[2025:RJ-JP:5006-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 349/2024 In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.88/2000 Roop Singh Son Of Shri Laxman Singh, Aged About 67 Years, Resident Of Khedi Post Jajoda Via Palsana, District Sikar, Presently Beldar In The Office Of Assistant Engineer P.W.D., Sikar. ----Appellant Versus 1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through the Secretary, P.W,D, Rajasthan, Jaipur 2. The Chief Engineer P.W.D., Rajasthan, Jaipur. 3. The Chief Engineer, P.W.D. Sikar. 4. The Assistant Engineer, P.W.D. Sikar. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. P.S. Tomar HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UMA SHANKER VYAS Order 05/02/2025 1. Heard. 2. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is under challenge in this appeal mainly on the ground that the learned Single Judge has recorded perverse finding that the appellant was not entitled to similarity of treatment on the ground of parity vis-a-vis Kishan Kumar Gupta. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that Kishan Kumar Gupta was appointed as Lower Divisional Clerk (LDC) in the year 1991, whereas on that day the appellant was working as Beldar, though in semi-permanent capacity. He was subsequently [2025:RJ-JP:5006-DB] (2 of 2) [SAW-349/2024] made permanent in the year 1997, therefore, he was also entitled to be appointed as LDC on parity with Kishan Kumar Gupta. 4. Learned Single Judge has distinguished the case on the finding that the benefit was given to those who were declared surplus. It has also been recorded that Kishan Kumar Gupta was appointed prior to the appellant. 5. In the absence of there being any specific pleading made in the writ petition seeking parity with Kishan Kumar Gupta, the appellant was not entitled to claim the said benefit. We also find that on the day when Kishan Kumar Gupta was appointed, the appellant was only semi-permanent employee and became permanent in the year 1997. There is no relief sought that the appellant should be declared permanent prior to 1991. 6. In the above circumstances, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands dismissed. (UMA SHANKER VYAS),J (MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA),CJ KAMLESH KUMAR/RAJAT/34