STATE OF HP AND OTHERS v. Sanjeev Kumar and another
CMP.M/1261/2025 · 2025-08-29
Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Ranjan Sharma
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 19409 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 19409 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
CMP(M) No.1261 of 2025 and LPA No 592 of 2025 Decided on:29.08.2025 __________________________________________________________
State of HP and others
….Applicants/Appellants
Versus
Sanjeev Kumar
...Respondents
Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1Whether approved for reporting?
For the appellants:
Mr. Arsh Rattan, Deputy,
Advocate General.
For the respondents: Mr. Tek Chand Sharma, Advocate, for performa respondent.
G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice [Oral]
CMP(M) No.1261 of 2025 & LPA No.592 of 2025
The present appeal has filed against the
judgment of learned Single Judge in CWP No.1530 of 2023, titled Sanjeev Kumar versus State of H.P. and others, decided on 03.08.2023, which is barred by one and half years as per the application itself, whereas office has calculated the delay of 646 days. 2. A detailed application has been filed showing
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? - 2 - that how the file moved from one office to the other, but in our considered opinion merely the movement of the file on a regular basis cannot extend the period of limitation for the convenience of the State. The certified copy having been applied within five days on 08.08.2023 and attested on 26.08.2023 was apparently received from the office of Advocate General on 24.11.2023. 3. As per the application itself, counsel for the writ petitioner had requested to comply with the order of the Court and then the matter was examined and referred to the State by Principal Conservator of Forests (HoFF). The opinion of Law Department having been taken and the matter was sent to the Deputy Controller (F&A) on 19.12.2023, where on merits, the matter was again thrashed out, whether the grant of annual increment, as such, which has been granted by learned Single Judge just prior to retirement keeping in law laid down in The Director (Admn. And HR) KPTCL & Ors. versus C.P. Mundinamani & Ors. was payable and a distinction was sought to be made that he had been granted higher pay scale w.e.f. 01.01.2016. 4. A perusal of the reply would go on to show
- 3 - that apparently these facts were never pleaded and the simple plea was taken that he had retired on 30.04.2016 and was not in service on 01.05.2016. 5. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the State has been remiss, as such, even in the pleadings about factual matrix in its reply and now cannot seek to improve on it on account of having re-examined the files, which was the process, which had to be done when the written statement was filed before the learned Single Judge.
Thereafter, having taken the opinion of Deputy Controller (F&A) on 30.04.2024, the matter was referred to the State on 15.05.2024 for re-examination and consultation was done with Finance (Pay Revision) Department and the opinion of the Advocate General was taken on 13.09.2024, whereby the opinion to file a review was given. 6. The review was apparently not filed, then a decision was taken to file the LPA on 20.02.2025 and eventually drafted on 28.04.2025 and the same was filed on 17.05.2025. 7. It is thus apparent that one year and eight months have been taken by the State in taking a call on
- 4 - a simple issue which even had not pleaded the basics in the written statement. The negligence on the face of it is thus apparent and the manner in which the case was defended. The benefit thus has to go to the writ petitioner, who specially is a retiree and having superannuated almost a decade back on 30.04.2016. 8. In such circumstances, the law laid by the Apex Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Anr. reported in (2010) 2 S.C.R. 1172 and Postmaster General and Ors. vs. Living Media India Limited and Anr. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 would be applicable. The same reads as under:
“25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11.09.2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said
judgment only on 08.01.2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for certified copy of the impugned
judgment on 11.09.2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied only on 08.01.2010, i.e. after a period of nearly four months. - 5 -
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in- charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”
- 6 -
9.
Similarly in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, the principles were laid down as to the fact that non-pedantic approach has to be applied and that substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. Further, it was held that liberal approach has to be kept in mind but State cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play and the conduct, behaviour and attitude should be the relevant factors to be taken into consideration, though, it may be given some acceptable latitude. The said principles read as under:
21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can be broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. - 7 -
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should
- 8 - be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2 (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3 (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4 (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 10. Accordingly, in view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgments referred to supra, we do not find any plausible reason to allow this application. 11. The tendency of the State to file ‘Certificate Cases’ is noticed by the apex Court in State of Madhya
- 9 - Pradesh versus Bherulal (2020) 10 SCC 654, and State of Orissa and others versus Sunanda Mahakuda (2021) 1 SCC 560. 12. In State of Uttar Pradesh and others versus Sabha Narain and others (2022) 9 SCC 266, a three Judge Bench of the apex Court noticed the fact that the SLPs were being filed to save the skin of the officers who may have defaulted in following the due process of law. 13. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 SC OnLine SC 513, it was held that stale matters cannot be entertained to defeat the substantial law of limitation and Statute. 14. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed along with LPA No.592 of 2025. 15. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia)
Chief Justice
(Ranjan Sharma)
Judge 29th August, 2025
[Himani/Shivender]