Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Rajasthan · body

2025 DAILYLAW 19280 (RAJ)

RAJESH CHOUDHARY S/O SHARWAN LAL CHOUDHARY v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

SAW/725/2022 · 2025-09-08

Sanjeet Purohit, Sanjeev Prakash Sharma

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

[2025:RJ-JP:35896-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 725/2022 in SB Civil Writ petition No. 11893/2017 Rajesh Choudhary S/o Sharwan Lal Choudhary, Aged About 33 Years, R/o Village Kalyanpura, Tehsil Dudu District Jaipur Rajasthan ----Appellant-Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Secretary, Home Department, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat Jaipur Rajasthan 2. Superintendent Of Police, Kota Rajasthan 3. Superintendent Of Police / Commandant, State Disaster Response Force (Iind Battalion) Kota Rajasthan ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mrs. Sudesh Kasana, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Kartikeya Shukla, Adv. & Mr. Samee Khan, AAAG HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT Order 08/09/2025 The issue raised in the present special appeal (writ) is no more res integra in view of the judgment passed by this Court in DB Special Appeal (Writ) No. 971/2022 titled as ‘Babbal Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.’. In the case of Babbal Singh (supra) following observations are made:- “9.1 We have heard learned counsel for parties and scrutinized the material available on record. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition while observing that acquittal on the basis of compromise [2025:RJ-JP:35896-DB] (2 of 5) [SAW-725/2022] cannot be considered as clean acquittal and in the case of appointment in discipline security forces, the character of candidate assumes significance. The learned Single Judge has further relied upon the judgments passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and Love Kush Meena (supra). 9.2 A bare perusal of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989, makes it clear that the said provision does not prescribe the disqualification mere on the factum of conviction but the same is based upon nature of offences involved in the criminal case. Mere conviction alone is not a disqualification for appointment under the Rules of 1989. The object of the said provision is to debar the candidate only if his conviction is based upon the offences involving moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence etc. 9.3 Even the Circular dated 28.03.2017 (Ann.R/6) issued by the respondent - Police Department itself reveals that the guidelines have been issued for consideration of the candidature for recruitment under the Rules of 1989 and the same provides that the candidates will be considered for appointment who have disclosed the criminal antecedents where; (i) after investigation, the candidate is not found accused, final report is accepted (ii) where the candidate has been acquitted by the Court “on the basis of benefit of doubt or lack of evidence” (iii) where the candidate has been acquitted on the basis of compromise (iv) where the benefit of probation has been granted (v) where the benefit of Section 15 (ii) (a) under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act was granted. 9.4 On conjoint reading of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989 as well as the Circular dated 28.03.2017, it is clear that the acquittal on the basis of compromise as well as criminal case wherein FR has been given by the Investigation Agency are not considered as ground to deny the appointment under the Rules of 1989. So far as gravity of offence involved in case of the appellant- petitioner is concerned, it is clear that the same was not [2025:RJ-JP:35896-DB] (3 of 5) [SAW-725/2022] of heinous nature rather falls within the exception clearly carved out under Rule 13 (2) (b) of the Rules of 1989. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ravindra Kumar (supra) has clearly held that each case will depend upon of its facts and circumstances which has to be considered on various relevant factors. In our opinion, when even a conviction for an offence not involving moral turpitude or crimes of violence is not considered as disqualification, the acquittal on the basis of compromise can in no case is considered as justified ground to deny appointment to a meritorious candidate. In view of the facts of the present case, it is clear that the FIR against the appellant-petitioner was registered in the year 2007 and the criminal case came to be decided in the year 2010 by way of compromise. Whereas the recruitment advertisement in the present case was issued in the year 2012 i.e. 2 years after acquittal of the appellant-petitioner. This clearly shows that the said compromise was arrived between the parties with the spirit of brotherhood and for maintaining future peaceful relations and the same was not arrived only for the purpose of securing employment. In view of the facts of the present case, the rejection of the appellant- petitioner’s candidature while holding that the acquittal on the basis of compromise cannot be considered as clean acquittal cannot be sustained. 11.1 Learned Single Judge has placed reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Love Kush Meena (supra) and Raj Kumar (supra). It is a settled position of law of precedents that the judgments are to be made applicable only upon the similar facts and circumstances. A bare perusal of the judgment passed in case of Love Kush Meena (supra) shows that one of the case registered against the petitioner therein was for the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC and the facts also referred to planed action / intention to commit the crime. In the said background where the alleged crime against the petitioner therein was of heinous nature, the Hon’ble Court has passed the said judgment. [2025:RJ-JP:35896-DB] (4 of 5) [SAW-725/2022] However, in the presence case, the offences alleged against the appellant-petitioner were for offences under Section 323, 451,325/34 IPC which are not of grave nature and even the Rule 13(2) (b) clearly provides that the violence shall not include the assault under Sections 324, 325 and 326 IPC. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment passed in case of Love Kush Meena (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11.2 The judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) is also not applicable in the present case as in the said case the offence has been committed in planned manner where the accused persons armed with ‘lathis’ committed offence of trespass into house of complainant and snatched the jewellery of complainant’s daughter-in-law by causing injuries. 12. The appellant-petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.10830/2020: State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajesh Kumar Meena wherein the SLP has been dismissed in the case where the acquittal was based upon compromise between the parties. After the said decision, the appointment has been granted to the said candidate. 13. On the facts of present case and in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances set out hereinabove, we do not think that the acquittal on compromise as well as non-disclosure of offence of trivial nature can be deemed to be fatal for the appellant.” Both the counsels are ad idem that the said finding would also apply in the case of present appellant. Therefore, the present special appeal (writ) is allowed in the same terms of Babbal Singh (supra). In view of the above discussion, the present appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The judgment impugned dated [2025:RJ-JP:35896-DB] (5 of 5) [SAW-725/2022] 22.04.2022 is quashed and set aside. The writ petition filed by the appellant-petitioner is allowed, while directing the respondent- department to grant appointment to the appellant-petitioner on the post of Constable for which he was selected pursuant to the recruitment notification dated 28.09.2012. We make it clear that the appellant-petitioner will not be entitled for arrears of salary for the period during which he has not served in the force. However, we direct that the appellant-petitioner will be entitled for all notional benefits including pay-scale, seniority and other consequential benefits. The respondents are directed to pass necessary orders within a period of four weeks from today. There shall be no order as to costs. (SANJEET PUROHIT),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),J Ritu/54