1 2025:CGHC:22888 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1599 of 2025 1 - Nalin Kumar Kothari S/o. Umed Chand Kothari Aged About 50 Years R/o. Kamthi Line, In Front Of State Bank Of India, Rajnandgaon, Post, Tahsil And Dist. Rajnandgaon (C.G.) (Complainant) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Vipin Madame S/o. Late Charandas Madame Aged About 24 Years R/o. In Front Of Government Mudranalaya, Chikhali, Main Road, Post, Tahsil And District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) .. Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Shri Anuj Kumar Pandey, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J Order On Board 10/06/2025 : 1. Heard on IA No.1/2025, application for condonation of delay. 2. On due consideration, the Application is allowed and delay is condoned. 3. The present petition has been filed under Section 419 (4) of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for grant of leave to appeal. 4. Facts of the case are that on 1.1.2020, the respondent/accused has taken one shop of the complainant on rent @ Rs.5,000/- per month. A written agreement has also been executed and the respondent/accused has paid KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Digitally signed by KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Date: 2025.06.11 11:05:23 +0530 2 one month rent for the period 1.1.2020 to 31.1.2020 and thereafter he has not paid monthly rent, and for arrears from 1.2.2020 to 31.7.2020, he has issued a cheque (Ex.-P/1) of Rs.1,50,000/- and also vacated the shop on 1st September, 2022. When the said cheque was presented for encashment, the same got dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter legal notice was sent and despite receiving the said notice, when the payment was not made, a complaint case was filed and after trial, the same ended in acquittal. Hence this petition seeking leave to appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective though there is legal presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act. 6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 7. In the matter of Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa {(2019) 5 SCC 418}, principles relating to presumption under Section 118 (a) and 139 of the NI Act were summarized at para-25 which reads as under:- “25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner: 25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting 3 the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. 25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. 25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.” 8. It is also well settled that in the matter of appeal against acquittal, the High Courts should not ordinarily set aside the judgment of acquittal in cases where two views are possible. The same principle has been reiterated in the matters of Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 9 SCC 731] and V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala, [(2006) 10 SCC 617]. 9. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the complainant has admitted that the agreement (Ex.-P/13) was executed in the presence of two witnesses, but in the documents which were filed and proved before the Court, there was no signatures of the witnesses and the said deed was also not executed on proper stamp paper. Further, complainant (PW-1) has also admitted in his cross-examination at para- 14 that he does not remember whether in the instant case two agreements have been executed or not. He also does not remember that except 4 agreement (Ex.-P/13) any other agreement was prepared or not and the same was executed with any other person. He has also admitted that he has filed cases relating to dishonour of cheques against other persons, but he does not remember as to against how many persons he has filed such nature of cases. 10.Taking into consideration the conduct of the complainant and the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court has reached to the conclusion that the respondent/accused has rebutted the presumption. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the trial Court is possible one. 11. No case is made out for grant of leave to appeal. 12.Accordingly, the CRMP is dismissed. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Barve