Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Himachal Pradesh · body

2025 DAILYLAW 20618 (HP)

SATNAM SINGH @ SATTI v. STATE OF HP

CRMPM/1694/2025 · 2025-08-19

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2025:HHC:27875 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1694 of 2025 Reserved on: 13.08.2025 Date of Decision: 19.08.2025. Satnam Singh @ Satii ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1. No. For the Petitioner : Mr. K.S. Gill, Advocate. For the respondent/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 142 of 2025 dated 02.05.2025 registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 105 read with Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) at Police Station Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, Saurabh Sharma had died on 02.05.2025, due to the overdose of the drugs administered by Satnam Singh @ Satti (present 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:27875 petitioner) and Sanjay Khan. Saurabh had taken ₹1200/- from his mother on the same day at 2:30 p.m. and disclosed that the petitioner and Sanjay Khan were supplying drugs to him. Police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. The police arrested the petitioner on 3.05.2025. Co-accused had already been released by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., on 05.07.2025. The petitioner is also entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Seven F.I.R.s have been registered against the petitioner, out of which he has been acquitted in five F.I.R.s. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the present petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received an intimation on 02.0.5.2025 that one person was creating ruckus in CHC, Nalagarh, in a state of intoxication. The police went to the hospital, where it was found that one person had died. The police enquired and found that Satnam Singh and Sanjay Khan had brought Saurabh Sharma to the hospital. Informant Kuldeep Sharma made a complaint to the police that Saurabh Sharma demanded ₹1200/- from his mother on 02.05.2025 at 2:30 p.m. by saying that 3 2025:HHC:27875 Satnam Singh (petitioner) had kept the mobile phone of Saurabh Sharma as a mortgage. Saurabh Sharma used to consume drugs after taking them from Satpal Singh. He (Saurabh) and Sanjay Khan had consumed drugs many times. The police arrested the petitioner and Sanjay Khan. Sanjay Khan disclosed the place where the drugs were administered. As per the report of the Medical Officer, the cause of death was cardio-pulmonary arrest. Blood and viscera were preserved and sent to the SFSL, Junga. As per the report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), traces of Pregabalin and Tapentadol were found in the urine sample of Sanjay Khan and traces of Pregabalin, Tapentadol and Acetaminophen were found in the petitioner’s urine sample. However, no traces of any drugs were found in the urine sample of Saurabh Sharma. F.I.R. No. 356 of 2024 is pending against the petitioner. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr. K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely 4 2025:HHC:27875 implicated. There is no material to show that the petitioner had supplied the drugs to the deceased. The report of the analysis does not show the presence of drugs in the urine sample of deceased Saurabh Sharma, which falsifies the prosecution’s version regarding the administration of the drugs by the petitioner. The co-accused has been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the petitioner had supplied drugs to Saurabh Sharma. This fact was also disclosed to the informant by the deceased. The petitioner is responsible for the death of Saurabh Sharma. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 5 2025:HHC:27875 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- 6 2025:HHC:27875 “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms:— “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and 7 2025:HHC:27875 should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 8 2025:HHC:27875 12. The prosecution has come up with the version that the petitioner had supplied the drugs to the deceased, which were consumed by him, leading to his death. This version is not supported by the medical evidence and the report of the analysis. The report of the post-mortem shows that the cause of death was cardio-pulmonary arrest. The report of analysis shows that traces of drugs were found in the urine samples of Sanjay Khan and the petitioner; however, no such traces were found in the urine sample of the deceased. The absence of traces of the drug sample in the urine of the deceased, prima facie, falsifies the prosecution’s version that the cause of death was an overdose of drugs. 13. In any case, the administration of the drugs by a person is novus actus and breaks the chain of causation. This principle is explained by Professor Glanville Williams in Textbook of Criminal Law, Fourth Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2015, in para 11-059 as under: “Does this mean that if I give a person a recreational drug and she accidentally kills herself by ingesting it, I will not be liable for her murder? The chain of causation will be broken by the drug- taker’s independent, informed and voluntary choice to take the dangerous drug. The House of Lords recognised 9 2025:HHC:27875 as much in R v. Kennedy (No. 2) [2008] 1 A.C. 269. In that case, D prepared a syringe of heroin and gave it to B. B immediately injected himself. B died within an hour of injecting the drugs into himself. The defendant was charged with manslaughter, even though he merely prepared and supplied the drug. The critical question was whether mere supply was an act causative of B’s death, given that B injected himself. The House of Lords held that the ultimate harm could not be imputed to the defendant as B’s free, autonomous and informed choice broke the chain of causation. Lord Bingham said: “… the doctrine of secondary liability was developed precisely because an informed voluntary choice was ordinarily regarded as a novus actus inter veniens breaking the chain of causation: ‘Principals cause, accomplices encourage (or otherwise influence) or help. If the instigator were regarded as causing the result, he would be a principal, and the conceptual division between principals… and accessories would vanish. Indeed, it was because the instigator was not regarded as causing the crime that the notion of accessories had to be developed. This is the irrefragable argument for recognising the novusactus principle as one of the bases of our criminal law. The final act is done by the perpetrator, and his guilt pushes the accessories, conceptually speaking, into the background.” Kennedy’s act of supplying the drug was a mere indirect but for cause. He did not put a gun to B’s head and demand that B to inject himself. B was not an innocent agent because he knew fully well that he was injecting himself with a dangerous recreational drug. Kennedy’s indirect assistance might be sufficient to ground derivative liability in the right circumstances (i.e. where it is designed to facilitate some primary criminality of a principal), but B was not a principal committing self- 10 2025:HHC:27875 manslaughter—there is no such offence. Nor was he attempting suicide; his death was accidental. The only act he committed was self-injection, which is not a crime. Adults with full capacity are able to make their own decisions when it comes to risking self-harm. When a person makes a voluntary and informed decision to engage in self- harm, it seems pointless to punish their addict associates, who on a different occasion would have been the recipient of the supply.” 14. Therefore, prima facie, it is doubtful that the allegations in the FIR would have constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 15. It was submitted that seven FIRs have been registered against the petitioners, and he should not be released on bail, keeping in view his criminal antecedents. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The prosecution has to make out a prima facie case to justify a pre-trial detention of the petitioner, and cannot seek the pre-trial detention of the petitioner on the ground that he has criminal antecedents. Therefore, the criminal antecedents are not sufficient to detain the petitioner in custody for an indefinite period. 11 2025:HHC:27875 16. Learned Trial Court has released the co- accused on bail; therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. 17. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be 12 2025:HHC:27875 intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 18. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 19. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Superintendent of Sub-Jail Kishanpura, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 20. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19th August 2025 (ravinder) Digitally signed by RAVINDER KUMAR DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA, Phone=35ecb6f93c6891a7dae90f163e34d7 ecaa420b13af1363204ab0e0f5c87077dc, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh, SERIALNUMBER=f6cc63c55495d14ce1f86 23eacdb6cb9ef2c553803537a2f53c4ee637 cbebaff, CN=RAVINDER KUMAR Reason: I am the author of this document Location: Date: 2025-08-19 14:44:40 RAVINDE R KUMAR