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2025 DAILYLAW 20934 (CHH)

SANTU NAG ALIAS CHOTU v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CRA/1160/2024 · 2025-01-14

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 / 27 2025:CGHC:2200-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2024 1 - Santu Nag Alias Chotu, S/o Devdas Nag, Aged About 24 Years, R/o Kumharras, Ward No. 15, Behind Adiwasi Bhavan P.S. and District Sukma (C.G.) 2 - Ashok Yadav, S/o Raju Yadav, Aged About 23 Years, R/o Koyalabhatti, in front of Jail Badi, Ward No.5, Sukma, P.S. and District Sukma (C.G.) ... Appellants versus State of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Sukma, District Sukma (C.G.) ---- Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Adhiraj Surana, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Jaiswal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 14.01.2025 1. Heard Mr. Adhiraj Surana, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants as well as Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel lawyer appearing on behalf of the State/respondent. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.03.2024 passed by learned Additional ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.01.15 10:24:45 +0530 2 / 27 Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), South Bastar, Dantewada, Chhattisgarh in Special Session (POCSO) Case No.40 of 2021 whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 366 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 1 year. Under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Life imprisonment (Remainder of his natural life) and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 1 year. Under Section 77 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 Rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 1 year. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. Learned State counsel submits that notice issued to the brother of the complainant/victim (PW-5) has been served, but none has appeared on behalf of the complainant to contest the present appeal. 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 21.12.2020, at about 12.00 noon at village Patelpara Jhapra, Sukma within the ambit of Police Station Sukma, accused persons formed a group and abducted a minor victim/prosecutrix below 18 years of age by alluring her committed forceful sexual intercourse with her. 5. Further case of the prosecution, is that, brother of the victim/prosecutrix (PW-5) lodged a written complaint to the Police 3 / 27 Station Incharge, Sukma alleging therein that on the date of incident, accused persons took his sister in an auto to the Sukma liquor distillery by alluring her that they would buy her slippers. The accused took the victim to a forest after drinking her alcohol and committed gang-rape with her. They left her on the road near the river and went away from the spot. Based upon the said written report (Ex.P/12), First Information Report was lodged against the accused persons vide Ex.P/13 in connection with Crime No.01/2020 at Police Station, Sukma for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376DA of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’), Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’), Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1985 (Amendment 2015) (for short, ‘SC/ST Act’) and Section 77 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 (for short, JJ, Act’). Thereafter, the Investigating Officer visited the crime scene and prepared a crime details form vide Ex.P/5 and a spot map (Ex.P/4) as per complainant’s statement. Notice under Section 160 of the Cr.P.C. was given vide Ex.P/36 to Ex.P/48. The complainant/victim was then sent for medical examination, and consent from prosecutrix as well as from her brother (Exs.P/6 and P/14) was obtained. Two vaginal slides and two vaginal swab of victim have been seized vide Ex.P/24. Pubic hairs and panis urethral smear of accused Ashok Yadav were seized vide Ex.P/29 and pubic hairs and panis urethral of accused Santu Nag alias 4 / 27 Chhotu were seized (Ex.P/30). Memorandum statement of appellant Santu Nag alias Chhotu was recorded vide Ex.P/1, based upon which, one black coloured Bajaj RE Auto was seized vide Ex.P/2. Statement of the prosecutrix was recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. vide Ex.P/9. Dakhil-kharij register of Government Primary School, Jhapra was seized vide Ex.P/17 and a copy of Dakhil-kharij register is Ex.P/15C. The prosecutrix was sent for medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. Raspal Singh Suman (PW-13), who has given its report vide Ex.P/22. Appellants were also sent for medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. Ojesh Kumar Baghel (PW-10), who gave its report vide Exs.P/19 and P/20. Caste certificate of the prosecutrix was also seized vide Ex.P/51. The seized properties were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Jagdalpur vide Ex.P/55 and FSL report was obtained vide Ex.P/54. The DNA report is also obtained vide Ex.P/53. The appellants were arrested vide Exs.P/31 and P/32 on 24.12.2020 at about 2.15 PM. 6. Statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. of the witnesses were recorded by the police and the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 of the of the Cr.P.C. was also recorded. After completing the entire investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special Judge, Dantewada for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(d) of the IPC as well as Section and 6 of the POCSO Act, Section 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST Act and Secdtion 77 of the JJ Act. 5 / 27 7. The trial Court has framed charges under Sections 366 of the IPC as well as Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 77 of the JJ Act. During trial, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 56 documents Exs.P/1 to P/56. 8. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants and sentenced them as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants have been falsely implicated in the present case and the prosecution has completely failed to prove the guilt of the appellants. He further submits that as per case of the prosecution, victim was minor on the date of incident, but this fact has not been proved by adducing lawful evidence. In this regard, only Dakhil- Kharij register (Ex.P/15C) of the victim has been seized, which shows that date of birth of victim is 20.02.2004, but it has not been proved by any of the witnesses that, on what basis aforesaid date of birth was recorded in the school. It is further submitted that since prosecution has failed to prove by adducing cogent evidence that, on the date of incident, victim was minor, hence the finding recorded by learned trial Court in this regard is not sustainable. It has been contended that learned trial Court erred in reading MLC report and statement of Dr. Raspal Singh Suman (PW-13) and has also failed to consider that there is nothing in 6 / 27 medical report to show that forcible sexual intercourse was committed upon the victim. It has been further contended that there are so many contradiction and omission in the statement of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, the conviction of the appellants is not sustainable and the appellants should be acquitted of the charges framed against them. 10. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses are fully reliable. He further submits that the offences committed by the appellants were heinous in nature and thus, the trial Court had rightly convicted them. It has been contended that the trial Court had considered all the arguments made by the appellant and there was sufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident which is proved by the school admission and discharge register Ex.P/15C which contains the date of birth of the victim as 20.02.2004. The evidence of the victim need not be required for any corroboration and on the sole testimony of the victim the conviction can be made. It has been further contended that the prosecutrix in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement has categorically stated that appellants have forcefully consumed her liquor and thereafter, by alluring her, committed sexual intercourse with her. It has been argued that MLC as well as DNA report is found to be positive. Therefore, 7 / 27 there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence needs no interference. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the learned trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 12. In the instant case, conviction of the accused/appellants is substantially based on the testimonies of the victim (PW-4), Gendlal Makhija (PW-6) and Dakhil-kharij Register (Ex.P/15C). 13. As per case of the prosecution, the date of birth of the victim is 20.02.2004 and on the said basis, on the date of incident i.e. 21.12.2020, the age of the victim was 16 years 10 months and 1 day. To substantiate this fact, prosecution has adduced Dakhil- kharij Register of Government Primary School, Jhapra, District Sukma (C.G.), which has been proved by the Head Master of the said school Gendlal Makhija (PW-6). This witness has clearly deposed in his deposition that in the Daakhil-kharij Register information with regard to victim has been noted in Serial No.86 and she was admitted in Class-I. He has also stated that as per this Register, the date of birth of victim is 20.02.2004. 14. The date of birth of the victim was recorded as 20.02.2004 in the Dakhil-kharij Register prior to 16 years of the present incident, on the basis of which, victim was found to be aged about 16 years 10 8 / 27 months and 1 day on the date of incident. The appellants did not adduced any evidence to discard aforesaid age of the victim. 15. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, we find that the learned trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident the victim was child i.e. below the age of 16 years. 16. So far as the allegation with regard to rape committed by the appellants with the victim is concerned, PW-4, who is victim in the case, in her examination-in-chief has stated that on the date of incident, all the family members had gone to her sister-in-law's house at Kamkapal and she was alone at home. She further deposed that accused came to her house in the afternoon and they told her to buy slippers for her, then, she went along with them. They took her in an auto to a liquor distillery where they bought liquor and drank it. They also made her to drink and when she refused to have it, they forcibly made her to drink. Thereafter, they took her into the forest, where they committed sexual intercourse with her and left her on the river bank. She further deposed that she was crying and when the villagers saw her, they dropped her to the house and where she narrated the incident to her mother, and then, she went to the Police Station and lodged a report. She deposed in paragraph-6 of her examination-in-chief that when the witness was shown the photograph pasted in the arrest-sheet in the case, she identified both the accused as the perpetrators of the incident. She deposed in paragraph-7 of the 9 / 27 evidence that it is correct to say that both the accused came to her house and told that they were her brother's friends. She deposed that after the arrest of the accused, the Police had conducted the identification proceedings of the accused in front of her in the Tehsil office of Sukma, in which she had identified the accused. In cross-examination, she admitted that her house is on the main road of village Jhapra and the incident happened on Monday, on the said date, there is a market in Sukma. She further admitted that on market day, many auto rickshaw drivers and vehicles come to our village from Sukma and we will go to Sukma market by sitting in those autos and vehicles. She denied that on the date of incident, she told about coming to Sukma by sitting in the auto, other villagers were also sitting in the auto besides her. 17. Brother of the victim (PW-5) has deposed in his examination-in- chief that all of us except his sister went to visit relatives in village Kankapal on the date of incident and his sister was alone at home. They returned at night and on the next day morning, his sister narrated the incident to his mother. He further deposed in paragraph-3 that on the date of incident, when we were not at home, the accused came to our house and told his sister that they would buy slippers and took her in an auto to a liquor shop where the accused made the victim drink liquor and from there, they took her to a forest and committed sexual intercourse with her. They left her at the river bank and went away. She was coming back from there in crying condition, then one Deva of village brought 10 / 27 her home. He further deposed in paragraph-4 of his evidence that when his mother told about the above incident, after informing the villagers, a meeting was convened in the village and the accused were called there. Both of them accepted to have committed the incident and thereafter, they went to the Police Station for lodging of written report (Ex.P/12), based upon which, First Information Report (Ex.P/13) was registered. 18. Smt. Asha Sen (PW12) has deposed in her examination-in-chief that she had registered the FIR based on the written report lodged by the brother of the victim. She further deposed that she has prepared Nazri-naksha vide Ex.P/5. She has prepared the memo for MLC and sonography of the victim vide Exs.P/22 and P/23. She has prepared a memo for recording 164 Cr.P.C. of the victim vide Ex.P/25 as well as she has sent the accused for medical examination vide Exs.P/19 and P/20, prepared seizure memos (Exs.P/2, P16, P/24, P/29, P/30 & P/50), sent evidence for DNA Profiling Ex.P/52 and sent evidence to the State Forensic Science Laboratory vide Ex.P/53, prepared arrest memos vide Exs.P/33 and P/34 and recorded the statements of witnesses and the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. 19. Dr. Raspal Singh Suman (PW-12), the medical officer who has examined the victim, has deposed that on 23.12.2020, the victim was brought before her for examination by Lady Constable, namely, Laxmi Bharni. During the examination, she obtained the 11 / 27 victim's consent for a physical examination, including internal examination. Upon examination, she found there was mole on her right cheek. According to victim, two persons, one of whom was Komal Barse, took her to Pusamipara forest by alluring her on the pretext of buying slippers and forcibly drank her alcohol and thereafter, forcefully committed sexual intercourse with her and one of the persons left her in the Shabri river. On external examination of the prosecutrix, she found no injury on her body and the victim was in a semi-conscious state at the time of examination. On internal examination of the prosecutrix, she found that there was slight bleeding from the vagina and the victim had abrasions on her urethral meatus and vestibular fissure and intritus. She further found abrasions on her labia majora as well as her hymen was ruptured. Abrasions were also found on labia minora and vaginal muscles were found to be tensed. Thereafter, two pieces of vaginal slide, vaginal swab and vaginal smear of the victim were prepared, sealed and handed over to the concerned constable for FSL examination. In her opinion, intentionally sexual assault has been committed upon the victim by the accused persons. 20. Dr. Ojesh Kumar Baghel (PW-10) has deposed in his evidence that he has conducted the medical examination of the accused persons and found that the accused were completely healthy and there were no injury mark on their body. He further found that accused had developed secondary sexual characteristics and 12 / 27 they were fully capable of having sexual intercourse. He prepared the public hairs and semen smear of the acused, sealed it along with their undergarments and handed over to the concerned Constable for FSL examination and DNA profiling. 21. In view of above discussion, we also affirm finding recorded by the trial Court that the appellants are the perpetrator of instant crime. 22. During course of submission learned defence counsel draw our attention towards some contradictions and omissions in depositions of the prosecution witnesses, but the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384, while considering the reliability of the statement of the victim has held that “minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault was enough for conviction and does not require corroboration unless there were compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The Court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience”. The same was reiterated in Pappu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 176. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants during course of argument also raised objection that except victim there is no credible evidence in support of her statement even deposition of her brother is based on information given by victim and medical 13 / 27 evidence also does not corroborate, therefore, only on the basis of deposition of victim holding guilty to the appellants by the learned trial Court is not sustainable. 24. We are not inclined with the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants as it is settled proposition of law that conviction of the accused could be based on sole testimony, without corroboration and it has also been held that the sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by the Court merely based on assumptions and surmises. 25. In the case of Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the victim is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments on conviction on the sole evidence of the victim. In paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3, it was observed and held as under: “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay vs. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98) “9. In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain 14 / 27 [State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 550] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to 15 / 27 Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 10. In State of U.P. vs. Pappu [State of U.P. vs. Pappu, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 594] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads 16 / 27 the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’ 11. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384], this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is 17 / 27 duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. …The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the 18 / 27 negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. …The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self- respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. …Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … *** 21. …The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable 19 / 27 prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’ 12. In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 86], this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh, 20 / 27 reported in (1993) 2 SCC 622], this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P., reported in (2010) 2 SCC 9] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1952 SC 54]. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.” 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 130], it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same 21 / 27 inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21]. In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and 22 / 27 howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core 23 / 27 version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 26. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Pankaj Chaudhary, reported in (2019) 11 SCC 575, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by Court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it was observed and held as under: “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 283]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected 24 / 27 to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. [State of Rajasthan vs. N.K., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 30].” 27. In the case of Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34, the Supreme Court observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it was observed and held as under: “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place 25 / 27 implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384] (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self- respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of 26 / 27 her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 635)].” 28. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the evidences of the victim (PW-4) brother of the victim (PW-5), Dakhil-kharij Register (Ex.P/15C), DNA report (Ex.P/53), FSL report (Ex.54) (Ex.P/41), statement of Dr. Raspal Singh Suman (PW-13), the medical officer who has examined the victim and MLC report Ex.P/22, it is quite clear from the documentary and oral evidence presented by the prosecution on record and its analysis that the accused persons, after luring the victim for buying slippers, they took her the victim to the liquor shop and after consuming her liquor by force, committed forceful sexual intercourse (gang-rape) with her. The prosecution has also been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of the incident, the victim was minor i.e. below the age of 18 years and the accused on the said date, time and place, committed penetrative sexual assault by repeatedly having sexual intercourse (gang-rape) with the minor victim. Thus, this Court 27 / 27 comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the appellants. The conviction and sentenced as awarded by the trial Court is hereby upheld. The present appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. 29. The appellants are stated to be in jail since 24.12.2020 being the date of arrest. They are directed to serve out the sentence as awarded to them by the learned trial Court. 30. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 31. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu