1 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1638 of 2025 Reserved on: 11.07.2025 Date of Decision: 28.07.2025. Surinder Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner Mr.Mukesh Sharma & DheerajThakur,Advocates. For the Respondent/State: Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 23 of 2024, dated 27.01.2024, registered at Police Station Sadar, Kullu, District Kullu, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), 1986. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. As per the prosecution's case, the police recovered 51 grams of heroin from the vehicle bearing registration No. PB02-EM-6978 and arrested Dalvinder Singh and Gursaheb Singh, the occupants of the vehicle. The name of the petitioner was not mentioned in the FIR. Dalvinder Singh, one of the occupants of the vehicle, is known to the petitioner as they are residing in the 3 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) same village. The petitioner is dealing in scrap, and Dalvinder Singh used to take money from the petitioner. Dalvinder Singh had returned a total amount of ₹ 65,000/- to the petitioner. The petitioner is implicated based on the statement made by Dalvinder Singh and the financial transaction. Hence the petition. 3. A perusal of the FIR shows that the police party was on traffic duty on 27.1.2024, when a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-02EM-6978 came from Kullu. The driver tried to reverse the vehicle after seeing the police. The police stopped the vehicle and apprehended the persons sitting inside it. The police searched the vehicle in the presence of independent witnesses, Puneet Rana and Parvinder Sharma. The driver of the vehicle bearing registration No. PB02- EM-6978 revealed his name as Dalvinder Singh. The 4 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) person sitting beside the driver revealed his name as Gursaheb Singh. The police asked the occupants of the vehicle to come out of it. Gursaheb Singh took out a packet from his pocket and concealed it in the vehicle. The police checked the packet and found 51 grams of heroin in it. The police arrested the occupants and seized the heroin. 4. The petitioner filed a bail petition before the learned Special Judge, Kullu, which was dismissed because the financial transactions were found between the petitioner and Dalvinder Singh, with the detailed record showing that Balvinder Singh and the petitioner were connected. 5. I have heard M/s. Mukesh Sharma and Dheeraj Thakur, Advocates for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State. 5 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) 6. Mr. Mukesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The police connected the petitioner to the present case with the help of the statement made by the co-accused, call detail records, and the financial transactions, which are not sufficient. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Anshul Rana vs. State of H.P., 2025 HHC 11014, in support of his submission. 7. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was named by the co- accused. This statement is duly corroborated by the financial transaction and the call detail record. There is sufficient material to interrogate the petitioner; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors are considered to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to 7 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) some extent interferes in the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 10. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that economic offences are to be treated differently from other offences. It was observed: Economic offences 78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of society. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain [Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105: 1998 SCC (Cri) 510], it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail. xxxxxx 80. Observing that an economic offence is committed with deliberate design with an eye 8 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community, in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal [State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal, (1987) 2 SCC 364: 1987 SCC (Cri) 364], it was held as under: (SCC p. 371, para 5) “5. … The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of the moment, upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit, regardless of the consequences to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white-collar crimes with a permissive eye, unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest.” 81. Observing that economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail, in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI [Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439: 9 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 552], the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p. 449, paras 34-35) “34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be viewed with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep- rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing a serious threat to the financial health of the country. 35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.” (emphasis supplied) 82. Referring to Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria [Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998) 1 SCC 52: 1998 SCC (Cri) 261], in Directorate of 10 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) Enforcement v. Bher Chand Tikaji Bora [Directorate of Enforcement v. Bher Chand Tikaji Bora, (1999) 5 SCC 720: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1045], while hearing an appeal by the Enforcement Directorate against the order [Bherchand Tikaji Bora v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Application No. 2140 of 1998, decided on 21-7-1998 (Bom)] of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court granting anticipatory bail to the respondent thereon, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Single Judge granting anticipatory bail. 11. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim 11 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 12. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in 12 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2087, that an accused dealing in narcotics should not be released on bail. It was observed: “9. To grant anticipatory bail in a case of this nature is not really warranted. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court fell into an error in granting anticipatory bail to the respondents.” 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) 15. It is undisputed that the petitioner was named by co-accused Dalvinder Singh. It was submitted that the statement made by the co- accused is not admissible. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2021 4 SCC (1) in support of this submission. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered this judgment in Union of India vs Khaliludeen 2022 Supreme SC 1247 and denied bail to the accused, who was named by the co-accused. It was observed: - “8. The answer to said question could be the statement recorded by Md. Nizam Uddin. The statement of Md. Jakir Hussain, recorded under Section 67 of the act, has also named his owner Abdul Hai. We are conscious of the fact that the validity and scope of such statements under Section 67 have been pronounced upon by this Court in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. In State by (NCB) Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta and Another, 2022 Live Law (SC) 69, the rigour of law laid down by this Court in 14 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) Tofan Singh was held to be applicable even at the stage of grant of bail. 9. However, going by the circumstances on record, at this stage, on the strength of the statement of Md. Nizam Uddin, though allegedly retracted later, the matter stands on a different footing. In our considered view, in the face of the mandate of Section 37 of the Act, the High Court could not and ought not to have released the accused on bail. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the view taken by the High Court and direct that both the appellants be taken in custody forthwith”. 16. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346, wherein it was held: “11. The information revealed by the above two accused persons indicated that both of them knew the respondent-accused and that they had connived with him to transport the illicit ganja, and that they were in direct contact with the respondent-accused all through his mobile number. The facts as unfurled from the complaint/FIR and the statements of the above two accused persons recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act reveal that the respondent-accused is the 15 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) kingpin and the organiser of the illicit trade in ganja xxxx 17. The quantity of “ganja” recovered is admittedly of commercial quantity. The High Court has not recorded any finding that the respondent-accused is not prima facie guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit the same offence when enlarged on bail; rather, his antecedents are indicative that he is a regular offender. In the absence of a recording of such satisfaction by the court, we are of the opinion that the High Court manifestly erred in enlarging the respondent-accused on bail. 17. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2087, that the accused cannot be released on pre-arrest bail relying upon the judgment in Tofan Singh (supra). It was observed: “4. The High Court decided to grant pre- arrest bail to the respondents on the only ground that no recovery was effected from the respondents and that they had been implicated only on the basis of the disclosure statement of the main accused, Dinesh 16 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) Kumar. Therefore, reliance was placed by the High Court in the majority judgment of this Court in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. xxxxx 8. In cases of this nature, the respondents may be able to take advantage of the decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), perhaps at the time of arguing the regular bail application or at the time of final hearing after the conclusion of the trial. 9. To grant anticipatory bail in a case of this nature is not really warranted. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court fell into an error in granting anticipatory bail to the respondents.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. These judgments were followed by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 458 of 2025, decided on 25.3.2025, and it was held that the pre-arrest bail can be denied to a person named by the co-accused to enable the police to interrogate the petitioner. An SLP No. 55547 of 2025 titled Rajesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. against this order was withdrawn on 21.4.2025. It was held by this Court in 17 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP 2025:HHC:20446 that a person named by the co-accused is not entitled to pre-arrest bail. This order was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jatinder Pal Singh vs. State of HP Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 9629/2025 decided on 10.07.2025. 19. Thus, the submission that the statement made by the co-accused is insufficient to justify the pre-trial detention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 20. In the present case, the petitioner was in touch with the co-accused, and the co-accused had transferred ₹65000/-to the petitioner. This material is prima facie sufficient to connect the petitioner with the commission of the crime. 21 It was submitted on behalf of the State that the petitioner is to be interrogated to determine 18 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) the source and the destination of the heroin. This submission is acceptable. Narcotics harm society, and it is necessary to trace their origin and destination. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed: - “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disintering much useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the 19 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offender.” 22. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: - “13. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must be also kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect is one of the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.” 20 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) 23. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed: “83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 24. Keeping in view the quantity of the narcotics in the present petition, the grant of pre- arrest bail is not justified. 25. The judgment in Anshul Rana (supra) dealt with the regular bail, which is to be decided on 21 ( 2025:HHC:24431 ) different parameters and does not apply to the present case. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 28. The observations made heretofore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 28th July, 2025. (veena)