HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW WRIT - A No. - 12254 of 2025 Court No. - 7 HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner, learned State Counsel for opposite parties no.1, 2 & 6, Mr. Utsav Misra, learned counsel for opposite party no.3 whose power filed today is taken on record and Mr. Vinod Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for opposite parties no.4 and 5. 2. Petition has been filed seeking the following reliefs:- “(i) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the opposite parties, more specifically the opposite party no.2 to consider candidature of the petitioner for providing appointment on the post of Homeopathic Pharmacists, ignoring the delay occurred due to natural calamity in the form of Covid-19, for which neither petitioner, nor any human being is responsible for the same, and (ii) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the opposite parties, more specifically the opposite party no.1 to exempt the delay if deems, occurred due to natural calamity in the form of Covid-19, alike the exemption / relaxation has been provided by the government in various matters. ............” 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that advertisement for recruitment on the said post has been issued on 15.06.2024 indicating the cut off date 19.07.2024 for last date of submission of applications for purposes of recruitment. It is submitted that since certificate with regard to petitioner's qualification was issued by the college concerned only after the cut off date on account of Covid-19 Pandemic, leverage with regard to Versus Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Ganga Singh Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Gaurav Mehrotra, Vinod Kumar Shukla Ajay Deep Singh .....Petitioner(s) State Of U.P. Thru. Chief Secy. U.P. Lko. And 5 Others .....Respondent(s) same is required to be granted to petitioner since petitioner was unable to obtain the requisite certificates within the cut off date on account of a natural calamity. 4. He has adverted to directions by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of IN Re: Cognizance For Extension Of Limitation with Miscellaneous Application No.29 of 2022 In Miscellaneous Application No.665 of 2021 In Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 5. Learned counsel for opposite party no.3 has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with the submission that petitioner does not have any substantive or statutory right to seek the prayer which he is making particularly in view of the fact that he is required to obtain the requisite qualifications as per the cut off date indicated in the advertisement. He has placed reliance on judgment rendered by Hon'ble the supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma versus State (NCT of Delhi) and Others, (2013)11 SCC 58. 6. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, it is evident that although petitioner does not have any substantive right to seek any change in the cut off date with regard to qualifications, he has placed reliance on directions issued by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Re:- Cognizance for Extension of Limitation for extending limitation period in view of Covid- 19 pandemic. 7. However a perusal of aforesaid directions issued clearly indicate that there is no direction issued for extending the cut off date with regard to any recruitment made and for relaxation with regard to qualifications which are to be submitted by applicants. 8. On the contrary, the case is squarely covered by judgment rendered by WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 2 Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma (supra) in the following manners:- “11. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the selection process commences on the date when applications are invited. Any person eligible on the last date of submission of the application has a right to be considered against the said vacancy provided he fulfils the requisite qualification. 12. In U.P. Public Service Commission v. Alpana [(1994) 2 SCC 723 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 742 : (1994) 27 ATC 10], this Court, after considering a large number of its earlier judgments, held that eligibility conditions should be examined as on the last date for receipt of applications by the Commission. That too was a case where the result of a candidate was declared subsequent to the last date of submission of the applications. This Court held that as the result does not relate back to the date of examination and eligibility of the candidate is to be considered on the last date of submission of applications, therefore, a candidate, whose result has not been declared up to the last date of submission of applications, would not be eligible. 13. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in M.V. Nair v.Union of India [(1993) 2 SCC 429 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 512 : (1993) 24 ATC 236] held as under : (SCC p. 434, para 9) “9. … It is well settled that suitability and eligibility have to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications, unless, of course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions [1995 Supp (4) SCC 706 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 226 : (1996) 32 ATC 172] this Court held : (SCC p. 707, para 2) “2. … It is to be seen that when the recruitment is sought to be made, the last date has been fixed for receipt of the applications. Such of those candidates, who possessed of all the qualifications as on that date, alone are eligible to apply for and to be considered for recruitment according to WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 3 the rules." (emphasis supplied) 15. This Court in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan [1993 Supp (3) SCC 168 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 951 : (1993) 25 ATC 234] held : (SCC p. 175, para 10) “10. The contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to be stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed date with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence viz. even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. … Reference in this connection may also be made to two recent decisions of this Court in A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra [(1990) 2 SCC 669 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 377 : (1990) 13 ATC 708] and Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [(1990) 3 SCC 655 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 520 : (1990) 14 ATC 766] .” (emphasis supplied) 16. In Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekher [1993 Supp (2) SCC 611 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 857 : (1993) 24 ATC 798] [hereinafter referred to as Ashok Kumar (1993)], the majority view was as under : (SCC pp. 616- WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 4 17, para 15) “15. The fact is that the appellants did pass the examination and were fully qualified for being selected prior to the date of interview. By allowing the appellants to sit for the interview and by their selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talents available. It was certainly in the public interest that the interview was made as broad based as was possible on the basis of qualification. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge was thus based on sound principle with reference to comparatively superior merits. It was in the public interest that better candidates who were fully qualified on the dates of selection were not rejected, notwithstanding that the results of the examination in which they had appeared had been delayed for no fault of theirs. The appellants were fully qualified on the dates of the interview and taking into account the generally followed principle of Rule 37 in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, we are of opinion that the technical view adopted by the learned Judges of the Division Bench was incorrect…. ” (emphasis supplied) However, the opinion of R.M. Sahai, J. had been that these 33 persons could not have been allowed to appear for the interview as they did not possess the requisite eligibility/qualification on the last date of submission of applications. 17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar [(1997) 4 SCC 18 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 913] reconsidered and explained the judgment of Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) [1993 Supp (2) SCC 611 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 857 : (1993) 24 ATC 798] observing : (Chander Shekhar case [(1997) 4 SCC 18 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 913] , SCC pp. 21-22, para 6) “6. The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 5 calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment.” (emphasis added) The Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma [(1997) 4 SCC 18 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 913] further explained that the majority view in Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) [1993 Supp (2) SCC 611 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 857 : (1993) 24 ATC 798] was not correct, rather the dissenting view by R.M. Sahai, J. was correct as the Court held as under : (SCC p. 22, para 6) “6. … The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview.”(emphasis added) 18. It may also be pertinent to mention here that in the aforesaid case reference to Rekha Chaturvedi [1993 Supp (3) SCC 168 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 951 : (1993) 25 ATC 234] appears to have been made by a typographical error as the said judgment is by a two-Judge Bench of this Court. In fact the Court wanted to make a reference to the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) [1993 Supp (2) SCC 611 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 857 : (1993) 24 ATC 798] . 19. In Bhupinderpal Singh v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 262 : 2000 WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 6 SCC (L&S) 639 : AIR 2000 SC 2011] this Court placing reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court held : (SCC p. 268, para 13) “13. … The High Court has held (i) that the cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules and if there be no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date as may be appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications; (ii) that if there be no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications have to be received by the competent authority. The view taken by the High Court is supported by several decisions of this Court and is therefore well settled and hence cannot be found fault with."(emphasis supplied) 20. This Court lately in State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari [(2012) 9 SCC 545 : (2012) 9 SCC (L&S) 795 : AIR 2012 SC 3281] held : (SCC p. 550, para 14) "14. A person who does not possess the requisite qualification cannot even apply for recruitment for the reason that his appointment would be contrary to the statutory rules, and would therefore, be void in law. Lacking eligibility for the post cannot be cured at any stage and appointing such a person would amount to serious illegality and not mere irregularity. Such a person cannot approach the court for any relief for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through court. (See Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal [1993 Supp (1) SCC 714 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 246 : (1993) 23 ATC 783] and Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission [(2008) 7 SCC 153 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 244] .)” (emphasis supplied) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission [(2008) 7 SCC 153 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 244] and State of Orissa v.Mamata Mohanty [(2011) 3 SCC 436 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 83] . 21. In the instant case, the appellant did not possess the requisite qualification on the last date of submission of the application though he WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 7 applied representing that he possessed the same. The letter of offer of appointment was issued to him which was provisional and conditional subject to the verification of educational qualification i.e. eligibility, character verification, etc. Clause 11 of the letter of offer of appointment dated 23-2-2009 made it clear that in case character is not certified or he did not possess the qualification, the services will be terminated. The legal proposition that emerges from the settled position of law as enumerated above is that the result of the examination does not relate back to the date of examination. A person would possess qualification only on the date of declaration of the result. Thus, in view of the above, no exception can be taken to the judgment of the High Court. 22. It also needs to be noted that like the present appellant there could be large number of candidates who were not eligible as per the requirement of rules/advertisement since they did not possess the required eligibility on the last date of submission of the application forms. Granting any benefit to the appellant would be violative of the doctrine of equality, a backbone of the fundamental rights under our Constitution. A large number of such candidates may not have applied considering themselves to be ineligible adhering to the statutory rules and the terms of the advertisement. 23. There is no obligation on the court to protect an illegal appointment. The extraordinary power of the court should be used only in an appropriate case to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the rights of others or create arbitrariness. Usurpation of a post by an ineligible candidate in any circumstance is impermissible. The process of verification and notice of termination in the instant case followed within a very short proximity of the appointment and was not delayed at all so as to even remotely give rise to an expectancy of continuance." 9. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid judgment is squarely applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. In view of aforesaid, such a direction cannot be issued to the authorities for the prayer so made by petitioner since there is no substantive or statutory right inherent in petitioner for grant of writ in WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 8 nature of such a mandamus. 11. In view of discussion made herein above, the petition being devoid of merit is dismissed at the admission stage itself. Parties to bear their own costs. October 16, 2025 Subodh/- WRIA No. 12254 of 2025 9 (Manish Mathur,J.) Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench