1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 637 of 2025 Decided on : 1.8.2025 Jorawar Singh & ors. …Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & ors. …Respondents ___________________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge Whether approved for reporting? ________________________________________________ For the Petitioners : Petitioners in person with Mr. T.S. Chauhan, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Surya Chauhan, Advocate. For the Respondents :Mr. Varun Chandel, Addl. A.G., for respondent No. 1. Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in person with Mr. Abhyuday Sharma, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge (oral) The petitioners have filed the present petition, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the B.N.S.S.) for quashing of FIR No. 145 of 2021, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the FIR in question’), registered under Sections 307, 326, 324 and 34 of the 2 Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’) and Section 25 (1-A) of the Arms Act with Police Station, Sadar Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, stated to be pending before the Court of learned Sessions Judge (Family Court), District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’). 2. The factual position, as emerges from the stand taken by the petitioners, and on the basis of reply filed by respondent No. 1, is that on 3.7.2021, complainant Divyansh Vaidya (respondent No. 2) made statement under Section 154 Cr. P.C., before S.I. Vijay Kumar, Incharge, P.P. City Mandi, disclosing therein, that on 2.7.2021, he alongwith his friend Anil Sharma (respondent No. 3) had gone to Ashoka Dhaba at Thaneda Bazar, where cousin of respondent No. 2, Hitesh Vaidya alongwith his friends Anil Sharma and Lakhwinder met them. All of them had their dinner and according to respondent No. 2, as deposed before the I.O., Aman and Lakhwinder had thereafter boarded 3 their car, in order to go to their home. Thereafter, at about 11:30 p.m., a white coloured car (Fortuner), being driven by its driver, came there from new bridge side and driver of the said car had stopped at a distance of about 8 to 10 feet from them. 3-4 young men came out of the said vehicle. One of them was having sword, in his hand. According to the complainant, the aforesaid persons, all of a sudden, attacked Anil Sharma and Hitesh Vaidya. 3. Thereafter, those persons boarded their white coloured Fortuner car and fled away from the spot. According to the complainant, he noticed that Anil Sharma and Hitesh Vaidya sustained grievous injuries. Blood was oozing out of the injuries and distal phalanges of finger of Anil Sharma is stated to have been chopped off. 4. Thereafter, Aman and Lakhwinder took Anil Sharma and complainant took Hitesh Vaidya to Zonal Hospital, Mandi, in their respective cars for treatment. 4 5. The complainant has also got recorded, in his statement that he had clicked the photographs of the aforesaid car with his mobile phone and read the registration number of the vehicle, as well. 6. On the basis of above facts, Police registered the FIR and criminal machinery swung into motion. After completion of investigation, Police had filed charge sheet, against the petitioners, which is stated to be pending, before the learned Sessions Judge (Family Court), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. 7. It is the further case of the petitioners that the accident in question had taken place, on account of sudden provocation and there was no intention. As per the further stand of the petitioners, parties to the dispute, i.e. petitioners, as well as, respondents No. 2 to 4, with the intervention of the respectables of the society, have now settled the dispute. The terms of the conditions of the compromise have been reduced into writing, and annexed with the petition, as Annexure P- 2. 5 8. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to quash the FIR in question, as well as, the proceedings, resultant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court. 9. When, put to notice, respondent No. 1 has filed the status report, disclosing therein about the fact how respondent No. 2 had made statement under Section 154 Cr. P.C., upon which, the Police registered the FIR in question, as referred above. After completion of investigation, the Police has filed charge sheet, against the petitioners, which is pending adjudication, before the learned trial Court. 10. It is also the specific case of the respondent- State that the case is pending before the learned trial Court and evidence has yet not been recorded, in this case. 11. Respondent No. 2, who, at one point of time, had levelled the allegations against the petitioners, put appearance before this Court and made statement on oath, regarding the manner, in which, he had lodged 6 the FIR in question and criminal machinery swung into motion, upon which, the Police has conducted investigation and filed charge sheet, against the petitioners, which is pending before the learned trial Court. 12. Apart from this, he has deposed that the settlement had taken place between them with regard to the incident in question. He has deposed, in unequivocal terms, that with the intervention of the respectables of the society, the matter has now been compromised. 13. On the basis of above facts, he has given his no objection, in case, the present petition is allowed by quashing the FIR in question. 14. The injured persons have been pleaded, in the present case, as respondents No. 3 and 4. Respondent No. 3 Anil Sharma, who had sustained grievous injuries, in this case, has also made statement, disclosing about the incident and compromise. Hitesh Vaidya (respondent No. 4), who also sustained injuries 7 in the accident in question, had deposed about the manner, in which, accident had taken place and deposed about the compromise, having been taken place, between the parties. 15. Petitioners have also made joint statement, in this regard. 16. On the basis of above facts, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that there is no previous criminal history of the petitioners, and according to him, the incident in question seems to have taken place in the spur of moment and the same was not pre-meditated. As such, it has been prayed that petitioners, as well as, respondents No. 2 to 4, are young persons and according to him, they have taken positive steps to settle the dispute and said efforts should be recognized by the Court. It has also been argued that the alleged injury on the person of Anil was not on the vital part of the body. 8 17. However, the prayer so made by the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, has been opposed by Mr. Varun Chandel, learned Addl. A.G., appearing for the respondent-State, on the ground that the petitioners have committed a serious offence, i.e. under Section 307 IPC. In this regard, he has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Laxmi Narayan & others, reported in (2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 688. 18. Heard. 19. First of all coming to the objections, so raised, by the learned Addl. A.G., qua the fact that in the present case, Section 307 of IPC has been added by the Police, as such, according to him, said matter cannot be compromised. 20. The arguments of learned Additional Advocate General holds no water, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Laxmi Narayan’s case (supra), had not created absolute prohibition by the Court to 9 exercise powers, under Section 482 Cr. P.C./528 of BNSS. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon paragraphs 14 and 15.4 of the judgment, which are reproduced as under: “14. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat (supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court has noted the difference between the power of compounding of offences conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 10 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court 11 is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at 12 immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge- sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” xxx xxx xxx 15.4 offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the 13 society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove” (self emphasis supplied) 21. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Laxmi Narayan’s case (supra), this Court is of the view that it is a case, where evidence has yet not been recorded, as such, there is no permanent prohibition for quashing the FIR, even if 14 the same is registered under Section 307 IPC. Moreover, the injury on the person of Anil is not on his vital part, as his distal phalanges of finger has been chopped off and there is nothing on the file/reply to show that there was any intention or knowledge on the part of the accused to cause death. 22. Moreover, this Court is satisfied with the genuineness of the compromise, Annexure P-2, entered into between the parties. 23. Acceptance of the compromise will not only help the petitioners and respondents No. 2 to 4 to live with peace and harmony, but will also save the precious judicial time of the learned trial Court, as the learned trial Court will be in a position to devote such time, for deciding some other serious disputes, pending before it. 24. In view of above, this Court is of the view that the petitioners are able to make out a case for quashing the FIR, under Section 528 of BNS/482 of 15 Cr.P.C., on the basis of compromise, having been effected between the parties. 25. Considering all these facts, the present petition is allowed and FIR in question, as well as, proceedings consequent thereto, pending adjudication before the learned trial Court, are quashed. 26. The statements of the parties and the compromise, Annexure P-2, be read as part of the judgment. 27. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (Virender Singh) Judge August 1, 2025 Kalpana