( 2025:HHC:25365 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 645 of 2025 Reserved on: 16.07.2025 Date of Decision: 30.07.2025 Prithi Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others ...Respondents _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Surinder Saklani, Advocate. For the respondent/ State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (in short “BNSS”) for quashing of F.I.R. No. 01 of 2018, dated 04.07.2018, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code (in 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2( 2025:HHC:25365 ) short “IPC”) and Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (in short “PC Act”) and consequent proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the respondent No.3- Jagdish Chand Jaswal, conducted the audit of several Cooperative Societies and he got recorded false/forged entries in the record maintained by the Sabha Secretaries. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police found embezzlement in different societies. ₹3,60,000/- were embezzled in Bharari Devi Krishi Seva Sehkari Sabha Samiti by Jagdish Chand Jaswal in connivance with the Secretary, Prithi Chand. ₹20,44,263/- were embezzled in Badagram Krishi Seva Sehkari Sabha Samiti by Jagdish Chand Jaswal in connivance with the Secretary, Kulwant Singh. Police also found embezzlement of ₹3,71,911/- in the Bagwara Krishi Seva Sehkari Sabha Samiti Avah Devi, committed by Jagdish Jaswal in connivance with the Secretary, Besari Ram and embezzlement of ₹4,33,263/- in Kehdru Krishi Seva Sehkari Sabha Smiti, committed by Jagdish Jaswal in connivance with the Secretary, Late Kashmir Chand. The petitioners have deposited the amount, and no objection certificate was issued by 3( 2025:HHC:25365 ) the Secretary. The investigation is not complete, and considerable time has elapsed. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. The matter has already been settled between the parties. Hence, the present petition for quashing of FIR. 3. I have heard Mr. Surinder Saklani, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent/State. 4. Mr. Surinder Saklani, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties, and the petitioners have deposited the money. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R., as well as consequential proceedings arising out of the same, be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.S. Gnaneshwaran Etc. Vs. The Inspector of Police & Anr. [2025 INSC 787], in support of his submission. 5. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the serious allegations were made against the 4( 2025:HHC:25365 ) petitioners regarding the falsification and misappropriation of the amount. The deposit of the amount will not absolve the petitioners of the commission of crime; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any; precise, clearly defined and 5( 2025:HHC:25365 ) sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the 6( 2025:HHC:25365 ) proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are 7( 2025:HHC:25365 ) neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 9. It was held in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234: 1988 SCC OnLine SC 80 that the Court has to determine whether the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint constitute a cognizable offence when the prosecution is at the initial stage. It was observed at page 695 7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish 8( 2025:HHC:25365 ) the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage. 10. The parameters for exercising jurisdiction to interfere with the investigations being carried out by the police were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, and it was observed at page 444: 13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29: (1943-44) 71 IA 203: AIR 1945 PC 18], the following principles of law emerge: 13.1. The police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences. 13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences. 13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report, the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. 9( 2025:HHC:25365 ) 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court.) 13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. 13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage. 13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity rather than an ordinary rule. 13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activity. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC. 13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping. 13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in the miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. 13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. 13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would 10( 2025:HHC:25365 ) be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law. During or after the investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate, which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure. 13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but the conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. 13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR. 11. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703: 11( 2025:HHC:25365 ) “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 12. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761. 33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well- established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court. 34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) 12( 2025:HHC:25365 ) “There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. *** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its own procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.” In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. 35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 13( 2025:HHC:25365 ) 37. 13( 2025:HHC:25365 ) 37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: “It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.” 38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.” What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case. 13. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them. However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498: 13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The 14( 2025:HHC:25365 ) Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged. 14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held: (Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) “5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the 15( 2025:HHC:25365 ) materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction. (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an 16( 2025:HHC:25365 ) instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.”(emphasis supplied) 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The contents of the petition show that the petitioners were posted as Sabha Secretaries. As per the prosecution, they had embezzled different amounts by falsification of the record. Mere deposit of the amount in such a situation will not wipe out the crime. It was laid down in Vishwa Nath v. State of J & K, (1983) 1 SCC 215: 1983 SCC (Cri) 173: 1983 SCC OnLine SC 15 that mere deposit of the embezzled amount does not absolve a person of the commission of the crime. It was observed: “6. We do not consider it necessary to refer to any decision. The facts and circumstances of this case clearly establish that there was embezzlement of government money by the accused, inasmuch as the accused had put to personal use the government money entrusted to him instead of depositing the same in the proper place. The fact that the accused refunded the amount when the act of his defalcation came to be discovered does not absolve him of the offence committed by him. The accused happened to be a public servant of the Police Department and was posted as Naib-Court. He was entrusted with the amount seized in two cases, FIR Nos. 16 and 17. In complete violation of the directions of law, he had failed to send the amount to Sadar Court, Udhampur and with criminal intention, he had not made any entry of the money in Rahdari Register while he made its entry in the 17( 2025:HHC:25365 ) Malkhana Register No. 1 so that his misappropriation of the amount might not be detected by anybody. He committed a criminal breach of trust with respect to this money over which he had complete dominion by putting the same to his use between February 7, 1972, and August 8, 1972. The refund of the amount after detection does not absolve him of the offence.” 16. The mere fact that the money has been deposited by the petitioners will not help them. 17. The police added the offence punishable under Section 13 of the PC Act during the investigation. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh, (2023) 6 SCC 559, that corruption is eroding public life, and it is the constitutional duty of the Courts to show zero tolerance to corruption. It was observed:- “47. We preface our discussion, leading to the answers to the above two questions, taking note of a dangerous and disquieting trend that obviously disturbs us without end. Though it is the preambular promise of the Constitution to secure social justice to the people of India by striving to achieve equal distribution of wealth, it is yet a distant dream. If not the main, one of the more prominent hurdles for achieving progress in this field is undoubtedly “corruption”. Corruption is a malaise, the presence of which is all-pervading in every walk of life. It is not now limited to the spheres of activities of governance; regrettably, responsible citizens say it has become a way of one's life. Indeed, it is a matter of disgrace for the entire community that not only on the one hand is there a steady decline in steadfastly pursuing the lofty ideals which the Founding Fathers of our Constitution had in 18( 2025:HHC:25365 ) mind, but degradation of moral values in society is rapidly on the rise on the other. Not much debate is required to trace the root of corruption. 48. “Greed”, regarded in Hinduism as one of the seven sins, has been overpowering in its impact. In fact, unsatiated greed for wealth has facilitated corruption to develop like cancer. If the corrupt succeed in duping the law enforcers, their success erodes even the fear of getting caught. They tend to bask under a hubris that rules and regulations are for humbler mortals and not them. To get caught, for them, is a sin. Little wonder, an outbreak of scams is commonly noticed. What is more distressing is the investigations/inquiries that follow. More often than not, these are botched and assume the proportion of bigger scams than the scams themselves. However, should this state of affairs be allowed to continue? Tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing them appropriately is the mandate of the PC Act. 49. “We the People”, with the adoption of our Constitution, had expected very high standards from people occupying positions of trust and responsibility in line with the constitutional ethos and values. Regrettably, that has not been possible because, inter alia, a small section of individuals inducted in public service for “serving the public” appears to have kept private interest above anything else and, in the process, amassed wealth not proportionate to their known sources of income at the cost of the nation. Although appropriate legislation is in place to prevent the cancer of corruption from growing and developing, where maximum punishment by way of imprisonment for ten years is stipulated, curbing it in adequate measure, much less eradicating it, is not only elusive but unthinkable in present times. 50. Since there exists no magic wand as in fairy tales, a swish of which could wipe out greed, the constitutional courts owe a duty to the people of the nation to show zero tolerance to corruption and come down heavily against 19( 2025:HHC:25365 ) the perpetrators of the crime while at the same time saving those innocent public servants, who unfortunately get entangled by men of dubious conduct acting from behind the screen with ulterior motives and/or to achieve vested interests. The task, no doubt, is onerous, but every effort ought to be made to achieve it by sifting the grain from the chaff. We leave the discussion here with the fervent hope of better times in future.” 18. It was further held that ordinarily, the Court should not quash the F.I.R. related to the corruption except in exceptional cases where there is absolutely no material or even a reasonable suspicion to support the case. This would harm innocent public servants, but it is a small price to pay to ensure probity in society. It was observed:- 80. Having regard to what we have observed above in paras 47 to 50 (supra) and to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the High Courts maintain a hands- off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, especially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could apply to the quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a PC Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for the High Courts to follow, in cases under the PC Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all, 20( 2025:HHC:25365 ) interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case. 81. Although what would constitute the special features has necessarily to depend on the peculiar facts of each case, interference could be made in exceptional cases where the records reveal absolutely no material to support even a reasonable suspicion of a public servant having intentionally enriched himself illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other than mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an investigation. 82. We quite appreciate that there could be cases of innocent public servants being entangled in investigations arising out of motivated complaints and the consequent mental agony, emotional pain and social stigma that they would have to encounter in the process, but this small price has to be paid if there is to be a society governed by the rule of law. While we do not intend to fetter the High Courts from intervening in appropriate cases, it is only just and proper to remind the courts to be careful, circumspect and cautious in quashing first information reports resting on mala fide of the nature alleged herein. 19. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR based on the fact that the amount has been deposited. 20. In N.S. In Gnaneshwaran’s case (supra), the loan was sanctioned by the Bank in favour of the company, which was deposited under a one-time settlement scheme. The Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the proceedings based on the compromise. In the present case, no loan was taken; rather, the money was embezzled by falsification of the record. The 21( 2025:HHC:25365 ) falsification of the record by the Sabha Secretaries, who are entrusted with the money of Society, is a serious offence. Quashing the FIR based on the deposit of the amount will encourage the like-minded Secretaries to misappropriate the amount, and if detected, deposit the same and get away. This would be subversive of the Rule of Law and cannot be allowed. 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to quash the FIR in the present case; therefore, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 23. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th July, 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez)