1 2025:CGHC:26561-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 384 of 2025 Deepak Joshi S/o Late Jhaduram Joshi Aged About 44 Years R/o Station Maroda, Umerpoti Road, Vijay Chowk, Police Station Newai, Tahsil and District Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Tribal Welfare, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Post and PS Mandir Hasaud, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Commissioner Durg Division, Durg, Chhattisgarh. 3. Collector District Durg, Chhattisgarh. 4. Assistant Commissioner Tribal Development District – Durg, Chhattisgarh. 5. Maya Warrier Assistant Commissioner Tribal Development Balod, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Varun Sharma, Advocate. For Respondents/State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.06.24 10:41:35 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 23 .06.2025 1. Heard Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State. 2. The present intra Court appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 20.03.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 97 of 2020 (Deepak Joshi vs. State of Chhattigarh & Others), whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner herein. 3. Facts of the case in brief is that the appellant was employed in Tribal Welfare Department as ‘Daily Wager’ in the year 2006. In the year 2014, his service was converted to ‘Work Charge Employee’. During his posting at Post Metric Tribal Welfare Boys Hostel, Dhamda, Durg, various complaints were made against the appellant, therefore, departmental enquiry was initiated against him. Despite service of notice to appear before Enquiry Officer, the appellant did not appear, hence ex-parte order was passed by the Enquiry Officer on 19.05.2017 against him. Based on that enquiry report, service of the appellant was terminated vide order dated 19.05.2017 (Annexure P/2 in the writ petition) passed by the Collector, Durg, and appeal preferred against it by the appellant was also 3 dismissed by the Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg vide order dated 26.09.2019 (Annexure P/1 in the writ petition). 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that on 12.09.2012, the Assistant Commissioner submitted a report to the Commissioner Tribal Welfare, Raipur in respect of the persons working as ‘Daily Wagers’. The name of the appellant is in the aforesaid list which was prepared mainly for regularization of ‘Daily Wagers’. He further submits that since no action was taken in respect of regularization the association of low income employees made a representation to the Divisional Commissioner, Raipur, link Court Durg on 18.10.2013. The Divisional Commissioner forwarded the representation to the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, Durg vide letter dated 18.10.2013. 5. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent No. 5, who was posted as Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, Durg assured the appellant for regularization in service and demanded Rs. 25,000.00 from the appellant. The appellant in fond hope somehow managed the aforesaid amount and paid to the respondent No.5. The respondent No. 5 thereafter, passed an order dated 28.07.2014 converting the services of the appellant from ‘Daily Wager’ to work charged employee which was actually done in compliance of State Government's order dated 07.03.2012. He also contended that the appellant was not satisfied with the above order as the appellant was promised regularization by the respondent No. 5. The appellant made a complaint to the President, CG State Scheduled Caste Commission, Raipur on 20.06.2015. 4 6. Learned counsel for the appellant stated that the respondent No. 5 upon learning that the appellant has made a complaint against her got annoyed and started harassing the appellant. Upon the instructions of the respondent No. 5 a Police complaint was made against the appellant on 14.02.2017 by one colleague of the appellant that the appellant misbehaved with him. The Police registered an FIR against the appellant. He further stated that the respondent No. 5 issued a charge-sheet containing 14 charges of misbehaving and other charges of violation of CG Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. The charge-sheet was not given with any list of prosecution witness and documents. He would submit that before the appellant could make a reply the respondent No. 5 without considering the non-applicability of the Civil Services (Conduct) Rules on the appellant proceeded to appoint the enquiry officer to conduct departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the appellant on 06.03.2017 made an application seeking relevant documents which were not supplied with the charge-sheet. 7. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Enquiry Officer vide memo dated 22.03.2017 threatened the appellant for filing the aforesaid application for relevant document stating that such application is also a misconduct in the service rules. Thereafter, without affording any proper opportunity of hearing to the appellant and without following the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 of the Department Work-charged and Contingency-paid Employees Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1975 (for short, ‘Rules of 1975’) which were made applicable on the appellant vide order dated 28.07.2014, the appellant was removed from service vide impugned order dated 5 19.05.2017 which was given to the appellant only on 22.07.2019. He also submits that the appellant preferred an appeal against the termination order. The Commissioner without following the provisions of law and without considering the aspect that the appellant being a work charged employee would be governed with an altogether separate set of rules has rejected the appeal of the appellant vide the impugned order dated 26.09.2019. He further contended that this Hon'ble Court in a similar case vide WP No. 4548 of 2004 in similar circumstances has quashed a termination order which was issued without complying with the provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1975. The appellant against the arbitrary actions on the part of the respondents filed writ petition bearing WPS No. 97 of 2020 before this Court, in which the respondents have filed their reply supporting the order passed by the Commissioner. The appellant in his rejoinder had contended that the appellant has been removed from service without following the principles of natural justice. The relevant documents were not provided to the appellant despite specific written application dated 06.03.2017. The Enquiry Officer vide order dated 22.03.2017 has refused to supply relevant documents stating student interest, public interest, security of state which is not a proper reason to deny opportunity of hearing. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the enquiry report based on which the impugned order of termination has been passed has also not been provided to the appellant and the opportunity to make representation was denied to the appellant. The respondents have filed the copy of enquiry report for the first time before this Court along with their reply. The Enquiry report mentions several documents relied by 6 the department, but no such document has been provided to the appellant. He also submits that the appellant has been removed from service which is a serious civil consequence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Hon'ble Court in a catena of judgments has held that termination order without proper opportunity of hearing is a nullity. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance of the judgment in the case of Lalit Pratap Singh vs. Union of India, reported vide 2022 SCC OnLine Chh 739, wherein termination order was quashed due to not providing the documents relied and not providing adequate opportunity. Paragraphs 22 and 23 reproduced below: “22. When the department produced documents for proving of charges levelled against the delinquent employee which were in their favour, then it was also their duty to produce those documents, which were sought for by the delinquent employee to defend himself. But, in the instant case, it is clear that respondents produced only those documents which were favourable to them, but they did not produce those documents which were relevant for defence of the appellant, despite the fact that those documents were held relevant to the charges, by the inquiry officer. 23. Hence, we find that, the departmental proceedings conducted against the appellant culminating in removal of the appellant from service, is not only vitiated for procedural illegality/irregularity, but also for violation of salutary principles of natural justice. Hence point No. (i) is decided in favour of the appellant.” 9. Hence, in view of the above the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant may kindly be reinstated in service with full consequential benefits. 7 10. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner, in which no interference is called for. It is further submitted by the learned State counsel that after service of charge-sheet, the appellant was directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer within 07 days to file his written reply or for personal hearing, but he did not appear before the Enquiry Officer, rather he filed application seeking various documents, which were confidential. He would further submit that perusal of the order dated 26.09.2019 (Annexure P/1 in the writ petition) passed by the Commissioner itself shows that 04 opportunities were granted to the appellant for submission of his defence, but he did not appear before the Enquiry Officer, therefore, Enquiry Officer was compelled to proceed ex- parte and in such compelling circumstances, ex-parte enquiry report was prepared holding the appellant guilty for the charges levelled against him under Rule 10 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short ‘Rules of 1966’). In pursuance of that enquiry report, vide order dated 19.05.2017 (Annexure P/2 in the writ petition), the appellant has been terminated from services by the Collector, Durg which has also been upheld by the Commissioner, Durg Division. Learned State counsel further contended that the impugned order(s) has been passed after providing due opportunity to the appellant. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and materials available on record. 12. The appellant was initially appointed as ‘Daily Wager Employee’ in the year 2006 and subsequently in the year 2014, his employment was 8 converted as ‘Work Charge Employee’. As per the record, when he was posted at Post Metric Tribal Welfare Boys Hostel, Dhamda, Durg, various complaints were made against him, as such, departmental enquiry was initiated. But despite various communications, the appellant did not participate in the departmental enquiry, therefore, ex-parte order was passed by the Enquiry Officer and pursuant to that enquiry report, he has been terminated from his employment. 13. Conduct of the appellant during enquiry proceedings has been observed by the Commissioner, Durg Division that the appellant, Deepak Joshi, was appointed for a fixed term of three years through an order dated 28.07.2014. However, his services were terminated with immediate effect by the Collector (Tribal Development Branch), Durg, through an order dated 19.05.2017, under Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules, due to his conduct being found inconsistent with government rules and directives. The documents presented reveal that the appellant was in the habit of making continuous complaints against his senior officers and office staff, which were investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. The appellant was also accused of various misconducts, including habitual absence, physical altercations with students in the hostel, abusive behavior towards office staff, and unauthorized residence in the hostel. A charge-sheet was issued to the appellant under Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules, and he was given opportunities to present his defence on multiple dates. However, the appellant failed to submit any written defence or appear before the Enquiry Officer to make a statement. The enquiry report and supporting 9 documents, including attendance records and statements from staff and students, confirmed the charges against the appellant. The appellant's argument that he was not provided with relevant documents and was not given an opportunity to defend himself was found to be without merit, as there was no evidence to support his claim. The Collector's order dated 19.05.2017, terminating the appellant's services, was found to be justified, given the appellant's conduct and behavior, which were inconsistent with the rules and directives of the government. The appeal was dismissed, and the order was upheld. 14. It was not controverted by learned counsel for the appellant that charge-sheet was served to the appellant on 24.02.2017, thereafter, the appellant filed application seeking some documents without making his presence before the Enquiry Officer for submission of his defence or for personal hearing. As per the impugned order, the appellant was repeatedly requested to appear before the Enquiry Officer i.e. on 23.02.2017, 22.03.2017, 30.3.20177 and 05.04.2017, but he did not appear before the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, Enquiry Officer was compelled to pass ex-parte order against him. 15. Learned Single Judge relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. R. Tewari vs. Union of India, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 , wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 19, 20 & 21 have held as under :- “19. In the case of CIT v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1182, this Court held that various parameters of the court’s power of judicial review of administrative or executive action on which the court 10 can interfere had been well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions. The Court further held: “11. ....It is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the court would be justified in interfering with the same.” “20.The court can exercise the power of judicial review if there is a manifest error in the exercise of power or the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary or if the power is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous. Such exercise of power would stand vitiated. The court may be justified in exercising the power of judicial review if the impugned order suffers from mala fide, dishonest or corrupt practices, for the reason, that the order had been passed by the authority beyond the limits conferred upon the authority by the legislature. Thus, the court has to be satisfied that the order had been passed by the authority only on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety before it interferes. The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. Therefore, the court itself may be fallible and interfering with the order of the authority may impose heavy administrative burden on the State or may lead to unbudgeted expenditure. (Vide: Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11; People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 456; 6 and State of N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr. v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo, AIR 2005 SC 11 2080).” “21. In Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., AIR (2000) SC 801, this Court explaining the scope of judicial review held that the court must act with great caution and should exercise such power only in furtherance to public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court must always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not.” 16. Learned Single Judge also placed reliance of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sanjay Kumar Singh vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 2012 SC 1783 and Union of India & Others vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, reported in (2011) 13 SCC 553, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has in a very categorical terms held that in departmental enquiry proceedings the scope of Court's are very limited. It has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in a disciplinary proceeding matters the Court cannot substitute its own finding and thus by replacing the finding arrived at by the authority that too after detailed appreciation of the evidence brought on record. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 226 of Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority. It has also been repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High Court under Article 226 would not re-appreciate the entire evidence and come to a different and independent finding. 17. Further in the case of Union of India & Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under in paragraphs 12 & 13, which is reproduced 12 herein-under: “12. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.” “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; 13 (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the same issue in the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 in paragraph No. 7 held as under: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or 14 statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi - Versus- Union of India – 1995 (6) SCC 749, Union of India vs. G. Gunayuthan – 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank of India -Versus- Degala Suryanarayana – 1999 (5) SCC 762, High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil– 2001 (1) SCC 416).” 19. Once when the law is settled that in disciplinary proceedings unless there is a ground of perversity or the finding being contrary to the evidence on record or there being technical flaw in the conducting of the departmental enquiry, the Court should be slow in interfering with such findings which are based on evidence which has come on record. 20. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is evident from the record that in pursuance of allegations made against the appellant, vide communication, dated 06.03.2017, he sought various documents for his defence against the charge-sheet, which he could otherwise have obtained by participating in the departmental enquiry. It is evident from enquiry report (Annexure-R/1 in the writ petition) that despite repeated communication made to him to participate in the departmental enquiry, he did not participate in the enquiry proceedings. Therefore, ex-parte enquiry report was prepared against him. In such situation, it cannot be said that due opportunity of hearing has not been provided to him, as because of his own arrogance, he himself did not participate in the enquiry proceedings. 21. While passing the order, learned Single Judge held that undisputedly, the appellant was working as ‘Work Charged Employee’, as 15 such, his service conditions shall be governed by the Rules 1975. Sections 13 & 14 of the said rules provides procedures for imposing penalty upon the contingency/workcharged employees. Rule 14(1)(एक)(दो) (तीन) contemplates that the delinquent employee shall be informed about the proposed action to be taken against him by written communication and also by providing due opportunity to put his defence/explanation and after considering his defence/explanation, any order under Rule 13 can be passed. Though in the present case, both the authorities i.e. the Collector and the Commissioner have mentioned about provisions of Rules 1966 instead of Rules 1975, but only because of such wrong mentioning of the rule, it cannot be held that any prejudice has been caused to the appellant, because as has been stated in the preceding paragraphs that, despite repeated communication, the appellant did not participate in the enquiry proceedings. If he was seeking any documents which has not been provided to him, then he can raise his objection in this regard by participating in the enquiry proceedings. But not providing the documents by the respondent/department, sought for by the appellant will not entitle the appellant to refuse to participate in the enquiry proceedings, hence, contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is not sustainable. Further, the appellant did not participate in the enquiry proceedings despite repeated communication, therefore, there was no occasion before the department to produce documents sought for by the appellant during enquiry proceedings. Hence, case law referred by the appellant i.e. Lalit Pratap Singh (supra) is not helpful to the appellant in the present case. 22. Considering the pleadings made in writ appeal, submissions 16 advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also considering the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court. 23. Accordingly, the present writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan