IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 ----- Bhuneshwar Prasad Gupta, son of Late Ganpat Sahu, resident of Chattigadilong, Tandwa, P.O. & P.S. Tandwa, District Chatra. .......... Petitioner. -Versus- 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Deputy Commissioner, Chatra. 3. Sub Divisional Officer, Simaria, District Chatra. 4. Marketing Officer, Tandwa, District Chatra. .......... Respondents. ----- CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Petitioner : Mr. Ayush Kumar Verma, Advocate For the State : Mr. Manav Poddar, AC to AAG-I ----- Order No.08 Date: 16.01.2025 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in memo no.539 dated 25th April, 2016 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Simaria- respondent no.3, whereby petitioner’s PDS Licence No.07/1984 for the village and Panchayat Chhatigadilong under Tandwa Block has been cancelled. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned order dated 25th April, 2016, submits that the same is completely arbitrary and unjustified, as the petitioner’s reply to the show cause notice as contained in memo no.68(GO) dated 21st April, 2016 has not at all been considered. 4. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents, while relying on the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos.2 & 3, submits that the action of the 2 W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 respondent no.3 in cancelling the petitioner’s PDS licence is completely justified. In fact, the respondent no.3 had conducted an enquiry of the petitioner’s PDS shop on 21st April, 2016 at about 10:00 a.m. and at that time several villagers had complained regarding irregularities being committed by the petitioner, which are as follows:- (i) The petitioner had changed the place of PDS shop without permission of the respondent no.3, which was violative of terms and conditions of PDS licence; (ii) The petitioner had not distributed foodgrains to the B.P.L. and Antyodaya Cardholders in each and every month; (iii) He had distributed less quantity of foodgrains to the cardholders; (iv) He had not distributed foodgrains to the cardholders for the month of March, 2016, rather he had mentioned in the distribution register that the foodgrains were distributed to the cardholders; (v) He had abused and misbehaved with some of the cardholders for which the female villagers of the area had also made complaint earlier; (vi) He had not distributed foodgrains for the month of February, 2016 to many cardholders, rather reported that the same was distributed among all cardholders; and 3 W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 (vii) He had distributed foodgrains to the cardholders by curtailing 500 grms. foodgrains to each member of the beneficiary families. 5. Subsequently, the respondent no.3 issued show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him to reply as to why his PDS licence be not cancelled for committing the aforesaid irregularities. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 23rd April, 2016, which was not found satisfactory, and consequently the petitioner’s PDS licence was cancelled vide impugned order dated 25th April, 2016 passed by the respondent no.3. 6. This Court is conscious of the fact that the petitioner has statutory remedy of preferring appeal against the impugned order dated 25th April, 2016 passed by the respondent no.3, however, keeping in view that the present writ petition has remained pending before this Court for several years, this Court proceeds to dispose of the present case on its own merit instead of relegating the petitioner to avail statutory remedy of preferring appeal. 7. On perusal of the impugned order dated 25th April, 2016 passed by the respondent no.3, it appears that after mentioning the irregularities said to have been committed by the petitioner for which show cause notice was issued to him vide memo no.68(GO) dated 21st April, 2016, the respondent no.3 has mentioned in the impugned order that the show cause reply submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory 4 W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 and that he was found violating the yardsticks of the PDS licence. The said respondent, thereafter, recorded observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition (Civil) No.196 of 2001 and then by mentioning that the petitioner had violated the conditions of PDS licence as well as the aforesaid order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the respondent no.3 has cancelled the petitioner’s PDS licence. 8. This Court is of the view that the order dated 25th April, 2016 is completely bereft of any reason whatsoever on the basis of which the respondent no.3 has reached the conclusion that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of the PDS licence. 9. It would be important to mention here that the petitioner while submitting his reply to the show cause notice dated 21st April, 2016 had given pointwise explanation and had thereby denied the allegations made against him in the said show cause notice. 10. In the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi- judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our 5 W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.” 11. In the case of Oryx Fisheries Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “40. In Kranti Associates [(2010) 9 SCC 496] this Court after considering various judgments formulated certain principles in SCC para 47 of the judgment which are set out below: (SCC pp. 510-12) “(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. 6 W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or ‘rubber-stamp reasons’ is not to be equated with a valid decision- making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor(1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731-37.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553], EHRR at p. 562, para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 : 2001 ICR 847 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, ‘adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions’. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of ‘due process’.” 12. Further in the case of Rajeev Suri vs. Delhi Development Authority & Others, reported in (2022) 11 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “406. ---------- The requirement of due application of mind is one of the shades of jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done but seen to be done. It requires a decision-making body, judicial or quasi- judicial, to abide by certain basic tenets of natural justice, including but not limited to the grant of hearing to the affected persons. Rules of natural justice are not 7 W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 embodied rules. They are means to an end and not end in themselves. The goal of these principles is to prevent prejudice. It is from the same source that the requirement of application of mind emerges in decision- making processes as it ensures objectivity in decision- making. In order to ascertain that due application of mind has taken place in a decision, the presence of reasons on record plays a crucial role. The presence of reasons would fulfil the twin objectives of revealing an objective application of mind and assisting the adjudicatory body in reviewing the decision. ----------- 408. It is settled that in cases where individual rights are affected by the decision, an opportunity of being heard and application of mind couched in the form of reasons form part of the jurisprudential doctrine. …….” 13. Thus, the order of an administrative/quasi judicial authority adversely affecting the right and interest of any party is required to be supported by sound decision making process which includes consideration of the explanation submitted by the affected party in reply to the show cause notice. Such decision would also facilitate the appellate and revisional authority to exercise their jurisdiction. It is not required that the reason should always be elaborate, rather it should be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy and the extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. When an administrative/quasi judicial authority is vested with the power to pass any order which is of determinative nature, then it is the duty of such authority to exercise its discretionary power in line with the principles of fairness and good governance. Such action should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias or favouritism. 8 W.P.(C) No.3159 of 2016 14. In the present case, the respondent no.3 was duty bound to deal with the pointwise explanation submitted by the petitioner, which was primarily factual in nature and should have passed an appropriate order accordingly. Non- consideration of the petitioner’s reply by the respondent no.3 is not merely violative of the principles of natural justice but also goes contrary to the requirement of fairness in an administrative decision making process. On the said score alone, the impugned order dated 25th April, 2016 passed by the respondent no.3 cannot be sustained in law and the same is, accordingly, quashed and set aside. 15. It is informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that subsequently the State Government has notified the District Supply Officers of respective districts as the Licensing Authorities. 16. Considering the said submission, let the District Supply Officer, Chatra be arrayed as respondent no.5. 17. Accordingly, the respondent no.5 is directed to issue appropriate order restoring the petitioner’s PDS licence within four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 18. The writ petition is allowed. (Rajesh Shankar, J.) Sanjay/AFR