1 2025:CGHC:9824 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2679 of 2020 1 - Yogesh Chandrakar S/o Late Jeewan Lal Chandrakar, Aged About 34 Years R/o. Ward No. 8, Sarojini Chowk, P S Kurud, Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, (C.G.) 2 - Director, Lok Shikshan Sanchalanalaya, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, (C.G.) 3 - The Collector, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh, District : Dhamtari, (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Santosh Soni, Govt. Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi Order on Board 24/02/2025 1. With the consent of learned counsel for both the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2 2. This writ petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 05.12.2018 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No. 3 / Collector, Dhamtari, whereby the petitioner was subjected to major penalty of dismissal from the post of Assistant Teacher (LB), Govt. Primary School, Madvapathra, Block Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (C.G.). 3. Facts of the case, in nutshell, are that the petitioner was initially appointed with the respondents as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III vide order dated 13.06.2005 and was posted at Naveen Primary School, Chuchrungpur (Mandaraud) for a probation of two years, on completion of which his service was confirmed vide order dated 25.07.2008 (Annexure P-2). His service was absorbed with the respondent No. 1 as Assistant Teacher (LB) under the School Education Department with effect from 01.07.2018 vide order dated 21.08.2018 (Annexure P-3). Thereafter, vide order dated 30.07.2018, the petitioner was placed under suspension and straightway in a disciplinary proceeding, an Enquiry Officer was appointed without issuing charge-sheet levelling charges against the petitioner enabling him to understand as to what are the allegations levelled against him. The petitioner was straightaway asked to inform about personal hearing / verbal hearing and name and address of witnesses within a period of three days, else ex- parte enquiry will be conducted against him. The petitioner did not appear before the Enquriy Officer, thereafter, he was attached at the office of the District Election Officer (General Branch), District Dhamtari (C.G.). Vide notice dated 01.11.2018, explanation was sought from the petitioner alleging undue influence over the election process. He filed reply to the said explanation, but without considering the 3 same and without conducting departmental enquiry, vide impugned order dated 05.12.2018 (Annexure P-1), respondent No. 3/ Collector, Dhamtari dismissed the petitioner from his service, which has been challenged by the petitioner in the instant petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was a regular employee, but he has been dismissed/ terminated from his service without conducting any due departmental enquiry, which is violative to the command of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (henceforth, “Rules, 1966”), as in aforesaid Rule major punishment cannot be imposed without conducting departmental enquiry. It is further contended that service of the petitioner has been terminated by the Collector, District Dhamtari vide impugned order dated 05.12.20218 (Annexure P-1), but he is not a competent authority to terminate his service, as parent department of the petitioner is ‘School Education Department’. As such, Collector, Dhamtari was not a disciplinary authority of the petitioner. It is contended further that termination of the petitioner has been made only on the basis of alleged preliminary enquiry (Annexure R-3) dated 26.9.2018, but major penalty of dismissal / termination of service cannot be made merely on the basis of preliminary enquiry, therefore, dismissal / termination of service of the petitioner is bad in law, hence, he submits that the petition may be allowed and the relief as sought for by the petitioner may be granted to him. 5. Respondents/State has filed its reply stating inter alia that since there is efficacious alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to 4 prefer an appeal against the impugned order under the Rules, 1966, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. Further, during the posting of petitioner in Govt. Primary School, Piparchedi Uparpara, Block Dhamtari, District Dhamatri, there was a complaint made against him in the Lok Suraj Abhiyan, 2018 and in enquiry, allegations levelled against him were found true. Thereafter, he was posted in Primary School, Budhrapara, Chandema (kha) vide order dated 15.03.2018 issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Nagri, but he did join the said place, therefore, he was suspended by the District Education Officer, Dhamtari vide order dated 30.07.2018 and attached to Government Shringrishi Higher Secondary School, Nagari. During course of departmental enquiry, only at once the petitioner appeared, thereafter he never appeared inspite of issuance of several notices & reminders. Subsequently, departmental enquiry has been constituted against him, in which, charge-sheet was duly issued to the petitioner, but he did not submit any reply / explanation, as such, Inquiry Officer completed departmental enquiry and submitted enquriy report (Annexure R-3) [it is actually a preliminary enquiry report] with a finding that the petitioner has shown gross misconduct and negligence towards his duty and recommended strict disciplinary action against him. 5.1. Learned counsel for the State/respondents while referring to its reply would submit that since the petitioner did not appear in the inquiry proceeding, therefore, contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that neither charge-sheet has been issued nor any opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the petitioner, has no substance. It is further submitted that after receipt of preliminary inquiry report, District Education Officer, 5 Dhamtari, District Dhamtari vide order dated 4.10.2018 (Annexure P-6) has instituted departmental enquiry against the petitioner and also appointed Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer. This order was also endorsed to the petitioner, but despite clear instructions and reminders, he did not appear. At that time, complaint with regard to involvement of the petitioner in political activities was received, to which report was sought, which was submitted against the petitioner. At the relevant time, Model Code of Conduct was also effective, hence, conduct of the petitioner was found against the provisions contained in Section 129 of the Representatives of People Act, 1951. Offence under aforesaid Act was also registered against him and the reply sought for from the petitioner was not found satisfactory, therefore, considering all above facts, he was dismissed / terminated from his service vide impugned order. 6. The petitioner has filed rejoinder to the return filed by the State stating inter alia that service of the petitioner has been terminated without serving a duly constituted charge-sheet, that too, on the basis of only preliminary inquiry report. Termination of service cannot be made only on the basis of preliminary inquiry report. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat & Another, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301 & State of Odisha v. Satish Kumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye, reported in (2021) 17 SCC 90. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the respondents have failed to demonstrate the channel of authorities, disciplinary and appeal, as initial appointing authority of the petitioner was Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.) of Janpad Panchayat and the order of absorption dated 21.07.2018 (Annexure P-3) 6 was passed by District Education Officer, as such, order of dismissal could have never been passed by the Collector/Respondent No. 3, Dhamtari because he does not fall within the channel of disciplinary authority of the petitioner, as such, order impugned is clear-cut violation of the provisions contained in Rules, 1966 and the protection granted to employee under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Undisputedly, the petitioner was regular employee of the ‘School Education Department’ and while his dismissal from service by the Collector, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari , he was posted as Assistant Teacher (LB) in Govt. Primary School, Madvapathra, Block Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (C.G.). 9. District Collector (Education), Dhamtari, District Dhamari had dismissed the petitioner vide order dated 05.12.2018 (Annexure P-1), which is reproduced hereinbelow ;- “dk;kZy; dysDVj ¼f’k{kk½ ftyk /kerjh ¼N0x0½ !!vkns’k!! Øekad@9334@f’kdk;r@lrdZrk@lsok lekfIr 2018&19@ /kerjh fnukad 05@12@2018 Jh ;ksxs’k pUnzkdj] lgk;d f’k{kd ¼,y-ch½ ’kkldh; izkFkfed 'kkyk ihijNsM+h ¼mijikjk½ fo- [k- uxjh esa vukf/kd`r ,oa vfu;fer mifLFkfr ds laca/k esa izkIr f’kdk;r ds vk/kkj ij 'kkldh; izkFkfed 'kkyk ihijNsM+h ¼mijkikjk½ fodkl[kaM uxjh ls 'kkldh; izkFkfed 'kkyk cqMjkikjk ¼pesnk [k½ fo-[k- uxjh esa inLFk fd;k x;kA dk;kZy;hu vkns’k Ø- @6686@f’kdk;r@lrZdrk@fuyacu@2018&19@/kerjh fnukad 30-07-2018 ds }kjk inh; nkf;Roksa ds izfr mnklhurk o ?kksjykijokgh djrs gq, vukf/kd`r :i ls vuqifLFkr jgus ds dkj.k Nrrhlx<+ flfoy lsok vkpj.k fu;e 1965 ds dafMdk 02 lkekU; fu;e (i,ii,iii) ds izfrdwy d`R; ds fy, 7 rRdky izHkko ls fuyafcr fd;k x;kA dk;kZy;hu vkns’k Øekad@8665@f’kdk;r@lrdZrk@cgkyh@2018&19 /kerjh fnukad 24- 10-2018 ds }kjk Jh ;ksxs’k pUnzkdj] lgk;d f’k{kd ¼,y-ch-½ 'kkldh; izkFkfed 'kkyk ihijNsM+h ¼Åijikjk½ dks fuyacu ls cgky djrs gq, 'kkldh; eM+okiFkjk esa inLFk djrs gq, foHkkxh; tkap lafLFkr dh xbZA dysDVj ,oa ftyk fuokZpu vf/kdkjh] ftyk /kerjh dk vkns’k Øekad@2534@fo-l- fu-@f’kdk;r@2018@/kerjh fnukad 31-10-2018 ds }kjk ftyk fuokZpu dk;kZy; /kerjh esa layXu fd;k x;kA Jh ;ksxs’k pUnzkdj] lgk;d f’k{kd ¼,y-ch-½ }kjk mPpkf/kdkjh ,oa foHkkxh; vf/kdkjh ds vkns’kksa dk vogsyuk dj LosPNkpkfjrkiwoZd dk;Z djrs gq, foHkkxh; tkap esa Hkh lg;ksx ugha fd;k x;kA vuqHkkxh; vf/kdkjh ¼jk0½ dq:n] ftyk /kerjh dk i= Øekad@43@vkfov@ok&2@2018@dq:n fnukad 26-10-2018 ds vuqlkj dq:n uxj esa vk;ksftr tudkjok dk;ZØe esa 'kkldh; deZpkjh gksrs gq, Hkh Hkkx ysdj jktuSfrd ,oa {ks= fodkl ls lacaf/kr 'kklu ds fofHkUu ;kstuk ds fo:) vkykspukRed fopkj o;Dr fd;k tkuk izfrosfnr gSA vkn’kZ vkpj.k lafgrk ds nkSjku jktuSfrd xfrfof/k;ksa esa lafyIr jgs tks NRrhlx<+ flfoy lsok vkpj.k fu;e 1965 ds fu;e 3 ds izko/kkuksa ds izfrdwy gSA Jh ;ksxs’k pUnzkdj ds }kjk yxkrkj inh; nkf;Roksa ds fuoZgu esa ?kksj ykijokgh] LosPNkpkfjrk ,oa mnklhurk cjrus ds QyLo:i fo|ky; esa Nk=@Nk=kvksa dk iBu&ikBu izHkkfor gqvk] foHkkxh; tkap ,oa fo/kkulHkk fuokZpu 2018 ¼vkn’kZ vkpj.k lafgrk½ ds rgr izkIr f’kdk;r fcUnqvksa ds xq.knks"kksa dk ijh{k.kksaijkar NRrhlx<+ flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k fu;a=.k rFkk vihy½ fu;e 1966 ds fu;e 10 ds mifu;e ¼9½ ds rgr Jh ;ksxs’k pUnzkdj lgk;d f’k{kd ¼,y-ch-½ 'kkldh; izkFkfed 'kkyk eM+okiFkjk] fodkl[akM /kerjh dks rRdky lsok ls inP;qr fd;k tkrk gSA NRrhlx<+ flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k fu;a=.k ,oa vihy½ fu;e 1966 ds fu;e 7 ¼1½ ds rgr lacaf/kr dks lsokeqfDr frfFk ls fdlh osru ;k HkRrs dh ik=rk ugha gksxhA ;g vkns’k rRdky izHkko’khy gksxkA dysDVj /kerjh” 10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid order shows that it was passed by the Collector, Dhamtari only on the basis of examination of merits & demerits of the complaint received against the petitioner. Impugned order 8 (Annexure P-1) does not show that it was passed after departmental enquiry conducted under the Rules, 1966 and finding guilty to the petitioner. 11. In reply, respondents/State has pleaded that departmental enquiry against the petitioner has been initiated, but it has not been pleaded that it has been concluded and in that departmental enquiry, the petitioner has been held guilty, rather as per reply of the State, only preliminary enquiry report dated 26.09.2018 (Annexure R-3) has been obtained against the petitioner, and thereafter, vide order dated 4.10.2018 (Annexure R-6), District Education Officer, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari has instituted departmental enquiry against the petitioner, but without concluding the said departmental enquiry, respondent No. 3/Collector, Dhamtari has terminated the service of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 05.12.2018. 12. During course of submission, learned counsel for the State also admitted the fact that impugned order has not been passed by respondent No. 3/ Collector, Dhamtari on the basis of departmental enquiry report holding guilty to the petitioner. Thus, it is abundantly clear that impugned order of dismissal has been passed without conducting due departmental enquiry against the petitioner, that too, without holding him guilty in such departmental enquiry, whereas, the petitioner was a regular employee. 13. In the instant case, the petitioner was regular employee and he has been dismissed from his service by imposing ‘major penalty’ contemplated under sub-Rule (9) of Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966 without following procedure contemplated under Rule 14 (1) of the Rules, 1966, provides 9 thus :- “14. Procedure for imosing major penalities – (1) No order imposing any of the penlaties in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 10 shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rule and Rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry is held under that Act.” 14. A focused glance of the aforesaid Rules specifically shows that ‘major penalty’ as specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of the Rule 10 cannot be made without conducting deparmental enquiry, as envisaged in rule 14(1) to (23) and Rule 15 of the Rules, 1966. 15. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the safeguard and protection guaranteed to the Government servant under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, which provides as under:- “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State – (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed : Provided further that this clause shall not apply - 10 (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. ” 16. ” 16. Article 311 basically aims at providing security of tenure to Government servants and guarantees constitutional protection to persons employed in civil capacities under Union and States against arbitrary dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. The protection is two fold - (a) against removal or dismissal by an authority subordinate to that by which employee was appointed, and (b) against dismissal, removal and reduction in rank without giving the employee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in an enquiry without complying with the principles of natural justice. 17. The enquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is what is generally known as a departmental enquiry and the constitutional requirement for a proper enquiry within the meaning of Article 311(2) are basically two fold- (i) The civil servant must be informed of the charges against him, and (ii) He must be offered a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. 11 18. The scope of the words “dismissed” and “removed” employed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Moti Ram Dheka v. General Manager, North Easter Frontier Railway1 in which Subba Rao, J., in his concurring yet separate opinion, has expressed that the said words mean nothing more or less than the termination of the services of a person's office. The effect of dismissal or removal of one from his office is to discharge him from that office i.e. to bring about cessation of service. Thus, the said words comprehend every termination of service of a Government servant. Article 311(2) in an effect therefore lays down that before the services of a Government servant are so terminated, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such a termination. Their Lordships further held that there is no decision for placing any limitation on the said expression. The attempt to imply the said limitation is neither warranted by the expressions used in the Article or by the reason given. If such limitations are imported, then it would lead to an extraordinary result that a Government servant, which has been guilty of misconduct would be entitled to a reasonable opportunity, whereas an honest Government servant could be dismissed without any such protection. A Government servant holding a substantive lien to a permanent post cannot be removed from the said post without affording a reasonable opportunity, as is contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. It is therefore evident that the right held by a Government employee to hold a post cannot be interfered lightly in case any such proceeding is required to be undertaken, necessary care and caution has to be ensured by the 1 AIR 1964 SC 600 12 Government, which in order to safeguard the interest of a Government employee, as is contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. It has been observed as under in paragraphs 67 and 68 :- “67. Therefore, whether the natural and dictionary meaning of the words “dismissal” and “removal” were adopted or the limited meanings given to those words by R. 49 were accepted, the result, so far as a permanent employee was concerned would be the same, namely, that in the case of termination of services of a Government servant outside the three categories mentioned in the explanation, it would be dismissal or removal within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution with the difference that in the former the dismissed servant would not be disqualified from future employment and in the latter ordinarily he would be disqualified from such employment. 68. If so, it follows that if the services of a permanent servant, which fall outside the three categories mentioned in the explanation, were terminated, he would be entitled to protection under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.” 19. The petitioner was a permanent Government servant. He had a right to his substantive rank. The Supreme Court in the matter of Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India2 has held that mere termination of service, without more, of such an employee, would constitute his 'removal' or 'dismissal' from service attracting Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. As such, the constitutional protection and safeguard guaranteed under Article 311(2) cannot be taken away by a side wind without following the provisions contained under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 20. In the matter of Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan3, the question that fell for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme 2 AIR 1958 SC 36 3 AIR 1966 SC 492 13 Court was, whether the provisions contained under the Jodhpur Service Regulations was sufficient to enable the Government to remove a person from service without giving him an opportunity of showing cause against that punishment, if any, and it was answered in negative holding that the regulation involves a punishment for overstaying one's leave and the burden is thrown on the incumbent to secure reinstatement by showing cause and the Government cannot order a person to be discharged from service without at least telling him that they propose to remove him and and without giving him an opportunity of showing cause as to why he should not be removed. It has further been observed as under :- “6. … A removal is removal and if it is punishment for overstaying one's leave an opportunity must be given to the person against whom such an order is proposed, no matter how the regulation describes it. To give no opportunity is to go against Article 311 and this is what has happened here. 7. In our judgment, Jai Shankar was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the proposed removal from service on his overstaying his leave and as no such opportunity was given to him, his removal from service was illegal. He is entitled to this declaration.” 21. Similarly, in the matter of Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar4, another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that an order of termination of service passed under Rule 76 of the Bihar Service Code on account of the servant's continuous absence for five years without giving an opportunity to the servant under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India would be invalid. 4 (1971) 2 SCC 330 14 22. The aforesaid principles of law laid down in Jai Shanker (supra) and Deokinandan Prasad (supra) have been followed with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Assam v. Akshaya Kumar Deb5 wherein the question that required consideration was as under :- “7. The only question that falls for determination is whether the services of the respondent could be terminated under Rule 18 of the Assam Fundamental and Subsidiary Rules, without complying with the procedure prescribed in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India ?” 23. Relying upon the decisions rendered in Jai Shanker (supra) and Deokinandan Prasad (supra), their Lordships answered the aforesaid question as under :- “14. Now in the case in hand, the impugned order was made against the consent of the respondent who has throughout been willing to continue in service. His case is that after the expiry of his leave he reported for duty and produced a medical certificate of his fitness, but he was arbitrarily and maliciously not allowed to work after September 13, 1956. Indeed his contention is that in these circumstances, F.R. 18 would not be attracted. Apart from the constitutional requirement of Article 311(2) natural justice and fairplay required that he should have been given a chance to substantiate his contention. The fact remains that given an opportunity, he would have controverted seriously the circumstances of his absence from duty on the basis of which the impugned action has been taken. 17. Even if it is assumed that termination under F.R. 18 does not cause forfeiture of benefits already earned such as pension, etc., then also that will not, by itself, take it out of the category of 'removal' as envisaged by Article 311(2). The respondent was a permanent government servant. He had a right to his substantive rank. According to the test laid down by this Court in 5 (1975) 4 SCC 339 15 Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case, the mere termination of service, without more, of such an employee would constitute his 'removal' or 'dismissal' from service, attracting Article 311(2). From the constitutional standpoint, therefore, the impugned termination of service will not cease to be 'removal' from service merely because it is described or declared in the phraseology of F.R. 18 as a 'cessation' of service. The constitutional protection guaranteed by Article 311(2) cannot be taken away “in this manner by a side wind”. 21. The above enunciation applies to the facts of the present case. Excepting the length of the period of absence, the basic features of Regulation 13 in Jai Shanker's case (supra) were very similar to those of F.R. 18 now under consideration. The words “should be considered to have sacrificed his appointment” in Regulation 13, substantially correspond to the words “servant ceases to be in Government employ” in F.R. 18. Further the import and effect of the phrase “may only be reinstated with the sanction of the competent authority” in the regulation, is largely the same as that of the opening clause “unless the Provincial Government, in view of the special circumstances of the case shall otherwise determine” in F.R. 18. The difference between the regulation and F.R. 18 as to the length of absence from duty prescribed as a condition precedent for the attraction of the respective provision, is a distinction without a difference in principle. The consequence of absence, though for different periods, envisaged by both the provisions, is the same, viz., “sacrifice” or “cessation” of the absentee's service. The present case will thus be governed by the ratio of Jai Shanker's case. 24. In view of the above approach, it is not thought necessary to express any final opinion as to the constitutional validity of Rule 18 of Assam Fundamental and Subsidiary Rules. Although couched in ambiguous and unhappy language, the rule is capable of being interpreted and worked consistently with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. This, however, should not lull the Government into a sense of complacency and belief that all is well with the rule. The sooner it is suitably amended, the better will it be in the interest of all concerned.” 16 24. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, in light of the provisions contained in Rules, 1966 and principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in afore-cited cases, it is quite vivid that undisputedly the petitioner was a regular / confirmed employee on the post of Assistant Teacher (LB) and by imposing major penalty, he has been dismissed / terminated from his service without conducting regular departmental inquiry as contemplated under Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966, which is not only against the Rule 14(1) of the Rules, 1966, rather it also against the constitutional / protection as contemplated under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, because once the petitioner was appointed on substantive post and his services have been confirmed, even if he has committed misconduct, procedure envisaged under Rules, 1966 and Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India was required to be followed and the petitioner ought to have been given reasonable opportunity of being heard as contemplated in Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966, but the same has not been followed while his dismissal / termination from his service, as such, order impugned dated 05.12.2018 (Annexure P-1) is bad in law and deserves to be set aside. 25. 25. One more ground for holding impugned order bad in law is that, the petitioner was employee of School Education Department, but he has been dismissed by respondent No. 3/Collector, Dhamtari, whereas, he is not a disciplinary / controlling authority of the petitioner. Though at the time of dismissal of the petitioner from service, he was said to be attached to the office of the District Election Officer (General Branch), District Dhamtari (C.G.), but such attachment only does not give right to respondent No. 3/Collector, Dhamtari for dismissal of the petitioner from 17 the services, rather if he was found guilty of any misconduct, then such issue may be referred to the Disciplinary Authority of parent department of the petitioner, but no such procedure has been followed and he has been arbitrarily dismissed from his services by the Collector, Dhamtari / respondent No. 3, that too, without following principles of natural justice and only on the basis of alleged preliminary inquiry report dated 26.9.2018 (Annexure R-3) and complaint made by a person belonging to a political party. 26. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under :- “The preliminary inquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee, which may warrant a regular employee.” 27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmala J. Jhala (supra), has held in paragraph 51 as under :- “51. ………………Natural justice is an inbuilt and inseparable ingredient of fairness and reasonableness. Strict adherence to the principle is required, whenever civil consequences follow up, as a result of the order passed. Natural justice is a universal justice. In certain factual circumstances even non-observance of the rule will itself result in prejudice. Thus, this principle is of supreme importance. (Vide S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan6, D.K. 6 (1980) 4 SCC 379 18 Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.7 and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P.8)” 28. In instant case, petitioner has been dismissed from service without departmental enquiry and without providing him opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses and only on the basis of preliminary inquiry report, as such, it cannot be said that principles of natural justice has been followed. Hence, order impugned dated 5.12.2018 is suffering from lack of jurisdiction / authority as also in utter violation of principle of natural justice, therefore, on this count also it is held illegal and bad in law. 29. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court, impugned order dated 5.12.2018 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No. 3/ Collector, Dhamtari is liable to be and is hereby quashed / set aside. 30. As a result, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner to the post of Assistant Teacher (LB) within 30 days from the date of receipt / submission of copy of this order. Since dismissal of the petitioner was made by the Collector, Dhamtari (C.G.) without authority, arbitrarily and in utter violation of rules / law, therefore, the petitioner is also held entitled for all consequential benefits including arrears of pay and seniority on such post, which shall be complied within a further period of 60 days. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Amit 7 (1993) 3 SCC 259 8 (2010) 10 SCC 539 AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2025.03.04 10:42:22 +0530