IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CMPMO No. 430 of 2025 Decided on: 01.08.2025 ____________________________________________________ Ami Chand and others ……….. petitioners Versus Nika Ram ……….respondent ___________________________________________________ Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the petitioner : Vikrant Chandel, Advocate. For the respondents : Nemo. ____________________________________________________ Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) The present petition has been preferred laying challenge to the impugned judgment dated 20.06.2025 passed by the 1st Appellate Court in an appeal preferred under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC against an order dated 22.10.2024 passed by the Civil Judge, Court No.-II, Mandi District Mandi on an application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC by the present respondent, which was allowed by the Trial Court and parties were directed to maintain status quo qua nature, possession, construction and interference in the land comprised under Khasra Nos. 955, 954, 928 situated at Mohal at Muhal Dadour, Tehsil Balh, Distcirt Mandi (suit land). The appeal so preferred against the order dated 22.10.2024 passed by the trial Court has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and the order passed by the trial Court has been affirmed and upheld. 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2. Heard counsel for the petitioners. Perused the impugned judgment and the pleadings appended alongwith. 3. The suit land in the case at hand comprises of three Khasra numbers namely 955, 954 and 928. From a perusal of the first Appellate court judgment (specifically para 14 thereof), it is evident that the controversy before the 1st Appellate Court was only limited to Khasra No. 955 by the counsels appearing for the contesting parties. 4. At the very outset, a reference to the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in case titled Wander Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 would be highly instructive as the same delineates the scope of interference by the 1st Appellate Court in an appeal against discretion (appeal on principle). Relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow for a ready reference:- “…...14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where they had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reasonably possible on the material. The appellate Court would normally not with justified in interfering with the exercise of 3 discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadker, J.in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. Vs. Pothan Joseph. (SCR 721). ….These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton ‘…. the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that 2arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case.” 5. From a perusal of the revenue record produced before the trial Court appended alongwith the present petition as Annexure P-1, it is evident that qua Khasra No. 955, parties to the lis have been recorded as Gair Marusi tenants. The record of rights carries with it a presumption of truth. Hence prima facie, there exists no material record to show that the parties to the lis have acquired ownership rights qua khasra No. 955. 6. The pleadings i.e. application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 filed by the present respondent before the trial Court and the response thereto by the present petitioners are appended alongwith the present petition as Annexure P-2 and P-3 respectively. In this regard, if a reference to the pleadings qua Khasra No. 955 is made in the application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 preferred by the present respondent before the trial Court 4 specifically para 2 thereof, it is evident that ownership rights qua Khasra No. 955 are being claimed by the present respondent on account of Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. In response thereto, acquisition of ownership rights qua Khasra No. 955 by the present petitioners is admitted on account of operation of Section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. 7. In terms of Section 46 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, if any party is aggrieved by an entry in the record of rights then the right course of action is to file a suit for declaration against the entry so appearing in the record of rights. 8. However, from the pleadings, it is evident that there is a dispute qua possession insofar as Khasra No. 955 is concerned, though possession is being claimed by the present respondent qua Khasra No. 955, the same is denied by the present petitioners. 9. In the facts and attending circumstances, I see no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the 1st Appellate Court dated 20.6.2025. Even otherwise the present petition has been under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Article 227 of the Constitution reads as under:- “227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. 5 (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories interrelation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may— (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision or any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.” 10. The scope of jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has been expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: (i) In Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & another, (2003)3 SCC 524, it has been held as under:- “7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or the Tribunal. It is also not 6 permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or Tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision.” (iii) In Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022)4 SCC 181, it has been held as under:- “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute conclusion, for its own that of decision the on facts inferior court and or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and Others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, (2010) 1 SCC violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.” 11. Thus, from the above stated exposition of law, it is clear that this Court has a restricted and limited jurisdiction to interfere under the correctional jurisdiction vested in it in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, except to set right a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse or violation of fundamental principle of law or justice. 7 12. In the case at hand, I am of the considered view that no ground is made out in the present petition to invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. In view of the aforesaid, I see no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court dated 20.06.2025. Therefore, the present petition is dismissed alongwith pending miscellaneous, applications, if any. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 01 August 2025 tarun