Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
APHC010183362025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] FRIDAY,THE EIGHTH DAY OF MAY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3910/2025 Between:
1. S PRAKASH BABU, S/O.S.NAGANNA, AGED 59 YEARS,OCC.TAHSILDAR, PRESENTLY WORKING AT BETHAMCHERLA MANDAL, KURNOOL ( NANDYAL)DISTRICT. R/O.FLAT NO. 104,VISHNU APARTMENTS, 'B' CAMP POST,KURNOOL CITY, KURNOOL DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, THROUGH SHO,P.S.ATMAKUR, HIGH COURT AT AMARAVATHI, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
2. DUDEKULA MODIN SAHEB, S/O.MABUSA, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, OCC.AGRICULTURE, R/O.H.NO.7-32,JENDA STREET, ATMAKUR TOWN,ATMAKUR MANDAL, KURNOOL ( NANDYAL)DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. CHALLA SIVASANKAR Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
2. SINGAMSETTY V.M. SANKAR The Court made the following:
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ORDER:
Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) by the Petitioner/Accused No.2, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in FIR.No.32 of 2025 of Atmakur Police Station.
2. Sri Challa Siva Sankar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the present Criminal Petition has been preferred assailing the Cognizance
Order dated 17.02.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Atmakur, Kurnool (Nandyal) District in C.F.R.No.06/2025, and the consequential FIR No.32/2025 dated 22.02.2025, registered on the file of Atmakur Police Station under Sections 2(37), 198, 199, 257, 318(4), 335, 336(1), 336(3), 339, 340(2) r/w 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNS’) and Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’). It is submitted that the Respondent No.2/De-facto Complainant has blatantly abused the process of law by instituting a manifestly false and motivated private complaint against the Petitioner and three others. The private complaint, originally presented before the learned Magistrate on 20.08.2024 under Section 200 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ was filed without a sworn affidavit as mandatorily required under Sections 223(1) and 223(2) of ‘the BNSS’, in flagrant contravention of the binding guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P.1 It is further submitted that the learned Magistrate committed a grave procedural irregularity by taking cognizance on 17.02.2025 without affording
1 (2015) 6 SCC 287
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any opportunity to the accused and without adherence to the procedure contemplated under the law, thereby rendering the cognizance order ex-facie illegal, void, and liable to be set aside.
3.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the private complaint filed by Respondent No.2 is not only procedurally defective but is also actuated by mala fide intent and motivated by collateral purposes. The Respondent No.2, having failed to obtain any favourable orders in W.P.No.584/2021, W.P.No.36693/2022, and W.P.No.3183/2024 filed before this Court, and having equally failed before the learned Revenue Divisional Officer whose order dated 20.04.2023 disposed of the appeal preferred against the Tahsildar’s Order dated 20.03.2021, has now resorted to the present private complaint as a tool of coercion and harassment against Government servants, with the oblique motive of bending public officials to secure favourable orders in his ongoing civil and revenue disputes. It is further submitted that the complaint is shrouded in deliberate suppression of material
facts, inasmuch as Respondent No.2 has conspicuously failed to disclose the date of the alleged occurrence and has offered no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay of nearly four years in approaching the learned Magistrate, thereby rendering the complaint hopelessly belated and lacking bona fides. It is also germane to point out that the alleged complaint to the Station House Officer was made only on 02.11.2024 and to the Superintendent of Police on 05.11.2024, evidencing a hastily constructed
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chain of complaints designed to lend a semblance of procedural compliance to an otherwise malicious prosecution.
4.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner furthermore submits that the Petitioner/Accused No. 2, being a Government servant, is entitled to the statutory protection enshrined under Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ as the allegations levelled against him pertain exclusively to acts performed in his official capacity in the discharge of his public duties. The registration of an FIR against a public servant for acts attributable to the exercise of official functions, without obtaining the prior sanction of the competent authority, is wholly impermissible in law, as authoritatively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.T. Virupakshappa v. C. Subash 2 . The continuation of the impugned proceedings would not only cause irreparable harm to the Petitioner’s reputation and career but would also set a dangerous precedent of weaponizing the criminal justice process against bona fide public officials. In these circumstances, it is urged that this Court may quash the FIR.No.32/2025 and the cognizance order dated 17.02.2025 against the Petitioner/Accused No. 2.
5.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava supra, wherein at paragraph Nos.27, 28, 30 & 31 it is held as under:
“27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice
2 (2015) 12 SCC 231
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and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the Bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter, for nobody is above the law. But, the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the Sarfaesi Act, invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution and circumspection has to be adhered to. 28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the application” to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees. As the factual exposition would reveal, Respondent 3 had prosecuted the earlier authorities and after the matter is dealt with by the High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement, he does not withdraw the criminal case and waits for some kind of situation where he can take vengeance as if he is the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that during the tenure of Appellant 1, who is presently occupying the position of Vice- President, neither was the loan taken, nor was the default made, nor was any action under the Sarfaesi Act taken.
However, the action under the Sarfaesi Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the present Appellant 1. We are only stating about the devilish design of Respondent 3 to harass the appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment of loan. When a citizen avails a loan from a financial institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not play truant or for that matter play possum. As we have noticed, he has been able to do such adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction that he will not be taken to task because an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is a simple application to the court for issue of a direction to the investigating agency. We have been apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed to show the compliance with Section 154(3), indicating it has been sent to the Superintendent of Police concerned. 30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. 31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section
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156(3).
Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.”
6. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava supra has laid down with authoritative clarity that applications under Section 156(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ cannot be entertained in a mechanical manner, but must be scrutinized with vigilance, circumspection, and judicious application of mind, particularly where allegations are directed against persons holding public or institutional office. The Court deprecated the unhealthy practice of Magistrates issuing directions “as per the application” to lodge FIRs, cautioning that such indiscriminate orders embolden unscrupulous litigants to misuse the criminal process for collateral purposes. It was emphatically held that a sworn affidavit is a mandatory prerequisite to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ thereby ensuring accountability of the complainant and deterring falsehood, since a false affidavit would itself attract penal consequences.
The Hon’ble Apex Court further mandated that prior recourse under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be demonstrated, and the learned Magistrate is empowered to verify the veracity of allegations before directing investigation. This jurisprudential pronouncement underscores that criminal
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law cannot be converted into an instrument of harassment or vengeance, and that judicial discretion under Section 156(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be exercised with utmost care, responsibility, and fidelity to the rule of law. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in D.T. Virupakshappa supra at paragraph Nos.5, 6 & 9 held as under:
“5. The question, whether sanction is necessary or not, may arise on any stage of the proceedings, and in a given case, it may arise at the stage of inception as held by this Court in Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand [Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 12 SCC 72 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 472] . To quote: (SCC p. 94, para 41)
“41. The upshot of this discussion is that whether sanction is necessary or not has to be decided from stage to stage. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. In a given case, it may arise at the inception. There may be unassailable and unimpeachable circumstances on record which may establish at the outset that the police officer or public servant was acting in performance of his official duty and is entitled to protection given under Section 197 of the Code. It is not possible for us to hold that in such a case, the court cannot look into any documents produced by the accused or the public servant concerned at the inception. The nature of the complaint may have to be kept in mind. It must be remembered that previous sanction is a precondition for taking cognizance of the offence and, therefore, there is no requirement that the accused must wait till the charges are framed to raise this plea.”
6.
In the case before us, the allegation is that the appellant exceeded in exercising his power during investigation of a criminal case and assaulted the respondent in order to extract some information with regard to the death of one Sannamma, and in that connection, the respondent was detained in the police station for some time. Therefore, the alleged conduct has an essential connection with the discharge of the official duty. Under Section 197 CrPC, in case, the government servant accused of an offence, which is alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty, the previous sanction is necessary. 9. In our view, the above guidelines squarely apply in the case of the appellant herein. Going by the factual matrix, it is evident that the whole allegation is on police excess in connection with the investigation of a criminal case. The said offensive conduct is reasonably connected with the performance of the official duty of the appellant. Therefore, the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the case without the previous sanction of the State Government. The High Court missed this crucial point in the impugned order.”
8. Hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.T. Virupakshappa supra has unequivocally held that the issue of sanction under Section 197 of ‘the
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Cr.P.C.,’ is not confined to any particular stage of proceedings but may arise even at the inception, wherever unimpeachable circumstances demonstrate that the alleged act was integrally connected with the discharge of official duty. The Court clarified that previous sanction is a condition precedent for cognizance where the conduct complained of bears a reasonable nexus with official functions, and that the learned Magistrate is not precluded from examining documents produced by the accused at the threshold to determine such entitlement.
In the factual matrix of that case, the allegation of police excess during investigation was found to be inseparably linked to the performance of official duty, thereby attracting the protective umbrella of Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Consequently, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Magistrate could not have assumed jurisdiction without prior sanction of the State Government, and faulted the High Court for overlooking this cardinal requirement, reiterating that sanction is a substantive safeguard against vexatious prosecution of public servants acting in discharge of their lawful duties. 9. On the other hand, Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the Complainant had duly instituted a Private Complaint on 31.01.2025 before the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Atmakur, against four accused persons, namely Pinjari Raju, S.Prakash Babu, S.Lokeswari, Deputy Tahsildar, and Y.Sreenivasulu, Senior Assistant, under Sections 2(37), 198, 199, 257, 318(4), 335, 336(1), 336(3), 339, 340(2) read with Section 3(5) of ‘the BNS’ and Section 175(3) of ‘the BNSS’, which was
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duly numbered as CFR No.6/2025. Upon due consideration of the complaint and the material placed on record, the learned Magistrate directed the Station House Officer, Atmakur, Nandyal District, to register a case against the accused, pursuant to which Crime No.32/2025 was registered on 22.02.2025. It is further submitted that the Complainant had, at the very inception, scrupulously complied with all procedural requirements mandated under the law, including the filing of a duly sworn affidavit through his counsel before the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Atmakur, along with the private complaint in CFR No.6/2025. This cardinal fact is conclusively and irrefutably established by the certified copies of the sworn affidavit obtained by the Complainant through his counsel by filing Certified Application No.257/2025 before the learned Magistrate’s Court on 18.05.2025, which are produced herewith for the kind perusal of this Court. The Complainant has, therefore, not committed any infraction of procedure as falsely and mischievously alleged by the accused. 10.
Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further submits that Accused No.2, S.Prakash Babu, being the Petitioner herein, has made patently false, reckless, and misleading averments in the affidavit, asserting that the Complainant had not filed any sworn affidavit before the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Atmakur, and that the Complainant had infringed the prescribed legal procedure. These averments are not merely erroneous but are deliberately and wilfully false, constituting a calculated attempt to mislead this Court. The conduct of the accused in this regard is rendered all the more
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glaring and culpable by the following incontrovertible fact: Accused No.2 had himself filed Certified Application No.134/2025 on 28.02.2025 and obtained a certified copy of the FIR, and had further filed Certified Application No.202/2025 on 26.03.2025 to obtain a certified copy of the Private Complaint. Significantly, at no point of time did Accused No.2 take any steps to obtain a certified copy of the sworn affidavit filed by the Complainant, despite having approached the Court on multiple occasions. Having chosen to obtain selective copies of the record, both Accused No.1 and Accused No.2 jointly and dishonestly drew an adverse and false inference that no sworn affidavit existed, and proceeded to place such a wilfully false statement on oath before this Court, thereby not only scandalising the process of this Court but also perpetrating a grave falsehood with the sole intent of securing the quashing of a legitimate prosecution. 11. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor furthermore submits the conduct of the accused, in knowingly and deliberately making false statements on oath in an affidavit filed before a constitutional court of record, constitutes a serious offence that strikes at the very foundation of the administration of justice and cannot be permitted to go unpunished. The accused have brazenly attempted to convert the judicial process into an instrument of oppression and falsehood, to the grave prejudice of the Complainant and to the detriment of the rule of law and it is urged that this Criminal Petition may be dismissed. 12.
Sri Singamsetty V.M. Sankar, learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 also reiterates the submissions advanced by the learned Assistant Public
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Prosecutor, emphasizing that the Complainant had duly complied with all procedural requirements, including filing a sworn affidavit along with the private complaint, and that the contrary assertions made by Accused No.2 are patently false, misleading, and intended to abuse the judicial process and therefore it is urged that the Criminal Petition be dismissed. 13. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and having perused the material placed on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the cognizance order dated 17.02.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Atmakur, in CFR.No.6/2025 is vitiated by a fundamental procedural infirmity and is liable to be set aside. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava supra has, with authoritative and binding clarity, mandated that an application invoking the jurisdiction of a learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be supported by a duly sworn affidavit, and that prior recourse under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be clearly demonstrated before such jurisdiction is invoked. The raison d’être of this salutary requirement, as the Hon’ble Apex Court has cogently articulated, is to impose a sense of responsibility and accountability upon the complainant, so as to deter the casual and irresponsible invocation of criminal process for collateral and extraneous purposes. This Court is not persuaded by the submission of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor that a sworn affidavit was duly filed along with the private complaint, inasmuch as the
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Petitioner/Accused No.2 had obtained certified copies of both the FIR and the private complaint through Certified Applications No.134/2025 and No.202/2025 respectively, and yet no sworn affidavit was forthcoming from the record of the court below at the relevant point of time.
Furthermore, the learned Magistrate has, in a mechanical and perfunctory manner, directed registration of the FIR without recording due satisfaction as to whether the allegations disclosed a cognizable offence and without adverting to the mandatory procedural safeguards, thereby rendering the cognizance order ex- facie unsustainable in law. 14. This Court is further persuaded that the private complaint instituted by Respondent No.2 is not an exercise of a bona fide right available to a citizen under the law, but is, in substance and in effect, a calculated instrument of coercion and harassment wielded against Government servants with the oblique and dishonest motive of securing favourable orders in pending civil and revenue proceedings. It is not without significance that Respondent No.2 had, on three previous occasions, approached this very Court in W.P.No.584/2021, W.P.No.36693/2022 and W.P.No.3183/2024 without success, and had equally failed to obtain redress before the learned Revenue Divisional Officer in the appeal arising from the Tahsildar’s Order dated
20.03.2021. It is a well-settled principle of law that the criminal process cannot be permitted to become a weapon in the armoury of a disappointed litigant to bend and intimidate public servants into compliance with his wishes. The complaint is further rendered suspect by the glaring absence of any
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explanation for the inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly four years in approaching the learned Magistrate after the alleged occurrence, and the belated and hasty filing of complaints before the Station House Officer on 02.11.2024 and the Superintendent of Police on 05.11.2024, which appear to be nothing more than a manufactured paper trail to simulate compliance with the procedural requirements laid down in Priyanka Srivastava supra. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in concluding that the complaint is tainted with mala fides and is liable to be quashed in its entirety. 15.
This Court is additionally of the view that the Petitioner/Accused No.2, being a Government servant, is entitled to the benefit of the statutory protection afforded under Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and that the registration of an FIR against him without prior sanction of the competent authority is wholly without jurisdiction and renders the entire proceedings a nullity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.T. Virupakshappa supra has laid down with unambiguous clarity that the question of sanction may arise even at the inception of proceedings, and that where unimpeachable circumstances demonstrate that the alleged act bears a direct and proximate nexus with the discharge of official duty, the learned Magistrate is precluded from assuming cognizance without prior governmental sanction. 16. The allegations in the present case pertain exclusively to official acts performed by the Petitioner in the course of his duties as a Government servant, and there is not an iota of material on record to suggest that the acts complained of were divorced from his official functions. The continuation of the
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impugned proceedings in the absence of the requisite prior sanction would not only be contrary to law but would also cause grave and irreparable harm to the Petitioner’s career and reputation. 17. In the result, for all the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the cognizance order dated 17.02.2025 passed in CFR No.6/2025 and the consequential FIR No.32/2025 registered at Atmakur Police Station are unsustainable in law and are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed, the impugned cognizance order and the FIR are hereby quashed insofar as the Petitioner/Accused No.2 is concerned. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. __________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO,J Date: 08.05.2026 VTS