1 2025:HHC:25577 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CrMMO No. : 662 of 2025 Decided on : 29.07.2025 Ramesh Kumar …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the petitioner: Petitioner in person, with Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Vinod K. Gupta, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additonal Advocate General, for respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 in person, with Mr. Sidharth, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge. (Oral) Petitioner-Ramesh Kumar has filed the present petition, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:25577 with a prayer to quash FIR No. 50 of 2024, dated 26th October, 2024 (hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR in question’), registered under Sections 64 (2), 351 (2) and 127 (2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNS’), with Women Police Station Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, which are stated to be pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chamba (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), on the basis of the compromise, which has taken place between the petitioner and respondent No. 2. 2. The victim-prosecutrix, has been impleaded as respondent No. 2, in the present case. 3. According to the petitioner-accused, the FIR in question was lodged at the instance of respondent No. 2- prosecutrix, who had alleged that the petitioner-accused is her brother-in-law (Jeth) in relation and is a teacher by profession. 4. As per the case of the prosecution, on 4th July, 2024, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix had gone to Hospital, where, the petitioner-accused allegedly met her and told her that Neetu @ Anita, wife of the petitioner-accused, had 3 2025:HHC:25577 called her to her house and had sent the petitioner- accused to bring her, so, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix should accompany him. 5. According to the further allegations of respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, since, they are from the same family, as such, she accompanied the petitioner- accused and when they reached at the house of petitioner- accused, nobody was found present there. 6. It is the further case of respondent No. 2- prosecutrix that the petitioner-accused disclosed to her that his wife Neetu might have gone to the neighbour’s house and will come soon. Thereafter, when, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix allegedly had gone to toilet, petitioner- accused bolted the door of the room from inside and when, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix came out of the toilet, the petitioner-accused caught hold of her and forcibly threw her on the bed. He gagged her mouth, so that, she could not raise the alarm and raped her. 7. It is her further case that after getting up from the bed, petitioner-accused took his mobile from TV trolley and told respondent No. 2-prosecutrix that he had 4 2025:HHC:25577 recorded their activities and compelled her to dance on his tunes. However, according to respondent No. 2- prosecutrix, petitioner-accused had not shown the video to her, nor, he had deleted the same. Thereafter, on the pretext of making the said video viral, she was allegedly raped by the accused-petitioner, on six occasions. 8. As per the further case of respondent No. 2- prosecutrix, when, there was mundan ceremony of daughter of one Lekh Raj, in their village, on 11th September, 2024 then, the petitioner-accused had also gone there one day prior to mundan ceremony, i.e. 10th September, 2024. Husband of respondent No. 2- prosecutrix was not at his house and the petitioner- accused had gone to the house of respondent No. 2- prosecutrix and forcibly made relations against her will, due to which, she got pregnant. Thereafter, their relationship came to the notice of their relatives. 9. Lastly, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix has alleged that the petitioner-accused had forcibly made physical relations with her, but, she had not disclosed this fact to anybody, as, she was afraid of petitioner-accused, who 5 2025:HHC:25577 could have made her video viral. As such, she has prayed that action be taken against the petitioner-accused. 10. On the basis of the above facts, FIR in question was registered and criminal machinery swung into motion. After completion of the investigation, the police has filed the charge sheet before the learned trial Court, however, as per the case of the petitioner-accused, during the pendency of those proceedings, matter has been compromised, between him and respondent No. 2-prosecutrix. 11. Re-iterating the fact that the FIR in question had been lodged due to some misunderstanding, it is the case of the petitioner-accused that continuation of the proceedings, arisen out of FIR in question, may cause further hardship to him, as well as, respondent No. 2- prosecutrix. Statement of respondent No. 2-prosecutrix is also stated to have been recorded by the learned trial Court, in which, she has denied the allegations of rape. 12. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer to quash the FIR in question, as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, has been made. 6 2025:HHC:25577 13. When put to notice, the respondent No. 1-State has filed the status report, disclosing therein, about the manner, in which, the FIR in question has been registered, at the instance of respondent No. 2, as well as, the manner, in which, the police has conducted the investigation. 14. It has been submitted, in the status report, that the police has submitted the challan, before the learned trial Court, which is pending adjudication. As per the status report, out of 28 prosecution witnesses, one witness, i.e. respondent No. 2-prosecutrix has been examined on 28th May, 2025 and the case is now listed on 9th September, 2025, for further orders. 15. Today, the petitioner-accused, as well as, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix appeared before this Court. Petitioner-accused has made a statement, on oath, disclosing about the fact that respondent No. 2-prosecutrix is his sister-in-law in relation and according to him, they had developed affection towards each other, which resulted into their relationship. Their relationship is stated to be consensual, on account of their mutual affection. 7 2025:HHC:25577 16. He has also deposed that when their relationship became public, then, at the instance of uncle of respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, FIR in question had been lodged by her, in which, the police has conducted the investigation and submitted the charge-sheet before the learned trial Court. 17. As per the further deposition of the petitioner- accused, after his arrest, when, he had moved the application for bail, before this Court, in the said bail application, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix had also filed the affidavit, admitting their consensual relationship. 18. According to the petitioner-accused, in the proceedings pending before the learned trial also, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, in her statement (Annexure P-3) has admitted their consensual relationship. 19. On the basis of the statement of respondent No. 2-prosecutrix (Annexure P-3), recorded before the learned trial Court and the affidavit (Ex. PX), sworn-in by her, as well as, on the basis of the compromise, Ex. PZ, the petitioner-accused has prayed that the present petition may kindly be allowed, by quashing the FIR in question, as 8 2025:HHC:25577 well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court. 20. Respondent No. 2-prosecutrix has also made the similar statement, by deposing that the petitioner- accused is her brother-in-law (Jeth). She has also deposed that they had developed affection towards each other and thereby, remained in physical relationship, voluntarily. 21. According to respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, their relationship was consensual, without any threat, fear and on account of affection only, however, when their relationship became public, then, at the instance of her uncle, she had lodged the FIR in question, with Women Police Station Chamba. Thereafter, the police has conducted the investigation and submitted the charge- sheet, before the learned trial Court. 22. Not only this, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, has also deposed that when the petitioner-accused filed the application for bail, after her arrest, then, she had also filed an affidavit, admitting therein, their consensual relationship. 9 2025:HHC:25577 23. As per the further deposition of respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, her statement before the learned trial Court has been recorded as Annexure P-3 and she has also sworn-in the affidavit, Ex. PX. 24. Lastly, she has deposed that now, the matter has been compromised between her and the petitioner- accused, out of her free will and consent, in terms of compromise, Ex. PZ. 25. On the basis of the said compromise, Ex. PZ, she has stated that she has no objection, if the present petition is allowed. 26. Heard. 27. Respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, at one point of time, had appeared before the police of Women Police Station, Chamba and lodged the FIR in question, by levelling the allegations of rape, against the petitioner- accused. Now, the petitioner-accused and respondent No. 2-prosecutrix have approached this Court, by way of the present petition, with a prayer to quash the FIR in question, as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court. 10 2025:HHC:25577 28. As per the stand taken in the compromise (Ex. PZ), as well as, in the affidavit (Ex. PX), sworn-in by respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, she has totally exonerated the petitioner-accused from all the allegations, which have been levelled against him. Not only this, she has moved a step further, by deposing that she had lodged the FIR in question, against the petitioner-accused, at the instance of her uncle. 29. In such situation, the question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is as to whether this Court should exercise the power under Section 528 of the BNSS (Section 482 CrPC), in the present case or not. 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another, reported in (2014) 6 Supreme Court Cases 466, has elaborately discussed the powers of this Court, under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) and formulated the guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings, while holding that the timing of the settlement is a crucial factor, 11 2025:HHC:25577 for exercising the power, under Section 482 CrPC. Relevant para 29.7, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/ investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 12 2025:HHC:25577 31. The judgment in Narinder Singh’s case (supra) has been affirmed by a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Laxmi Narayan and others, reported in (2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 688. 32. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the above-noted decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, now, this Court would proceed further to determine as to when the compromise has taken place between the parties. 33. Respondent No.2-prosecutrix, in her affidavit, Ex. PX, has categorically stated that in the bail application, filed by the petitioner-accused, she had filed the affidavit, stating therein, that their relationship was consensual and the petitioner-accused has not committed any forcible sexual intercourse with her. 34. Meaning thereby, the compromise/settlement between the parties has taken place at the very initial stage of the investigation. Even otherwise, the case is still at the stage of recording the statements of the prosecution 13 2025:HHC:25577 witnesses and only, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix has been examined, on 28th May, 2025. This fact has been duly mentioned in the status report, by pleading that out of 28 prosecution witnesses, only respondent No.2-prosecutrix has been examined on 28th May, 2025 and the case is now listed on 9th September, 2025, for further orders. 35. Admittedly, the case has been registered against the petitioner-accused, under the serious provisions of the law, i.e. Section 64 of the BNS (Section 376 IPC). Now, the next question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is as to whether there is clear cut prohibition in quashing the proceedings under Section 64 of the BNS. The answer is in negative, as, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision, in Madhukar & Ors. versus The State of Maharashtra & Anr., Neutral Citation No. 2025 INSC 819, has provided a window to this Court, while exercising the power, under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNS), as per the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant para 6, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: 14 2025:HHC:25577 “6. At the outset, we recognise that the offence under Section 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature. Ordinarily, quasing of proceedings involving such offences on the ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly. However, the power of the court under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case.” 36. In Haji Iqbal alias Bala through S.P.O.A. versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2023) 20 Supreme Court Cases 209, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while re-iterating the powers of this Court, under Section 482 CrPC, has cast a duty upon this Court, to look into the FIR, with care and more closely and held that this Court is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case, as well as, the material collected in the course of investigation. Relevant paras 14 to 17, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “14. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. 15 2025:HHC:25577 It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.[See : Raju & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 133] 15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. 16. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. 17. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other 16 2025:HHC:25577 attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.” 37. This Court in Criminal Misc. Petition (Main) u/s 482 CrPC No. 1049 of 2022, titled as Mohan Lal Sharma versus State of H.P. and another, decided on 4th November, 2022, has held that according to the facts and circumstances of the case, the prayer for quashing of FIR in rape cases, can be accepted. Relevant paras 10 to 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “10. Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 4th October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh’s case supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would be profitable to 17 2025:HHC:25577 reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein: “13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to thepower under Section 482: “…In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved." 14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376, the court rejected the submission 18 2025:HHC:25577 that the first respondent was a woman “who was following the command of her husband” and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: “... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score…” “…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system…” 15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarized in the following propositions: 19 2025:HHC:25577 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power; (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated; 20 2025:HHC:25577 vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. 21 2025:HHC:25577 The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 11. True it is that Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh supra, has cautioned High Courts not to exercise power under S. 482 CrPC, for quashing of criminal proceedings in the offence involving rape, dacoity, murder, but if the aforesaid judgment is read in its entirety, it does not suggest that there is complete bar for this Court to accede to the request for quashing of FIR in cases of rape, dacoity, murder etc. If, while considering prayer for quashing of FIR in these cases, court comes to the conclusion that quashing of FIR would result in harmony inter se parties and continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law and wastage of time of the court, it can proceed to quash FIR in such like cases also. 12. Aforesaid view taken by this court is fortified by judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Kapil Gutpa v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr, Cr. Appeal No. 1217 of 2022, decided on 10.8.2022, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court, specifically taking note Narinder Singh Supra, has held that though court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the high court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The court has also to taken into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them, which may improve 22 2025:HHC:25577 their mutual relationship. Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh versus State of Punjab1, which read thus: "29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the 23 2025:HHC:25577 High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can 24 2025:HHC:25577 show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime." 13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving 25 2025:HHC:25577 the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship. 14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power.” 38. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the above decisions, in the present case, it is the categorical stand of respondent No. 2-prosecutrix that their relationship was consensual and she had lodged the FIR in question, against the petitioner- accused, at the instance of her uncle. Also, when respondent No.2-prosecutrix appeared before the learned trial Court, for recording her statement, she has not only exonerated the petitioner-accused from all the allegations, by stating that the relations between her and petitioner- accused were consensual, but, has also stated that the FIR 26 2025:HHC:25577 in question had been registered at the instance of her uncle. Meaning thereby, the chances of success of the prosecution case are bleak. 39. Respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, while appearing before this Court, has given her age as 34 years and considering the allegations, this Court is of the view that the stand of respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, qua her alleged consensual relationship, with the petitioner-accused, cannot be ruled out, in this case. The possibility of lodging the FIR, at the instance of the uncle of respondent No. 2- prosecutrix can also not be discarded completely, at this stage. 40. Considering all these facts, in the considered opinion of this Court, the continuation of the proceedings before the learned trial Court, arising out of the FIR in question, would be noting, but abuse of the process of law and acceptance of the prayer, as made in the petition, would not only give the petitioner-accused, as well as, respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, a chance to live peacefully in the society, but, would also save the precious judicial time of the learned trial Court. 27 2025:HHC:25577 41. 27 2025:HHC:25577 41. In view of the stand taken by the petitioner- accused and respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, that their relationship was consensual and the FIR in question had been lodged by respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, at the instance of her uncle, when, their relationship became public, then, this Court is of the view that the consensual act committed by both of them, i.e. petitioner-accused and respondent No. 2-prosecutrix, does not fall within the definition of ‘rape’, as punishable under Section 64 (2) of the BNS. As such, the prayer is liable to be allowed, but, subject to costs. 42. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the FIR in question, as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court, are ordered to be quashed, subject to costs of 75,000/-, ₹ out of which, 25,000/- each, shall be deposited with the ₹ Member Secretary, H.P. State Legal Services Authority; H.P. High Court Bar Association Welfare Funds and H.P. High Court Staff Welfare Association, within a period of four weeks from today. 28 2025:HHC:25577 43. Needless to say that in case of failure to deposit the costs, within the prescribed period, the present petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed and the FIR in question, as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court, shall revive automatically. 44. The compromise, Ex. PZ, and the statements of the parties, recorded today, in the Court, shall form part of the judgment. 45. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of, accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge July 29, 2025 ( rajni )