( 2025:HHC:23328 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1653 of 2025 Reserved on: 14.07.2025 Date of Decision: 18th July, 2025. Roop Ram Shukla ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Mukesh Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 06/2025, dated 06.01.2025, registered at Police Station Rampur, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420, 406, and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) 2. This is the second round of the litigation. Earlier, the petitioner and his co-accused Madhu Bala had approached this Court seeking their pre-arrest bail in the same FIR. Their petitions were registered as Cr.MPM No.163 of 2025 and Cr.MPM 164 of 2025, respectively. Both the petitions were dismissed on 10.03.2025 by a common order. Co-accused Madhu Bala approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India seeking pre- arrest bail. Her petition was registered as Special Leave to Appeal Criminal No.4027/2025 and was dismissed on 24.03.2025. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was pleased to grant her two weeks, time to surrender and apply for regular bail. It appears that she has surrendered and was granted regular bail. The charge sheet has been filed against her before the Court. 3. The petitioner has again approached this Court to seek his pre-arrest bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was falsely implicated. He had no personal or financial dealings with the complainants. Statements of complainant No.2, Naresh Chandel and Kuldeep Azad are contradictory. The allegations of the complainant, Pankaj Thakur, and Devender Singh are false. Complainant Reena Devi and Wasim Khan had a transaction with Madhu Bala. The present petition has been filed due to a change 3 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) in the circumstances. The investigation has been completed. Hence the petition. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a copy of FIR stating that the petitioner and his co-accused are running a business in the name and style of One Touch Trading Solution Company. They used to collect money from different people by assuring them to give a handsome return of 15% on the invested money. The people invested various amounts with the petitioner and the co-accused. The petitioner and the co-accused failed to pay the assured return or even to return the money. The victims had borrowed the money from various sources to get a higher return, and they were unable to return the borrowed money. Petitioner- Roop Ram Shukla purchased four bighas of land at Narkanda, one plot at Uttarakhand and one kothi at Zirakpur with the money collected from people. The petitioner and the co-accused threatened the victims when they sought the return of their invested money. 5. I have heard Mr. Mukesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 4 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) 6. Mr. Mukesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. There are various contradictions in the statements of the complainants. The allegations are false. The co-accused has been released on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and that the petitioner be released on pre-arrest bail. 7. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner has absconded and he could not be arrested despite best efforts. The co-accused surrendered as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, and she was granted bail. The petitioner is to be interrogated regarding the money taken from various investors, and the extent of the fraud is to be unearthed; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submission made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power of 5 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre- arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 10. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper 6 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 11. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 12. It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that pre-arrest bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the 7 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was observed at page 501: “21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely enroped in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution. 22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563], wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34) “34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 8 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) 23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations which the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. A perusal of the FIR shows that the petitioner had taken money from various investors after assuring them a return of 15% of the amount. The FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner had purchased property at various places with the money so taken by him. This clearly shows that the petitioner had no intention to return the money, and false representations were made to get the money from the people. Therefore, there is a prima facie case against the petitioner. 15. It has been submitted that the petitioner has absconded. This appears to be correct because the petitioner has not surrendered after the dismissal of his earlier bail petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa Versus Mahimanand Mishra (2018) 10 SCC 516 that while 9 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) considering a bail application, the Court should also look at the possibility of the appearance of accused to face trial. When the accused had absconded and was arrested after a lookout circular was issued, he was not entitled to bail. 16. The petitioner is involved in the commission of an economic crime, which is committed after due deliberation. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that economic offences are to be treated differently from other offences while considering pre- arrest bail. It was observed: Economic offences 78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of society. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain [Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105: 1998 SCC (Cri) 510], it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail. xxxxxx 80. Observing that an economic offence is committed with deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community, in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal [State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal, (1987) 2 SCC 364: 1987 SCC (Cri) 364], it was held as under: (SCC p. 371, para 5) “5. … The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of the moment, upon passions 10 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit, regardless of the consequences to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white-collar crimes with a permissive eye, unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest.” 81. Observing that economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail, in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI [Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 552], the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p. 449, paras 34-35) “34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing a serious threat to the financial health of the country. 35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.” (emphasis supplied) 82. Referring to Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria [Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, 11 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) (1998) 1 SCC 52: 1998 SCC (Cri) 261], in Directorate of Enforcement v. Bher Chand Tikaji Bora [Directorate of Enforcement v. Bher Chand Tikaji Bora, (1999) 5 SCC 720: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1045], while hearing an appeal by the Enforcement Directorate against the order [Bherchand Tikaji Bora v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Application No. 2140 of 1998, decided on 21-7-1998 (Bom)] of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court granting anticipatory bail to the respondent thereon, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Single Judge granting anticipatory bail. 17. It was submitted on behalf of the State that custodial interrogation of the petitioner is required to unearth the extent of the fraud. This has to be accepted as correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed: - “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation- oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves 12 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offender” 18. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: - “13. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must be also kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect is one of the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.” 19. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed: “83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knew that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 20. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to pre-arrest bail on this consideration as well. 13 ( 2025:HHC:23328 ) 21. It was submitted that the co-accused has been granted bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This submission is not acceptable, the petitioner had purchased the properties, and the co-accused had not. The co-accused surrendered after the dismissal of her bail petition, whereas the petitioner is trying to evade the process of the law. The investigation against the co-accused is complete, and the charge sheet has been filed against her, whereas the investigation is continuing against the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any parity with the co-accused. 22. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to the concession of pre-arrest bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 23. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. 18th July, 2025 (Ritu) (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge