Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR WRIT PETITION NO.1566 OF 2025 PETITIONERS (Original Defendants No. 1 & 2) 1) Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, a Govt. of Maharashtra undertaking having its office at Prakashgarh, 1st Floor, Bandra (East), Mumbai - 400051 2) The Superintending Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, having its office at Prakashgarh, 1st Floor, Bandra (East), Mumbai-400051 ...VERSUS... RESPONDENTS (Original Plaintiff) 1) Ramakrishna Electricals Limited having its registered office at N-5, Hingna M.I.D.C., Nagpur 440016, through its Director Shri. R.G. Subramanium, R/o. Plot No. 42 B, Tilak Nagar, Nagpur – 440010 (Original Defendant No.3) 2) Punjab National Bank, a Body Corporate, constituted under Banking Companies Act, through its Manager, having branch office at 290, Nashine Enclave, Dharampeth Extension, West High Court Road, Nagpur - 440010 APTE/Pvf 2026:BHC-NAG:7386 Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 2 WRIT PETITION NO.1573 OF 2025 PETITIONERS (Original Defendants No. 1 & 2) 1) Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, a Govt. of Maharashtra undertaking having its office at Prakashgarh, 1st Floor, Bandra (East), Mumbai-400051 2) The Superintending Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, a Govt. of Maharashtra undertaking having its office at Prakashgarh, 1st Floor, Bandra (East), Mumbai-400051 ...VERSUS... RESPONDENTS (Original Plaintiff) 1) Ramakrishna Electricals Limited having its registered office at N-5, Hingna M.I.D.C., Nagpur 440016, through its Director Shri. R.G. Subramanium, R/o. Plot No. 42 B, Tilak Nagar, Nagpur – 440010 (Original Defendant No.3) 2) Punjab National Bank, a Body Corporate, constituted under Banking Companies Act, through its Manager, having branch office at 290, Nashine Enclave, Dharampeth Extension, West High Court Road, Nagpur - 440010 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. S.V. Purohit, Advocate for Petitioner. Mr. R.S. Sundaram, Advocate for Respondent No.1. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 3 CORAM : PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J . RESERVED ON : 10/03/2026 PRONOUNCED ON : 05/06/2026 JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. Rule. 2. The petitioner-MSEDCL (for short, ‘the petitioner-Company’) in both the petitions has raised a challenge to the Order dated 20.12.2024 passed by the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Nagpur in Regular Civil Suit No.613/2024 and Regular Civil Suit No.614/2024, to the extent of rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the Code’). Since the controversy involved in both the petitions is identical and since the parties have advanced same arguments, both these petitions are decided by this common judgment. 3. The petitioners are the original defendants in the suits filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration and permanent injunction with respect to the communications for invoking the Bank Guarantees as stated therein. The plaintiffs have also sought for quashing of the communication with respect to de-barring the plaintiffs from participating in tenders floated by the petitioner-Company in future. The defendants had appeared in the suits and filed their written APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 4 statements dated 19.07.2024. On the same day, the defendants also filed a separate application, at Exhibit 18, under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code for rejection of the plaint wherein an alternate relief was claimed under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code, seeking return of plaint. The plaintiffs resisted the application by filing their reply. By order dated 20.12.2024, the trial Court has rejected the application at Exhibit 18. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the original defendants have raised a challenge to the said Order by way of the instant petition. 4. Shri S.V. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the plaints deserved to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code in view of the Exclusion / Ouster Clause as contained in the tender document. By relying on Clause 32 of the document of Conditions of Tender and Supply, he submitted that the parties have agreed for exclusive jurisdiction of the Court at Mumbai and as such the plaints filed at Nagpur deserves to be returned. He invited attention to Clauses 4 and 8 of the document of Performance Bank Guarantee and submitted that even by clause-8, the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties has been conferred on the Courts at Mumbai and hence in view of these Clauses, the plaint deserved to be returned. He also placed reliance on Clause 27 of the Second Tender Document which contains an ‘exclusion Clause’ conferring exclusive jurisdiction on APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 5 the Courts at Mumbai. He thus submitted that in view of the clear and unambiguous ‘exclusion Clause’ and by considering the facts that the tenders were floated from Mumbai, the bank guarantees where payable at Mumbai and even the payment of bills, dispatch of instructions were issued from Mumbai, it became clear that the cause of action had arisen at Mumbai and no part of cause of action arose at Nagpur. He therefore, submitted that only the Courts at Mumbai had the jurisdiction. In support of his submissions he relied on the following judgments: i) Swastik Gases Private Limited Versus Indian Oil Corporation Limited reported in (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 32 ii) South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd., Versus Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. And Others reported in (1996) 3 Supreme Court Cases 443, iii) Rakesh Kumar Verma Versus HDFC Bank Ltd., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 752 5. By pointing out the legal position in these judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, he submitted that since the exclusion Clause is clear and unambiguous, the jurisdiction to entertain any dispute in between the parties lies with the Courts at Mumbai alone. He also submitted that even though in Clauses 4 and 8 of the Performance Guarantee, words such as ‘alone’, ‘only’ or ‘exclusive’ are not used, the same is not decisive for deciding the jurisdiction of the Courts in view of APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 6 Clause 32 of the Document of Conditions of Tender. He thus submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swastik Gases Private Limited Versus Indian Oil Corporation Limited reported in (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 32 has elaborately clarified the legal position by considering the earlier judgments right from the judgment in A.B.C. Luminart (P) Ltd. Vs. A.P. Agencies reported in (1989) 2 SCC 163 and therefore, the ‘exclusion Clause’ must be given its true effect as the parties have clearly expressed their intention about conferring jurisdiction on the Courts in Mumbai. 6. As against this, Shri R.S. Sundaram, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that the jurisdiction lies with Nagpur Court in view of the peculiar facts of the instant case. He submitted that the dispute in the suit is not about the challenge to the conditions of contract and as such Clause 32 of the Conditions of Tender relied upon by the petitioners is not applicable. He submitted that since the controversy in the suit is with respect to the Performance Bank Guarantee, the only relevant Clause are the clauses of the said ‘Bank Guarantee’, which is an independent contract. He therefore submitted that the only relevant Clause for deciding the jurisdiction of the Courts would be Clause 8 of the document of Performance Bank Guarantee and not Clause 32 of the document of APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 7 Conditions of Contract. He submitted that since Clause 8 is not in the nature of an ‘exclusion Clause’, the application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code seeking return of plaint deserved to be rejected. He also submitted that the subject matter of the suit being the Performance Bank Guarantee for the period from 2013 to 2015, the reliance placed by the petitioners on Clause 32 of the Document of Conditions of tender is misplaced. He also invited attention to the order passed by the Division Bench on 19.01.2023 in Writ Petition no.3592 of 2022 in between the same parties which records a prima-facie opinion that the Nagpur Bench does have a territorial jurisdiction and in view of this, the contentions of the petitioners about exclusive jurisdiction of the Court at Mumbai are without any substance. 7. In support of his submissions he placed reliance on the following judgments:- i) Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., Versus State of Bihar and Others reported in (1999) 8 SCC 436. ii) ELDECO Housing and Industries Limited Versus Ashok Vidyarthi and Others reported in (2024) 11 SCC 503. iii) Maharashtra Chess Association Versus Union of India and Others reported in (2020) 13 SCC 285. APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 8 iv) Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. Versus Union of India and Another reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254. 8. By pointing out the legal position in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., Versus State of Bihar and Others reported in (1999) 8 Supreme Court Cases 436, he submitted that the bank guarantee constitutes a different, separate and independent contract and therefore, suit filed at Nagpur, is maintainable as part of cause of action had arisen at Nagpur. By relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ELDECO Housing and Industries Limited Versus Ashok Vidyarthi and Others reported in (2024) 11 Supreme Court Cases 503, he submitted that the issue about occurrence of cause of action at a particular place is a disputed question of fact and hence, unless evidence is lead nothing can be concluded about jurisdiction of the Court at this stage. As regards, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra), on which the counsel for the petitioners has relied, the counsel for the respondents submitted that the same is not applicable in the instant case as it has dealt with the interpretation of arbitration Clause. Further, in the instant matter, since Clause 8 in question does not contain the word ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ or ‘alone’, the judgment in Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra), is not of any assistance to the petitioners. APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 9 9. To controvert the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents, Shri S.V. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners has invited my attention to the communication dated 25.03.2023 issued by the Chief Engineer of the petitioner-Company which makes a reference to certain documents of tender conditions and by pointing out Clauses 5 and 6 at pages 90 and 91 with respect to the ‘performance deposit’ and ‘bank guarantee’, he submitted that the bank guarantee is furnished in accordance with the terms of contract and hence the terms of contract including Clause 32 as referred above is relevant for deciding the jurisdiction of the Court. He also submitted that since the bank guarantee is payable at Mumbai, the exclusion Clause must be given its full effect. By relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd., Versus Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. And Others reported in (1996) 3 Supreme Court Cases 443, he submitted that the cause of action cannot arise at a place at which the bank guarantee is simply executed. As such, he submitted that the application at Exhibit 18 for return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code was required to be allowed. 10. In the backdrop of these submissions, rival contentions fall for my consideration. APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 10 11. The main issue which needs to be considered is whether the jurisdiction of Court at Nagpur stands excluded in view of the clauses which are mentioned in the document of tender conditions and Bank Guarantee. It has to be noted that the suit was filed by the respondents seeking a declaration that the communication dated 15.06.2022 issued by the petitioner-Company for invocation of the Bank Guarantee is bad in law. As such the challenge in the suit is to the decision of MSEDCL (petitioners herein) seeking invocation of Bank Guarantee, which was furnished in accordance with the Order No.SP/L-104/T-1202/0512/1421 Dated 25.03.2013 for supply of 100 KVA, 11 KV, 3 Phase, Distribution Transformers without CSP feature, on rate contract basis against the concerned tender. It has also to be noted that the suit challenging the invocation of the Bank Guarantee is concerned with the supply order dated 25.03.2013, which mentions various terms and conditions as clarified in Annexure ‘A’ and Annexure ‘B’ attached to the said order. The order dated 25.03.2013 (Annexure-D to the petition) specifically mentions that it shall be governed by the terms and conditions, as per Annexure ‘A’ comprising Section-II (conditions of tender and supply). Annexure ‘A’ – Conditions of Tender and Supply (Section-II) contains several conditions, including a APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 11 condition regarding jurisdiction as mentioned in Clause-32, which is reproduced below :- “32. JURISDICTION: Any disputes of difference arising under, out of or in connection with this tender or contract if concluded, shall be subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the “Courts” in Mumbai.” 12. It has also to be noted that the Performance Bank Guarantee was executed by the plaintiffs with reference to the aforesaid order bearing No.SP/L-104/T-1202/0512/1421 Dated 25.03.2013, which also contains certain conditions, including condition No.8, which is reproduced below :- “8. in case of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the extension or encashment of Bank Guarantee, the courts in Mumbai will have the jurisdiction.” 13. As such, it is clear that the performance Bank Guarantee was executed with reference to the supply order dated 25.03.2013 and both these documents contains certain conditions as stipulated therein. It is pertinent to note that Clause-32 of the conditions of tender provides for an exclusion/ouster clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts at Mumbai. Even Clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee also provides for jurisdiction of Mumbai Courts. It is crucial to note that Clause-32 of the conditions of tender using the word ‘exclusive’, APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 12 whereas, Clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee does not use the word ‘exclusive’ or any such word. However, it has to be noted that the performance Bank Guarantee came to be executed on the basis of the supply order dated 25.03.2013 and it is not the plaintiffs’ case that the terms and conditions as mentioned in the conditions of tender (Anenxure-A) are not binding upon it. Although it is the contention of the respondents herein that Clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee has to be read independently, Clause-32 of the tender documents is not relevant, however, it cannot be ignored that Performance Bank Guarantee is executed by reference to the Tender document. 14. It has also to be noted that the respondents have not demonstrated anything to show that Clause-32 of the conditions of Tender is not governing the parties at the relevant time. On a conjoint reading of Clause-32 of the tender conditions and Clause-8 of the Performance Bank Guarantee, it can fairly be concluded that the parties agreed for conferring the jurisdiction on the Courts at Mumbai. True it is, that Clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee does not use the word ‘exclusive’, as is used in Clause-32 of the conditions of the tender document, however, it is crucial to note that Clause-8 is clear and unambiguous in stating that ‘any dispute arising out of or in connection APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 13 with the extension or encroachment of the Bank Guarantee shall be tried before the Courts at Mumbai’. Thus, the mere absence of a word ‘exclusive’, is not decisive, particularly, in view of Clause-32 of the tender document, which still governs the parties and as such, its effect cannot be said to have been obliterated. Hence, the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents that the only relevant clause is Clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee, is not acceptable. 15. In this regard, it is also crucial to note that the supply order dated 25.03.2013 clearly provides for a mandate upon the plaintiffs to furnish a Bank Guarantee, as can be seen from Clauses-5 and 6 of the supply order, which provides for Performance Deposit and Bank Guarantee. Thus, it is clear that the Bank Guarantee was furnished by the plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the supply order dated 25.03.2013 and hence, clauses of the tender conditions as well as Bank Guarantee will have to be read together and given its complete effect. 16. In view of the controversy raised in the suit, it has to be noted that the tenders in question were floated from Mumbai and the Bank Guarantee was also submitted and payable at Mumbai. Further, the payment of bills was to be made from Mumbai and dispatch instructions were to be issued from Mumbai and as such, a substantial part of the APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 14 cause of action has arisen at Mumbai. It is not the case that no part of cause of action arose at Mumbai and despite that the exclusion clause is being invoked. 17. The position of law is settled by a catena of decisions including the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the matter of Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra), that when the exclusion clause is clear, unambiguous and specific, accepted notions of contract would bind the parties. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to demonstrate any absence of ad-idem and when the plaintiffs have not disputed the existence of Clause-32 in the tender document, the effect of the said clause cannot be nullified. As such, even in absence of any words like ‘alone’, ‘only’ or ‘exclusive’, the jurisdiction clause can be considered and given its true effect. In this regard, it is relevant to take note of the concluding paragraph of the judgment in the matter of Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra) as mentioned in the para No.57, which is reproduced below :- “57. For the reasons mentioned above. I agree with my learned Brother that in the jurisdiction clause of an agreement, the absence of words like "alone". "only", "exclusive" or "exclusive jurisdiction" is neither decisive nor does it make any material difference in deciding the jurisdiction of a court. The very existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement makes the intention of the parties to an agreement quite clear and it is not advisable to read such a clause in the agreement like a statute. In the present case, only the courts in APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 15 Kolkata had jurisdiction to entertain the disputes between the parties.” 18. In the instant case, although clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee does not use words ‘alone’ or ‘exclusive’ or any such words, the clause itself is clear and unambiguous to state that the Courts at Mumbai will have jurisdiction. The argument of the respondents to demonstrate the effect of the use of word ‘will’ instead of ‘shall’, in my respectful opinion is not acceptable and it does not involve any element of ambiguity. Pertinent to note, Clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee is also clear and unambiguous. It is not the plaintiffs’ case that the Clause-8 is not binding upon them. Most crucial to note that Clause-32 of the tender document, which binds the parties is clearly an ouster clause and has binding effect. As such, the position of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra) has to be applied in the instant matter. 19. After considering the position of law as laid down by the several judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had reiterated the legal position in the recent judgment of Rakesh Kumar Verma (supra) and after referring to the judgment of Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra) in para No.15 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed in para No.16 onwards, which are reproduced below :- APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 16 “16. There are multiple other decisions of this Court upholding similar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The decisions in Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics (P) Ltd. v. Chand Mal Baradia, Rajasthan SEB v. Universal Petrol Chemicals Ltd. and A.V.M. Sales Corpn. v. Anuradha Chemicals (P) Ltd. are some of them providing ample guidance in this behalf. 17. The issue as to how an exclusive jurisdiction clause has to be read and understood is, thus, no longer res-integra. 18. A bare perusal of the above decisions leads to the conclusion that for an exclusive jurisdiction clause to be valid, it should be (a) in consonance with Section 28 of the Contract Act, i.e., it should not absolutely restrict any party from initiating legal proceedings pertaining to the contract, (b) the Court that has been given exclusive jurisdiction must be competent to have such jurisdiction in the first place, i.e., a Court not having jurisdiction as per the statutory regime cannot be bestowed jurisdiction by means of a contract and, finally, (c) the parties must either impliedly or explicitly confer jurisdiction on a specific set of courts. These three limbs/criteria have to be mandatorily fulfilled. 19. Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. (supra) is wholly applicable to the facts at hand, and being a larger Bench decision, binds us.” 20. As regards the position of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hindustan Construction Company Limited (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, the same is not disputed. While commenting upon the nature of Bank Guarantee, it has been laid down that a Bank Guarantee constitutes a separate, distinct and independent contract. This aspect would indeed be considered while deciding the controversy involved in the suit APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 17 challenging the invocation of Bank Guarantee. However, the issue raised through the instant petition is with respect to return of plaint by relying upon the ouster clause. 21. Further, the position of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Maharashtra Chess Association (supra) and Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra) is not disputed. However, in my respectful opinion, the controversy involved in the instant petition revolves around the binding nature of the ouster clause contained in Clause-28 of the tender document and the position of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra), appears to govern the controversy. As such, the judgments in the mater of the Maharashtra Chess Association (supra) and Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra) are of no assistance at this stage. 22. It has to be noted that prior to the filing of civil suits, the plaintiffs had filed Writ Petition bearing No.3592/2022 (Ramkrishna Electricals Limited Vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and Others) and Writ Petition bearing No.3593/2022 (Ramkrishna Electricals Limited Vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and Others) before this Court, seeking APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 18 similar reliefs, which are sought in the civil suits. The said writ petitions were later on withdrawn by the plaintiffs and accordingly, both the writ petitions were disposed of by an order dated 29.02.2024. My attention is invited to the order dated 19.01.2023 passed by this Court in the said writ petitions, in which it was recorded that prima-facie, the Court was satisfied that the Nagpur Bench has the territorial jurisdiction to consider the said writ petitions. The order does not reflect that the issue about interpretation of the ouster clauses was decided. The issue about ouster of jurisdiction was raised by the defendants by filing a separate application at Exh.18, which was decided by the impugned order. As such, while testing the challenge to the impugned order, the effect of ouster clauses as mentioned in the Clause-32 of the tender document and Clause-8 of the performance Bank Guarantee, with respect to the prayers in the civil suits, is required to be independently decided. Therefore, in my opinion, the rival contentions based on the ouster clause fell for consideration only while entertaining the application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the same are required to be decided independently. It is also crucial to note that the petitioners had withdrawn their writ petitions and liberty was granted to them in both the petitions to approach the Civil Courts. In this background, the civil suits and contentions raised therein are APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 19 required to be decided independently. Thus, the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents, by relying on the cursory observations made in the order dated 19.01.2023 passed by this Court, is not acceptable. 23. A perusal of the impugned orders passed by the Trial Court shows that the Court has focused on clause-8 of the Performance Bank Guarantee and the effect of Clause-32 of the Tender Document on the basis of which the Bank Guarantee was executed, is not considered. As such, the inferences drawn by the Trial Court about effect of ouster clause are not sustainable. Pertinent to note that, although part of cause of action may have arisen at Nagpur, but, in view of the ouster/exclusion clause, the suits ought to be decided by Courts at Mumbai. 24. For all the above mentioned reasons I am of the firm opinion that the application filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, seeking return of plaint was required to be allowed. It is clarified here that the controversy involved in the instant petition is decided only with reference to the contentions for return of plaint and this Court has not decided the contentions with respect to the rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 20 25. Accordingly, I pass the following Order :- O R D E R (i) Writ Petition No.1566/2025 and Writ Petition No.1573/2025 are partly allowed. (ii) Impugned orders dated 20.12.2024 passed by the Trial Court below application at Exh.18 in Regular Civil Suit No.613/2024 and Regular Civil Suit No.614/2024 to the extent of rejection of the application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are quashed and set-aside. (iii) The Application at Exh.18 under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in Regular Civil Suit No.613/2024 and Regular Civil Suit No.614/2024 are partly allowed and the plaint in both the suits be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation before the Competent Court at Mumbai. (iv) The interim reliefs, if any, granted by the Trial Court shall operate for a period of six weeks to enable the plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No.613/2024 and Regular Civil Suit No.614/2024 to submit the plaint before the Competent Court at Mumbai. 26. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs. (PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J . ) APTE/Pvf Judgment WP-1566-2025-1573-2025 J..odt 21 27. After the judgment was pronounced, Dr. R.S. Sundaram, learned Advocate for the respondents prayed for stay to this judgment and continuation of interim order passed in connected writ petitions, by virtue of which the bank guarantee could not be invoked, so as to enable the respondents to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He also stated on instructions that for the period for which the stay is to operate, the bank guarantee will be extended by the respondent No.1. 28. Although Mr. P.V. Bawankule holding for Mr. S.V. Purohit, learned Advocate for the petitioners opposed the request, in view of the fact that an interim relief in the connected writ petitions was operating, by virtue of which the bank guarantee was extended, it is directed that this judgment shall remain stayed for a period of eight weeks from today. (PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J . ) APTE/𝒫𝓇𝒾𝓋𝑒𝓁 APTE/Pvf