IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE Present :- The Hon’ble Justice PARTHA SARATHI SEN WPA 8508 of 2023 With CAN 2 of 2024 With CAN 3 of 2025 With CAN 4 of 2025 Apu Rice Mill Private Limited Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. For the petitioner: Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, Adv., Mr. Abirlal Chakravorti, Adv., Mr. Sayan Banerjee, Adv. For the State: Mr. Chandi Charan De, AGP Mr. Anirban Sarkar, Adv., Ms. Chandana Ghosh, Adv. Hearing concluded on: 25.07. 2025. Judgment on: 25.07.2025. PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J. : – 1. By filing the instant writ petition the writ petitioner has prayed for issuance of appropriate writ/writs against the respondents/authorities for consideration of the representation as submitted before them by the writ petitioner, for quashing and/or canceling the tender dated 06.01.2023 in 2 respect of the plot of land particulars of which has been mentioned in paragraph no. 4 of the instant writ petition, for recalling and/or quashing of the work order dated 31.01.2023 along with other ancillary reliefs. 2. At the time of hearing, Mr. Chatterjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner at the very outset draws attention of this Court to page no. 47 of the instant writ petition being a copy of memo dated 25.11.2014 as issued by the respondent no. 5/authority in favour of the respondent no. 4/authority whereby and whereunder the proposal for long term lease as submitted by the writ petitioner/company in respect of the aforementioned land was forwarded to the respondent no. 4/authority. 3. In course of his submission Mr. Chatterjee further draws attention of this Court to page nos. 50A and 51 of the instant writ petition being a copy of the order dated 16.12.2025 as passed by the respondent no. 5/authority. It is submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that on careful perusal of the proposal as given by the writ petitioner the said respondent no. 5/authority came to a finding that the said plot of land may be settled in favour of the writ petitioner on long term basis following the Rules 2 to 3 of W.B.L.R. Manual, 1991 subject to payment of „salami‟ as well as annual rent. 4. It is further submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that all on a sudden the respondents/authorities had taken a contrary decision for interdepartmental transfer of the said Government land in favour of Panchayat and Rural Development Department allegedly for solid waste 3 management scheme without considering the said order dated 16.12.2015 as passed by the respondent no. 5/authority wherein recommendation has been made for allotment of the said land in favour of the writ petitioner. It is submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that despite submission of several representations by and/or on behalf of the writ petitioner, the respondents/authorities failed and neglected to consider the genuine grievance of the writ petitioner and the said authorities being authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution of India had failed to act in a just and proper manner in refuting the genuine claim of the writ petitioner. It is thus submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that it is a fit case for allowing the instant writ petition in terms in terms of the prayers made therein. 5. Per contra, Mr. De, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State at the very outset raises the question of maintainability of the instant writ petition in view of the provisions of Section 6(b) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to the „said Act of 1997‟ in short) read with Section 2(r) of the self- same Act of 1997. It is submitted by Mr. De that since the writ petitioner has practically made a complaint regarding inaction and/or culpable negligence on the part of the respondent no. 5/authority even after passing of the order dated 16.12.2015, the instant writ petition is not maintainable before this Court. 4 6. In his next fold of submission, Mr. De draws attention of this Court to the report supported by affidavit as filed by the respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 and as affirmed on 08.06.2023. It is submitted by Mr. De that from the said report, it would reveal that though by passing the order dated 16.12.2015 by the respondent no. 5/authority, a fabourable observation has been made by the said authority in favour of the writ petitioner but by no stretch of imagination it can be said that on account of such favourable observation, a valuable right has accrued in favour of the writ petitioner inasmuch as on behalf of the writ petitioner no material could be placed before this Court that pursuant to such observation, the respondents/authorities, more specifically, the respondent no. 2/authority and/or the respondent no. 3/authority had executed any long term lease in favour of the writ petitioner. 7. It is further submitted that after passing of the aforementioned order dated 16.12.2015, the respondents/authorities, more specifically the respondent no. 1/authority received a proposal for interdepartmental transfer from the respondent no. 2/authority for a public purpose and for the said reason, the said public purpose was prioritized and accordingly, the interdepartmental transfer has been made in favour of the Panchayat and Rural Development so as to enable them to initiate a work of public interest over the said land. 5 8. It is thus submitted by Mr. De that the writ petitioner has miserably failed to prove violation of its legal and/or constitutional right and, therefore, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. In his reply, Mr. Chatterjee, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petition, however, disputed the contention of Mr. De regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition. It is contended by him that from the prayers as made in the instant writ petition, it would reveal that no prayer has been made in the instant writ petition complaining inaction and/or culpable negligence on the part of the respondent no. 5/authority. 10. On careful consideration of the entire materials as placed before this Court and after hearing the learned advocates for the contending parties, if I look to the order dated 16.12.2015 as passed by the respondent no. 5/authority vis-à-vis the prayers made in the instant writ petition, it appears to this Court that in the instant writ petition, the writ petitioner was not at all aggrieved with the inaction and/or culpable negligence on the part of the respondent no. 5/authority. 11. Rather it appears to this Court that the writ petitioner is really aggrieved that despite passing a favourable order by the respondent no. 5/authority, the other respondents/authorities for the reasons best known to them had completely overlooked such favourable recommendation of the respondent no. 5/authority and without giving an opportunity of hearing to the writ 6 petitioner allowed interdepartmental transfer in favour of the Panchayat and Rural Development. 12. In view of such, this Court finds no merit in the submission of Mr. De inasmuch as by filing the instant writ petition, the writ petitioner has not made any complaint with regard to the inaction and/or culpable negligence on the part of the respondent no. 5/authority. 13. In view of such, this Court holds that the instant writ petition is very much maintainable. 14. At this juncture, if I once again look to the said order dated 16.12.2015 as passed by the respondent no. 5/authority, it reveals that under cover of the said order, the respondent no. 5/authority on receipt of the proposal for long term lease from the writ petitioner through the respondent no. 4/authority duly considered such proposal and came to a positive finding that the land in-question may be settled on long term basis in favour of the writ petitioner. 15. As rightly pointed out by Mr. De that the said order dated 16.12.2015 was merely a favourable recommendation and no material could be placed on behalf of the writ petitioner that in terms of such favourable recommendation, the respondents/authorities, more specifically, the respondent no. 1/authority had directed for payment of „salami‟ and/or annual rent and/or had taken any positive steps for execution of a long term lease deed in favour of the writ petitioner. 7 16. It thus appears to this Court that on the basis of the said order dated 16.12.2015, in fact, no valuable right accrues in favour of the writ petitioner. Rather it appears to this Court that at best a legitimate expectation arose in the mind of the writ petitioner on account of favourable recommendation pursuant to the said order dated 16.012.2015. 17. For the sake of argument, even if, I accept that the respondent no. 1/authority has not acted in an appropriate manner while negating the prayer for long term lease of the writ petitioner, however, from the report as submitted before this Court on behalf of the respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6, it appears that in respect of the self-same land, the respondent no. 1/authority has received a proposal for interdepartmental transfer from the respondent no. 2/authority for public purpose where the Panchayat and Rural Development has proposed to set up an infrastructure for dumping garbage. 18. At this juncture I propose to look to the action of the respondent/authorities, more specifically of the respondent no.5/ authority while passing the order dated 16.12.2015 from the angle of “Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation” though the learned advocates for the contending parties to the instant writ petition have made no deliberations on such doctrine. 8 19. In order to understand the “Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation” this Court proposes to look to a Constitutional Bench decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Sivanandan C.T and Ors. vs. High Court of Kerala and Ors. reported in (2024) 3 SCC 799, the relevant portions of which are quoted hereinbelow in verbatim:- “………… (a) Doctrine of legitimate expectation under common law 18. The basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is founded on the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness in Government dealings with individuals. It recognizes that a public authority's promise or past conduct will give rise to a legitimate expectation. The doctrine is premised on the notion that public authorities, while performing their public duties, ought to honour their promises or past practices. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred if it is rooted in law, custom, or established procedure. ……………………………………………...……………………………………… 23. The doctrine of legitimate expectation emerged as a common law doctrine to guarantee procedural fairness and propriety in administrative actions. Legitimate expectation was developed by the courts to require a degree of procedural fairness by public authorities in their dealings with individuals. Denial of an assured benefit or advantage was accepted as a ground to challenge the decision of a public authority. ……………………………………………………………….. 25. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. reported in (1993) 3 SCC 499 this Court clarified the contours of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the following terms: (i) legitimate expectation arises based on a representation or past conduct of a public authority: (ii) legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular or natural sequence: (iii) legitimate expectation provides locus standi to a claimant for judicial review: (iv) the doctrine is mostly confined to a right of a fair hearing before a decision and does not give scope to claim relief straightaway; (v) 9 the public authority should justify the denial of a person's legitimate expectation by resorting to overriding public interest; and (vi) the courts cannot interfere with the decision of an authority taken by way of policy or public interest unless such decision amounts to an abuse of power. …………………………………………………………… 27.A claim based on the doctrine of procedural legitimate expectation arises where a claimant expects the public authority to follow a particular procedure before taking a decision. This is in contradistinction to the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation where a claimant expects conferral of a substantive benefit based on the existing promise or practice of the public authority. The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation has now been accepted as an integral part of both the common law as well as Indian jurisprudence. ……………………..………………………………… 34. This Court has consistently held that a legitimate expectation must always yield to the larger public interest. In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA21, this Court clarified that legitimate expectation will not be applicable where the decision of the public authority is based on a public policy or is in the public interest, unless the action amounts to an abuse of power. The doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to fetter valid exercise of administrative discretion. 22 In P. Suseela v. UGC23, the claimants challenged the UGC Regulations which made it mandatory for candidates seeking to be appointed to the post of Lecturer or Assistant Professor to qualify at the NET examination. The Court held that the legitimate expectation of the claimants must yield to the larger public interest having highly qualified Assistant Professors and Lecturers to teach in educational institutions governed by the UGC. …………….………………………….. 38. The doctrine of legitimate expectation does not impede or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay down a policy or withdraw it. The public authority has the discretion to exercise the full range of choices available within its executive power. The public authority often has to take into consideration diverse factors, concerns, and interests before arriving at a particular policy decision. The courts are generally cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of public authorities which denies a legitimate expectation provided 10 such a decision is taken in the larger public interest. Thus, public interest serves as a limitation on the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Courts have to determine whether the public interest is compelling and sufficient to outweigh the legitimate expectation of the claimant. While performing a balancing exercise, courts have to often grapple with the issues of burden and standard of proof required to dislodge the claim of legitimate expectation. ………………..…………………………. 46. From the above discussion, it is evident that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is entrenched in Indian administrative law subject to the limitations on its applicability in given factual situations. The development of Indian jurisprudence is keeping in line with the developments in the common law. The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation can be successfully invoked by individuals to claim substantive benefits or entitlements based on an existing promise or practice of a public authority. However, it is important to clarify that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot serve as an independent basis for judicial review of decisions taken by public authorities. Such a limitation is now well recognized in Indian jurisprudence considering the fact that a legitimate expectation is not a legal right. 33 It is merely an expectation to avail a benefit or relief based on an existing promise or practice. Although the decision by a public authority to deny legitimate expectation may be termed as arbitrary, unfair, or abuse of power, the validity of the decision itself can only be questioned on established principles of equality and non-arbitrariness under Article 14. In a nutshell, an individual who claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to establish: (i) the legitimacy of the expectation; and (ii) that the denial of the legitimate expectation led to the violation of Article 14. ………………………………………………….. 57. The following are our conclusions in view of the above discussions: 57.1. The principles of good administration require that the decisions of public authorities must withstand the test of consistency, transparency, and predictability to avoid being termed as arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 57.2. An individual who claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation has to establish the 11 following: (i) the legitimacy of the expectation; and that (ii) the denial of the legitimate expectation led to a violation of Article 14: 57.3. A public authority must objectively demonstrate by placing relevant material before the court that its decision was in the public interest to frustrate a claim of legitimate expectation; ………………………………………….” 17. Keeping in mind the aforementioned principle of law if I consider the said “Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation” in the context of the factual scenarios as involved in the instant writ petition it, appears to this Court that it is the consistent stand of the respondent/authorities that by way of inter- departmental transfer the plot of land in question was transferred to the Panchayat and Rural Development Department basically for the purpose of solid waste management scheme. 18. It is trite law that the legitimate expectation cannot have an overriding effect over the decision of an administrative authority, if such decision is based on public policy and/or in the public interest unless it is shown that the alleged action amounts to abuse of power and wrongful exercise of administrative decision. 19. It thus appears to this Court that sufficient jurisdiction has been placed on behalf of the respondent/State and its instrumentalities that instead of allotting the plot of land in question by way of long term lease in favour of the writ petitioner, the respondent no.1/authority has approved the proposal for interdepartmental transfer to the Panchayat and Rural Development. 12 20. This Court thus finds that the respondents/authorities, being the authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution of India has given sufficient justification for their action i.e., for transferring the land by way of interdepartmental transfer towards Panchayat and Rural Development authority. 21. It thus appears to this Court that the action of the respondents/authorities, more specifically, the respondent no. 1/authority can no way be called as arbitrary and/or capricious in nature. 22. In view of such, this Court thus finds no merit in the instant writ petition. 23. The instant writ petition being WPA 8508 of 2023 is devoid of any merit and is thus dismissed. 24. With the dismissal of the instant writ petition, the interim order as passed earlier stands hereby vacated. 25. All interlocutory pending applications are also disposed of. (Partha Sarathi Sen, J.)