HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW WRIT - A No. - 14247 of 2025 Court No. - 7 HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J. 1. Heard Mr. Aditya Mohan, learned counsel for petitioner and learned state counsel for opposite party. 2. Petition has been filed challenging order dated 25.10.2024 granting sanction for prosecution of petitioner in case crime No.88 of 2024, under sections 504, 506, 507, 189 IPC and under section 197 CRPC on allegation of submitting forged medical bills. 3. Challenge has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner to the impugned order primarily on the ground that it has been passed without any application of mind. It is submitted that the issue of sanction of prosecution against a public servant being a serious matter, cannot be granted in such a cursory manner as has been done by the authority concerned. It has also been submitted that the impugned order clearly indicates that there was no material before the sanctioning authority nor was any such material considered with regard to complicity of petitioner regarding allegations levelled against him. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on judgment rendered in the case of Mansukh Lal Vithaldas Chauhan versus State of Gujarat 1997(7) SCC 622. 4. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, it is evident that by means of impugned order, sanction for prosecution has been granted against petitioner with regard to case crime No. 88 of 2024. Although the order Versus Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Aditya Mohan Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C. Balwan Singh Yadav .....Petitioner(s) State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Revenue Lko. And 5 Others .....Respondent(s) does not indicate so but the sanction presumably has been granted under section 197 Cr.P.C. The said provision clearly indicates that with regard to public servant, sanction can be granted by the competent authority and it is only after grant of such sanction that criminal prosecution can take place. 5. The aforesaid aspects have been dealt with by Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Lal Vithaldas Chauhan (supra) in the following manner: " 8. Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code which deals with the prosecution of Judges and public servants for offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty, lays down that no court shall take cognizance of such offences except with the previous sanction either of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. Section 6 of the Act, however, contains a special provision for sanction for prosecution for a few specific offences, including the offence punishable under Section 161 IPC. It provides as under: "6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.?(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161 (or Section 164) or Section 165 of the Penal Code, 1860, or under sub-section (2) [or sub-section (3-A)] of Section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the (Union) and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, (of the) Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of (a State) and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, (of the) State Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the WRIA No. 14247 of 2025 2 time when the offence was alleged to have been committed." 9. This section places a bar on the Court from taking cognizance of the offences specified in sub-section (1) against public servants unless the prosecution for those offences has been sanctioned either by the Central Government, if the person who has allegedly committed the offence, is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union Government and is not removable from his office except with the sanction of the Central Government, or by the State Government if that person is employed in connection with the affairs of the State Government. But if the "public servant" is not an employee of either the Central Government or the State Government, sanction is to be given by the authority competent to remove him from the office held by him. 12. Once the person against whom prosecution is to be launched is found to be covered by the definition of "public servant" and the requirement to that extent is satisfied, the next question whether he is to be prosecuted or not is considered either by the Central Government or by the State Government and if the person is neither the employee of the Central Government nor of the State Government, the question of sanction is considered by the person who is competent to remove him from the office held by him. 13. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 is clarificatory in nature inasmuch as it provides that if any doubt arises whether the sanction is to be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, it shall be given by the appropriate Government or the authority, which was competent to remove that person from the office on the date on which the offence was committed. This rule is a departure from the normal rule under which the relevant date is the date of taking cognizance, as laid down by this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [(1984) 2 SCC 183 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 172 : AIR 1984 SC 684 : 1984 Cri LJ 613] . 17. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. [(1979) 4 SCC 172 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 926 : AIR 1979 SC 677] ) Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty. 18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and WRIA No. 14247 of 2025 3 evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. (See also Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 124 : 1958 SCR 762] and State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : 1991 Cri LJ 1438] .) 19. Since the validity of "sanction" depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution." 6. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present facts and circumstances of the case, it is thus evident that sanction for prosecution would depend upon the material placed before sanctioning authority and has to be considered which implies application of mind. It has been held that the order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered evidence and other material placed before it. It is also held that the sanctioning authority has to apply his own independent mind and such sanction cannot be on the basis of any external force acting upon it or extraneous materials. 7. From a perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that there is absolutely no discussion at all with regard to material which was placed before the sanctioning authority. The order, in fact, is quite cryptic in WRIA No. 14247 of 2025 4 nature and only indicates allegations levelled against petitioner while sanctioning prosecution. In the considered opinion of this court, once prosecution was being sanctioned, it was incumbent upon the authority to have indicated material which was available before the authority and how it was considered by the authority prior to reaching a definititve conclusion or subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was liable to be prosecuted for the same. Gravity of allegations or charges was also required to be considered by the authority. Such a procedure having not been followed clearly indicates non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority. 8. Considering aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order dated 25.10.2024 is hereby quashed by issuance of writ in the nature of Certiorari granting liberty to opposite parties to pass order afresh in case so desired, but only in accordance with judgment rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (supra). 9. Resultantly, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs. December 10, 2025 Subodh/- WRIA No. 14247 of 2025 5 (Manish Mathur,J.) Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench