2025:HHC:23404 _________________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 580 of 2025 Reserved on: 30.06.2025 Date of Decision: 21.07.2025 Surjeet Singh & another ...Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Sandeep Gahlawat Advocate. For the respondent No.1/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R No. 5 of 2023 dated 09.02.2023, registered at Women Police Station, Una, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. 2 2025:HHC:23404 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police asserting that she was married to Krishan Gopal on 19.07.2022. She stayed in her matrimonial home at Lamlehra for some time after her marriage. She, her husband and her parents-in-law (present petitioners) shifted to Mohali after some time. Informant’s husband started taunting her at the behest of the petitioners, saying that she was provided nothing by her parents at the time of her marriage. Her mother-in-law taunted her by saying that she had given ₹2,50,000/- to her daughter in marriage for the purchase of a car, but the informant’s parents had not given her anything. She was asked to bring money from her parents. Petitioners used to say that she came empty- handed. Her father-in-law used to say that the informant was not as per his status, and she looked like a toy. They restrained her from going out of the house. When she went to her parental home for tying Rakhi, her husband left for Australia on 04.09.2022. The informant started residing with the petitioners. They harassed the informant and stopped paying expenses for her needs. They also abused the informant’s mother and her brother. They tried to kill the informant and snatch her mobile 3 2025:HHC:23404 phone. She started shivering due to fear. Her mother-in-law requested her not to reveal the incident to any person to save the family's honour. She was taken to her parental home on 12.11.2022. She tried to contact the petitioners but failed to do so. She went to Lamlehra, and the house was found locked. She called her father-in-law, who stated that he did not know her. He revealed that he was residing in Mumbai. She tried to contact her husband, who picked up the calls after several attempts and said that he would not talk to her and would divorce her via a video call. Informant’s parents tried to contact the petitioners and ask them to keep the informant with them; however, they refused. They stated that they were issued a Visa and they were leaving India. The informant, her family members, and Pardhan Gram Panchayat Takoli went to the petitioners’ house on 31.01.2022; however, the petitioners refused to open the door. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the F.I.R., conducted the investigation, and filed a charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R. and the filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioners have filed the 4 2025:HHC:23404 present petition for quashing of the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings. It was asserted that the petitioners are residing in their house alone. They are unable to do any work due to their old age and were dragged into this litigation unnecessarily. The petitioners, their son and informant, resided together at Lamlehra for 15 days and thereafter shifted to Mohali. The petitioners’ son went to Australia, where he was working before his marriage. The informant knew about the fact that her husband was serving in Australia, and he would leave India. His ticket was booked by the informant. The informant and her husband used to talk to each other on the telephone. She was kept nicely in her matrimonial home. She herself left for her parental home. She did not return to the petitioners’ house. The petitioners published an advertisement in two leading newspapers stating that they had disinherited their son and informant. They filed an application under Section 22 of the Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act,2007. The notice was issued to the informant, but she did not file any response. She filed a false complaint against her husband and the petitioners. No allegations of demand for dowry were made in the application. The matter was found to be 5 2025:HHC:23404 one of domestic violence and was sent to CDPO, Bangana, District Una, H.P., for taking action as per law. The petitioners went abroad on 08.02.2023 as their son-in-law was suffering from a serious ailment in his ear and required surgery. The informant made a false complaint against the petitioners and their son. Her statement was recorded, and she has materially improved upon her version. The contents of the F.I.R. do not disclose the commission of any offence. No specific allegations were made in the F.I.R. No complaint was made till 12.11.2022. The petitioners’ version was not verified by the police. The evidence on record is inconsistent with the allegations in the F.I.R. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. The allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and F.I.R., as well as consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr. Sandeep Gahlawat, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 6 2025:HHC:23404 5. Mr. Sandeep Gahlawat, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. The petitioners made a false complaint. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R., as well as consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., be quashed. 6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR. The police conducted the investigation and found sufficient material for filing the charge sheet. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - 7 2025:HHC:23404 “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 8 2025:HHC:23404 (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute 9 2025:HHC:23404 any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the 10 2025:HHC:23404 criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 10. It was held in Raghunath Sharma v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1148, that the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is the exception and not the rule. It was observed: 7. The scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr. P.C. has engaged this Court on numerous occasions [Ref: State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699; Sunder Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 14 SCC 244; Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P. (2017) 13 SCC 369; Ahmad Ali Quraishi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 13 SCC 435.] The observations made in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89 by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges encapsulate the purpose of this power most aptly in the following terms: “6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express 11 2025:HHC:23404 provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 12 2025:HHC:23404 11. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703: “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 12. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761: 13 2025:HHC:23404 33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well- established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court. 34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) “There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. *** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.” In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. 35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process 14 2025:HHC:23404 justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: “It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.” 38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.” What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case. 13. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them. However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while 15 2025:HHC:23404 exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498: 13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged. 14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) “5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action 16 2025:HHC:23404 which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be 17 2025:HHC:23404 sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.” (emphasis supplied) 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal misconduct amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet papers indicates that the allegations levelled by the First Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping, specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the other members of the Appellants' family. Thus, we are of the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domestic violence case. 18 2025:HHC:23404 25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: - “32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill. Instead of salvaging the situation and making every possible endeavour to save the marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about the destruction of the marriage over trivial issues. The first thing that comes to mind for the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner does the matter reach the Police than even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other's faults, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what 19 2025:HHC:23404 constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage were to come to an end, then what would be the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill- treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill- treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband to ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to the other may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Chadha v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094 that the provisions of Section 498A of IPC are being invoked without mentioning any specific date, time or incident, which casts 20 2025:HHC:23404 serious suspicion on the complainant’s version. It was observed:- 13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are distressed with the manner in, the offences under Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant- wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant- wife or her family members, and vitiates the very objective of a protective legislation. The observations made by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana (2025) 3 SCC 735 appropriately encapsulate this essence as under: “25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement, should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations, unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations, cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant No. 1, have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution, and the same would be an abuse of the process of the 21 2025:HHC:23404 law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.” 14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse by the parties, and cannot be established simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least. The tendency of roping these sections, without mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case of the prosecution, and casts serious suspicion on the viability of the version of the Complainant. We cannot ignore the missing specifics in a criminal complaint, which is the premise of invoking the criminal machinery of the State. Be that as it may, we are informed that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce decree has attained finality; hence, any further prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of process of law. 18. This position was reiterated in Ghanshyam Soni Vs. State, NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1301, wherein it was observed:- 10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing an insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to a few instances of such atrocities; however, the allegations are generic and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, are that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure, beat her up, but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also 22 2025:HHC:23404 been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he, being a friend of the Appellant, instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home(2018) 14 SCC 452, fits perfectly into the present scenario: “6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.” 11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat 2024 INSC 960 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 671. The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dated. 06.12.1999, six days later, on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family, and the 23 2025:HHC:23404 investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Janshruti v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 909 that there are hundreds of genuine cases as contrasted to a false case registered under Section 498A, and the Courts should be conscious of the ground reality while adjudicating the cases under Section 498-A of IPC. It was observed:- 11. We are cognizant of the growing discourse highlighting instances where the provision may have been misused. However, it must be borne in mind that for every such instance, there are likely hundreds of genuine cases where Section 498A has served as a crucial safeguard for victims of domestic cruelty. We are also aware that certain unconscionable individuals, emboldened by the rising fervour to dismantle such protective provisions, have gone so far as to publicly share videos depicting the exchange of dowry —an act not only unlawful but also indicative of the entrenched nature of the very evil this provision seeks to combat. 12. We also remain acutely attuned to the ground realities. As the Constitutional Court and the apex judicial body of the country, we bear the solemn responsibility of safeguarding justice for our entire population. The harsh truth is that dowry continues to persist as a deeply entrenched social evil, prevalent across vast sections of the country. A significant majority of such cases go unreported, with countless women compelled to endure injustice in silence. This underscores the continuing need for legal provisions such as Section 498A, which serve as 24 2025:HHC:23404 vital instruments of protection and redressal for those most vulnerable. 20. Thus, the Court has to strike a fine balance and it has to see that the allegations made against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC are not general, vague or omnibus to rope in the relatives of the husband. At the same time, the Court should not scuttle a genuine case filed under Section 498A of the IPC. 21. A perusal of the F.I.R. shows that the informant had made specific allegations against the petitioners. It was asserted against her mother-in-law that she told the informant that ₹2-5 Lakhs were provided in her daughter’s dowry, and the informant had not brought anything with her. The allegations against the father-in-law were that he used to tell the informant’s husband that she was not upto her status, and she looked like a toy. She further asserted that the petitioners did not provide any maintenance to her. The petitioners abused her mother and brother, and an attempt was made to kill her and snatch her mobile phone. She was left in her parental home, and she was not allowed to visit her matrimonial home. When she went to her matrimonial home with her relatives and Pardhan, 25 2025:HHC:23404 the petitioners did not open the door. These allegations clearly show the continuous harassment, mental and physical cruelty inflicted upon the informant. 22. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are false. It is impermissible to look into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed:- “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of 26 2025:HHC:23404 Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: 27 2025:HHC:23404 “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 24. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the power to quash a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly and not routinely. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 28 2025:HHC:23404 25. This position was reiterated in Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1216, wherein it was observed: 37. This Court, in a catena of decisions, has observed that it is not for the courts to embark upon an enquiry into the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR at the stage of quashing of the proceedings. However, it is of paramount importance that the allegations made against the accused, if taken at face value, must disclose the commission of an offence, whether from the FIR, the chargesheet, or other relevant materials. It is incumbent upon the courts to exercise their discretionary powers where the materials on record indicate that the criminal proceedings are being misused as instruments of oppression or harassment. 26. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in it. 27. A heavy reliance was placed upon the documents annexed to the petition to submit that these documents show that the informant had improved upon her version, and her version cannot be relied upon. All these documents are photocopies, and their authenticity has not been established. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondent State that it is impermissible to rely upon the documents not forming part of the charge-sheet, especially when the authenticity of these documents is yet to be seen. It was laid down by the Hon’ble 29 2025:HHC:23404 Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 28. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr. P.C.” 30 2025:HHC:23404 29. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and the evidence presented in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 31 2025:HHC:23404 30. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 31. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 32. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the 32 2025:HHC:23404 accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae , i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied). 33. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the documents to determine that the informant/victim improved upon her version and her testimony cannot be relied upon. This is the matter for trial where the victim would be cross- examined and her credibility would be weighed against the other evidence. 33 2025:HHC:23404 34. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge- sheet before the learned Trial Court. Hence, the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 35. No other point was urged. 36. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 34 2025:HHC:23404 37. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 38. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. ( Rakesh Kainthla ) 21st July 2025 Judge (ravinder)