Shyam Lal Vs State of H.P. Cr. MP No.2710 of 2025 in Cr.Revision No. 92 of 2008 Reserved on : 2.7.2025 14.07.2025: Present: Mr. Rohit Shyam Thakur, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for the respondent- State. Cr. MP No.2710 of 2025 The applicant-accused was convicted by the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 506 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC. He was sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of ₹ 10,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. He preferred appeal, which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla on 7.3.2008. He filed a Criminal Revision before this Court, which was admitted on 28.5.2008. 2. The revision petition was taken up for hearing on 29.8.2016, but no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner; hence, the Court dismissed the revision petition in default. Subsequently, an application for recall of said order was filed, which was allowed on 30.9.2021, and the matter was ordered to be restored to its original position. 3. The matter was adjourned at the request of learned counsel for the petitioner for 3.4.2025 as the last opportunity. Learned counsel for the petitioner on 3.4.2025 stated that he is not in touch with the petitioner; hence, the warrants of arrest were issued. It was reported that the petitioner-accused had absconded, and his whereabouts were not known. Therefore, a written proclamation requiring the presence of the accused before this Court on 2.7.2025 was issued. Today, the petitioner appeared and applied for the cancellation of the NBWs of arrest issued against him. 4. It is apparent from the perusal of the record that the petitioner has defaulted in appearance before this Court on 29.8.2016, and the Court was constrained to dismiss the petition in default. Subsequently, the order was recalled, and the learned counsel for the petitioner did not argue the matter because the petitioner had not contacted him. Hence, it is apparent that the petitioner is not cooperating with the disposal of the revision petition. 5. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 81: 1958 SCR 1226: 1958 CRI LJ 701: 1958 SCJ 672: AIR 1958 SC 376 that an absconding accused compromises fair trial and is not entitled to bail. It was observed: “6. Now, it is obvious that the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons. Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and provisions of the Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption, but a fair trial has naturally two objects in view; it must be fair to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat, either from the prosecution or the defence. A criminal trial must never be conducted by the prosecution as it would lead to the conviction of an innocent person; similarly, the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial, and so there can be no possible doubt that if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the High Courts to secure the ends of justice. There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial, and it is for the continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial. Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself and if there is no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case, the inherent power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked. In regard to non-bailable offences, there is no need to invoke such power because Section 497(5) specifically deals with such cases. The question which we have to decide in this case is whether the exercise of inherent power under Section 561-A against persons accused of bailable offences who have been released on bail is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of Section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. In the present case, the petitioner obstructed the disposal of the petition by absconding; therefore, the sentence imposed upon him cannot be suspended, and he cannot be released on bail. Further, the matter has already been on the hearing board for so many years and is likely to be disposed of soon; hence, the essential condition for suspension of the sentence, that the revision is not likely to be disposed of soon, is not satisfied at this stage. Hence, in these circumstances also, it would not be proper to suspend the sentence at this stage. 7. Consequently, the present application fails, and the same is dismissed. 8. List for the final hearing at the earliest. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th July 2025. (mamta)