2025:HHC:23620 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1559 of 2025 Reserved on: 18.07.2025 Date of Decision: 22.7.2025. Khage Neparne @ Khadak Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Suram Singh Rana, Advocate. For the Respondent/State: Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 136 of 2021, dated 20.8.2021, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 302 and 112 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Bhuntar, District Kullu, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that, as per prosecution, the informant Dharamjit @ Sikender and Ram Chand Mistri (since 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 deceased) were staying together. The petitioner came to the room during the mid-night of 19/20.8.2021, armed with an iron rod and inflicted blows on the mouth and head of the deceased. These allegations are false and the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case. The presence of Dharamjit on the spot is highly doubtful because he did not try to save Ram Chand and did not inform any person in the neighborhood regarding the incident. He was summoned on seven occasions, but he has failed to appear before the learned Trial Court. The prosecution has examined nine witnesses out of 29 witnesses cited by it. The witnesses examined by the prosecution have also not supported the prosecution's case. As per the prosecution, the petitioner had inflicted injuries through an iron rod and TAWA, which is highly improbable. The offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is not made out. The petitioner cannot be kept behind the bars indefinitely. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the present petition. 3. The police filed the status report, asserting that the informant told the police that he and Ram Chand were residing in the house of Harish Kumar, a resident of Sharabai, where they 3 were constructing a house. The petitioner resided in the vicinity with his family members in the old house. The informant and Ram Chand went to sleep. The petitioner entered the room armed with an iron rod and attacked Ram Chand at midnight. Ram Chand shouted, and the informant woke up. The accused inflicted a blow with an iron rod on the head of Ram Chand. He also kicked Ram Chand, who became unconscious. The accused asked the informant to bring the water, but the informant ran away. He told the police about the incident. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. Ram Chand was found dead. His postmortem examination was conducted, and the report was issued showing that the cause of death was head injury due to a Subdural Hematoma. The petitioner absconded and was apprehended after some time. He made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of the iron rod. The samples were sent to FSL, and human blood of Group ‘AB’ was found on the T-shirt of the petitioner, blood lifted from the kitchen shed, pants and T-shirt of deceased Ram Chand. Human blood of group ‘O was found in the blood sample of the petitioner. The police filed a charge sheet against the petitioner. The matter is 4 now listed on 28th to 30th July, 2025, before the learned Trial Court for prosecution evidence. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Suram Singh Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokedner Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Suram Singh Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The informant has not been examined by the prosecution despite repeated opportunities given by the learned Trial Court. The right to a speedy trial of the petitioner is being violated; therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. No case is made out on merits, hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that there is no delay in the progress of the trial. The prosecution has examined nine witnesses, and now the matter is listed from 28.07.2025 to 30.07.2025 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. The fact that the matter is listed for three 5 consecutive dates shows the anxiety of learned Trial Court to conclude the trial expeditiously. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. His previous bail petition was dismissed by this Court, and there is no change in the circumstances. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail petition bearing Cr.MP(M) No. 1782 of 2024, which was dismissed by this Court on 26.09.2024. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial 6 discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of 7 circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstance. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be 8 interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. It was submitted that there are various discrepancies in the prosecution's case. The presence of the informant on the spot is doubtful because he had not reported the matter to the 9 police and had not tried to save the deceased. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court has already concluded, while deciding his previous petition, that there is sufficient material on record to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070 that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676: 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 15. Therefore, it is impermissible to review the earlier order passed by this Court. 16. It was submitted that the prosecution witnesses have not supported the prosecution's case, and the petitioner is 10 entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the Accused. 15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim. 16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release 11 on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.” 17. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercises bail jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the evidence. It was observed: 10. Petitioner has placed reliance on the statements of witnesses already recorded by the learned Special Judge, in support of his argument to the effect that, from perusal of these statements, reasonable grounds can be entertained for concluding prima facie innocence of the petitioner. The arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner deserve to be rejected for the reason that this Court, while dealing with the bail application, will not appreciate the evidence being recorded during the trial. Undisputedly, only some of the witnesses out of the entire list of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution have been examined. In these circumstances, it is not prudent to form any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the petitioner on the basis of such partial evidence. 18. Therefore, the submission that the petitioner is entitled to bail because witnesses have not supported the case of prosecution cannot be accepted. 19. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. Copies of the order sheets have not been filed to demonstrate that the delay is not attributable to the petitioner. 12 Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail on the ground of delay in the progress of trial. 20. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the matter is listed before the learned Trial Court for three consecutive dates, which shows the anxiety of the learned Trial Court to conclude the trial expeditiously, therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail on the ground of delay at this stage. However, the petitioner is at liberty to approach the Court in case it is found that the trial is not progressing due to the circumstances not attributable to him. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 22. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22nd July 2025. (ravinder)