IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI TUESDAY ,THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE B S BHANUMATHI CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1382 OF 2024 AND CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1383 OF 2024 CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1382 OF 2024 Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, being aggrieved by the Order Dt. 12.3.2024 passed in I.A. No. 91 of 2024 in O.S No. 128 of 2022 on the file of the Court of learned III Additional District Judge, Nellore. Between: Pulipati Venkata Rathnam, S/o. Buchi Naidu, aged 55 years, R/o D.No. 7-480, 1ST Street, Santhi Nagar, Nellore city, SPSR Nellore District. ...PETITIONER/ PETITIONER/PROPOSED 4^^ DEFENDANT AND Bellamkonda Krishnaiah, S/o. Penchalaiah, Aged about 49 years, R/o Paturivari Kandriga Village Venkatachalam Mandal, SPSR Nellore District. ’ ...RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF 1. Bellamkonda Jayamma, , W/o Bellamkonda Chinnaiah, Aged 62 years, R/o D.No.26-15-133, Mini bypass Road Vanamthopu, Kondayapalem Nellore City, SPSR Nellore District. 2. Bellamkonda Vani, , W/o. Chinnaiah, Aged 52 years, R/o D.No. 27-7/938, 7TH Cross Road, Saraswathi Nagar, Nellore -2, SPSR Nellore District. 3. Bellamkonda Chinnaiah,, S/o. Late Venkataiah, Aged about 66 years, R/o D.No.26-15-133, Mini Bypass Road, Vanamthopu, Kondayapalem, Nellore city, SPSR Nellore District. ...RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS 1 TO 3 lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings in O.S No. 128 of 2022 on the file of the Court of learned III Additional District Judge, Nellore, pending disposal of the main CRP. CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1383 OF 2024 Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, aggrieved by the Order Dt. 12.3.2024 passed in I.A. No. 97 of 2024 in O.S No. Ill of 2022 on the file of the Court of learned III Additional District Judge, Nellore. Between: Pulipati Venkata Rathnam,, S/o Buchi Naidu, aged 55 years, R/o D. No. 7-480, 1st Street, Santhi Nagar, Nellore City, SPSR Nellore District. - ...PETITIONER/ PETITIONER/PROPOSED 4^” DEFENDANT AND Vallepu Yasodamma,, W/o Balaiah, Aged about 51 years, R/o Paturivari Kandriga Village, Muthukur Mandal, SPSR Nellore District. ...RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF / ?■ Bellamkonda Jayamma,, W/o Bellamkonda Chinnaiah, Aged 62 years, R/o D.No.26-15-133, Mini bypass Road, Vanamthopu, Kondayapalem Nellore City, SPSR Nellore District. 1. if / Bellamkonda Vani,, W/o. Chinnaiah, Aged 52 years, R/o D.No.27-7/938 7th Cross Road, Saraswathi Nagar, Nellore -2, SPSR Nellore District. 2. Bellamkonda Chinnaiah,, S/o. Late Venkataiah, Aged about 66 years, R/o D.No.26-15-133, Mini Bypass Road, Vanamthopu, Kondayapalem Nellore City, SPSR Nellore District. 3. ...RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS 1 TO 3 lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings in O.S No. Ill of 2022 on the file of the Court of learned III Additional District Judge, Nellore, pending disposal of the main CRP. Counsel for the Petitioner in both revision petition : SRI DIVYATHEJA GADIKOTA Counsel for the Respondents in both revision petition : NO REPRESENTATION The Court made the following COMMON ORDER : 1 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 APHC010275152024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3311] TUESDAY, THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE B S BHANUMATHI CIVIL REVISION PETITION NOs: 1382 & 1383/2024 Between: Pulipati Venkata Rathnam ...PETITIONER AND Bellamkonda Krishnaiah and Others Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.DIVYATHEJAGADIKOTA Counsel for the Respondent(S): ...RESPONDENT(S) 1. The Court made the following: I 2 BSB, J C.R.P.NOS.1382 & 1383 of 2024 COMMON ORDER: These revisions are directed against the orders, dated 12.03.2024, dismissing I.A.No.91 of 2024 in O.S.No.128 of 2022 and I.A.No.97 of 2024 in O.S.No.111 of 2022 respectively on the file of the Court of III Additional District Judge, Nellore, filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to implead the petitioner therein as defendant No.4 in the suit and to allow the consequential amendment. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. In spite of service of notice on respondents 1 to 4, there is no appearance. 3. As the defendants in both the suits and the proposed party sought to be impleaded as defendant No.4 are one and the same, both these revisions are heard together and a common order is passed. The facts that lead to filing of these applications seeking to 4. implead the proposed party as stated in the affidavits filed in support of the applications, in brief, are as follows: The 1®' and the 3^'^ defendants in these suits, viz., O.S.Nos.128 of a. 2022 and 111 of 2022, namely, Bellamkonda Jayamma and BellamkondaChinnaiah,filed a suit in O.S.No.104of 2023 on the file of the Court of III Additional District Judge, Nellore, for specific perforrtiance of agreement of sale, dated 08.09.2017, coupled with the 3 BSBJ C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 memorandum of understanding, dated 06.12.2019, and to execute the registered sale deed in their favour or their nominees. In the said suit (O.S.No.104 of 2023), the plaintiffs, who are the 1 rd and the 3 defendants herein, admitted that marketing agreement, dated 06.12.2019, relating to 16 plots was executed in favour of the proposed defendant. Another marketing agreement, dated 06.12.2019, relating to 108 plots was also executed by the 1"* and the O'"' defendants herein in favour of the proposed defendant. The 3^^^ defendant is the agent of the 1®* and the 3'^^ defendants under general power of attorney. Subsequent to the execution of memorandum of understanding, dated 06.12.2019, and marketing agreements, the 2 nd defendant executed settlement deeds in favour of her son and daughter ignoring the memorandum of understanding and marketing agreements, dated 06.12.2019. The 1®‘ and the 3'*^ defendants, in collusion with the plaintiff herein, filed the present suits to grab the suit schedule property with fabricated agreement of sale. In the event the suits are decreed, it would affect the rights of the proposed party over the suit schedule property under the marketing agreements, dated 06.12.2019. protect the rights of the proposed party over the suit schedule property, it is just and necessary to add the proposed party as 4'^ defendant in the present suits. Hence, in order to 4 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 The 1®‘ plaintiff filed counter stating that the suit was filed seeking a direction to execute registered sale deed pursuant to the agreement of b. sale, dated 31.03.2016 in favour of the plaintiff. The said agreement was executed between the plaintiff and the defendants and the proposed party is not a party to the suit document and hence, the proposed party is not a necessary party. The suit in O.S.No.104 of 2023 has nothing to do with the plaintiff. The memorandum of understanding cannot be enforced. No absolute rights over the suit schedule property are conveyed in favour of the proposed party. To decide and determine the issues in the suits, the proposed party is not a necessary party. If the proposed party has any grievance, his remedy lies elsewhere, but not in these suits. The 2"^^ and the 4'^ defendants filed separate counters denying the allegations in the petition and contending that the present suits were filed against the defendants seeking specific performance of agreement of sale executed by the 4**^ defendant as general power of attorney of the 2'^'^ and the 3*^^ respondents and the petitioner is a stranger to the suit agreement of sale and the proposed party is claiming a right which is independent to a suit agreement of sale and even as per the decision of the apex Court, third party to an agreement of sale who claims right independent of such agreement does not become a necessary party to c. 5 * BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 \ the suit for specific performance and as such, the petitioner is not a necessary party to the suit. The petition is filed only to protract the \ proceedings and hence, it is liable to be dismissed. The 3'^'^ defendant filed a counter contending that the petition is not maintainable as the proposed party is not a necessary party for adjudication of the real controversy involved in the suit and the d. marketing agreement was not executed on 06.12.2019 by this defendant and no original general power of attorney was filed. It is further contended that the proposed party is not remedyless and he can nd sue independently by filing a separate suit against the 1 and the 2 defendants. The petition is liable to be dismissed. After hearing both parties, the trial Court dismissed the petitions observing that the suit filed by the 1®’ and the 3’’^ defendants against the 5. petitioner in O.S.No.104 of 2023 is still pending and as such, the petitioner can agitate his remedy in the said suit. It further observed respondent/plaintiff is for specific performance of the agreement of sale executed in favour of the 1®* and St that since the suit filed by the 1 rd defendants, the petitioner who is a stranger to the said the 3 agreement is not at all either a necessary or a proper party to the present suits. 6. Hence, these revision petitions were filed by the proposed party. 6 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the proposed party is a necessary and proper party and if the lis is adjudicated in the absence of the petitioner, the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and hardship as the properties involved in these suits and the marketing agreements, dated 06.12.2019, are in respect of one and the same issue. The learned counsel further submitted that if the impugned order is not set aside, the petitioner would be put to serious prejudice. 8. Before proceeding further, it is apt to refer to the legal position on the point. In Vidur Impex & Traders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. ^, it was observed by the Supreme Court as under: i) "36. Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made in some of the aforementioned judgments, the broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment are: 1. The Court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application made by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit. ^ AIR 2012 SC 2925 7 BSB/J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the Court. 3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made. 4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the Court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff. 5. In a suit for specific performance, the Court can order impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above board, and who files application for being joined as party within reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about the pending litigation. 6. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction transaction made by the owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint order passed by the Court or the application is unduly delayed then the Court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for impleadment." or a ii). The Supreme Court in the case of Mumbai International Airport Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors^, observed as under; “12. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order I of Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded 'AIR 2010 SC 3109 r 8 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo moto or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. This Court in Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. Invest Import. [1980; INSC;197 : 1981 (1) SCC 80], reiterated the classic definition of 'discretion' by Lord Mansfield in R. vs. Wilkes - [1770 (98) ER 327] that 'discretion' when applied to courts of justice, sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, 'but legal and regular'. We may now give some illustrations regarding exercise of discretion under the said Sub-Rule. 12.1) If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a person as a defendant on the ground that he is a necessary party, the court may implead him having regard to the provisions of Rules 9 and 10(2) of Order I. If the claim against such a person is barred by limitation, it may refuse to add him as a party and even dismiss the suit for non-joinder of a necessary party. as a on an means 9 C.R.P.Nos.1382 12.2) If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an additional prayer for delivery of physical possession from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a necessary party in so far as the prayer for actual possession. 12.3) If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment, then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to be a necessary party, the court may proceed to dismiss the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. Court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and court finds him to be a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the. scope of the specific performance suit; or the court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of 'P' representing that he is the co-owner with half share, and 'P' files a suit for i r 10 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half share, the court may permit the other co owner who contends that 'D' has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the vendor- defendant to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit, only the issues relating to specific performance, that is whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party." Keeping the above principles in view, the facts in the present 9. case are to be examined. 1 BSB,J ^ C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 11 According to the revision petitioner/proposed party, he has interest in the suit schedule property by virtue of the above refered documents, and therefore, he is a necessary and proper party to the suit. It is his further case that the 1®* and the 3'^^ defendants admitted in 10. O.S.No.104 of 2003 about execution of the marketing agreement in his favour. On the other hand, it is the case of the 1®^ respondent/plaintiff that the proposed party is not at all a necessary and proper party to the surt since the plaintiff is a dominus litis and cannot be compelled to proceed against any party against his wish. 11. On a consideration of the pleadings of both parties, it is not clear as to whether the property covered under the aforesaid agreements and the property covered by the suit schedule are one and the same or not. 12. Admittedly, the petitioner is not a purchaser of the property from the defendants. Even according to the petitioner, he only entered into a memorandum of understanding and marketing agreement. However, he did not file either the memorandum of understanding or the marketing agreement. When it is the serious contention of the petitioner that if the suit is decreed, it will affect his rights over the suit schedule property under the marketing agreement/memorandum of understanding, he ought to have filed those documents. 12 BSB, J C.R.P.Nos.1382 & 1383 of 2024 13. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the matter, the Civil Revision Petitions are disposed of, setting aside the impugned orders, dated 12.03.2024, and granting liberty to the petitioner to file the documents as per law and thereafter, the trial Court shall dispose of the petition afresh in the light of the said documents, if admissible under law. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.^ SD/- U.SRIDEVI ASSISTANT REGISTRAR A //TRUE COPY// SECTON OFFICER To, 1. The III Additional District Judge, Nellore, SPSR Nellore District 2. Five CCs to Sri Divyatheja Gadikota Advocate [OPUC] 3. THREE CD COPIES stu TAC HIGH COURT DATED: 21/01/2025 COMMON ORDER CRP.No.1382 and 1383 of 2024 AND/7^ g U FEB 2025 -F\ o\ mf Current Section DISPOSING OF THE CIVIL REVISION PETITIONS