1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Civil Revision No.206 of 2022 Date of Decision : 18.08.2025 Suresh Kumar and others …… Petitioners Versus Santosh and others ……Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the petitioners : Mr. P.S. Goverdhan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. V.S. Chauhan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Pranshul Sharma and Ms. Priti Steta, Advocates, for respondent No.1. None for respondent No.2. Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, Additional Advocate General for respondents No.3 and 4. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) The present petition has been preferred against order dated 25.07.2022, whereby an application preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay in filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the respondents for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 26.07.2014, passed in Civil Suit No.226/1 of 2000, titled Suresh vs. Union of India and others, has been allowed. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and the documents appended along with present petition. 3. The respondent, admittedly were contesting the aforementioned Civil Suit till 14.07.2014, on which date, the matter was listed for arguments. No one had appeared on behalf of the respondents on the said date and therefore, the respondents had been proceeded against ex parte. The suit was decreed in favour of the present petitioners and the Counter Claim filed by the respondents was dismissed vide judgment dated 26.07.2014. 4. The application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for setting aside ex parte judgment dated 26.07.2014 along-with an application for condonation of delay was filed on 25.07.2016. 5. From perusal of the application for condonation of delay, it is evident that in the application seeking condonation of delay, specifically Paragraph-4, it has been mentioned that from July, 2014 onwards, present respondent had remained at Chandigarh with her son for her treatment to cure her chronic asthma. It is submitted that on this count, she could not contact her counsel. It is further averred in the application that it is only in the first week of July, 2016 when respondent came to her native house at Solan, it is only thereafter that she searched for the phone number of the counsel and contacted her to inquire about the fate of her case. It is thereafter that requisite necessary action in this respect was taken. 6. The categoric stand taken by the respondents in the reply to the application, seeking condonation of delay that after July, 2014 she remained 3 at Chandigarh, is belied by the documents pertaining to her treatment appended along with present application. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to report dated 03.09.2014 issued by the District Ayurveda Hospital, Solan. 7. Other than the aforesaid, it would be appropriate to refer to prescription slip issued by the District Ayurveda Hospital, Solan dated 06.12.2014 pertaining to the present respondent. Besides the aforesaid, no treatment record from any Chandigarh Hospital has been placed on record to justify the averment that post July, 2014 till July 2016, respondent was seeking treatment for Asthma at Chandigarh. 8. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in SLP © No.17575 of 2023 Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran & Anr. Decided on 13.05.2025, relevant extract whereof is being reproduced herein below: Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet. 9. Other than the aforesaid it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation. 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result 4 flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.” 10. Admittedly, the delay in the case at hand is about 2 years. The length of delay is immaterial. The condonation of delay is a discretionary 5 power. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of cause shown and the degree of its acceptability thereof. The expression “sufficient cause” is to be duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part. 11. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531. The relevant extract of the same are as under:- “…...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” 6 12. Before the appeal court regular and periodical dates of hearing are fixed. The process is called ‘adjournment of hearing. A party or his counsel is expected to appear on those dates and keep track of the case. If a litigant does not keep track of his case than ‘want of diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be attributed to such a litigant. With respect to the aspect of ‘want of diligence’ or inaction attributed to the applicant in the case at hand, it would be appropriate to refer to Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321 : “15. … …. …. There is a significant difference between an appeal pending in a subordinate court and an appeal pending in a High Court. In lower courts, dates of hearing are periodically fixed and a party or his counsel is expected to appear on those dates and keep track of the case. The process is known as “adjournment of hearing.” In what cases can Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ be attributed to an applicant it would be appropriate to refer to Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (2009) 11 SCC 183 : “Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent.” (emphasis in original) 13. In the case at hand, after 14th July, 2014, the respondent did not keep track of her case. The conduct exhibited by the respondent shows a complete lack of diligence. The explanation offered is belied by the documents filed by the respondent. The same is in the nature of an excuse. 7 14. In the case at hand, for the reasons stated herein above, I am of the considered view that Court below has failed to exercise jurisdiction and hence, interference of this Court is called for. 15. In view of above terms, I find merit in the present petition and the same is allowed accordingly. Impugned order dated 25.07.2022 is quashed and set aside. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (Bipin Chander Negi) August 18, 2025 (KS) Judge