- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.5043 OF 2025 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: DILIP JOSE S/O PUTHIYIDATHU JOSEPH AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS MD AND CEO, MANIPAL HEALTH ENTERPRISES PVT. LTD. HAVING OFFICE AT: THE ANNEXE #98/2, RUSTOM BAGH ROAD HAL AIRPORT ROAD BENGALURU – 560 017. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. PRABHULING NAVADIG, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. ABHISHEK M., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY STATION HOUSE OFFICER KOTHANUR POLICE STATION BENGALURU REP. BY THE HIGH COURT GOVERNMENT PLEADER HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE – 560 001. 2. SIDDARTH CHHOTTRAY S/O S K CHHOTTARAY AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS R/A FLAT NO.61002 10TH FLOOR, TOWER -6 NICKOO HOMES -1, BHARATHIYA CITY BENGLAURU – 560 064. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. THEJESH.P, HCGP FOR R-1; SRI. ABHILASH RAJU, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT DATED Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 15/02/2025 LODGED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT QUA THE PETITIONER AND THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT IN CRIME NO.0029/2025 DATED 15/02/2025 REGISTERED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT / KOTHANUR POLICE STATION FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND 3(5) OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 AND SECTION 72 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HON’BLE XXIX ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU, QUA THE PETITIONER (ANNEXURE-A). THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR ORAL ORDER In this petition, petitioner – accused No.4 seeks quashing of the impugned complaint and FIR dated 15.02.2025 registered in Crime No.29/2025 for offences punishable under Sections 318 and 3(5) of the BNS, 2023 and Section 72 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short, ‘ the IT Act’) on the file of the XXIX ACJM, Bengaluru City and for other reliefs. 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent No.2 as well as learned HCGP for respondent No.1 and perused the material on record. 3. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the impugned complaint and FIR in order to point out that even a plain / - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 bare reading of the same will indicate that it does not disclose the commission of the aforesaid offences by the petitioner – accused No.4 and as such, in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt and others Vs. State of Haryana and another – (2025) SCC Online SC 32, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner – accused No.4 deserve to be quashed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 6. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the 2nd respondent – complainant filed the impugned complaint arraigning the petitioner as accused No.4 along with the complainant’s wife, Akanksha Mohanty as accused No.2 and the Chief HR Officer of Manipal Group as accused No.1 and Deputy Manager, MRD, Manipal Health Enterprises as accused No.3 for alleged offences punishable under Section 3(5) and 318 of the BNS, 2023 and Section 72 of the IT Act. It is contended by the complainant that his medical records was shared by accused No.3 - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 with accused No.1 along with his wife, accused No.2, who produced the said records in matrimonial disputes in M.C.No.873/2025 pending before the Family Court between the respondent No.2 – complainant and his wife – accused No.2. In this context, it is relevant to state that the impugned complaint neither imputes petitioner’s direct involvement in the alleged offences nor are there specific allegations against the petitioner concerning his participation in the alleged incident except vague, bald and omnibus allegations regarding the petitioner’s involvement in the day to day activities of the company of which he was the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer. It is also relevant to state that the company i.e., Manipal Health Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., of which the petitioner is the Managing Director and CEO has not been arraigned as an accused to the impugned proceedings. Under identical circumstances, the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt’s case supra held as under: “10. We take notice of the fact that having regard to the Scheme of the Act, 1900, there is no vicarious liability that can be attached to any of the directors or any office bearers of the company. It is the individual liability or the act that would make the person concerned liable for being prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 19 of the Act, 1900. Having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is difficult for us to take the view that the appellants herein are responsible for the alleged offence. There are no allegations worth the name in the complaint that the three - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 appellants before us are directly responsible for uprooting of the trees with the aid of Bulldozers or JCB machines or causing damage to the environment. The persons who were actually found at the site felling the trees have not been arrayed as accused in the complaint. Although the license/necessary permission for development of the land in the specified area had been granted in favour of the company, yet for the reasons best known to the complainant the company has not been arrayed as an accused in the complaint. 11. It appears that the Courts below proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the three appellants herein being responsible officers of the company are liable for the alleged offence. While a company may be held liable for the wrongful acts of its employees, the liability of its directors is not automatic. It depends on specific circumstances, particularly the interplay between the director's personal actions and the company's responsibilities. A director may be vicariously liable only if the company itself is liable in the first place and if such director personally acted in a manner that directly connects their conduct to the company's liability. Mere authorization of an act at the behest of the company or the exercise of a supervisory role over certain actions or activities of the company is not enough to render a director vicariously liable. There must exist something to show that such actions of the director stemmed from their personal involvement and arose from actions or conduct falling outside the scope of its routine corporate duties. Thus, where the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. There has to be a specific act attributed to the director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company. 12. At the same time, wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned. When it comes to penal provisions, vicarious liability of the managing director and director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Even where such provision for fastening vicarious liability exists, it does not mean that any and all directors of the company would be automatically liable for any contravention of such statute. Vicarious Liability - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 would arise only if there are specific and substantiated allegations attributing a particular role or conduct to such director, sufficient enough to attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability and by extension the offence itself. 13. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, if the statute provides for such liability and if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening criminal liability on an officer of a company, there is no presumption that every officer of a company knows about the transaction in question. 14. The allegations which find place against the appellants herein in their personal capacity seem to be absolutely vague. When a complainant intends to rope in a Managing Director or any officer of a company, it is essential to make requisite allegations to constitute the various liability. 15. When jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the CrPC, the Court concerned should remain vigilant & apply its mind carefully before taking cognizance of a complaint of the present nature. 16. The High Court failed to pose unto itself the correct question i.e., as to whether the complaint even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety would lead to the conclusion that the appellants herein were personally liable for the offence under Section 4 of the Act, 1900 made punishable under Section 19 of the Act, 1900. 17. In Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited v. Datar Switchgear Limited, as reported in (2010) 10 SCC 479, wherein, the Chairman of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board was made an accused for the offence under Sections 192 and 199 respectively read with Section 34 of the IPC, this Court observed thus: “30. It is trite law that wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned. In our opinion, neither - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 Section 192 IPC nor Section 199 IPC incorporate the principle of vicarious liability, and therefore, it was incumbent on the complainant to specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint. It would be profitable to extract the following observations made in S.K. Alagh : (SCC p.667, para 19) “19. As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the company, even if the appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Penal Code. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In such circumstances, referred to above, no case could be said to have been made out for putting the three appellants to trial for the alleged offence. The Court concerned could not have issued process for the alleged offence. 19. In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned complaint and order taking cognizance of the said complaint is hereby quashed. 20. We clarify that if it is the case of the department that the company has committed any breach or violation of any of the conditions imposed at the time of grant of license, then it is always open for authority concerned to proceed against the company for violation of such terms and conditions. 21. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.” 7. In the instant case, the material on record discloses that the petitioner is the Managing Director and CEO of the aforesaid company, which operates the chain of hospitals under the brand name “Manipal Hospitals”, which runs 37 hospitals across 19 cities including the hospital at Old Airport road where the - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 alleged incident is said to have occurred; the petitioner’s role as the Managing Director and CEO is nearly strategic in nature without him being involved in the operational or administrative functions of any individual hospital unit since each one of such units have their own separate and independent administrative heads. It is also pertinent to note that the 1st respondent – police without conducting any preliminary enquiry regarding alleged involvement of the petitioner on the vague, bald and omnibus allegations regarding him being in-charge of the day to day activities of the company has registered the impugned FIR, which is not sustainable in law. 8. A perusal of the material on record will also indicate that even as per the complaint, the medical records of the 2nd respondent was shared by accused No.3 and accused No.1 with the accused No.2 – wife, who produced it before the Family Court in M.C.No.873/2025 and despite the petitioner having no connection with the aforesaid incident / transaction or personal disputes between the 2nd respondent and his wife – accused No.2, the petitioner has clearly been unnecessarily dragged into the impugned proceedings and arraigned as accused No.4 and on this - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 ground also, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner deserve to be quashed. 9. The material on record also indicates that the petitioner is neither a custodian of the medical records of the 2nd respondent – complainant nor does he have any knowledge or control over such documents, which have been allegedly furnished to accused No.2, wife along with accused Nos.1 and 3 in relation to which no knowledge or awareness can be attributed to the petitioner; so also, it is well settled that in the absence of clear and substantiated allegations linking the petitioner’s specific action or conduct to the offence in question, the petitioner being an Managing Director and CEO of the company cannot be held to be vicariously liable for the alleged acts of the accused Nos.1 to 3; as stated earlier except for vague, bald and omnibus allegations regarding petitioner’s involvement in the day to day activities of the company, there are no specific allegations in the complaint against the petitioner concerning his involvement or participation in the alleged incident and on this score also, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner deserve to be quashed. - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 10. Insofar as the alleged offences under Section 72 of the IT Act are concerned, a bare perusal of the impugned complaint is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the same does not impute the petitioner’s direct involvement in the alleged offence; in fact, the basic mandatory requirements for invocation of Section 72 of the IT Act are prima-facie missing in the impugned complaint and FIR especially neither the petitioner had any access to the alleged documents nor did he disclose the same to any other person coupled with complete and total absence of allegations of dishonest intention / concealment on the part of the petitioner, which is yet another circumstance that would vitiate the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner. 11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner would amount to abuse of process of law warranting interference in the present petition. 12. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is hereby allowed. - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:8904 WP No. 5043 of 2025 (ii) The impugned complaint and FIR dated 15.02.2025 registered in Crime No.29/2025 for offences punishable under Sections 318 and 3(5) of the BNS, 2023 and Section 72 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short, ‘ the IT Act’) on the file of the XXIX ACJM, Bengaluru City are hereby quashed qua the petitioner. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE Srl. / SV