1 2025:CGHC:1669-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR REVP No. 118 of 2024 Swaroopa D/o P.V. Ramana Rao, aged about 30 years R/o Flat No. 406, Block A-3, Dolphin Heights, Near Singpore City District- Vizianagaram ( Andhra Pradesh) Presently Residing at PSL Swaroopa, House No. 34, Phase 1, Wallfort Paradise, Boriyakhurd, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner Versus K. Kiran Kumar S/o Shri K. Dharmarao, aged about 38 years R/o House No. 571/ 10, Vijay Nagar, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent __________________________________________________________________ For Petitioner : Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Senior Advocate with Mr. Himanshu Pandey, Advocate. For Respondent : Ms. Suryakawalkar Dangi, Advocate Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Order on Board SAURABH YADAV Digitally signed by SAURABH YADAV 2 Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J. 10.01.2025 1. This petition has been preferred by the non-applicant- Swaroopa Rao under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking the review of the judgment dated 02.04.2024 passed by this Court in FA (MAT) No. 26 of 2021. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that after passing of the impugned judgment, the child namely Dakshata does not want to go with her father as it would be undue hardship to her and if she is forced to go with her father, it would, then be not desirable for her. Further contention of the petitioner is that, since the respondent had solemnized second marriage, therefore, it would not be the welfare of the said minor child to live with her father. The judgment impugned is, therefore, deserves to be reviewed, so that the second counselling could be made with the said minor child in order to pass an appropriate order in the matter. 3. On the other head, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the reasons as assigned in the application, particularly at paragraph 13, would not be sufficient for the reviewal of the judgment impugned as in absence of pointing out any mistake apparent on the face of the record, the same would not be sufficient for the reviewal of the judgment impugned. It is contended further that though, it has been alleged by the petitioner that the non-applicant has got second marriage, but, neither the plea to this effect was taken, nor any material in this regard has been placed, therefore, it cannot be said 3 that he has performed second marriage, as alleged herein by the counsel for the petitioner. Further contention of the respondent is that, the propriety of the impugned judgment was questioned by the petitioner before Hon’ble the Supreme Court and vide order dated 22.04.2024 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8952/2024, the same was dismissed, but without disclosing the said material fact, the instant petition has been filed with an ulterior motive, therefore, the instant petition, as framed, is liable to be dismissed with costs. In support, she has placed her reliance upon the decision rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Perry Kansagra v. Smriti Madan Kansagra reported in (2019) 20 SCC 753. 4. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 5. From perusal of the record, it appears that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the respondent on 24.05.2014 and, out of their wedlock, the minor child, namely, Dakshata was born on 21.03.2015. It appears further that the marriage between the parties was dissolved on 25.11.2023 and the said minor child was started living with her mother. In order to obtain the custody of the said child, an application enumerated under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 was filed by the respondent/father before the concerned Trial Court, who in turn, vide its order dated 06.03.2021 has rejected the same in Civil Suit No. 24/2020 and, being aggrieved with the said order, an appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 was preferred by the respondent and, during the pendency of the said appeal, the conversation was made with the said 4 child. The entire conversation made with the child is relevant for the purpose which reads as under; 35. With such background and on the basis of principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the conversation was made with the child. The entire conversation, which took place in the chamber is relevant and the same is quoted below : vkt fnukad 05@02@2024] mDr izdj.k esa vihykFkhZ ,oa mRrjoknh dh iq=h&dqekjh n{krk djhZ] djhc 9 o”kZ] ¼ckfydk½ (sic about 11 years) ls ckr dh xbZ rks mlus ;g fuEufyf[kr ckrsa crk;h %& 1 og lu~ 2020 ls viuh ek¡ ¼mRrjoknh½ ds lkFk jgrh gS] ij mldh ek¡ ds;jysl gS vkSj mls ekjrh&ihVrh jgrh gSA esjh ek¡ ftl vLirky esa dke djrh gS] ogka ij eq>s ysdj tkrh gS vkSj ogka ejs gq;s O;fDr;ksa dks ns[kdj eq>s Mj yxrk gSaA 2 ek¡ eq>s gjkeh] dqRrs tSls [kjkc 'kCn fl[kkrh gS vkSj esjh ek¡ esjh ukuh ¼ek¡ dh ek¡½ ds cky [khaprh gS vkSj mls ekjrh gS] esjh ek¡ dk NksVk HkkbZ ¼ekek½ NksVk gksdj Hkh esjh ek¡ dks ekjrk gSA esjh ek¡ esjh fcydqy Hkh ds;j ugha djrh gSA ckfydk ds }kjk viuh ;g ckrsa crkrs gq;s mlus viuh dksguh ds ikl yxh pksV dks fn[kk;k vkSj iqjkus [kjksap ds fu'kku Hkh fn[kk;s vkSj crk;h dh esjh ek¡ eq>s pksV yxus ds ckotwn Hkh ds;jysl gS vkSj esjk /;ku ugha j[krh gSA eSa viuh ek¡ ds lkFk fcYdqy Hkh ugha jguk pkgrh gwWaA 3 esjs firkth ¼vihykFkhZ½ eq>s cgqr gh vPNs ls vius lkFk j[krs Fks vkSj ogka esjs nknk&nknh Hkh vPNs ls esjh ns[kHkky djrs Fks vkSj eq>s cgqr I;kj djrs FksA 4 ckfydk us vkxs ;g Hkh dgk fd] eSus ;gka tks ;g ckrssa crk;h gS] mls esjh ek¡ dks er crkuk] ugha rks og eq>s ekjsxh A mlus fQj dgk fd og viuh ek¡ ds lkFk fcYdqy Hkh ugha jguk pkgrh gS vkSj og vius firkth ds lkFk esa gh jguk pkgrh gS] tks mls cgqr gh vPNs ls j[krs gS vkSj mldh ns[kHkky Hkh vPNs ls djrs gSaA iqu% og jksoklh gksdj fQj cksyh fd ;g lc ckrsa esjh ek¡ dks er crkbZ,xk] ugha rks og eq>s fQj ekjsxh A 6. After the conversation with the child, the following observation was made by this Court in the said appeal at Paragraph 36 which is also relevant for the purpose, reads as under: “36. Perusal of the entire conversation would show that though the child is in the custody of mother, she has made allegation that her mother is a careless person and she used to beat her. She is being taken by her mother to the hospital wherein she is scared after seeing the dead bodies. She further stated that she is being tutored the abusive words. According to the child, her mother also used to beat her Nani. Her Mama used to beat her mother, 5 though he is younger to her. The girl further showed her injuries as also the marks of old injuries. Whereas with respect to father, the girl stated that she was kept very well and her grandparents (dada dadi) also used to take care of her and used to love her. She also stated that whatever she has stated herein should not be disclosed to her mother otherwise she would be beaten and she do not want to stay with her mother and want to stay with her father. The said statement was made by the girl despite the fact that she was in the company of the mother when the appeal was heard.” 7. After considering the said conversation with the child, this Court arrived at a conclusion that it would not be appropriate for the continuation of the custody of the child with the mother and accordingly while allowing the appeal has made the following arrangements at paragraph 40 which reads as under: 40. Therefore, following the principles laid down in the case of Yashita Sahu v State of Rajasthan and Ors, (2020) 3 SCC 67 and in the case of Ritika Sharan v Sujoy Ghosh, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 878, we hereby order to facilitate the grant of visitation and contact right to mother. The following arrangement shall be drawn by both the appellant and the respondent as father and mother:- • The respondent-mother would be able to engage with the child on a suitable video conferencing platform for one hour every Saturday and Sunday and 5-10 minutes on other days. • Both the respondent-mother and the appellant-father in order to facilitate the video conferencing in between shall procure smart phones which would facilitate the inter se video calling. • Every month preferably on 2nd Saturday and 2nd Sunday and on a festival day, the father shall allow the child to visit 6 her mother. 8. In view of the aforesaid observations made by this Court, the reasons as has been assigned by the petitioner for review of the judgment impugned cannot be held to be sustainable in the eye of law as we do not find any mistake which could be said to be apparent on the face of the record, so as to call for any interference in the judgment impugned. 9. The aforesaid observation is fortified by the principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Perry Kansagra (supra) wherein, at paragraph 17 it has been held as under: “17. We have gone through both the judgments of the High Court in the instant case and considered rival submissions on the point. It is well settled that an error which is required to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. To justify exercise of review jurisdiction, the error must be self- evident. Tested on this parameter, the exercise of jurisdiction in the present case was not correct. The exercise undertaken in the present case, in our considered view, was as if the High Court was sitting in appeal over the earlier decision dated 17.02.2017. Even assuming that there was no correct appreciation of facts and law in the earlier judgment, the parties could be left to challenge the decision in an appeal. But the review was not a proper remedy at all. In our view, the High Court erred in entertaining the review petition and setting aside the earlier view dated 17.02.2017…….” 10. It is now to be seen further that the judgment impugned passed by this Court was questioned by the petitioner before Hon’ble the Supreme Court, where the same was registered as Special Leave Petition (C) No.8952 of 2024 and vide order dated 22.04.2024, the same was dismissed. But, despite the dismissal of the same as such, the same has deliberately not been disclosed while preferring this review petition, made on 06.05.2024 and, when the said fact was disclosed 7 by the respondent on 10.07.2024, then only the said fact was made by the petitioner in her application, made on 06.08.2024, for condonation of delay in filing the instant petition. The petitioner has, thus, suppressed the material facts to this Court, and, appears to have been made with an ulterior motive, which therefore, deserves to be burdened with exemplary costs, as the Supreme Court in the matter of “Dnyandeo Sabaji naik and another vs. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar and others" reported in (2017) 5 Supreme Court Case 496 had deprecated the conduct of the litigants in flooding the Court with frivolous litigations as a result of which, the genuine matters, which require consideration are delayed. The relevant observation made therein at paragraphs 13 and 14 reads as under:- “13. This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth. 14. Courts across the legal system - this Court not being an exception – are choked with litigation. Frivolous and groundless filings constitute a serious menace to the administration of justice. They consume time and clog the infrastructure. Productive resources which should be deployed in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated in attending to cases filed only to benefit from delay, by prolonging dead issues and pursuing worthless causes. No litigant can have a vested interest in delay. Unfortunately, as the present case exemplifies, the process of dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the detriment of the legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a simple issue has occupied the time of the courts and of how successive applications have been filed to prolong the inevitable. The person in whose favour the balance of justice lies has in the process been left in the lurch by repeated attempts to revive a 8 stale issue. This tendency can be curbed only if courts across the system adopt an institutional approach which penalizes such behavior. Liberal access to justice does not mean access to chaos and indiscipline. A strong message must be conveyed that courts of justice will not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies designed to profit from the delays of the law. Unless remedial action is taken by all courts here and now our society will breed a legal culture based on evasion instead of abidance. It is the duty of every court to firmly deal with such situations. The imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as well as to prevent the filing of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts can set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is also necessary to ensure that access to courts is available to citizens with genuine grievances. Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes simply by the weight of undeserving cases which flood the system. Such a situation cannot be allowed to come to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of discretion but a duty and obligation cast upon all courts to ensure that the legal system is not exploited by those who use the forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend all courts to deal with frivolous filings in the same manner.” (Emphasis Supplied) 11. In view of the aforesaid mandate given by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the instant petition is, accordingly, dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000/- (Twenty Five Thousand Only), which is payable to the High Court Legal Aid Service Committee through Its Secretary Member, within a period of 15 days from today. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) JUDGE JUDGE Saurabh