2025:HHC:25011 _________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MPM No. 1489 of 2025 Reserved on: 21.07.2025 Date of Decision: 30.7.2025 Gagan Sarna .... Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Umesh Kanwar, Advocate. For the Respondent- State : Mr. Jatinder K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 127 of 2024, dated 27.10.2024, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 29 and 27A of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 2 2025:HHC:25011 Substances Act (ND&PS Act) at Police Station Damtal District Kangra, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police apprehended Kamaljeet on 27.10.2024 at about 7:00 pm with 262 grams of heroin. Kamaljeet revealed that he had purchased heroin from Rajesh Kumar, which was to be delivered to Rajat Kumar. The police arrested Rajesh Kumar, who disclosed that one Vishal @ Shalubali resident of Dubai, used to send heroin to him. He (Rajesh Kumar) would collect money and hand it over to Raj Kumar @ Sethi, who used to hand over the money to Lakhvinder. The police arrested Lakhvinder, who disclosed that he had deposited the money with the petitioner, owner of Gaurav Jeweller. The police arrested the petitioner. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. He is a first offender, and no case is made out against him. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that police party apprehended Kamajeet Singh with a carry bag containing 262 grams of heroin on 27.10.2024. The 3 2025:HHC:25011 police seized the heroin and arrested Kamaljeet. Kamaljeet revealed during the interrogation that he had purchased the heroin from Rajesh, and he was to deliver it to Rajat Kumar. The police checked call details records and found that he (Rajesh) and Rajat Kumar had been in touch with each other. The police apprehended Rajesh, who revealed that Vishal @ Shalubali a resident of Dubai, supplies the heroin to him with directions to further supply it to the persons named by him. He used to hand over the money to Rajesh Kumar alias Sethi. The police apprehended Rajesh Kumar alias Sethi. Rajesh Kumar alias Sethi revealed during the interrogation that he handed over the money to Lakhvinder Singh as per the directions of Vishal. The police apprehended Lakhvinder, who revealed that he had deposited the money into his account and handed over some of the money to Mohit Singh, an employee of Gaurav Jewellers. He had also handed over about three crores rupees to petitioner Gagan Sarna, owner of Gaurav Jeweller. The police arrested Mohit Singh and recovered the gold ornaments, currency notes, and documents of investment. The police also arrested the petitioner at the instance of Lakhvinder Singh and recovered currency notes of ₹2,10,76,000/- (Two Crore Ten Lakh Seventy 4 2025:HHC:25011 Thousand only) and one kilogram Gold. (Rupees One Crore and Fifty Lakhs) and jewellery. The money collected by the Drug trade was kept with the petitioner. The petitioner was earlier involved in another case, and he stated that he was not aware of the fact that money was generated from the drug trade. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Mr. Umesh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Umesh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The prosecution has not collected any material to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. Even if the allegations of the prosecution are accepted to be correct, only the drug money was deposited with the petitioner. This may attract the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, but does not attract the provisions of NDPS. 5 2025:HHC:25011 Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the financing of the drug trade. He abetted the sale/purchase of the heroin. The quantity of heroin recovered by the police is commercial, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if 6 2025:HHC:25011 the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, 7 2025:HHC:25011 overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: — “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: 8 2025:HHC:25011 “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The allegations against the petitioner are that the drug money was deposited with him. According to the prosecution, this amounts to financing of the drugs. This submission is not acceptable. The term financing was explained 9 2025:HHC:25011 by Bombay High Court in Rhea Chakraborty v. Union of India 2021 Cr LJ 248 as under:- “66. Section 27A is much wider if sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(viiia) is taken into account. This sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(viiia) takes in its sweep all the remaining activities which are not mentioned in sub-clauses (i),(ii) & (iii). This covers just about every activity which can be described as dealing in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The interpretation of Section 27A should not be stretched to the extent of rendering the classification of sentences depending on the quantities in penal Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 otiose. 67. Sub-clause (viiia) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act is an inclusive definition. The inclusive part mentions financing, abetting or conspiring and harbouring. The financing and harbouring parts are specifically made punishable under Section 27A. 68. The activities mentioned in Section 2(viiia)(iii) and Section 8(c) refer to sale, purchase, export, import, etc. All these activities involve monetary transactions. For every sale or purchase, there can be use of money. But that will not mean that either of the parties has “financed” the transaction. Such sales and purchases are separately prohibited and made punishable under Section 8(c), read with Section 20 and other similar Sections. Therefore, “financing” is something more than just paying for purchases and other activities involving contraband as defined under Section 8(c). Contravention of that Section and indulging in activities mentioned in Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 incur punishment depending on the quantity of the contraband. 69. For interpreting Section 27A harmoniously with the Scheme of the Act and other Sections, it is necessary to go to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for incorporating this Section in the Act w.e.f. 29.5.1989. The Statement of 10 2025:HHC:25011 Objects and Reasons of the 1989 Amendment, which is reproduced hereinbefore, mentions that India was facing a problem of transit traffic in illicit drugs. The spillover from such traffic was causing problems of abuse and addiction. Therefore, a need was felt to amend the Law to further strengthen it. 70. Thus, the aim was to control the traffic in illicit drugs as the spillover from such traffic was causing problems of abuse and addiction. The Legislature wanted to attack the basic cause of the illicit traffic of drugs. The prohibitory Section 8 was already existing at that time. Therefore, a separate Section 27A was introduced to check these activities, which were the root cause of illicit traffic. “Financing” and “harbouring” such activities were, therefore, specifically mentioned under Section 27A. 71. “Financing” is not defined under the Act. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word “finance” as “(1) the management of (esp. public) money, (2) monetary support for an enterprise, (3) (in pl.) the money resources of a state, company, or person, to provide capital for (a person or enterprise)”. 72. Black's Law Dictionary gives the meaning of the word “finance” as “to raise or provide funds”. 73. Thus, “financing” as generally understood is offering monetary support or providing funds. 74. Therefore, simply providing money for a particular transaction or other transactions will not be financing of that activity. Financing will have to be interpreted to mean to provide funds for either making that particular activity operational or for sustaining it. It is the financial support which directly or indirectly causes the existence of such illicit traffic. The word “financing” would necessarily refer to some activities involving illegal trade or business 75. The allegations against the Applicant of spending money in procuring drugs for Sushant Singh Rajput will 11 2025:HHC:25011 not, therefore, mean that she had financed illicit traffic.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In the present case, the prosecution alleged that the petitioner had taken money generated from the sale of the heroin. This does not amount to financing. It was submitted that the petitioner paid money to the Drug Dealers as per the direction of Vishal. Even if it is accepted to be correct, the money belonged to Drug Dealers, as per prosecution, and returning the money to them will not amount to financing by any stretch of interpretation. Thus, prima facie, the allegations against the petitioner do not attract the provisions of Section 27A of the NDPS Act. 14. Perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner had received money from the Drug Dealers; therefore, he would not be an abettor. It was laid down by the Gujarat High Court in Lalitbhai Vikramchand Parekh vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (10.04.2015 - GUJHC) : MANU/GJ/0165/2015 that the abettor is a person who instigates the commission of the offence. It was observed: 13. As the expressions "abetment" and "abettor" have been legislatively defined, the ordinary dictionary meaning of the expressions would not be determinative of their import. It may, however, be useful to have a look 12 2025:HHC:25011 at the dictionary meaning of the expression "abet". According to Webster, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Vol. I, the expression "abet", means to incite, encourage, instigate, or countenance-now usually used disparagingly. According to Wharton, Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th ed., "abet" means to stir up or excite, to maintain or patronise: to encourage or set on, and the "abettor" is an instigator or setter on, one who promotes or procures a crime to be committed. Stroud, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th ed., has given various meanings of the expression "aid" or "abet", based on judicial pronouncements in England, in the context of different statutes. Thus, according to Hawkins, 51 L J.M.C. 78-R. v. Coney, J., "To constitute an aider or abettor, some active steps must be taken, by word or action, with intent to instigate the principal or principals. Encouragement does not, of necessity, amount to aiding and abetting. It may be intentional or unintentional. A man may unwillingly encourage another in fact by his presence, by misinterpreted gestures, or by his silence or non- interference; he may encourage intentionally by expressions, gestures, or actions, intended to signify approval. In the latter case, he aids and abets; in the former he does not." Stroud also cites the case of Du Cros v. Lambourne, 1907 (1) K.B. 40. in which it was held that "the owner in, and in control of, a motor car which is being driven at an improper speed by a driver who is not his servant, "aids or abets" in the offence if he (the owner) does not interfere." It is further noticed on the basis of decision in the case of Rubie v. Faulkner, 1980 (1) K.B. 571: "For a supervisor of a learner driver to see that an unlawful act is about to be done and to fail to prevent it is he can is for him to aid and abet." It is further noticed, on the authority of the decision in the case of Callow v. Tillstone, 83 L.T. 411, that "A man does not by negligence aid and abet a person to expose unsound meat for sale." It is further noticed, on the basis of the decision in the case of Ackroyds Air Travel v. Director of Police Prosecutions, 1950 (1) All. E.R. 933 and Thomas v. Lindop, 1950 (1) All. E.R. 13 2025:HHC:25011 966, that "If a person knows all the circumstances which constitute the offence he will be guilty of aiding and abetting whether he knew that they did in fact constitute the offence or not " Stroud also quotes Lord Goddard C J. in Ferguson v. Weaving, 1951 (1) K.B 814, that "it is well know that the words 'aid and abet are apt to describe the action of a person who is present at the time of the commission of an offence and takes some part therein." 14. It may be useful to refer to some of the early English decisions, dealing with different ways of taking part in a felony. It was recognised that a felony may be committed by the hand of an "innocent agent" who, having no blameworthy intentions in that he did, incurred no criminal liability by doing it. In such a case, the man who "instigates" this agent is the real offender; his was the last mens rea that preceded the crime, though it did not cause it "immediately but mediately". "Thus, if a physician provides a poisonous draught and tells a nurse that it is the medicine to be administered to her patient, and then by her administration of it the patient is killed, the murderous physician-and not the innocent nurse-is the principal in the first degree Kel. 52 (T.A.C.)." In English Law, as it stood before the later developments, "a principal in the second degree is one by whom the actual perpetrator of the felony is aided and abetted at the very time when it is committed; for instance, a car-owner sitting beside the chauffeur who kills some one by over- fast driving, or a passenger on a clandestine joy-riding expedition which results in manslaughter 1930 (22) Cr, App. R. 70: 144 L.T. 185, "or bigamist's second 'wife' if she knows he is committing bigamy, or even be spectators if they actively encourage such a contest even by mere applause. "But a spectator's presence at a prize-fight does not of itself constitute sufficient encouragement to amount to an aiding and abetting 1882 (8) Q.B.D. 534." It was also recognised that a man may effectively "aid and abet" a crime and at the very moment of its perpetration, without being present at the place where it is perpetrated. 14 2025:HHC:25011 "To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a person must either render effective aid to the principal offender or else must be present and acquiesce in what he is doing. Before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence, be must at least know the essential matters which constitute the offence 1951 (1) All. E.R. 412(414). "But acquiescence sufficient to constitute the offence may be established by evidence of the accused person’s motive and of his subsequent conduct 1951 (1) All. E.R. 464." In the category of "accessory before the fact" comes a person who "procures or advises" one or more of the principals to commit the felony. This "requires from him an instigation so active that a person who is merely shown to have acted as the stakeholder for a prize-fight which ended fatally, would not be punishable as an accessory 1875, 2 C.C.R. 147." "The fact that a crime has been committed in a manner different from the mode which the accessory had advised will not excuse him from liability for it. But a man who has counselled a crime does not become liable as an accessory if. Instead of any form of the crime suggested, an entirely different offence is committed 1936 (2) All. E.R. 813." Kenny, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, New ed. by J.W.C. Turner, p. 88, points out that it is not always easy to decide whether or not the crime actually committed comes within the terms of the "incitement." so as to make the inciter legally responsible for it. He further observed that the courts in some of the older cases tended to "take a strict view of the facts" and refers by illustration to the case of R. v. Saunders, Kel. 52 (T.A.C.) and Archer in 1578. referred to in Plowden. xxxxx 16. Halsbury, in Halsbury's Law of England, 4th ed. Paras. 42 to 44 notice some of the English decisions in the matter of classification of offence and complicity in the crime. Thus, a person who "assists the perpetrator at the time of 15 2025:HHC:25011 its commission, or if he assists or encourages the perpetrator before its commission, was held liable 1970 (2) Q.B. 54. According to R.V. Gregory (1867) L.R.I. C.C.R. 77 "any person who aids, counsels or procures the commission of an offence, whether an offence at common law or by statute, and whether indictable or summary, is liable to be tried and punished as a principal offender." Mere presence at the commission of the crime is not enough to create criminal liability, nor is it enough that a person is present with a secret intention to assist the principal should assistance be required. Some encouragement or assistance must have been given to the principal either before or at the time of the commission of the crime with the intention of furthering its commission. Presence without more may, however, afford some evidence of aid and encouragement. It is an indictable offence at common law for a person to incite or solicit another to commit an offence. For an incitement to be complete, there must be some form of actual communication with a person whom it is intended to incite, where, however, a communication is sent with a view to inciting, but does not reach the intended recipient, the sender may be guilty of an attempt to incite. Incitement is complete though the mind of the person incited is unaffected, and notwithstanding that person incited intends to inform on the inciter; but there can be no incitement unless one person seeks to persuade or encourage another. Halsbury's Laws of England, Paras. 42 to 44. xxxxx 18. Some later decisions arising out of other instances of instigation throw further light on the question. In the case of Parimal Chatterjee and others MANU/WB/0073/1932: A.I.R 1932 Cal. 760, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed that the word "instigate" literally means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act. A person may, however, not only instigate another, but he may co- 16 2025:HHC:25011 operate with him, and his Co-operation may consist of a conjoint action, and that would amount to abetment. In the case of State of Bihar v. Ranen Nath and other MANU/BH/0096/1958: A.I.R. 1958 Patna 259, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court was construing Section 27 of the Industrial Disputes Act which uses the expressions Instigation and incitement' and observed that the words "should be read to signify something deeper than a mere asking of a person to do a particular act. There must be something in the nature of solicitation to constitute instigation or incitement" and it was held that the words seem to convey the meaning "to goad or urge forward or to provoke or encourage the doing of an act." It was further observed that what acts should amount to instigation or incitement within the meaning of that section will depend upon the "particular facts of each case", and that in some circumstances a "throw of a finger" or "a mere turning of the eye' may give rise to an inference of either "incitement or instigation", and yet in others even "strong words, expressly used, may not mean that the person using them was stimulating or suggesting to anyone to do a particular act." The court expressed the view that there must be something "tangible" in evidence to show that the persons responsible for such action were "deliberately trying to stir up other persons to bring about a certain object". According to a division bench of the Calcutta High Court, a person abets the doing of a thing when he or she, inter alia. "instigates any person to do that thing." The other modes of abetment, besides instigation, are "conspiracy and intentional aid". The word "instigation" literally means "to goad or urge forward to do an act." "It is something more than co- operation." In the case of Shri Ram and another, MANU/SC/0207/1974: 1975 (2) S.C.R. 622, the Supreme Court observed that in order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have "intentionally" aided the commission of the crime. "Mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abetter is not enough 17 2025:HHC:25011 compliance with the requirements of Section 107". A person may, for example, "invite another casually or for a friendly purpose and that may facilitate the murder of the invitee". But unless the invitation was extended "with intent to facilitate the commission of the murder", the person inviting cannot be said to have abetted the murder. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor "happens to facilitate the commission of the crime". "Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment under the third paragraph of Section 107".z 15. Thus, the case of the petitioner will not prima facie fall within the definition of the abetment and he cannot be held liable under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. 16. In view of the above, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner has committed an offence punishable under Section 27-A of the NDPS Act or had abetted the possession of commercial quantity of heroin. Hence, he cannot be detained in custody for an indefinite period. 17. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions:- 18 2025:HHC:25011 (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 18. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 19. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai District & Air Correctional Home, Dharamshala and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 19 2025:HHC:25011 20. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th July, 2025 (ravinder)