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2025 DAILYLAW 19429 (CHH)

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH v. ANOOP DAS @ ANNU

ACQA/246/2024 · 2025-08-24

Shri Sachin Singh Rajput

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Judgment text

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1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 246 of 2024 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Station House Officer, Police Station Ajk, Jagdalpur, District- Bastar, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - Anoop Das @ Annu S/o Raghuraj Das Aged About 29 Years Occupation Kirana Shop, R/o Village Chhote Garavand (Khurd), Police Station Nagarnar, District- Bastar, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. HAPS Bhatia, PL For Respondent(s) : None Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Judgment on Board 25.08.2025 1. This appeal under section 14 (A) (1) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 (for short ‘SC/ST Act’) has been filed by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 15.03.2023 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge (SC/ST), Bastar, place at Jagdalpur (CG) (for short ‘trial Court’) in Special Sessions case no. 02/2019 whereby the respondent has been acquitted from the charge punishable under Sections 341, 354 and 323 of the Indian Panel Code, 1860 (for short IPC) and also under Section 3 (1) (b) of the SC/ST Act. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant lodged a written report at Police Station City Kotwali, Jagdalpur, alleging that on 17.04.2018, HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2025.09.12 17:55:22 +0530 2 while she was returning from Jagdalpur with her daughter, the accused intercepted her near Dhobiguda Chowk, misbehaved by slapping and molesting her, and thereafter fled from the spot. On the basis of the said report, an FIR was registered and investigation was conducted. After completion of investigation, sufficient material was found against the accused, and a charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Bastar, Jagdalpur. 3. During trial, the accused abjured guilt. The prosecution examined the prosecutrix and other witnesses in support of its case. However, the learned trial Court, upon appreciation of evidence, did not find the charges proved and acquitted the accused. Hence, the present appeal has been preferred. 4. On due appreciation, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused (respondent herein) on the aforesaid offences. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is illegal, improper, and unsustainable. It is urged that the Trial Court has erred in discarding the testimony of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses without cogent reasons, and has been swayed by minor omissions and contradictions. The statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. clearly supports the prosecution case, and the ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC and relevant provisions of the SC/ST Act, are duly established. It is contended that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its correct perspective and overlooked the conduct of the respondent, which demonstrates his ill-intention. In such circumstances, the finding of acquittal is perverse and liable to be set aside, and the respondent ought to have been convicted in accordance with law. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the documents on record. 3 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461 observed that an appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial Court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. It has been held in paragraph 9 as under - “Before concluding, we would like to point out that this Court in a number of cases has held that an Appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. In other words, if from the same set of evidence two views are possible and if the trial court has taken one view on the said evidence, unless the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is either perverse or such that no reasonable person could come to that conclusion or that such a finding of the trial court is not based on any material on record, it should not merely because another conclusion is possible reverse the finding of the trial court. [See : M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Dass vs. Ram Narain & Ors. (1979 (3) SCC 279), State of Punjab vs. Balraj Singh alias Chhajju (1978 (3) SCC 129), State of Maharashtra vs. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar (1981 (3) SCC 199) and Ram Kumar Pandey vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975 (3) SCC 815)]. In the instant case also we find that the trial court had taken a view which the High Court has not held to be either perverse, unreasonable or a finding which is not based on evidence, still on re-appreciation of the evidence, the High Court came to a different conclusion which on facts of this case and on the basis of the ratio of the law laid down by this Court in the above cited cases cannot be sustained. 8. In the case of M.C.Ali and anr. v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 573, it has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal and placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 in which it has been held as under - 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of 4 appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 9. Learned trial Court has meticulously discussed the evidence available on record in respect of all the offences which has been charged against the respondent and after analysis of the evidence of the witnesses, in paragraphs 53, 54 and 55 gave following finding:- “ (53) With reference to the First Information Report (Ex. P-02) and the statement made by the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief, it is noteworthy that the prosecutrix is educated, a B.A. graduate, and employed. Despite this, no explanation is forthcoming as to why she did not lodge a complaint against the accused at the police station immediately on the date of the incident, i.e., 17.04.2018. She disclosed the incident to her husband only on the next day, i.e., 18.04.2018, but even then, despite the police station being merely one kilometer away, 5 she did not file a complaint on the same day. No satisfactory explanation is available for this delay. The complaint lodged by the prosecutrix against the accused on 20.04.2018, after such considerable delay, casts doubt on the occurrence of the incident. Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the written complaint (Ex. P-01) and the FIR (Ex. P-02) registered on its basis also appear doubtful. In such a situation, no safe conclusion can be drawn against the accused on the basis of these documents. (54) The spot map (Ex. P-03), site plan (Ex. P-05), spot panchnama (Ex. P-05A), and the arrest memo of the accused (Ex. P-12), annexed in the case, are not of such substantive evidentiary value that any conclusion can be drawn against the accused on their basis. (55) Hence, upon consideration of the entire evidence, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, Anupdas alias Annu, committed the alleged offences under Sections 341, 354, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(b) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Accordingly, giving the benefit of doubt, the accused Anupdas alias Annu is acquitted of the charges under Sections 341, 354, and 323 IPC and Section 3(1)(b) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.” 10. The question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court warrants any interference by this Court. 11. This Court finds that there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, despite the prosecutrix being educated and the police station being situated merely one kilometer away. The complaint was lodged only on 20.04.2018, i.e., after three days of the incident, which casts serious doubt on the prosecution story. The written complaint (Ex. P-01) and the FIR (Ex. P-02), being doubtful, cannot safely be relied upon. Further, the spot map, site plan, panchnama, and arrest memo are not of such evidentiary value as to establish the guilt of the accused. 12. On due appreciation of the entire evidence, this Court concurs with the finding of 6 the learned trial Court that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 341, 354, and 323 IPC and Section 3(1)(b) of the SC/ST Act beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court is affirmed. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge H.Ansari