HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW WRIT - A No. - 8641 of 2025 Court No. - 7 HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J. 1. Heard Mr. Mohd. Ateeq Khan, learned counsel petitioner and learned State counsel for opposing parties. 2. Petition has been filed challenging order dated 18.06.2025 whereby minor penalty of censure as well as the major penalty of withholding two increments with permanent effect has been imposed upon petitioner. Further prayer for grant of all consequential service benefit has also been sought. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner was served with charge-sheet dated 23.01.2023 indicating the sole charge that petitioner as a member of the Regularization Committee incorrectly recommended names of three employees who were ineligible for regularization. Reply to the show cause notice was submitted on 29.05.2023 and inquiry report was thereafter submitted on 30.06.2023 exonerating petitioner from charges levelled against him. It is submitted that thereafter a show cause notice Versus Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Mohd. Ateeq Khan Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C. Suresh Kumar .....Petitioner(s) State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Deptt. Horticulture And Food Processing Lko. And Another .....Respondent(s) under Rule 9 of the U. P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 dated 21.11.2023 was issued against petitioner indicating disagreement with the inquiry report. Reply to the same was submitted by petitioner on 23.12.2023 but thereafter by means of impugned order, punishment orders have been passed. 4. It is submitted that inquiry report has clearly exonerated petitioner on the ground that recommendation for regularization was made on the basis of reports submitted by appointing authority of the daily wage employees which did not indicate any break in service of the daily- wage employees and therefore it was held that petitioner could not be saddled with liability of making a wrong recommendation when the appointing authority himself did not indicate the period during which the said daily-wage employees were not in service. 5. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Rule 6(iii)(iv)(v) of the U. P. Regularization of Daily Wages Appointment on Group D Posts Rules, 2001 to submit that it was the burden cast upon the appointing authority to furnish all the relevant details of daily-wage employees to the Committee and therefore if there was any lacuna with regard to details of service of such employees, it is only the appointing authority who could be held liable. 6. It is also submitted that the aforesaid aspect has been completely ignored by the disciplinary authority in the notice dated 21.11.2023 which has not taken the aforesaid aspect into consideration while disagreeing with the inquiry WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 2 report. 7. It is therefore submitted that disagreement of the disciplinary authority with the inquiry report is not in terms of Rule 9(iv) of the Rules of 1999. 8. It is further submitted that even otherwise, major and minor penalty cannot be imposed in conjunction as has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. S.C. Parashar, (2006)3 SCC 167. He has also placed reliance on judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Shiv Mangal Verma vs. State of U.P. Writ Petition No.1489 (S/B) of 2009. 9. Mr. Anirudh Singh, learned State counsel has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner on the basis of counter affidavit filed and submits that the disciplinary authority while issuing notice under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1999 has clearly indicated and recorded reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry report. He has also adverted to Rule 6 of the Regularization Rules of 2001 to submit that the burden is not only cast upon the appointing authority to submit the report indicating details of Daily Wage Employees but duty was also cast upon the Members of Regularization Committee to have called for records of all such persons. It is submitted that the Rule in fact prescribes interview of the Daily Wage Employees, if required. It is also submitted that the petitioner being a Member of the Regularization Committee cannot brush aside his role in recommending ineligible persons for regularization. 10. He has also adverted to the aspect that the WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 3 judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of S.C. Parashar (supra) pertained to the Central Civil Service Regulations whereas in Rule 9 (iv) of the Rules of 1999, it is specifically prescribed that one or more punishments indicated in Rule 3 of the Rules of 1999 can be imposed. It is therefore submitted that judgment rendered in the case of S.C. Parashar (supra) is inapplicable in the present case. 11. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, the entire dispute revolves around the aspect whether the show cause notice dated 21.11.2023 is in consonance with Rule 9(iv) of the Rules of 1999 and consequently whether the impugned punishment order is in accordance with the aforesaid Rules. 12. From a perusal of material on record, it is evident that the inquiry report clearly adverts to the fact that three persons indicated therein were ineligible for regularization in terms of the Regularization Rules owing to the fact that they did not render continuous service from the date of initial appointment till the date on which the Rules were notified. The inquiry report thereafter has exonerated petitioner primarily on the ground that since it was the burden upon the appointing authority to furnish all relevant details of such employees to the Committee but failed to indicate the periods of absence of such daily wage employees, there was no deliberate error on the part of Members of the Committee in making the recommendation. WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 4 13. A perusal of show cause notice dated 21.11.2023 issued under Rule 9(iv) of the Rules of 1999, however, indicates reasons recorded by disciplinary authority for disagreeing with the inquiry report. The aforesaid aspect as indicated by the inquiry officer that all relevant details of the employees were not made available to the Committee, have not been contradicted. Disagreement has been recorded only on the ground that it was the duty of the Members of Committee to have sought for the relevant details of such employees. 14. It is thus quite evident that petitioner has been exonerated of the charges leveled against him primarily on the ground that it was the duty of the appointing authority to have submitted a report indicating all the relevant details of the said employees but failed to do so due to which the Committee based its recommendations on incomplete data supplied by the appointing authority. It is also evident that in the notice issued under Rule 9 (iv) of the Rules of 1999, this aspect has not been contradicted by the disciplinary authority, who has cast a burden upon the petitioner only on the ground that he was duty bound to have called for all the relevant documents. 15. However a perusal of Rule 6 of the Rules of 2016 does not indicate any such duty cast upon the Members of the Regularization Committee. On the contrary, Sub-Rule 3(iii), (iv) & (v) of Rule 6 of the Rules of 2016 clearly indicates the aspect that burden is upon the appointing authority to furnish all the relevant details. WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 5 16. It is also pertinent that such a plea has been taken specifically by petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice but has not been adverted to in the impugned order which again places reliance only on the aspect of duty cast upon the petitioner as Member of the Regularization Committee to have sought for and obtain all the relevant details. 17. With regard to aforesaid, an examination of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1999 would be pertinent and is as follows: "9. Action on Inquiry Report. - (1) The disciplinary authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation to the charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry from such stage as directed by the disciplinary authority, according to the provisions of Rule 7. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. (3) In case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated by the disciplinary authority of the charges and inform him accordingly; (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of charges is of the opinion that any penalty WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 6 specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the charged Government servant, he shall give a copy of the inquiry report and his findings recorded under sub-rule (2) to the charged Government servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The disciplinary authority shall, having regard to all the relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of the charged Government servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, pass a reasoned order imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and communicate the same to the charged Government servant." 18. A perusal of aforesaid Rules, therefore, clearly indicates that the disciplinary authority is required to record his findings for disagreeing with the inquiry report. It is also a relevant factor that such reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry report are required to be cogent and in accordance with Service Rules applicable upon the employees. 19. In the present case, it is evident that duty said to have been cast upon the petitioner as a Member of Regularization Committee is not borne out from the Service Regulations or even from the Rules of 2016. This is an aspect which has been clearly overlooked by the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order. 20. It is also evident that there is no finding recorded in the impugned order that any such WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 7 recommendation was made by petitioner deliberately or with manifest ulterior motive. 21. In view of aforesaid, it can be said that petitioner may be guilty of negligence but of not deliberately submitting an incorrect report. 22. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 related to misconduct in the following manner: "11. Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for the government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct (see Pierce v. Foster [17 QB 536, 542] ). A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers [(1959) 1 WLR 698] )]. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur [61 Bom LR 1596] , and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza [10 Guj LR 23] . The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under: “Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.” In industrial jurisprudence amongst others, habitual or gross negligence constitute WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 8 misconduct but in Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik [AIR 1966 SC 1051 : (1966) 2 SCR 434 : (1966) 1 LLJ 398 : 28 FJR 131] in the absence of standing orders governing the employee's undertaking, unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India [(1967) 2 SCR 566 : AIR 1967 SC 1274 : (1967) 2 LLJ 249] the manner in which a member of the service discharged his quasi judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings. A single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this Court in P.H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta [AIR 1963 SC 1756 : (1964) 2 SCR 104 : (1963) 1 LLJ 679 : 24 FJR 464] wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 9 as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar instances of which a railway cabinman signals in a train on the same track where there is a stationery train causing head-on collision; a nurse giving intravenous injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing instantaneous death; a pilot overlooking an instrument showing snag in engine and the aircraft crashes causing heavy loss of life. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil (see Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Manager, Ahmedabad Coop. Department Stores Ltd. [(1978) 19 Guj LR 108, 120] ). But in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion to duty." 23. It is clearly held that negligence cannot be construed as a misconduct inviting a harsh penalty. 24. In view of aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 18.06.2025 is found to be in violation of not only the Rules but also the law enunciated. In view thereof, impugned order dated 18.06.2025 is hereby quashed by issuance of writ WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 10 in the nature of certiorari with consequential benefits to be provided to petitioner. 25. Resultantly, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs. December 4, 2025 Subodh/- WRIA No. 8641 of 2025 11 (Manish Mathur,J.) Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench