IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 8669 of 2024 Date of Decision: 20.06.2025 _______________________________________________________ Ravi Kumar …….Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & another … Respondents ______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioner: Mr. Arun Raj, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General with Mr. Rajan Kahol and Mr. B.C.Verma, Additional Advocate Generals and Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General. _______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): By way of instant petition, petitioner has prayed for following main reliefs:- i. That any appropriate writ/order or direction may kindly be issued and the impugned order dated 29.04.2023 (Annexure P-4) may kindly be quashed and set aside as the same has been issued without following the due procedure; ii. That any appropriate writ/order or direction may kindly be issued and the impugned order dated 18.8.2023 (Annexure P-5) may kindly be quashed and set-aside. 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 iii. That any appropriate writ/order or direction may kindly be issued to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits.” 2. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Arun Raj, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that services of the petitioner have been terminated without following due process of law. Neither any show cause notice was ever issued to the petitioner nor any disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and straightway, on the basis of allegation of paper leakage levelled against the petitioner, the respondents proceeded to terminate him from the service. 3. On 28.02.2022, petitioner was appointed as Traffic Inspector on contract basis in the respondent-Department. Contract of the petitioner was renewed/extended for another one year on the basis of his performance & satisfactory conduct. However, before the petitioner herein could be regularized, FIR No.3/2023, dated 22.3.2023, came to be registered against him by SV & ACB, Hamirpur, under Sections 420, 120-B, 201 of IPC and Sections 7, 8 & 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on the allegation that he was also involved in the paper leak case. After registration of FIR, as detailed hereinabove, respondents, without serving any show cause notice or initiating any disciplinary proceedings, straightway proceeded to terminate the services of the petitioner vide order dated 3 29.04.2023. In the month of August, 2023, petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of termination dated 29.4.2023, passed by respondent No.2, before respondent No.1, i.e. Principal Secretary (Transport) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. However, afore authority, vide impugned order dated 18.08.2023, dismissed the appeal. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for the reliefs, as have been reproduced hereinabove. 4. Pursuant to the notices issued in the instant proceedings, respondents have filed reply, wherein facts, as have been noticed hereinabove, have not been disputed. As per reply filed by the respondents, petitioner was arrested by the State Vigilance & Anti Corruption Bureau, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, on 30.03.2023. The said arrest was related to the paper leak case of the Post Code 819 conducted by erstwhile HPSSC, Hamirpur, and he remained in police custody w.e.f. 30.03.2023 to 27.04.2023. It is averred in the reply that since CCS & CCA Rules are not applicable to the contract appointee, service of the petitioner was not suspended under the relevant rules, rather, in terms of amended standard format of R&P Rules vide letter number PER(AP)C-B-1/2009-Loose dated 05.02.2019 under Col Number 15-A(VII) and Sr. No.3 of Annexure-B, 4 respondents straightway proceeded to terminate the services of the petitioner. 5. While inviting attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Nar Singh Pal vs. Union of India and others, (2000) 3 SCC 588, learned counsel representing the petitioner vehemently argued that even in the case of temporary employee, disciplinary proceedings are required to be initiated and the delinquent official can only be removed after providing an opportunity of being heard. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that since petitioner herein was never afforded an opportunity of being heard before passing impugned termination order, same deserves to be set-aside. 6. He also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Dr. Vijaykumaran C.P.V. vs. Central University of Kerala and others, 2020(12) SCC 426 to substantiate his aforesaid plea. 7. To the contrary, Mr. Ravi Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, while supporting the impugned action of the respondents, vehemently argued that since petitioner was appointed on contract basis, there was no requirement, if any, to conduct disciplinary proceedings under the CCS(Conduct)Rules, 1972. While referring to the standard format of R&P Rules vide letter dated 5 05.02.2019, learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that in case a contract appointee is not satisfied with the termination order issued by Appointing Authority, he/she may prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority, who shall be higher in rank to the Appointing Authority, within a period of 45 days, but definitely there is no requirement, if any, of issuing suspension order and initiating the disciplinary proceedings. He further submitted that since contract appointment is purely on contract basis and during the period of contract, petitioner was found to have committed serious misconduct, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the respondents, while ordering his termination. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 9. It is not in dispute that petitioner at the time of lodging of FIR against him, was serving on contract basis, but question, which needs to be determined in the case at hand is “whether an employee appointed on contract can be terminated from service during the subsistence of contract on the ground of misconduct or not without serving show cause notice and initiating disciplinary proceedings. 6 10. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of standard format of R&P Rules formulated by the Government of Himachal Pradesh vide letter dated 05.02.2019, which reads as under:- “The service of the contract appointee will be purely on temporary basis. The appointment is liable to be terminated in case the performance/conduct of the contract appointee is not found satisfactory. In case, the contract appointee is not satisfied with the termination orders issued by the appointing authority, he/she may prefer an appeal before the appellate Authority who shall be higher in rank to the Appointing Authority, within a period of 45 days, from the date on which copies of termination order is delivered to him/her.” 11. While placing heavy reliance upon aforesaid provision, though, learned Deputy Advocate General vehemently argued that the services of a contract appointee, being purely on temporary basis, can be terminated in case the performance and conduct of the contract appointee is not found satisfactory. Admittedly, in the case at hand, respondents before ordering termination of the petitioner never issued show cause notice, rather taking note of factum of lodging of FIR and arrest of the petitioner, straightway proceeded to terminate his services. 12. By now, it is well settled that even in the case of a temporary employee, disciplinary proceedings are required to be initiated before passing a stigmatic order. Since in the case at hand, 7 petitioner came to be terminated on account of his arrest in paper leak case, order of termination, being stigmatic and punitive, could not have been passed without adhering to the principles of natural justice, which also includes opportunity of being heard. 13. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Nar Singh Pal VS UOI & ors. (supra), relevant paras whereof are reproduced as under:- “8. The documents which have been placed before us pertain to the preliminary enquiry made against the appellant in which the statement of certain persons who had seen the incident was recorded. The services of the appellant were, thereafter, terminated by paying him the retrenchment compensation through a cheque along with the order dated 20-5-1992. The order having been passed on the basis of preliminary enquiry and not on the basis of regular departmental enquiry without issuing a charge sheet or giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant, cannot be sustained. 9. We may, at this stage, refer to the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha in which the learned Judge observed as under: 53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does 8 not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate, (liven an alleged misconduct and a live nexuses between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used." (Emphasis supplied) 10. Applying the above principles, the order in the instant, case, cannot be treated to be a simple order of retrenchment. It was an order passed by way of punishment and, therefore, was an order of dismissal which having been passed without holding a regular departmental enquiry, be sustained. 14. Reliance is also been placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Dr. Vijaykumaran C.P.V Vs Central University of Kerala and ors. (supra), relevant paragraphs whereof reads as under: “11. In the present case, all the three elements are attracted, as a result of which it must follow that the stated order is exfacie stigmatic and punitive. Such an order could be issued only after subjecting the incumbent to a regular inquiry as per the service rules. As a matter of fact, the Internal Complaints Committee had recommended to proceed against the appellant appropriately but the Executive Council proceeded under the mistaken belief that in terms of clause 7 of the contract, it was open to the Executive Council to terminate the services of the appellant without a formal regular inquiry as per the service rules. Indisputably, in the present case, the Internal Complaints Committee was constituted in reference to the complaints received from the girl students about the alleged misconduct committed by the appellant, which allegations were duly inquired into in a formal inquiry after giving opportunity to the appellant and culminated with the report recording finding against the appellant with recommendation to proceed against him. 13. A priori, we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned termination order dated 30.11.2017 is illegal being exfacie stigmatic as it has been issued without subjecting the appellant to a regular inquiry as per the service rules. On this conclusion, the appellant would stand reinstated, but whether he should be granted backwages and other benefits including placing him under suspension and proceeding against him by way of departmental or regular inquiry as per the service rules, is, in our opinion, a matter to be taken forward by the authority concerned in accordance with law. We do not intend to issue any direction in that regard keeping in mind the principle 9 underlying the exposition of the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. vs. R. Karunakar & Ors. 4. In that case, the Court was called upon to decide as to what should be the incidental order to be passed by the Court in case after following necessary procedure, the Court/Tribunal was to set aside the order of punishment. The Court observed thus: “31. ….Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the 4 (1993) 4 SCC 727 authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the backwages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” (emphasis supplied) Following the principle underlying the above quoted exposition, we proceed to hold that even though the impugned order of termination dated 30.11.2017 is set aside in terms of this judgment, as a result of which the appellant would stand reinstated, but at the same time, due to flawed approach of the respondent No. 1 – University, the entitlement to grant backwages is a matter which will be subject to the outcome of further action to be taken by the University as per the service rules and in accordance with law.” 15. Careful reading of aforesaid judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court clearly suggests that order of retrenchment by way of punishment cannot be passed without holding a regular departmental inquiry. Hon’ble Apex Court in aforesaid judgments has 10 held that since termination order is punitive in nature and stigmatic, delinquent official is required to be subjected to regular enquiry. In both the cases before Hon’ble Apex Court, delinquent officials were temporary employee. 16. Since in the case at hand, termination order against petitioner came to be passed without holding any inquiry, therefore, the same is not tenable in the eye of law and as such, deserves to be quashed. 17. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment dated 24.08.2020 passed by Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. No.1666 of 2027, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & others vs. Dr. Parvesh Thakur, wherein Division Bench of this Court taking note of judgment passed by Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Meenakshi vs. State of UP and others,2018(9) ADJ 550, in which afore Court taking into consideration as many as 49 judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court including various Constitution Bench Judgments, laid down the principles to find out whether a simple order of termination/discharge of a temporary employee or probationer is punitive or not”- “(a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. (b) An order of termination simplicitor prima facie is not a punishment and carries no evil consequences. 11 (c) Where termination simplicitor is challenged on the ground of casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance the order itself to find out whether it cast any stigma and can be said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said order. (d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, makes it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or attending, show only the motive of the employer to terminate, it being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found that order is founded on such act or omission constituting misconduct. (e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the employee was a mere probationer or temporary. (f) "Motive" and "foundation" are distinct, though the distinction is either very thin or overlapping. "Motive" is the moving power, which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently. "Motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. "Foundation", however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the employee, When his acts and omissions treated to be misconduct, proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation. (g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, but if it falls short of it, it would not. (h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish to bother about it, and, instead of going into the correctness of guilt, feel like not to keep the employee and thus terminate him, it is simpliciter termination and not punitive. (i) Where the termination simplicitor is preceded by an enquiry, purpose, object of such enquiry as also the stage at which, the order of termination has been passed. (j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge, would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating an probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive. (k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry would not render termination punitive. (l) Where the employer hold a formal enquiry to find out the correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and proceed on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive, and, cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee. m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not pursued to the end. Instead a simple order of termination is passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would be immaterial and such an order would be non punitive. 12 (n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide, if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the Court, that would not make the order founded on any misconduct. (o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The following words mentioned in the order have not been held to be punitive. i. "want of application", ii. "lack of potential", iii. "found not dependable", iv. "under suspension", v. "work is unsatisfactory", vi. "unlikely to prove an efficient officer". (p) Description of background facts also have not been held to be stigmatic. (q) However, the words "undesirable to be retained in Government service", have been held stigmatic. (r) If there is (i) a full scale formal enquiry, (ii) in the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct, (iii) which culminated in a finding of guilt; where all these three factors are present, the order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form. However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive.” 13 Judged in light of the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that the only basis for terminating the respondent was that he was arrested for an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and remained in custody for more than 48 hours. 14 The State did not even choose to hold any independent inquiry with regard to the case registered against the respondent. 15 It is not in dispute that the respondent was honourably acquitted in the case that was registered against him and the said findings have attained finality as neither the State nor the prosecutrix filed an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, dated 22.7.2019. 16 In the given circumstances, no fault can be found with the findings rendered by the learned Tribunal, wherein it was observed as under: “From the sequence of the facts of the case, the inference is irresistible that the impugned order of termination of the services of the applicant is penal in nature. It is well settled that though the order is innocuous on the face of it, then the Court, if necessary for the ends of fair play and justice, can lift the veil and find out the real nature of the order. If it is found that the impugned order is penal in nature even though it is couched with the order of termination in accordance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment, the order will be set aside.” 18. In afore-referred case before Division Bench of this Court, the individual was arrested for an offence punishable under 13 Section 376 of IPC and he remained in custody for more than 48 hours, but yet Division Bench of this Court held the judgment passed by erstwhile Tribunal, whereby termination of the petitioner in that case was upheld to be bad in law being punitive in nature. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No. 4886 of 2022, titled Arun Kang vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 20.05.2025, whereby petitioner, who was contract employee with respondent, was terminated without following due process of law. Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Swati Priyadarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh in Civil Appeal No.9758 of 2024, decided on 22.08.2024 held that since the termination was for alleged misconduct, a formal inquiry was necessary, and its absence rendered the action invalid. Relevant paras from the judgment are as under:- “4. On 15.10.2012, the sole appellant was appointed by the Respondent No.4 to the post of Assistant Project Coordinator (hereinafter referred to as “APC”) under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan (hereinafter referred to as “SSA”) on contract basis, initially for one academic session (1 year), renewable in subsequent years for two years each “subject to evaluation of work in the first year.” 5 to 10……………... 11. Order dated 30.03.2013 was passed by the Respondent No.4 deciding not to extend the contract of the appellant as APC from 31.03.2013 on the ground of dereliction of duty, as the work/performance of the appellant was found to be unsatisfactory. English translation of this order as annexed by the appellant with the paper-book reads as under: “Under the above subject matter and under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan on 30.03.2013 in the meeting of the District Appointment Committee after the consideration and determination is done and subsequent to the same this decision has been taken that as you work is not satisfactory and due to this reason from the end dated 31.03.2013 of the Education Session your contract service may 14 not be increased. In the context of the above decision from dated 31.03.2013 furthermore your contract service is not increased.” (sic) 12 to 32…………………... 33. In either of the above-noted eventualities, the Impugned Judgment would have to necessarily be set aside. Nevertheless, let us examine the reasoning of the Division Bench, which opined that the order is nonstigmatic and simpliciter non-renewal of contract. The order dated 30.03.2013 was, quite obviously, the culmination of the process set into motion by the two SCNs, which has been overlooked by the Division Bench. The mere non- mention of the background situation or the SCNs in the order dated 30.03.2013 cannot, by itself, be determinative of the nature of the order. As held by this Court in Samsher Singh v State of Punjab7 and Anoop Jaiswal v Government of India , the form of an order is not its final determinant and the Court can find out the real reason and true character behind terminating/removing an employee. Moreover, the Impugned Judgment also does not deal with Clause 4. Interestingly, this Clause also escaped the attention of or/and was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge either. 34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India : “28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India 10. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh 11 In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on 15 misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.” (emphasis supplied) 35. We would only be adding to verbosity by multiplying authorities. In view of the above dictum, it is clear that the Respondents did not comply with Clause 4 – either the first part or the second part thereof. The order dated 30.03.2013 does visit the 16 appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her re further employment. 36. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the Impugned Judgment is quashed and set aside. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20.06.2017 stands revived, however with a modification to the extent that the appellant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits including notional continuation in service at par with other similarly- situated employees, but with the back wages restricted to 50%. Further, in view of the long passage of time, we deny liberty to the respondents to proceed afresh against the appellant as was granted by the learned Single Judge. However, this will not preclude the respondents from taking action against the appellant in accordance with law in futuro apropos her official duties on the post in question, if the situation so arises. The exercise be completed within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment.” 19. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds merit in the present petition and accordingly same is allowed. Impugned orders dated 29.04.2023(Annexure P-4) and 18.08.2023 (Annexure P-5) are quashed and set aside. Though, in terms of instant judgment, petitioner shall be entitled to be reinstated in service forthwith, but respondents shall be at liberty to hold inquiry against him in accordance with law as well as observation made hereinabove, if required. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge June 20, 2025 (shankar)