2025:HHC:28089 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1625 of 2025 Reserved on: 14.8.2025 Date of Decision: 20.08.2025. Gorakh Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Jiwan Kumar, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 50 of 2024, dated 19.9.2024, registered at Police Station Mcleodganj, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 118(1) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the petitioner caused injury to the victim on her neck with a knife. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:28089 The police have filed the charge sheet, and custody of the petitioner is not required. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report, asserting that the informant, Rekha (the victim), and the petitioner were serving in the Gangnam Korean Hotel, Mcleodganj. The informant and other staff members were closing the hotel on 18.9.2024, at around 10.20 PM. The petitioner picked up a knife and slashed Rekha’s neck. She was taken to the hospital. Intimation was given to the police. The police reached the hospital and recorded the informant’s statement. The police arrested the petitioner. Blood stains were found on his clothes. The CCTV footage was checked, and it was found that the petitioner had pushed Rekha and slashed her neck with the knife. The police seized the CCTV footage. The case property was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL). A report of analysis was issued stating that the DNA profile obtained from the knife/dagger matched the victim’s DNA profile. The DNA profile obtained from the blood lifted on 3 2025:HHC:28089 the spot matched the DNA profile of the victim and the petitioner. The DNA profile obtained from the T-shirt and Chappal matched the petitioner’s DNA profile. The charge sheet was presented before the Court. The matter was listed on 13.8.2025 for recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses. 4. I have heard Mr. Jiwan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr. Jiwan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. There is no evidence to prima facie conclude the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of BNS. The nature of the injury was not found to be dangerous to life. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had slashed the victim’s neck by using a dagger. It is not essential to cause injury to attract Section 109 of the BNS. It is sufficient that 4 2025:HHC:28089 the circumstances are such that if the death is caused, the person would be guilty of murder. In the present case, the use of a knife (a sharp-edged weapon) on the neck (a vital part) shows that had the death been caused, the petitioner would have been guilty of murder. Therefore, all the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of BNS are satisfied. The petitioner can intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as follows: - “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the 5 2025:HHC:28089 accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice”, has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: — “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the application for bail and observed: 6 2025:HHC:28089 “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report shows that the petitioner picked up a knife, pushed the victim and slashed her neck. The victim’s condition was critical, and she was referred to Dr. Rajendra Prasad Government Medical College, Tanda, for management. These facts show that had the death been caused, the petitioner would have been guilty of murder because he had used a 7 2025:HHC:28089 dangerous weapon (knife/dagger) to cause injury to a vital part (neck) of the victim. 11. It was submitted that the injuries were not stated to be dangerous to life, and the provisions of Section 109 of BNS are not attracted to the present case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Kanha @ Om Parkash (2019) 3 SCC 605 that causing bodily injury is not necessary to attract Section 307 of IPC (corresponding to Section 109 of BNS). It was observed:- “11. Several judgments of this Court have interpreted Section 307 of the Penal Code. In State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil, (1983) 2 SCC 28, this Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted: "9...To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of the injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still, there may be cases 8 2025:HHC:28089 in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be a criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof." This position in law was followed by subsequent benches of this Court. In State of M.P. v. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, this Court held thus: "13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present intent coupled with some overt act in the execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt." In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366, this Court held that to establish the commission of an offence under Section 307, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted: "12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused had attempted to commit 9 2025:HHC:28089 the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit the murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of the injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of the injury and severity of the blows given, etc." The above judgements of this Court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.” 12. Similar is the judgment in Chhanga @ Manoj Versus State of M.P. (2017) 11 SCC 115, wherein it was observed: “7. Neither of the points raised by Shri Garg appeals to us. First and foremost, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted in order that the charge under Section 307 be made out. It is enough if there is an intention coupled with some common act in execution thereof. This position has been repeatedly laid down by this Court in “State of M.P. vs. Kashiram and Others” (2009) 4 SCC 26 at paragraphs 12 to 16. In addition, in a recent Judgment in `Jage Ram and Others vs. State of 10 2025:HHC:28089 Haryana' (2015) 11 SCC 366, the law has been laid down as follows: “For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit the murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of the injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of the injury and severity of the blows given, etc.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Singh Versus State, 2022 (1) Crimes 133, that causing injury is not necessary to attract Section 307 of IPC. It was observed:- “18. Before we advert to the factual matrix or gauge the trustworthiness of the witnesses, it will be beneficial to brace ourselves with the case-law qua the essential conditions, requisite for bringing home a conviction under Section 307 IPC. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem @ Chamaru & Anr., (2005) 5 SCC 554, this Court, 11 2025:HHC:28089 while re-appreciating the true import of Section 307 IPC, held as follows: "12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of the injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still, there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be a criminal need not be a penultimate act. It is sufficient in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in the execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt." (Emphasis Applied) 12 2025:HHC:28089 19. These very ingredients have been accentuated in some of the later decisions, including in State of M.P. vs. Kashiram & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 26, Jage Ram & Ors. vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of M.P. vs. Kanha @ Om Prakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605. 20. It is by now a lucid dictum that for the purpose of constituting an offence under Section 307 IPC, there are two ingredients that a Court must consider, first, whether there was any intention or knowledge on the part of the accused to cause the death of the victim, and, second, such intent or knowledge was followed by some overt actus rea in the execution thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to whether or not any injury is inflicted upon the victim. The Courts may deduce such intent from the conduct of the accused and the surrounding circumstances of the offence, including the nature of the weapon used or the nature of the injury, if any. The manner in which the occurrence took place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim. It is thus not necessary that a victim shall have to suffer an injury dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307 IPC. 21. It would also be fruitful at this stage to appraise whether the requirement of 'motive' is indispensable for proving the charge of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC.” 14. Therefore, merely because the injury was not stated to be dangerous to life, an inference cannot be drawn that no offence punishable under Section 109 of BNS was made out. 15. The status report shows that the prosecution witnesses are yet to be examined. Therefore, releasing the petitioner on bail would adversely affect the fair trial. Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail at this stage. 13 2025:HHC:28089 16. No other point was urged. 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 18. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th August 2025 (Chander)