1 2025:HHC:29007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CrMMO No. : 789 of 2025 Decided on : 19.08 . 2025 Jamat Ali and others …Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and another …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the petitioners: Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. H.S. Rawat, Mr. Mohinder Zharaick and Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additional Advocates General, and Ms. Ranjna Patial, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No. 1. Virender Singh, Judge. (Oral) Petitioners have filed the present petition, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), for quashing of FIR No. 239 of 2022, dated 9th August, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR in question), registered under Sections 366, 376, 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:29007 506 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’), with Police Station Sadar Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, pending in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in the shape of Police Challan No. 7 of 2023, titled as State of H.P. versus Jamat Ali. 2. The relief of quashing has been sought, on the ground, that at the instance of respondent No. 2, FIR in question has been registered. After the completion of the investigation, the police has filed the charge sheet, which is pending before the learned trial Court. 3. It is the further case of the petitioners that after the registration of the FIR in question, respondent No. 2 realized that the said FIR has been got registered out of heat of anger and now, she has settled the dispute with the petitioners and the terms and conditions of the compromise have been reduced into writing, vide compromise, Annexure P-3. 3 2025:HHC:29007 4. On the basis of the said compromise, the prayer for quashing has been made. Alongwith the petition, photocopy of the FIR, report under Section 173 (2) CrPC and compromise have been annexed. 5. Perusal of the copy of the FIR shows that the criminal machinery was put to motion by respondent No. 2, by lodging the report on 9th August, 2022, disclosing therein, that on 4th June, 2022, she had gone to her paternal home from the matrimonial home at 11.00 a.m. At about 06.00 p.m., when she was on her way back to her matrimonial home and reached near Poled Temple, then, Haneef (petitioner No. 2) met her and inquired as to where she was going. They had talked with each other. Meanwhile, a truck, being driven by its driver came there, however, she could not remember the registration number of the said truck. When the said truck stopped near them, then, Haneef (petitioner No. 2) forcibly made her to sit in the truck. He himself also boarded the truck and took her to Pathankot. Haneef (petitioner No. 2) was calling the truck driver as Sham. Prior to reaching at Pathankot, the truck was got parked on the side of the road, where, 4 2025:HHC:29007 Haneef (petitioner No. 2) had forcibly raped her. Thereafter, she was taken to Pathankot bridge in the same truck, where, one Commander vehicle was parked. She was made to sit in the said Commander vehicle. In the said Commander vehicle, Jamat Ali (petitioner No. 1) was already there, who is cousin brother of the complainant (respondent No. 2). Another lady, namely Noor Bibi (petitioner No. 5) was also there. They took the complainant to a room at Sahnewal, where, Jamat Ali (petitioner No. 1) kept her for 4-5 days and made forcible physical relations with her. The owner of the said house was Dhuda (petitioner No. 4). Thereafter, Jamat Ali (petitioner No. 1) took her to Gobindgarh to a rented accommodation. He kept her there for two months and without her consent, made physical relations with her. Thereafter, when the complainant (prosecutrix) got an opportunity, she had called her husband Mohammad Deen, from the mobile phone of a neighbour tenant. 6. She has further got recorded that all the persons, involved in the crime, are her distant relatives. Lastly, she has levelled the allegations that Haneef 5 2025:HHC:29007 (petitioner No. 2) had hatched a conspiracy, with a view to solemnize her marriage with someone and enticed her away and raped her. Similar allegations have been levelled against Jamat Ali (petitioner No. 1). Jamat Ali (petitioner No. 1) took her to Court, after threatening her and obtained her signatures and proclaimed that now, he is married to her. Thereafter, she remained with Jamat Ali. Subsequently, her husband obtained search warrant and with the help of police, brought her back to Chamba, from Mandi Gobindgarh. According to the prosecutrix- complainant, at that time, she was frightened, as such, she could not disclose the true facts to the police and the Court. 7. On the basis of the above facts, the prosecutrix- complainant has prayed that action be taken against the accused persons. 8. After the registration of the FIR, the police filed the charge sheet against petitioners No. 1 and 2, under Sections 366, 376, 506 IPC and against petitioners No. 3 to 5, under Sections 506, 120-B IPC. 6 2025:HHC:29007 9. Now, the petitioners are before this Court, on the basis of the compromise, which has been annexed with the petition, as Annexure P-3. The compromise has been effected only on the ground that the FIR in question was lodged by respondent No. 2, due to some misunderstanding and now, they have amicably settled the matter. 10. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made by Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, that the continuation of the proceedings would be nothing, but, the abuse of the process of law. As such, the jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked to quash the FIR in question, by exercising the powers, under Section 528 of the BNSS. 11. The petitioner-accused has filed the present petition, under Section 528 of the BNSS, for quashing of the FIR in question, as well as, the consequential proceedings, which are stated to be pending before the learned trial Court. 7 2025:HHC:29007 12. Scope of Section 482 CrPC (Section 582 of the BNSS) has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the year 1992, in the case titled as State of Haryana versus Chaudhary Bhajan Lal & Others, reported as 1992 CrLJ 527, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has formulated the guidelines for exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC (Section 582 of the BNSS). Relevant paragraph 107, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “107. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, 8 2025:HHC:29007 accompanying the FIR. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate with the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FLR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only. a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 13. This view has again been reiterated by a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika 9 2025:HHC:29007 Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra & Others, reported as 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315. Relevant paragraph 38, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:- 38. In the case of Golconda Lingaswamy (supra), after considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra) and other decisions on the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in paragraphs 5, 7 and 8, it is observed and held as under: “5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle 10 2025:HHC:29007 quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of 11 2025:HHC:29007 the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death….. 8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of 12 2025:HHC:29007 Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognisance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/FIR has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/FIR is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding.” 13 2025:HHC:29007 14. It is no longer res integra that at the time of deciding the petition, under Section 482 CrPC (Section 582 of the BNSS), this Court cannot assume the powers of the appellate/revisional Court, nor, this Court can act as trial Court. While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided by the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu & Another versus State of Andhra Pradesh & Another, reported as (2019) 10 SCALE 239. Relevant paragraph 15, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:- “15. In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it were a trial Court. The Court is only to be prima facie satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate materials and documents on record, but it cannot appreciate the evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 15. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar & Others versus State of Bihar & Another, reported as (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 241. 16. In view of the above, now, this Court would proceed to consider, as to whether, the relief of quashing 14 2025:HHC:29007 can be granted to the petitioners, in this case, on the basis of the compromise, allegedly taken place between the complainant-prosecutrix (respondent No. 2) and the accused persons (petitioners). 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another, reported in (2014) 6 Supreme Court Cases 466, has discussed the powers of the Court, under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS), however, in para 29.3, certain restrictions have been imposed, upon the powers of this Court, to quash the proceedings, in serious and heinous offences, like, murder, rape, dacoity, etc., by holding that such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Relevant para 29.3, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.” 15 2025:HHC:29007 18. The petitioners have sought the relief, on the basis of the compromise and even, in the compromise, reason for settlement has been mentioned that the FIR in question was lodged by respondent No. 2, due to some misunderstanding, whereas, she has specifically levelled the allegations against petitioners No. 1 and 2. Similarly, she has also levelled serious allegations against petitioners No. 3 to 5. 19. It is not a case, where, the consensual relationship has been given the colour of rape. In this case, respondent No. 2 (prosecutrix-complainant), being a married lady, had been forcibly taken away by petitioner No. 2, who, not only raped her, in the truck, rather, had forcibly made her to sit in the Commander Jeep and took her to Ludhiana, alongwith petitioner No. 1-Jamat Ali, who is respondent No. 2’s cousin brother. Petitioner No. 1 has also raped her and kept her forcibly in a room at Sahnewal, Punjab. 20. Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this 16 2025:HHC:29007 Court, as to how, the matter can be compromised, where serious allegations of mental depravity have been levelled. 21. It is not a simple case that the prosecutrix was raped on the pretext of marriage, or, where the parties have solemnized marriage with each other and then, approached this Court, for compromise. 22. From the allegations, so levelled, in the FIR in question, the inference of consensual relationship cannot be drawn, at this stage. The allegations of force, keeping the complainant-prosecutrix (respondent No. 2) forcibly in a room at Sahnewal and Mandi Gobindgarh and obtaining her signatures over the papers, speak voluminously, about the seriousness of the offences. 23. Merely, on the sweet will of respondent No. 2, if the present petition is allowed, on the basis of the alleged compromise, then, it would encourage other persons also, to put the criminal machinery into motion, by levelling such type of allegations and thereafter, approaching the Court, for getting the FIR quashed, merely, on the a basis of the vague averments, as made in the compromise. 17 2025:HHC:29007 24. Another aspect of the case, which is liable to be highlighted, is that the stream of justice cannot be curtailed down, on the basis of the alleged compromise, as, seriousness of the allegations, as highlighted above, is also one of the considerations, to accept or reject the plea of compromise. 25. If the allegations, levelled by respondent No. 2, against the accused persons-petitioners, are proved to be false, then, the plea of compromise is not liable to be accepted, as, the present compromise would be noting, but a futile attempt to save herself from the penal consequences, for levelling false allegations. On the other hand, if those allegations are proved to be true, then, the petitioners (accused persons) would face the consequences, as per the law. 26. In both the eventualities, when the crime of rape is held to be having serious impact on the society, then, this Court is of the view that the plea of compromise, is not liable to be accepted, in the present case. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. 18 2025:HHC:29007 27. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as, these observations are confined only to the disposal of the present petition. 28. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge August 19, 2025 ( rajni )