1 2025:CGHC:9937 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 110 of 2007 1 - Jagdish Yadav Aged About 31 Years, son of Mukutram Yadav, aged about 65 years, resident of village Kosir, Police station and Tahsil Pamgarh, District Janjgir, Champa, Chhattisgarh. 2. Smt. Aghni Bai, wife of Mukut, aged about 65 years, resident of village Kosir, P.S. & Tahsil Pamgarh, Distt. Janjgir, Champa (C.G) - (Her appeal stands abated vide order dated 10.03.2016) … Appellants versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh through the Police station Pamgarh, District Janjgir, Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For the appellant : Mr. Shrawan Chandel, Advocate For the State : Mr. H.A.P.S. Bhatia, Panel Lawyer For the complainant : Mr. Krishna Kumar Dewangan, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Order on Board 27/02/2025 A ANNAJEE RAO Digitally signed by A ANNAJEE RAO 2 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.01.2007 passed by the learned Special Judge, Janjgir Champa in Sessions Trial No 51/2006 whereby appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under : U/s 323 of IPC : RI for 1 year and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 2 months U/s 325 of IPC : RI for 2 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 6 months U/s 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST (PoA) Act, 1989 : RI for 1 year and fine of Rs.1000/-, 2. During the pendency of appeal, appellant no. 2 Smt. Aghani Bai has has died, her appeal stands abated by order dated 10/03/2016. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 18.12.2005 at about 5.00 p.m., complainant Amrikabai was collecting dung. At that time accused Aghni Bai came and picked a dispute Amrika Bai saying that all the dung was being collected by Amrikabai and Aghni Bai abused Amrika Bai. On which Amrika Bai asked her to stop using abusive language. Aghni Bai did not stop and again abused Amrika Bai by calling her a Chamar (cobbler), prostitute etc., and hit Amrika Bai on her right hand, right shoulder and back with a stick and was trying to drag her by holding her hair. At the same time, America Bai’s mother Teejamati and father Hetram came there and rescued her. Meanwhile, accused Jagdish also came there and pelted stone at Teejamati, due to which, she sustained injury on left lumbar region (waist). Hetram was also hit by a stone which caused injury on his right leg. Complainant Amrika Bai lodged report in Pamgarh Police Station which led 3 to registration of FIR in Crime No.448/2005. During the course of investigation, seizures were made and statements of witnesses were recorded. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed. 4. The prosecution has examined in all 9 witnesses and exhibited 16 documents to prove the guilt of accused. The accused were examined u/s 313 CrPC wherein they pleaded innocence and false implication. The accused have also examined 2 witnesses to defend their case. The learned trial Court after evaluating the evidence and material on record, has convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned above. Hence this appeal. 5. The appellant and complainant are present before this Court through their respective counsels and submit that at this stage, a joint application (I.A.No.1 of 2025) was filed by the appellant Jagdish Yadav and complainant Amrika Bai under Section 359 read with Section 528 of Cr.P.C., seeking permission to compound the offence and further to dispose of the appeal by acquitting the appellant. 6. Complainant/victim Amrika Bai was heard on I.A.No.01/2025 which is duly supported by the affidavits of the appellant Jagdish Yadav and complainant/victim Smt. Amrika Bai. 7. During the pendency of the appeal, injured Teejamati (PW-2) and Hetram (PW-3) who were the parents of victim Amrika Bai (PW-1) respectively have passed away. Therefore, application for compromise has been given on their behalf also by victim Amrika Bai (PW-1). Meanwhile, the main accused Aghni Bai has also expired during the pendency of this appeal. 8. The incident is of 18/12/2005. Before the court, victim Amrika Bai (PW- 1) has voluntarily given application for compromise wherein she has stated that she does not want to further prosecute the appellant no.1 and wants to acquit him on the basis of compromise arrived between them. Therefore, 4 permission is granted to compound offence u/s Sections 323 & 325 IPC by way of this compromise application. Appellant Jagdish is acquitted of the offences under Sections 323 & 325 of IPC. Accordingly, application for compromise is allowed. 9. As regards the conviction of appellant Jagdish Yadav for the offence under Section 3(i)(x) of the SC/ST Act, learned counsel for the appellant argues that mere mention of the word caste by itself is not sufficient for the purpose of Section 3(i)(x) of the SC/ST Act, rather it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused had the intention to insult or intimidate on the basis of caste. In support of his contention, he cited the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Anil Kumar Pandey v. Daulat Prasad, 2006 (4) Crimes 191. 10. The provisions contained in Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, 1989 as it stood before its amendment dated 26.01.2016 reads as under : “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-- [(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-- xxx xxx xxx (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view” 11. In case of Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 531 Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that intentional insult or intimidation by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view is a necessary ingredient for the said offence and held as under:- 5 “6. According to the basis ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to fact the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law.” 12. Further Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma v. Govt. State of Uttarakhand and another, (2020) 10 SCC 710 held that an offence under Section 3(1)(r) is not established merely on the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. Paras 16 to 18 are relevant and quoted below : “16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting respondent No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2020) 18 SCC 763 this Court held 6 that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2) (v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.” 13. In the light of the above legal position, if we consider the facts and evidence of the case on hand, it becomes clear that the appellant is said to have used the word "Chamrin" when there was a dispute over the issue of lifting of cow dung by the complainant/victim America Bai (PW-1). The subject matter of the dispute was about lifting of a very small quantity of cow dung. It does not reflect from the First Information Report that the intention behind using caste-related words was merely to insult or intimidate her on the basis of caste. Under the circumstances, no case is made out against the appellant under section 3(1)(x) SC/ST Act. Hence the conviction is not found to be justified on this count and while partly allowing the appeal, the 7 impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Special Act is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offence under the Special Act also. 14. In the result, the appeal is disposed of. 15. The appellant is on bail. He is not required to again surrender in this case. However, his bail bond(s) shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provisions contained in Section 437-A of CrPC. 16. Let a certified copy of this judgment along-with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for information and necessary action, if any. Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge R a o