2025:JHHC:20122-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A. No. 152 of 2024 ------ Yaswant Kumar, S/o Rajendra Sharma, R/o Teacher’s Colony Jaridih, Jainamore, PO + PS Jaridih, Dist-Bokaro, At present R/o TGT- Hindi, Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Patratu, Road No.05, PO & PS: PTPS, Distt. Ramgarh. ... … Petitioner/Appellant Versus Sharda Vandna, W/o Yaswant Kumar, D/o Hira Lal Sharma, At present R/o Pokhartoli Shaket Nagar, Hinoo, PO + PS Doranda, Distt. Ranchi. … … Respondent/Respondent ------ CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR ------- For the Appellant : Mr. Ranjan Kumar Singh, Advocate; Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Shishir Raj, Advocate -------- Order No.06/Dated:18th July, 2025 [Per, Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.] 1. The instant appeal preferred under Section19(1) of the Family Courts Act, is directed against the judgment dated 21.12.2020 passed in Original Suit No.368 of 2015 by the learned Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Ranchi, by which, the Suit filed under Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has been dismissed on contest. 2. Notice was issued to the respondent-wife vide order dated 7.5.2025. In pursuance thereof, appearance has been made through Mr. Shishir Raj, the learned counsel who has filed his vakalatnama. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has submitted that before entering into the merits of the present case, IA No. 11615 of 2024 which has been filed by the appellant-husband under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay of 1178 days, in filing the present appeal, needs to be considered. 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 2 4. This Court also thinks it proper to consider the limitation petition before entering into the merits of the case. I.A. No.11615 of 2024 5. Mr. Ranjan Kumar Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband has submitted that delay of 1178 days’ in filing the present First Appeal has sufficiently been explained in paragraph nos. 5 and 6 of the instant Interlocutory Application. 6. The learned counsel has further referred to the statement made in paragraph no.5 of the instant Interlocutory Application that the judgment impugned was passed on 21.12.2020 when the lock down was there due to Pandemic COVID-19. 7. It has been further submitted that period of Pandemic COVID-19 has been excluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Miscellaneous Application No.21 of 2022 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.03 of 2020, whereby and whereunder the period of limitation during pandemic Covid-19 period has been waived but without taking into consideration the aforesaid facts, the office has pointed out delay of 1178 days. 8. It has further been submitted that the time has also been consumed in arranging the documents and the money which was to be incurred in filing the appeal and, as such, it is also one of the reasons for delay in filing the present appeal. 9. While, on the other hand, Mr. Shishir Raj, the learned counsel for the respondent-wife has contended that even accepting the fact that period of Pandemic COVID-19 has been excluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the instant I.A. may not be allowed reason being that impugned judgment is dated 21.12.2020 and the lock down was lifted in the month of March 2022 but the instant appeal has been filed on 28.6.2024, as such, it is a case where the limitation period was expired during the period of Pandemic COVID-19 and even after lifting of the lock down, the appeal has not been filed within time frame and, as such, it is not a fit case to consider the limitation petition on the ground of Pandemic COVID-19. 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 3 10. The learned counsel has further submitted that delay of 1178 days has not sufficiently been explained and, hence, the said delay is not fit to be condoned. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the submissions made on their behalf. This Court is conscious of the fact that the period of delay is having no bearing for the purpose of condoning the delay in exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 rather the sufficient cause is necessary to be considered and if the party concerned is in a position to make out the sufficient cause to condone the delay then irrespective of the period of delay, the delay is to be condoned. 12. It requires to refer here that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Basawaraj & Anr. V. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer,” [(2013)14 SCC 81)] in paragraph Nos. 9 to 15 has held as under: "9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, It has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee (AIR 1964 SC 1336), Mata Din v. Α. Narayanan ((1969) 2 SCC 770: AIR 1970 SC 1953] Parimal v. Veena ((2011) 3 SCC 545: (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1: AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai ((2012) 5 SCC 157: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 AIR 2012 SC 1629].) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 4 only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal ((2002) 1 SCC 535: AIR 2002 SC 100) and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao ((2002) 3 SCC 195: AIR 2002 SC 1201).) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statuto so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of Insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. ((2005) 7 SCC 510), Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh ((1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537) and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project ((2008) 17 SCC 448 (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907).) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. Stato of Kamataka ((2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Crl) 830 AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak ((1992) 1 SCC 225 1992 SCC (Cri) 93: AIR 1992 SC 1701]. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 5 case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 6 14. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and, as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 15. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. 16. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 7 refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine- like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 17. This Court after referring to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein the word ‘sufficient cause’ has been interpreted, adverting to the cause shown on behalf of the appellant-husband in the instant Interlocutory Application in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the cause which has been shown on behalf of the appellant in the present Interlocutory Application can be said to be ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of condoning the delay of 1178 days. 18. The ground has been taken that judgment passed on 21.12.2020 and during that period the country was suffering from the Pandemic COVID-19 and due to that the instant appeal could not have been filed on time. 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also taken into consideration as to how to deal with the period of limitation when the country was suffering from unavoidable situation of approaching the Court of law by taking suo moto cognizance of the said aspect of the matter. The relevant part of the said order is reproduced hereinbelow: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 IN RE: COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION. …….. ………….. Petitioner (s) Versus ……. ………….. Respondent (s) 1. Due to the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, this Court took suo motu cognizance of the situation arising from difficulties that might be faced by the litigants across the country in filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 8 period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central or State). By an order dated 23.03.2020 this Court extended the period of limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether compoundable or not with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders. The order dated 23.03.2020 was extended from time to time. Though, we have not seen the end of the pandemic, there is considerable improvement. The lockdown has been lifted and the country is returning to normalcy. Almost all the Courts and Tribunals are functioning either physically or by virtual mode. We are of the opinion that the order dated 23.03.2020 has served its purpose and in view of the changing scenario relating to the pandemic, the extension of limitation should come to an end. 2. We have considered the suggestions of the learned Attorney General for India regarding the future course of action. We deem it appropriate to issue the following directions: 1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021. 2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. 3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. 4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for containment zones, to state. “Regulated movement will be allowed for medical emergencies, provision of essential goods and services, and other necessary functions, such as, time bound applications, including for legal purposes, and educational and job-related requirements.” 5. The Suo Motu Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. 20. Later on, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 10.01.2022 passed in Miscellaneous Application No. . 21 OF 2022 in Miscellaneous Application No. 665 of 2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) NO. 3 OF 2020 has extended the period. In Suo Motu Writ Petition (c) No. 3 of 2020 with Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 2022 & Miscellaneous Application No. 665/2021 dated 10.01.2022 The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 9 III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. 21. In the backdrop of the aforesaid, the matter would have been different herein if the period of limitation had expired during the period which has been excluded by virtue of the direction passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case. In order to consider as to whether even excluding the period of limitation as per the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the delay can be condoned or not? 22. The judgment is dated 21.12.2020 and the appeal has been filed on 28.6.2024. Since the period of exclusion as per the direction passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court is up to 28.02.2022 but the appeal has been filed on 28.6.2024 which is much beyond the period of exclusion as has been directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for calculating the limitation by excluding the period when the country was facing the rigor of Pandemic COVID-19. 23. Hence the ground which has been taken that due to prevalence of Pandemic COVID-19, the appeal could not have been filed appears to be not a sufficient cause, reason being that the appeal has been filed even after the period which was directed to be excluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 24. The second ground, as stated in paragraph no. 6 of the instant Interlocutory Application is that the time was consumed in arranging the documents and the expenditure which was to be incurred in filing the appeal shall be read with paragraph no.5 wherein the ground of the effect of the Pandemic COVID-19 has been taken and since we have come to the conclusion that the benefit of period of exclusion, as per the direction passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, is not allowed to be given as the appeal was filed much beyond the period of exclusion. 25. Further, the ground which has been shown either in paragraph no. 5 or paragraph no.6 cannot be said to be sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Since, the delay has not sufficiently been explained, this court is of the view that the instant Interlocutory Application cannot be allowed causing the miscarriage of justice to the respondent. 2025:JHHC:20122-DB 10 26. Accordingly, the instant Interlocutory Application is hereby dismissed. 27. In consequence of dismissal of the present Interlocutory Application, the instant First Appeal also stands dismissed. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) KNR /- AFR