” procedure guaranteed by Article 21 and it is the constitutional obligation of the State to device such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial to the Accused. 7. While deciding an application for bail, Court should refrain from evaluating or undertaking a detailed assessment of evidence, which has the potential to prejudice either the case of the prosecution or the defence, is undesirable. 8. The consequences of pre-trial incarceration are grave. A person in incarceration is subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail. Further, a jailed individual is prevented from contributing to the preparation of his defence. The burden of his detention falls heavily on the innocent members of his family. 9. From the status report, so filed, it is evident that the petitioner does not have criminal antecedents. There is no possibility of flight risk in the case at hand. Personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right. The same is to be curtailed only when it becomes imperative, according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 12. Hence, after going through the material available on record and considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the present is a fit case where judicial discretion to admit the petitioner on bail is required to be exercised in his favour. Accordingly, the bail application is allowed and it is ordered that the petitioner, who has been arrested by the police, in FIR No.44 of 2023, dated ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 32 - 20.10.2023, registered at Women Police Station, Baddi, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, shall be forthwith released on bail, subject to his furnishing personal bond to the tune of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) with one local surety in the like amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. 11(iv). While dealing with the claim for bail in background of Section 35(2) of the POCSO Act, 2012, in Cr.MP(M) No. 1887 of 2025, titled as Dhananjay Kumar versus State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 20.08.2025, it has been mandated that the trial shall be completed by Special Court, as far as possible, within a period of one year from the date of taking cognizance of an offence, in the following terms: 1. Bail petitioner, namely Dhananjay Kumar, who is behind the bars since 24.02.2024, has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Section 483 BNSS, 2023, for grant of regular bail in case FIR No.3 of 2024, dated 07.02.2024, under Sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act, registered at WPS Baddi, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. 9. In the case at hand, Challan was filed on 18.04.2024 and supplementary Challan was filed on 29.06.2024, if it is so, trial ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 33 - was required to be concluded before 30.06.2025, in terms of Section 35 of the POCSO Act. In the instant case, charge- sheet was framed on 25.10.2024. After framing of charge, though dates repeatedly came to be fixed for recording the statement of prosecution witnesses, but fact remains that till date, not even a single prosecution witness has been examined. 11. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 35(2) of the POCSO Act, 2012, which reads as under: “35. Period for recording of evidence of child and disposal of case.— (1) The evidence of the child shall be recorded within a period of thirty days of the Special Court taking cognizance of the offence and reasons for delay, if any, shall be recorded by the Special Court. (2) The Special Court shall complete the trial, as far as possible, within a period of one year from the date of taking cognizance of the offence. 11.1. As per aforesaid provision of the Act, Special Court is under obligation to complete the trial, as far as possible, within a period of one year from the date of taking cognizance of the offence and in the case at hand, as has been noticed hereinabove, Challan was filed on 18.04.2024 and charge was framed on 25.10.2024, but till date, what to talk about conclusion of trial within a period of one year, not even a single prosecution witness has been examined. As per Section 35(1) of the POSCO Act, the evidence of the child shall be recorded within a period of thirty days of the Special Court taking cognizance of the offence and reasons for delay, if any, shall be recorded by the Special Court, ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 34 - however, in the instant case, statement of child-victim is yet to be recorded. 12. Though there appears to be some dispute with regard to age of the accused, but there was no bar, if any, for the trial Court to record the statement of child-victim within the specified period of thirty days, from the date it took cognizance of the offence. For the non-compliance of the provisions contained in Section 35 of the Act, as detailed hereinabove, prayer made on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be considered. Based on the statutory provisions of Section 35(2) of the POCSO Act and in facts of instant case, once the F.I.R. was registered on 19.05.2023 and the Police Report/Challan was presented before the Competent Court on 20.12.2023 and the charge was framed by Learned Special Court on 15.02.2024 and the trial has not concluded within the mandatory period of one year, therefore, keeping in view the intent of speedy trial in Article 21 and the statutory provisions of Section 35(2) of the POCSO Act and the judgement passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Dhananjay Kumar (supra), this Court is of the considered view that non-completion of trial, in terms of the statute cannot deter this Court from denying bail ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 35 - and prolonging incarceration in the instant case. Accordingly, based on this ground, coupled with other grounds as discussed in the judgement, the prayer for bail is accepted. PERSONAL LIBERTY AND CLAIM FOR BAIL: 12. While dealing with the concept of bail the personal liberty of an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held in Criminal Appeal No.2787 of 2024, titled as Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh versus State of Maharashtra and Another, in the following terms:- “18 Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations. 19 If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 36 - have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. 20 We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be. 21 We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency as well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 22 In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.” ADHERANCE TO PRINCIPLE:- BAIL IS RULE: 13. Depriving the petitioner of the concession of bail shall negate the principle that ‘bail is a rule and jail is an exception’, as outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Manish Sisodia vs Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Criminal) No.8781 of 2024, as under:- “49. We find that, on account of a long period of incarceration running for around 17 months and the trial even not having been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial. ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 37 - 50. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial of these rights, the trial court as well as the High Court ought to have given due weightage to this factor. 52. The Court also reproduced the observations made in Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), which read thus: “10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240. We quote: “What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]: “I observe that in this case bail was refused for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the, magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial”” 53. The Court further observed that, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 38 - to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”. 55. As observed by this Court in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), the objective to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal is to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial. 56. In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots in the society. There is no possibility of him fleeing away from the country and not being available for facing the trial. In any case, conditions can be imposed to address the concern of the State. 57. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned ASG regarding the possibility of tampering the evidence is concerned, it is to be noted that the case largely depends on documentary evidence which is already seized by the prosecution. As such, there is no possibility of tampering with the evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard to influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said concern can be addressed by imposing stringent conditions upon the appellant.” PROLONGED INCARCERATION & INFRINGMENT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 14. While reiterating the grant of bail, despite statutory embargoes in Special Enactments, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.5266 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 13870 of 2024, titled as Partha Chatterjee Versus Directorate of Enforcement, decided on 13.12.2024, ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 39 - 2024 SCC Online SC 3729, has been reiterated, by treating the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to be of paramount importance and action of prolonging the incarceration so as to make such incarceration punitive has been deprecated by granting bail. Prolonged detention of petitioner, in facts of this case, shall certainly amount to depriving and curtailing the personal liberty of the petitioner on mere accusation or conjectures or surmises, which are yet to be tested, examined and proved during the trial. Detention of the petitioner can neither be punitive nor preventative, so as to make the petitioner to taste imprisonment as a lesson. Denial of bail shall certainly violate the principle that “bail is rule and jail is an exception”. Even, the State Authorities, have failed to ensure speedy trial and still considerable time is likely to be taken for conclusion of trial, and therefore, the claim of the petitioner for bail carries weight. NO PAST CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS: ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 40 - 15. Learned Counsel for the bail petitioner asserts that the petitioner has no past criminal antecedents. The status report does not indicate any past criminal antecedents and, therefore, in view of these facts, the present accusation which is yet to be tested, examined and proved during the trial, cannot be made the basis for prolonging the incarceration of the bail petitioner in facts of in the instant case. NOTHING ADVERSARIAL REGARDING TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE OR WITNESSES ETC: 16. Status Reports filed by State Authorities have neither pointed out cogent and convincing material revealing adversarial circumstances that after release on bail, the petitioner is likely to tamper with evidence or may cause inducement, threat or promise to any person or persons acquainted with the facts of the case. However, the apprehension if any, of the State Authorities are being safeguarded, by imposing stringent conditions in this bail order. ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 41 - NOTHING ADVERSARIAL REGARDING OBSTRUCTING OR ATTEMPTING TO THWARTLING JUSTICE : 17. Status Reports filed by State Authorities have neither pointed out any adversarial circumstances nor placed on record any cogent and convincing material on record to infer that after release on bail, the petitioner may obstruct or thwart the cause of justice in any manner. In absence of any cogent and convincing material, the plea for bail, deserves to be granted to the petitioner, in the instant case. NOTHING ADVERSARIAL LIKELIHOOD OF FLEEING AWAY FROM TRIAL OR JURISDICTION OF COURT: 18. In order to safeguard the rights of bail petitioner and to take care of apprehensions of State that bail petitioner may flee away [notwithstanding the fact that no such apprehension has been pointed out in Status Report] yet, in peculiar facts of this case, this Court stringent conditions in the bail orders, in later part of this order. ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 42 - OBJECTIONS BY VICTIM THROUGH FATHER CANNOT BE SOLE BASE FOR PROLONGING INCARCERATION: 19. Learned Counsel for the victim has objected to the grant of bail on the ground that the bail petitioner may threaten the victim/complainant or the family members of the victim. Mere apprehension that the bail petitioner may temper with the evidence or threaten the complainant or her family or the victim appears to be misconceived and without merit, at this stage, in view of the fact, that the trial is underway, wherein, out of 26 PWs 20 PWs have already been examined by the Trial Court. Even the testimony of victim, complainant and other material witnesses have already been recorded by the trial Court. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view, that the balance has to be carved out between the rights of the accused vis-à-vis rights of the victim and the societal interest also. No cogent and convincing material has been placed on record by the objector that since the date of arrest of the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 43 - accused [directly or indirectly] has caused any inducement or threat either to the complainant or the victim or the family members. A bald assertion, without any cogent and convincing material cannot be the sole basis for denying bail. At the same time, the apprehension, if any, can be taken care of by this Court by imposing stricter/stringent conditions in the bail order, which are being imposed in later part of this order. CONCLUSION: 20. In the facts of instant case, the plea of petitioner for bail carries weight, for the reason, that firstly, prima facie prosecution story appears to be highly doubtful and improbable at this stage as discussed hereinabove; and secondly, the Status Report reveals that the bail petitioner is in custody since 19.05.2023 and is undergoing incarceration for about two years and three months; and thirdly, conclusion of trial is likely to take considerable time, when out of total 26 PWs, Learned State Counsel states that 20 PWs have been examined and the trial ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 44 - is still likely to take considerable time; and fourthly, delay in trial is not attributable to the petitioner; and fifthly, the bail petitioner- accused is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty; and sixthly, the continued detention can neither be punitive nor preventative ; and seventhly, continued detention in guise of penalizing the petitioner by presuming guilt cannot be permitted; and eighthly, even the State Authorities have not placed any cogent and convincing material that after release on bail there is possibility of accused fleeing away from trial or an accused is likely to threaten witnesses or is likely to thwart justice; and ninthly, even the State Authorities have not placed anything on record to show that petitioner has misused liberty granted to him earlier; and tenthly, the accusation is yet to be tested, examined and proved during the trial; and eleventhly, the denial of the right of speedy trial as mandated in Article 21 and in Section 35(2) of the POCSO Act are also an added factor for granting bail when delay in completion of trial is not attributable to the petitioner herein; ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 45 - and lastly, in order to safeguard the right of bail petitioner and the victim vis-à-vis the interests of the State, this Court imposes stringent condition in this order hereinafter mandating that infraction, violation or misuse of the concession-liberty, shall entitle the State Authorities to seek cancellation of the concession extended to the petitioner. Denial of bail shall deprive and curtail the sacrosanct fundamental rights of personal liberty and right of speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India of the petitioner at this stage. On totality of facts and circumstances and the mandate of law, referred to above, the claim of the petitioner [Heera Lal Mehto] for enlargement on bail carries weight, in peculiar facts-situation of this case, as discussed above. DIRECTIONS: 21. Based on the above discussion and the material on record and the mandate of law and for the reasons recorded hereinabove and in peculiar facts of case, the instant petition is allowed; ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 46 - and the State Authorities are directed to release the petitioner [Heera Lal Mehto] on bail, subject to the observance of following conditions:- (i) Respondent-State Authorities shall release bail petitioner [Heera Lal Mehto] on furnishing personal bond of Rs.50,000/- each {Rupees Fifty Thousand each} with two sureties in the like amount out of whom one surety shall be resident of State of Himachal Pradesh and other surety shall be of his permanent place of residence in Uttar Pradesh to the satisfaction of Learned Trial Court; (ii) Petitioner shall undertake to appear in the trial hereinafter, except for his medical exigencies and the exemption granted therefore, if any, in accordance with law; (iii) Based on Para 13 of the bail application, the bail petitioner shall not leave the jurisdiction of this Court without the permission of Trial Court. (iv) Petitioner shall abide by all or any other condition(s), which may be imposed by the Learned Trial Court, in view of this order; (v) Petitioner shall neither involve himself nor shall abet the commission of any offence hereinafter. Involvement in any offence whatsoever or abetting thereof shall entail automatic cancellation of bail granted in terms of this order ; (vi) Petitioner shall disclose his functional E-Mail IDs/ WhatsApp number and that of his surety to the Learned Trial Court; ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 47 - (vii) Petitioner after release, shall report to Investigating Officer or SHO of Police Station (as in para iii) supra concerned, on 2nd Sunday of every month at 11.00 a.m., only for having an update on good conduct and behaviour; (viii) Petitioner shall not jump over the bail and also shall not leave the country without the prior information of the Court; (ix) Petitioner shall not tamper with the evidence in any manner; (x) Petitioner shall not cause any inducement, threat or promise {directly or indirectly} to witnesses or the victim or any other person acquainted with the case; (xi) Bail petitioner directly or indirectly shall not make any attempts to re-associate with the victim girl in any manner either through a device or in-person; (xii) Petitioner is free to seek modification of any condition contained hereinabove, if need arises; (xiii) Learned Trial Court can impose any other condition, if so desires, to ensure the presence and effective progress of trial hereinafter; (xiv) State Authorities are free to move this Court for seeking alteration/modification of any of the condition contained in this order or any condition imposed by the Learned Trial Court as a sequel to this order, in fact situation of instant case or circumstances so necessitate, at any time herein-after; (xv) State Authorities are free to move this Court for seeking cancellation of the ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 48 - concession of bail, in case, the petitioner violates any of the conditions contained in this order.; 22. Observations made in this judgment shall not be construed in any manner as an indictive of findings, for or against the parties herein, either for the purpose of investigation or for trial, which shall proceed in-accordance with law, irrespective of any of the observations contained hereinabove. 23. Petitioner is permitted to produce/use copy of this order, downloaded from the web-page of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist for production of a certified copy, but if required, may verify about the passing of this order from the Website of this Court. 24. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to Superintendent of Police, Chapra [Saran], Bihar as well as Superintendent of Police, Solan, District Solan, [H.P.], for information and with the direction to intimate the concerned SHO including Women Police Station, Baddi, [H.P.] to keep an update ( 2025:HHC:29483 ) - 49 - on good conduct and behaviour of the bail petitioner [Heera Lal Mehto] in terms of this order. In aforesaid terms, the instant petitioner and all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (Ranjan Sharma) August 30, 2025 Judge [tm/Shivender] Digitally signed by TARUN MAHAJAN DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA, Phone= 887aba774dfe8f4f3e95a41c7aa2abacb4ecee8f82e fd8f56ec39f8e6b442b68, PostalCode=171001, S= Himachal Pradesh, SERIALNUMBER= 3ff6ebe501e8d7c8d73d0e5a5294bacca3f198d7d6 6b105bbf507179673109f5, CN=TARUN MAHAJAN Reason: I am the author of this document Location: 12345678 Date: 2025.08.30 19:23:50+05'30' Foxit PDF Reader Version: 2023.2.0 TARUN MAHAJAN