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High Court of Karnataka · body
2025 DAILYLAW 20781 (KAR)
RAKESHA H.M. v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
CRL.P/3841/2025 · 2025-06-10
S R Krishna Kumar
body2025
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 20781 (KAR) · dailylaw.ai ]
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 20781 (KAR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 3841 OF 2025 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS) BETWEEN:
RAKESHA H.M.
S/O, MOHAN KUMAR AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS R/AT, SATHYAMANGALA KASABA HOBLI, HASSAN-01 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. PRATHEEP.K.C, ADVOCATE) AND:
1.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY HASSAN WOMEN POLICE STATION HASSAN DISTRICT REP. BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE-560 001.
2.
RANI H.N D/O LATE NANJEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS R/AT, SATHYAMANGALA KASABA HOBLI, HASSAN-01 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.K. NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R-1)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN S.C.NO.24/2024 PENDING ON THE FILE OF PRL.DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, HASSAN FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 376,420,504,506 OF IPC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, the petitioner seeks the following reliefs:
“WHEREFORE, the petitioner in the above petition most humbly prays that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to quash the entire proceedings in S.C.No.24/2024 pending on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Hassan for the offence punishable U/S 376, 420, 504, 506 of IPC in the interest of justice.”
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned HCGP for respondent No.1 and learned counsel for respondent No.2 and perused the material on record. 3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that on the basis of the complaint dated 03.06.2023 filed by respondent No.2 against the petitioner inter alia alleging that she had consensual relationship with him since 2020 on the false pretext of marriage, the petitioner was guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376, 420, 504 and 506 of IPC. The respondent-Police conducted investigation and have filed charge sheet dated 12.07.2023, which is currently pending in S.C.No.24/2024 before the Sessions Court. - 3 -
HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
4. It is the specific contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Apex Court has repeatedly held that having consensual relationship for a longer duration under the false pretext of marriage would not constitute the alleged offences against the petitioner and places reliance upon the following judgments: i) Prashant Vs. State of NCT of Delhi – 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3375. ii) Jothiragawan Vs. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police and Another – 2025 SCC OnLine SC 628. iii) Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another – 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471. 5. In the case of Prashant Vs. State of NCT of Delhi (supra), the Apex Court held as under:
“19. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376 (2)(n) IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164 Cr.PC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017.
Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution. 20. The ingredients of criminal intimidation are threat to another person, inter alia, with any injury to his person, reputation with intent to cause alarm to that person or to cause that person to any act which he is not legally bound to do. In the instant case, as already noted, the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual in nature. In fact, they wanted to fructify the relationship into marriage. It is in that context that they indulged in sexual activity. Therefore, there cannot be a case of criminal intimidation involved as against the complainant. We do not find that there was any threat caused to the complainant by the appellant when all along there was cordiality between them and it was only when the appellant got married in the year 2019 that the complainant filed a complaint.
In the circumstances, we do not think that the offence under
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
Section 503 read with Section 506 of the IPC has been made out in the instant case.”
6. In the case of Jothiragawan Vs. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police and Another (supra), the Apex Court held as under:
“7. We have gone through the First Information Statement made by the complainant and the statement given before the Police which would form the basis of the trial. Unless the ingredients of an offence under Section 376 of the I.P.C. comes forth from these documents; which read together reveal identical statements, there cannot be any continuation of the prosecution. In this context, we also have to notice Prithivirajan from which paragraph 7 is extracted hereunder:
“7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted.”
7. In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another (supra), the Apex Court held as under:
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
“ 22. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or
consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.”
8. The complaint dated 20.06.2023 given by the complainant to the respondent No.1 – Police reads as under:
“ UÉ, DgÀPÀëPÀ ¤jÃPÀëgÀÄ, ªÀÄ»¼Á ¥ÉÆÃ°¸ï oÁuÉ, ºÁ¸À£À. EAzÀ, gÁt D/O ¯ÉÃmï £ÀAeÉÃUËqÀ 37 ªÀµÀð, ªÀPÀ̰UÀgÀÄ ¸ÀvÀåªÀÄAUÀ® £ÀUÀgÀ ¸À¨sÉAiÀİè PÉ®¸À. - 7 -
HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ jÃwAiÀÄ PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉÆ¼Àî¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ PÉýPÉÆ¼ÀÄîvÉÛÃ£É ºÁUÀÆ gÁdå ¥ÀAZÁ¬Äw PÀgÉzÀÄ CªÀgÀÄ ¨ÁgÀzÀ PÁgÀt F ¢£À vÀqÀªÁV §AzÀÄ zÀÆgÀÄ ¤ÃqÀÄgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. ªÀAzÀ£ÉUÀ¼ÉÆA¢UÉ, ¢£ÁAPÀ: 03/06/2023. ¢£ÁAPÀ; 03/06/2023 gÀAzÀÄ gÁwæ 8:15 UÀAmÉUÉ ¦AiÀiÁð¢ oÁuÉUÉ ºÁdgÁV ¤ÃrzÀ zÀÆgÀ£ÀÄß ¹éÃPÀj¹ oÁuÁ ªÉÆ,£ÀA. 50/2023 PÀ®A 376, 120, 504, 506, 34 L¦¹ jÃwAiÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR°¹gÀÄvÉÛãÉ.”
9. As is clear from the aforesaid complaint, respondent No.2 has specifically stated that there was consensual sexual relationship between her and petitioner from 15.01.2020 onwards by the petitioner specifically promising to marry her and the same cannot be treated nor construed as the offences punishable under Section 376 of IPC. Under these circumstances, in the light of the material on record and the principle enunciated in the decisions of the Apex Court (supra), continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to abuse of process of law and the same deserves to be quashed. 10. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER i) The petition is allowed.
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:19703 CRL.P No. 3841 of 2025
ii) The impugned criminal proceedings in S.C.No.24/2024 (arising out of Crime No.50/2023, registered by respondent No.1-Police), pending on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Hassan, in so far as the petitioner is concerned, are hereby quashed.
Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE
BMC List No.: 1 Sl No.: 36