1 CRA No.1647 of 2017 2025:CGHC:43335 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1647 of 2017 1 - Manohar Lal Agarwal S/o Jugal Kishore Agrawal, Aged About 68 Years R/o A /203, Pooja Apartments Kranti Nagar, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Manjulata Agarwal, W/o Manohar Lal Agarwal, Aged About 60 Years R/o A /203, Pooja Apartments Kranti Nagar, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Milan Agarwal, S/o Manohar Lal Agarwal, Aged About 34 Years R/o A /203, Pooja Apartments Kranti Nagar, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Mukesh Agarwal, S/o Manohar Lal Agarwal, Aged About 33 Years R/o A /203, Pooja Apartments Kranti Nagar, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Aarakshi Kendra Tarbahar, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. R.C.S. Deo, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board 26/08/2025 AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.08.29 18:28:33 +0530 2 CRA No.1647 of 2017 1. This appeal is filed by the appellants directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 07/09/2017 passed by the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, C.G. in Sessions Case No.35/2016 whereby the appellants have been sentence and convicted as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 498-A/34 of the IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for 2 years & fine of Rs.2000/- in default of payment of fine,additional R.I. for 2 months each. Under Section 304-B/34 of the IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years each. Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, is that the appellants i.e. A-1 (father-in-law), A-2 (mother-in-law), A-3 (husband) and A-4 (brother-in-law) of Sapna (since decease). The marriage between A-3 and deceased was solemnized on 24/05/2015. Soon after marriage, A-2 started taunting her daughter-in-law (deceased) regarding food and bringing less dowry. On 03.08.2015, because of torture and harassment made by the appellants, the deceased left the matrimonial house and went to her maternal house. On 10.09.2015, deceased had talked with A-3 and Uncle-in-law, who is at Jaipur and on the same day, deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene on herself and setting her ablaze on fire. Thereafter, she was admitted in CIMS, Bilaspur for initial treatment and thereafter, referred to Burn Hospital of Dr. Kalda at Raipur. During treatment, deceased died on 16/09/2015. Prior to death, dying declaration of deceased was recorded. Merg was registered vide Ex.P-8. FIR was registered vide 3 CRA No.1647 of 2017 Ex.P-20. The appellants were arrested. The dead-body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination and in the postmortem examination report, Dr. M. Nirala (PW-15) opined that the cause of death was due to cardio respiratory failure, as a result of burn injuries and its complications. After completing of investigation, final report was prepared. 3. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses. The statement of the appellants under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. were also recorded in which they denied the material appearing against them and stated that are innocent and they have been falsely implicated in the case. 4. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellants and sentenced them as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. (a) Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the appellants have been falsely implicated in the case. There is no allegation of demand of dowry soon before the death of deceased. Leaned counsel submits that the deceased was not residing in matrimonial house since 05/08/2015. The deceased was far away from the appellants and there was no occasion for them to commit cruelty and harassment to the deceased either physically or mentally. He would submit that the deceased committed suicide in her parental house on 10/9/2015, which itself show that she is not in touch with the accused 4 CRA No.1647 of 2017 persons since last more than one month. In fact, the deceased never narrated about the alleged harassment caused by the accused to any of her family members. Had it been she disclosed they may lodge report etc. during this period of one month. (b) Learned counsel further stated that the deceased has not even disclosed about any harassment by appellants, soon before her death. He submits that there is no evidence produced by the prosecution that at any point of time, the appellants made any specific demand of dowry from the deceased and only general and bald allegations has been made against them without there being any specification regarding nature of alleged demand of dowry. Apart from that, dying declaration does not contain signature of the deceased. The deceased has not stated that because of alleged cruelty committed by the accused persons, she has committed suicide. The important witness Ravi, brother of deceased has not been examined, which gives reason to draw adverse inference against the prosecution. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and stated that there are sufficient evidence available on record to hold that the appellants are guilty for the alleged offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellants which does not require for any interference. 5 CRA No.1647 of 2017 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. PW-1 Raghuveer Prasad Gupta, father of deceased stated in his evidence that the marriage of his daughter Sapna/deceased was solemnized with A-3 on 24-05-2015. He stated that the appellants harassed his daughter regarding the demand of dowry. On 03-08-2015, his daughter was turned out by the accused from her matrimonial home and on 05-08-2015 he went to the house of accused/appellants and tried to persuade them to keep his daughter in her matrimonial home. His daughter told him that her mother-in-law constantly taunts and harass her regarding food, drinks, and going out, and says that “your father is a government servant, yet you have brought less dowry. Later, he stated that he had given gold and silver ornaments and as per demand, ₹2,21,000/- (out of which ₹70,000/- was in cash and ₹1,51,000/- was through cheque). He further stated that on 03.08.2015, in the evening, while his daughter was cooking food in her matrimonial home, her fingers got burnt with hot oil, and when she told her mother-in-law about it, she would not be able to do the work, then her mother-in-law was making taunt upon her for not doing the domestic chores. He also stated that on 10-09-2015 his daughter had a telephonic talk with her husband and also with Uncle of her husband who lives in Jaipur and was saying on telephone that as to why he wants divorce and why her life has been spoiled; on the same day i.e. 10-09-2015, his daughter poured kerosene oil upon her and set herself ablaze. Thereafter, she was taken to CIMS Bilaspur for treatment and then she was referred to Kalda Hospital Raipur, but during 6 CRA No.1647 of 2017 treatment, she died on 16-09-2015. 9. PW-2, Ranjana Gupta, mother of deceased stated in her evidence that she knows the accused Ankit Rai. She deposed regarding the demand of dowry and harassment made by the appellants with her daughter/deceased. She further deposed that on 02-08-2015 it was birthday of her son-in-law and on that night a love message of one Poonam was received on the mobile of her son-in-law/A-3, upon which, her daughter objected. On 03-08-2015, her daughter was turned out by the appellants from her matrimonial home. On 05-08-2015, she along with her husband went to the house of appellants and tried to persuade them to keep her daughter in her matrimonial home nicely. She also stated that on 10-09-2015 her daughter was talking with her husband on phone and there was a bit quarrel between her daughter and her son-in- law, when she asked from her daughter regarding the call, she told that her husband was saying to her on telephone that he will take divorce. She further deposed that thereafter she went to take bath and there she heard some voices, she immediately came out and found her daughter in a brunt condition. Subsequently, her daughter was taken to CIMS Bilaspur for treatment and thereafter referred to Kalda Hospital Raipur and during the treatment, she expired. 10. PW-10, Dr. Sunil Kalda, Medical Director of Kalda Cosmetic Surgery Institute & Burns Center Raipur (C.G.) stated in his evidence that on 10- 09-2015 at about 5.00 PM a patient namely Sapna Gupta w/o Milan 7 CRA No.1647 of 2017 Agarwal aged 28 years r/o Pooja Apartment Flat No.203-B Kranti Nagar Bilaspur was admitted in Burn Unit of his institute. The patient was brought by Raghuveer Prasad Gupta. She was previously admitted in CIMS Bilaspur. The place of occurrence was Jora Talab PS Sarkanda Bilaspur. This witness further deposed that it was a case of burns with kerosene oil and the patient was having about 70% burns present over her body. 11. PW-6 S.C. Shukla, Inspector, stated in his evidence, that on 12/09/2015, after receipt of case diary, he went to the spot and prepared site place vide Ex.P-6. During spot inspection, he sized some clothes worn by Sapna/deceased, 1 five liters plastic jerican having 2 liters kerosene oil vide seizure memo Ex.P-9. 12. PW-16, T.R. Maheshwari, Tahsildar (Executive Magistrate) stated in his evidence that Ex.P-28, the dying declaration, was written by him personally. He stated that he had gone to Kalda Hospital, Raipur, and contacted the doctor there he had asked whether the injured/deceased was in a condition to give a statement. He further stated that he had not separately obtained a written fitness certificate from the doctor; the witness himself says that the police had already obtained the fitness certificate. No certificate was shown to him by the police. 13. PW-15 Dr. M. Nirala, who conducted the postmortem of deceased and submitted a report, in which, she stated that the death was due to cardio respiratory failure as a result of burn injuries and its complications. 8 CRA No.1647 of 2017 There were 2nd to 3rd degree burns were present on all over the body except B/L legs, lower abdomen, lower back and genitalia. A distribution of burn surface area are as follows :- • Face & Neck-6% • Chest and Abdomen - 12% • Right upper limb-8% • Left upper limb-7% • Back -8% • Right lower limb - 8% • Left lower limb - 10% Total burn injuries all over the body were found to be 59% (Fifty nine percent) 14. From bare perusal of aforesaid evidence, it is manifest that the marriage of deceased/Sapna was solemnized with A-3 on 24/05/2015 according to hindu rites and rituals. On 05/08/2015, the deceased left her matrimonial house and started lives in her maternal house. The deceased remained in her-law’s house for about 2 months 12 days from the date of her marriage and since 05/08/2015, since was in her material house. On 10/09/2015, when she committed suicide by setting herself ablaze, she was in her maternal house and was not residing in matrimonial house. Hence, it is evident the deceased committed suicide in her maternal house and thus, the deceased was far away from the appellants for 1 month and 11 days and during that period, she had not met with the appellants. The appellants also did not come to the house of the 9 CRA No.1647 of 2017 deceased. There was no occasion for the appellants to cause cruelty and any harassment with regard to demand of dowry or any assault. In such circumstances, allegation against the appellants for harassment to the deceased in the form of dowry is completely absent, as the deceased was staying in her maternal house for about 1 month and 11 days from the 05/08/2015 till the date of her death i.e. 10/09/2015. 15. With regard to the dying declaration, PW-16 T.K. Maheshwari stated and admitted in his evidence that prior to recording dying declaration, he himself has not obtained certificate of doctor regarding competency of the person to depose. Further he admitted that no certificate was shown to him by the police. Thus, the dying declaration given by the deceased prior to her death in front of PW-16, Executive Magistrate is not fully reliable. 16. As far as the allegation of demand of dowry is concerned, after going through the above evidence, it is evident that since 05/08/2015, the deceased was in her maternal home till the date of incident i.e. 10/09/2015. Hence, between that period, soon before death, the appellants have never demanded any dowry, as she herself was living in her maternal house. Looking to the evidence of father and mother of deceased, they stated that her daughter deposed that she was harassed and tortured by the appellants in the form of dowry, but in the above evidence, there is omnibus and general allegations made against the appellants only regarding the daily domestic chores. The allegations 10 CRA No.1647 of 2017 were made without being full particulars about and date and place. There is no specific allegation against the appellants except common and general allegations against them with regard to the demand of dowry. 17. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act presumes as to dowry death, provision of which is extracted below for ready reference. “113B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860).]” 18. The aforementioned provision mentions that the person to be treated with cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand of dowry soon before her death. 19. Provision of Section 304-B of IPC is also extracted below for ready reference. “304B. Dowry death. -- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). 11 CRA No.1647 of 2017 (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” 20. In the aforementioned provision, it is provided that if a death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death it is subjected to cruelty or harassment. 21. A conjoint reading of both the provisions would show that it would not be enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time for invoking Section 304-B of IPC. But it is for the prosecution to prove that it happened “soon before her death”. The proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression and is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. The Supreme Court in the case of Hira Lal and others vs. State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi reported in 2003 AIR SCW 3570 observed that the expression “soon before her death” used in the substantive Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression “soon before” is not definite. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has 12 CRA No.1647 of 2017 become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 22. The Supreme Court in case of Kaliyaperumal and Another vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2004) 9 SCC 157 while considering the appeal against the conviction under Section 304-B of IPC has held thus: “4. Section 304B IPC deals with dowry death which reads as follows: "304B. Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation – For the purpose of this sub-section 'dowry' shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:- (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. 13 CRA No.1647 of 2017 (iii)She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows:- "113B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation – For the purposes of this section 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10th August, 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Reform'. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry related deaths, legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background presumptive Section 113B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of 'dowry death' in Section 304B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the concerned woman must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand of dowry". Presumption under Section 113B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes 14 CRA No.1647 of 2017 obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304B IPC). (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. 5. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either 15 CRA No.1647 of 2017 the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 23. Yet, in case of Manohar Lal (supra) considering the judgment in case of Hira Lal (supra) with approval has held thus: “20. The expression “soon before her death” used in the Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act was considered by this Court in Hira Lal & Others vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80,which reads as under: “8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowry death, reads as follows: “304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub- section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). 16 CRA No.1647 of 2017 (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows: (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows: “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.— When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection 17 CRA No.1647 of 2017 with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. [pic]Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10-8-1988 on “Dowry Deaths and Law Reform”. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of “dowry death” in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been “soon before her death” subjected to cruelty or harassment “for or in connection with the demand of dowry”. Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304- B IPC.) (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry. 18 CRA No.1647 of 2017 (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.” Similar observation was made by this Court in Balwant Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab (2004) 7 SCC 724. In the said case this Court held: (SCC p. 728, para 10) “10. These decisions and other decisions of this Court do lay down the proximity test. It has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court that “soon before” is an expression which permits of elasticity, and therefore the proximity test has to be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. The facts must show the existence of a proximate live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death of the victim.” ” 22. The statement of the complainant PW.1 is general and not specific. No specific incidence has been indicated suggesting the cruelty or harassment made by the accused-Manohar Lal. Her statement is not reliable and not trustworthy. Though the allegation of demand of dowry was made none of the witnesses including PW.1 stated that the deceased was harassed “soon before her death” for or in connection with demand of dowry. The accused appellant was charge- sheeted under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but the Trial Court has not convicted the accused under Section 498-A. In this background, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the accused harassed the deceased soon before her death for or in connection with a demand of dowry.” 24. If the facts of the case are tested in the light of the aforementioned rulings of the Supreme Court wherein as per evidence available on record it is clearly appearing that the deceased returned back from her matrimonial home to her parental home more than one month prior to the date of incident and she committed suicide in her parental home. 19 CRA No.1647 of 2017 25. As far as dying declaration made by the deceased is concerned, the same suffers from infirmity because while recording the dying declaration, PW-16 T.R. Maheshwari, Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate has not obtained the fitness certificate from the treating doctor though he has stated that he asked the Doctor with regard to health condition of the deceased. Even the Police has also not obtained the fitness certificate despite the fact that PW-10 Dr. Sunil Kalda categorically stated that upon the application of the police the treating Doctor stated that the patient was in a condition ‘fit to make statement’. 26. The Supreme Court in the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v State (Government of NCT of Delhi reported in (2020) 11 SCC 489, held that where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 27. Applying the well settled principles of law and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the appeal is Allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The appellants are acquitted from all the charges leveled against them. The appellants are on bail pursuant to the orders passed by the Supreme Court (A1 & A2) and this Court (A3 & A4). Surety and personal bonds earlier furnished by them at the time of suspension of sentence shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of the provisions of Section 481 of the BNSS. The appellants shall appear before the higher Court as and when directed. 20 CRA No.1647 of 2017 28. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/ Amardeep