1 CRA No. 870 of 2024 2025:CGHC:48491-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 870 of 2024 1 - Raja @ Ahmed Raza S/o Mohammad Ayyub Aged About 21 Years R/o Nai Basti, Raza Chowk, Raja Talab, Police Station Civil Line, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisarh .2 - Mohammad Ishtekhar @ Raju S/o Mohammad Ayyub Aged About 23 Years R/o Nai Basti, Raza Chowk, Raja Talab, Police Station Civil Line, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisarh. 3 - Mohammad Shahid S/o Mohammad Mushtak Aged About 22 Years R/o Kapda Market, Jaibhole Complex, Sarsawati Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station City Kotwali, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. S.C. Verma, Sr. Adv. along with Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, P.L. Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per, Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge 22/09/2025 1. In the instant case there were four accused persons i.e. present three appellants and one child in conflict with law (CCL). In JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2025.09.23 16:33:59 +0530 2 CRA No. 870 of 2024 respect of said CCL the matter was sent to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board. 2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellants under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.02.2024, passed by the learned Additional Session Judge (Special Judge of Special Court for Trial of C.B.I. Cases), District Raipur, C.G. in Sessions Trial No. 120/2022, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:- (Raja @ Ahmed Raza - Appellant No. 1) Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of the IPC R.I. for Life imprisonment and fine amount of Rs.500/-, in default, additional R.I. for 3 months Section 25 (1B) (b) of Arms Act 1859 R.I. for one year with fine Rs. 500/- in default of payment of further R.I. for 3 months. (All the sentences are directed to run concurrently) (Mohammad Ishtekhar @ Raju - Appellant No. 2 & Mohammad Shahid Appellant No.3) Conviction Sentence Under Section 302/34 of the IPC R.I. for life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of further R.I. for 3 months 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief is that on February 14, 2022, the wedding procession of Saheb Khan was going on wherein the deceased Farooq Khan was also participated. When the 3 CRA No. 870 of 2024 said procession was proceeding from the Taj Nagar locality to the wedding venue, Baijnath Para, Girls School Ground at about 9:45 p.m., Raja alias Raza (appellant No. 1) and his minor brother/child in conflict with law (CCL) joined the procession and began dancing on the road in front of the Muslim Hall gate. During the dance, an altercation broke out between Farooq Khan and the CCL, as a result of which the CCL sustained head injury.Subsequently owing to intervention of others, the procession proceeded to the wedding venue. Thereafter, Farooq Khan (deceased) was sitting with his friends on a chair at the wedding venue. At that time, accused Raja alias Ahmed Raza, his brother (CCL), their third brother namely; Raju alias Mohd. Ishtekhar (appellant No.2), and Mohd. Shahid (appellant No.3) came and surrounded and caught Farooq and the accused Raja alias Ahmed Raza (appellant No.1) stabbed Farooq in the chest with the intention of killing him. Subhan Khan, who came to intervene, was also injured in the left eye by the handle of the knife. Mohd. Farooq was taken to Mekahara Hospital for treatment, where he died at 11:40 pm that night. Thereafter, at City Kotwali Police Station case was registered under Section 174 of the CrPC regarding death of Farooq. Dead body was sent for post-mortem examination and the post-mortem report (P-15) revealed that the death was due to shock and hemorrhage due to stab wound. Based on this, an FIR was registered at City Kotwali Police Station against the accused Raja alias Raza Ahmed 4 CRA No. 870 of 2024 (Appellant No. 1), Mohammad Ishtekhar @ Raju (Appellant No. 2), Mohammad Shahid (appellant No. 3) and against the CCL under Sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and the investigation was initiated. A site map (Ex.P.5) was prepared. The accused persons were taken into custody and interrogated in presence of independent witnesses. Memorandum statements were prepared, Ex.P. 8 and 10. A brown pair of jeans and a moss-colored floral T-shirt were seized from appellant No. 3 in presence of independent witnesses, and a steel knife and black floral pants and a floral shirt were seized from appellant No. 1. Seizure memos, Ex.P.-11 and Ex.P-9, respectively, were prepared. Blood-stained soil and plain soil were seized from the scene of crime and a seizure memo, Ex.P- 6. Patwari map, Ex.P-17, was prepared through the Tehsildar. After inquiring the doctor regarding seized clothes and knife, the seized items were subjected to chemical analysis and sent for FSL. 4. After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed. Subsequently, charges were framed by the competent Court and read out to the accused persons, they denied having committed the crime and sought trial. The prosecution produced a total of 14 witnesses in the case and got a total of 29 documents certified by marking them as exhibits. Statement of the accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded, they declared themselves innocent. 5 CRA No. 870 of 2024 5. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 26.02.2024 convicted the appellants herein for the aforementioned offence and sentenced as mentioned herein-above against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants herein questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 6. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellants argued that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants. He further submits that the incident occurred in response to sudden provocation, suggesting that it was a spontaneous act without premeditated intention or mens rea to commit the murder. He further submits that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellants through cogent, convincing and reliable evidence. According to the learned counsel, at the most, the case of the appellant fall within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the act of the appellants are culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellants for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 Part-I or Part- II of the IPC and the sentence be reduced to RI for 6 years. 7. 7. On the other hand, learned P.L. appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellants have caused murder of deceased by deadly 6 CRA No. 870 of 2024 attacking due to which, he succumbed to injuries, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of IPC and it is not a case where the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/ converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be whether the deceased died under unnatural circumstances or not ? 10. In this regard, Dr. Snigdha Jain (PW-10) who is posted as Department of Forensic Medicine of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital cum Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Medical College, Raipur (CG) stated that she performed the autopsy and found that Left lung was torn & separated from its part at hilar region, surrounding structures are contused. Right lung is intact and pale. Pericardium shows stab wound slit of size 2.5 cm x 4 mm. Beneath it, heart just above apex shows stab wound of length 2 cm x 2 mm on left ventricle cavity deep obliquely, surrounding contusion in interventricular septum and ventricular wall. She further opined that stab wound found on the deceased's chest was antemortem and caused by a sharp-edged, pointed object. The injury was located in the internal vital organs, 7 CRA No. 870 of 2024 sufficient to cause death. The injury occurred prior to the deceased's death and was a fresh injury. The cause of death was shock and hemorrhage from the stab wound. The deceased died within 24 hours of the autopsy. The autopsy report provided by her is Ex.P. 15. Hence, it is clear from the medical report and uncontested medical evidence that the death of the deceased was a culpable homicide. 11. In view of the above, there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the medical witness Dr. Snigdha Jain (PW-10). Hence, the trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record particularly relying upon the statement of Dr. Snigdha Jain (PW-10) and PM report (Ex.P-15) has come to the conclusion that the deceased died under unnatural circumstances. 12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions advanced by them, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that the deceased died under unnatural circumstances is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 13. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellants herein are the perpetrators of the crime in question ? 14. Ahad Raja (PW-1) stated that the incident occurred 8 CRA No. 870 of 2024 approximately 3-4 months ago, at 9-10 p.m. He stated that he along with his friends was attending the wedding of his friend Shahid Khan. They were coming to Baijnath Para via Taj Nagar in the wedding procession, Farooq Khan (deceased) was also part of the procession. He stated that they were dancing and singing at the wedding. In the same procession, Mahfooz and Raja, from the bride's side, began to dance forcefully, kicking and waving their hands and legs. When Farooq refused to dance, Mahfooz began choking Farooq. The wedding party members intervened and calmed the situation, and they went inside the wedding venue. He further stated that they sat down inside the wedding hall along with Farooq. just then, Mehfooz, Raja (appellant No. 1), Raju (appellant No. 2), and Shoheb arrived. They kicked Shoheb off the chair, surrounded Farooq, and the four accused grabbed him. Raja (appellant No. 1) took out a knife and stabbed him in the chest, Farooq fell down, and crowd gathered. The four men fled. 15. Mohd. Shoheb (PW-3) deposed that about four months ago, in February, at around 9-10 p.m., he went to attend a friend, Shaheb's, wedding in Vaijnath Para. He further stated that they were dancing in the wedding procession when Raja and Mahfooz also began dancing and getting violent. Farooq Bhai calmed them down, and the situation calmed down. We were sitting down after eating. Raja, Raju, Mahfooz, and Shahid then grabbed Farooq Bhai, and Raja (Appellant No. 1) stabbed him in the chest. At that moment, Farooq Bhai fell. After rescuing him, Raja 9 CRA No. 870 of 2024 and Sonu took him to Mekahara Hospital for treatment, where he was declared dead. 16. Mohd. Jafar Ikabal (PW-4) stated that the incident occurred approximately 3-4 months ago, on a February night, at approximately 9:30 p.m. he was sitting at a wedding hall in Baijnath Para, having finished dinner. Farooq was also sitting a short distance away. Shahid, Raja, Raju, and Mahfooz arrived and accused Raja (appellant No. 1) kicked Shoheb, who was sitting on the ledger, onto a chair, causing him to fall. The four then grabbed Farooq and Raja pulled out a knife and stabbed him. Shubhan was standing nearby. When Raja was about to attack again, Shubhan caught him. We then began throwing the chair and saw Farooq lying there. Raja and Sonu took Farooq in their Activa and took him to the hospital. At the hospital, Farroq was declared dead. 17. Mohd. Mohsin (PW-7) stated that he was attending the wedding at Baijnath Para Girls School. He further stated that he was sitting with farooq and eating and talking, when Raja, Raju, Shahid, and Mahfooz came and kicked Shoheb's chair, causing him to fall from the chair. Mahfooz, Shahid, and Raju then came and grabbed Farooq. Raja, who was holding a knife, stabbed Farooq in the chest. He then picked up a chair and hit the accused, causing them to flee. Farooq fell to the ground, covered in blood. He further stated that they picked him up and took him 10 CRA No. 870 of 2024 to Mekahara Hospital. Later, he was declared dead. 18. Dr. Snigdha Jain (PW-10) deposed that the stab wound found on the deceased's chest was antemortem and caused by a sharp-edged, pointed object. The injury was located in internal vital organs, sufficient to cause death. The injury occurred prior to the deceased's death and was a fresh injury. The cause of death was shock and hemorrhage from the stab wound. The deceased died within 24 hours of the autopsy. The autopsy report submitted by her is Ex.P. 15. Further, FSL report shows that blood stains were found on the knife which was seized from appellant No. 1. 19. The testimonies of the witness successfully established the charge against appellant No. 1 beyond reasonable doubt. The consistent thread running through the depositions of PW-1 Ahad Raja, PW-3 Mohd. Shoheb, PW-4 Mohd. Jafar Ikabal, and PW-7 Mohd. Mohsin is that appellant Raja (accused No. 1) inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the deceased Farooq. Their evidence finds full corroboration from the medical testimony of PW-10 Dr. Snigdha Jain, who opined that the injury was antemortem, caused by a sharp-edged weapon, and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Further, the FSL report confirmed the presence of blood on the knife seized from appellant No. 1, lending strong forensic support to the ocular version. Thus, the prosecution has firmly proved that it was the appellant No. 1 who delivered the fatal stab wound and other 11 CRA No. 870 of 2024 appellants accompanied him, resulting in the death of Farooq. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 20. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? 21. The cause of death assigned in the postmortem report of the deceased as already noticed are ‘ sharp-edged weapon, and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 12 CRA No. 870 of 2024 prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 23. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this 13 CRA No. 870 of 2024 background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 14 CRA No. 870 of 2024 aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 15 CRA No. 870 of 2024 the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 26. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 16 CRA No. 870 of 2024 further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 27. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 17 CRA No. 870 of 2024 support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 28. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 18 CRA No. 870 of 2024 29. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 19 CRA No. 870 of 2024 act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not 20 CRA No. 870 of 2024 amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the 21 CRA No. 870 of 2024 following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide 22 CRA No. 870 of 2024 (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. 23 CRA No. 870 of 2024 (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or 24 CRA No. 870 of 2024 that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 31. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that on the date of incident the appellant assaulted the deceased with knife and due to deep injury in his chest and bleeding he died. He must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely to cause death of the deceased, as such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellants herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 32. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, particularly absence of motive in commission of murder of deceased and also taking into consideration that on the date of incident the appellants were aged about 21 years, 23 years and 22 years, respectively and they are in jail since 15.02.2022 and they have completed more than 3½ years, the conviction of the 25 CRA No. 870 of 2024 appellants under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC. However, the conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant No.1 under Section 25(1B)(b) of Arms Act is hereby maintained. 33. In view of foregoing, conviction of the appellant No.1 under Section 302 IPC is set aside however, the conviction & sentence under Section 25(1B) (b) of Arms Act is maintained. The conviction of the appellants No.2 & 3 under Section 302/34 IPC is set aside. However, all the appellants are convicted under Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 years. However, the fine amount imposed by the learned Trial Court shall remain unaltered. Sentence imposed under Section 304 Part-I and Section 25 (1B) (b) of Arms Act of appellant No.1 shall run concurrently. 34. In the result, the criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 35. It is stated that the appellants are in jail, they shall serve out the remaining sentence as modified by this Court. 36. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their 26 CRA No. 870 of 2024 jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Jyoti