2025:HHC:28470 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 554 of 2025. Reserved on: 12.08.2025. Date of Decision: 22.08.2025. Manpreet Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Ms. Aashima Kalra, Advocate (through video conferencing) and Mr. Himanshu Kondal, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. : Mr. Hitesh Kumar, Advocate for respondents No. 2 & 3. : None for respondent No. 4. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 71/2019, dated 11.08.2019, registered at Police Station Haripur, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 323, 325, 147, 149, 355, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:28470 109, 382, and 201 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner, respondent No. 2, Smt. Anita Kumari and respondent No. 3, Ravi Kumar, had amicably settled the matter. The petitioner was falsely arrayed as respondent No. 2 in the charge sheet. His name did not find mention in the FIR, and his name was added during the investigation. The respondent No. 4 is an informant and not an aggrieved party. The petitioner had lodged the FIR against the respondent No. 4 for extracting money. Since the matter has been compromised between the parties, hence, it was prayed that the instant petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed. 3. I have heard Ms. Aashima Kalra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No. 1-State and Mr. Hitesh Kumar, Advocate, learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 & 3. 4. Ms. Aashima Kalra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was falsely implicated. He was not named in the FIR, and his name was added subsequently. There is 3 2025:HHC:28470 insufficient material to connect him with the commission of the crime. The matter has been settled with the respondents No. 2 & 3. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed, on the basis of compromise. 5. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No.1-State, submitted that the informant is a necessary party to the compromise, and since he had not entered into a compromise, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed based on the compromise between the parties. There was sufficient material against the petitioner to connect him with the commission of the crime, and the charge sheet has been filed before the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the 4 2025:HHC:28470 decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 5 2025:HHC:28470 (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as 6 2025:HHC:28470 contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 9. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 7 2025:HHC:28470 10. A perusal of the report submitted by the police before the learned Trial Court shows that the petitioner had supplied the scissors, which were used for cutting the hair of Anita Kumari. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner was an abettor, and the submission that the petitioner is not involved in the commission of the offences is not acceptable. 11. It is admitted that the compromise has not been effected with the informant. The informant set the criminal law in motion and is a necessary party to the compromise. The submission that since he had not sustained any injury, therefore, he is not a necessary party is not acceptable. The parties are not seeking to compound the offences, but quashing of the FIR, based on the compromise effected between the parties. The offences are non- compoundable, and when the compromise has not been effected with the informant, he will continue to be a witness to prove the prosecution’s case against the petitioner. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR without the informant’s consent. 12. It was submitted that the FIR was registered against the informant at the instance of the petitioner regarding the demand for money. This submission will not help the petitioner. Any FIR 8 2025:HHC:28470 registered against the informant will be taken to its logical conclusion by the police, and if there is any corruption, the informant will be punished for the same. However, the same will not result in the quashing of the present FIR. 13. Since all the parties are before the Court, therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR. Hence, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 14. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22 August, 2025 (Pramod)