1 2025:CGHC:50317-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 444 of 2010 State Of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O., P.S. Bhilai Bhatti, Distt Durg (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Bhim Rao Bagde, S/o Bakshiji Bagde, Aged about 36 years, R/o Shanti Nagar, Ward No.4, P.S. Rajnandgaon, Distt Rajnandgaon, Presently at Hudco Sector, MIG 11, 273, P.S. Bhilai Nagar, Distt Durg (CG) 2. Shambhu Prasad, S/o Bhikhari Prasad, aged about 28 years, R/o Village Atba, P.S. Bharva, Distt Sivan (Bihar), presently at Ghasidas Nagar, Near Shiv Mandir, Jhopda, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 3. Hukumlal Patel, S/o Guhru Patel, aged about 22 years, R/o Village Garra, Chhuikhadan P.S. Chhuikhadan, Distt Rajnandgaon (CG) Presently Chhaoni Basti, near Radhakrishna H/o Rambharosa, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 4. Gopal, S/o Sukhchand Satnami, aged about 30 yeas, R/o Village Satyam Chowk, Bhilai 3, P.S. Bhilai-3, Distt Durg (CG) MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.10.10 11:13:48 +0530 2 5. Neelratan, S/o Harihar Ghoshal Bramhan, aged about 52 years, R/o Salva Colony, Post Chakdaha, Distt Nadiya (West Bengal), Presently at Sector 5, SPA/ 22-A, Bhilai Nagar, P.S. Bhilai Nagar, Distt Durg (CG) 6. Ramgopal Goyal, S/o Bhiloki Goyal, Caste Satnami, aged about 34 years, R/o Chitoud, P.S. Gurur, Distt Durg (CG) Presently at Ravan Bhata, Supela, P.S. Supela, Distt Durg (CG) 7. Bharat Bhushan Pandey, S/o Setubadh Pandey, aged about 29 years, R/o Netwar, P.S. Madanpur, Dist Deveariya, (U.P.) Presently at Ghasidas Nagar, P.S. Jamul, Distt Dug (CG) 8. Sheikh Ansar, S/o Sheikh Arman Musalman, aged about- 26 years, R/o Motipur, Ward No. 2, Rajnandagaon, Presently at Sarora, P.S. Dharsiwa, Distt Raipur (CG) 9. Sudama Prasad, S/o Kalisevak Dhobi, Aged about 18 years, R/o Ghasidas Nagar, Jamul, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) Permanent Address Village Devkar, P.S. Bhatni, Devariya (U.P.) 10. Meghdas Vaishnav, S/o Narottamdas Vaishnav, aged about 30 years, R/o Village Pendri, P.S. Lalbagh, Distt. Rajnandgaon (CG) 11. Ajaybalal Singh, S/o Laxman Singh Rajput, Aged about 29 years, R/o Village Basrehi, P.S. Patehara, Distt Rewa (Μ.Ρ.) Presently at Foujinagar, Opposite Shashi Industries, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 12. Arun Tiwari, S/o Jagnarayan Tiwari, aged about 26 years, R/o Village Mahuvar, Bisunpur P.S. Mahrajganj, Distt Sivan (Bihar) Presently at Ghasidas Nagar, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 13. Ramvilas Mandal, S/o Saryug Mandal, Caste Barai, Aged about 28 years, R/o Village Gopalpur, P.S. Mugari, Jamanpur, Distt Khagariya 3 (Bihar) Presently at Khursipar, Near Durga Mandir, P.S. Chhaoni, Distt Durg (CG) 14. Anup Singh, S/o Mahendra Singh Jat, Aged about 30 years, R/o Hudco Sector, MIG 1/273, P.S. Bhilai Nagar, Distt Durg (CG) Permanent Address Sihar Village Hajampur, P.S. Hasi, Distt Sihar (Hariyana) 15. Mathura Sahu, S/o Jhumuk Sahu, Aged about 30 years, R/o Ghasidas Nagar, Jamul, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 16. P. K. Nandi @ Pradatt Nandi, S/o R. S. Nandi, aged about 40 years, R/o Labour Camp Jamul, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 17. Manthir Sahu, S/o Mehattar Sahu, Aged about 28 years, R/o Village Kachandur, P.S. Gunderdehi, Presently at Kurudbasti, P.S. Jamul, Distt- Durg (CG) 18. Sadhuram Nishad, S/o Derharam Nishad, aged about 35 years, R/o Village Kurud, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 19. Gulabchand Prajapati, S/o Ramnaresh Kumhar, Aged about 25 years, R/o Shardapara, Chhaoni, Distt Durg (CG) (DIED) 20. Madhu Sharma S/o Shripat Sharma, aged about 20 years, R/o Ghasidas Nagar, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 21. Umashankar Ray, S/o Jhagruraj, aged about 30 years, R/o Sector - 1, Street 22, Qur. No. 1-A, P.S. Bhilai Bhatti, Distt Durg (CG) 22. Kapil Deo Sharma, S/o Amritlal Sharma, caste Nai, aged about 28 years, R/o Nandani Road, near Housing Board Tiraha, P.S. Jamul, Distt Durg (CG) 4 23. Janaklal Thakur, S/o Sukhram Halba, Aged about 43 years, R/o Pharadphod, P.S. Devari, Distt Durg (CG). Presently at Camp 1, Near Union Office, Rajhara, Distt Durg (CG) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, G.A. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manendra Dubey, Mr. Saurabh Dangi and Mr. Adil Minjah, Advocates Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J . 09.10.2025 1. Heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate for appellant / State. Also heard Mr. Manendra Dubey, Mr. Saurabh Dangi and Mr. Adil Minjah, learned counsel for respective respondents. 2. Perusal of the order-sheet dated 25.08.2010 and submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties goes to show that respondent No.19- Gulabchand died during the pendency of the trial and respondent No. 2- Shambhu Prasad and respondent No.20- Madhu Sharma were absconding and they have inadvertantly been impleaded as respondents, however, since they were absconding, the appeal has not been admitted on their behalf, as such, the present appeal is being considered in respect of the respondents, except respondents No. 2, 19 and 20. 5 3. This acquittal appeal under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment dated 22.12.2005 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Durg (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 223/1997, whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents from the charges under Section 147, 148, 353, 302/149 of the IPC. 4. It is the case of the prosecution that on 1st July 1992, about 3,000 to 4,000 workers of the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (CMM), including both men and women, had assembled and were staging a sit-in protest in a field situated in Sector-1 prior to the incident. On the same day, without any prior notice or permission, the protesting workers moved to the railway tracks near Power House Railway Station and began a rail roko agitation. The agitating workers, who were carrying sticks, batons, and iron rods, and most of whom were wearing helmets, were also seen holding red and green flags symbolizing their union. They were protesting under the leadership of their leaders - Jankalal Thakur and Anup Singh demanding certain concessions and fulfillment of their grievances from the industrial management. The workers sat on the railway tracks and raised slogans in support of their demands. 5. Due to the blockade caused by the workers sitting on the railway line, the Sarnath Express, travelling from Saypur to Durg, was halted at the Power House Railway Station, while a goods train proceeding from Durg to Raipur was also stopped near the outer signal. Upon receiving information about the disruption, officers 6 and personnel from the district police force, along with administrative officials, reached the spot to maintain law and order. Throughout the day, negotiations and persuasion were undertaken by the police and administrative officers with the leaders of the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha, requesting them to vacate the railway tracks to allow the movement of trains. However, the workers and their leaders refused to comply and adopted an aggressive and defiant attitude. Some workers even resorted to pelting stones at the police from time to time. In view of the deteriorating situation, additional police force was deployed at the site to maintain peace and order. When all efforts at persuasion failed and the police moved forward to disperse the crowd and clear the railway tracks, the agitating workers, allegedly at the instigation of their leaders, launched a violent attack on the police force. The mob pelted stones and hurled gravel from the railway tracks and also assaulted police personnel using sticks and iron rods lying nearby. During this violent assault, Sub-Inspector T.K. Singh, who was on duty at the spot, was surrounded and beaten mercilessly by the accused persons. It is alleged that accused Anup Singh picked up a large stone and threw it on the head of Sub-Inspector T.K. Singh, causing grievous injuries that rendered him unconscious. The injured officer was immediately taken to Sector-9 B.S.P. Hospital for treatment. On the report of Inspector R.K. Choubey, Crime No. 186/92 was registered at the concerned police station under Sections 307, 7 147, 148, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and investigation was set in motion. 6. Later the same day, on 1.7.1992 at about 8:35 p.m., Sub- Inspector T.K. Singh succumbed to his injuries during treatment at Sector-9 B.S.P. Hospital. Consequently, the case was altered to one under Sections 302, 147, 148, and 149 IPC. Panchnama proceedings were conducted, and postmortem examination of the deceased was carried out. The postmortem report opined that the death of Sub-Inspector T.K. Singh was caused by multiple injuries inflicted on vital parts of the body. 7. Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer found sufficient evidence against the accused persons for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 333, and 302 IPC, and accordingly filed a charge-sheet before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg. 8. The case was registered as Criminal Case No. 44/95, and subsequently, by order dated 9.7.1997, it was committed to the Court of Sessions, Durg, where it was registered as Sessions Case No. 223/97 and made over to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge for trial. 9. It was also recorded that accused Shambhu Prasad and Madhu Sharma were absconding, and accused Gulab Singh Prajapati had expired during the pendency of the proceedings. 8 10. Charges were framed against the above-named accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 353, and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. All the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 11. Upon conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they denied the allegations and stated that they were innocent and had been falsely implicated. 12. The learned trial Court has framed the charges against the respondents and after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record by the impugned judgment of acquittal has acquitted the respondents from the charges as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment. Hence, this acquittal appeal. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant/State vehemently argued that though the scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, this Court nevertheless possesses wide powers to re- appreciate the entire evidence on record. The settled legal position is that if, upon such reappraisal, it is found that the view taken by the trial Court is perverse, unreasonable, or contrary to the evidence, then the appellate Court is well within its jurisdiction to reverse the acquittal and record conviction. An acquittal that results from ignoring vital evidence, misreading the testimony of material witnesses, or by giving undue weight to trivial inconsistencies cannot be allowed to stand. He further submits 9 that the learned trial Court has committed grave error in discarding the testimony of the eye-witnesses (PW-2 & PW-6). In the present case, the eye-witnesses have clearly identified the accused persons and stated their act of causing grievous injuries to the deceased. Their statements are natural, consistent, and inspires confidence. By treating such reliable evidence as untrustworthy, the trial Court has misapplied the law. The postmortem report conducted by Dr. V.R. Meshram (PW-5) further strengthens the case of the prosecution. The postmortem report opined that the death of Sub-Inspector T.K. Singh (deceased) was caused by multiple injuries inflicted on vital parts of the body. There are strong corroborative circumstances which the trial Court has failed to appreciate in their proper perspective. 14. Learned counsel for State / appellant further argued that the learned trial Court has laid undue emphasis on minor omissions and contradictions appearing in the statements of prosecution witnesses. It is settled law that minor discrepancies are bound to occur in human testimony and cannot erode the substratum of the prosecution case. The Supreme Court has time and again held that trivial contradictions, which do not go to the root of the matter, should be ignored. The approach of the learned trial Court in magnifying minor contradictions and ignoring the overall consistency of the prosecution case is wholly erroneous. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffer from perversity inasmuch as they are against the weight of evidence and based 10 on conjectures. The acquittal has resulted from misappreciation of material evidence, incorrect application of legal principles, and failure to give due weight to the testimony of the eye-witnesses and supporting witnesses. Such a perverse and unjust acquittal calls for interference by the appellate Court in exercise of its powers under law. The evidence of the eye-witnesses, supported by corroborative medical evidence, clearly establishes the guilt of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. The order of acquittal, therefore, deserves to be set aside, and the respondents be convicted and punished under the offences with which they were charged. 15. On the other hand, learned counsels appearing for the accused / respondents supports the impugned judgment of acquittal and submits that learned trial Court after considering the evidence available on record has rightly acquitted the accused / respondents, which warrants no interference by this Court. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the trial Court. 17. The learned trial Court, upon a careful and comprehensive appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, arrived at the following material findings: a). Regarding the identity of the accused/respondents: The trial Court found that the identity of the respondents as the persons involved in the alleged 11 offence had not been seriously disputed. However, mere identity without corroborative evidence linking them to the alleged offence cannot form the basis for conviction. b). On the credibility of the witnesses: The trial Court observed that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were inconsistent on material particulars. Several key witnesses contradicted each other regarding dates, times, and the sequence of events. The Court held that these contradictions were substantial and created a reasonable doubt about the veracity of the prosecution’s version. c). Concerning the ocular evidence: The trial Court carefully examined the statements of witnesses who claimed to have directly observed the alleged incident. It found that the ocular testimony was weak, lacked corroboration, and was tainted by discrepancies that could not be reconciled. The Court noted that in criminal cases, conviction cannot rest on uncorroborated and doubtful ocular evidence. d). Regarding documentary and material evidence: The trial Court reviewed all documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. It was noted that key documents were either not properly proved or did not 12 conclusively establish the guilt of the respondents. No forensic or independent material evidence was produced that could directly link the respondents to the alleged crime. e). On the aspect of motive and intention: The trial Court considered whether the prosecution had established a clear motive for the respondents to commit the alleged offence. It observed that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of any motive beyond speculative assertions, and mere conjectures cannot substitute for substantive proof. f). Regarding inconsistencies and omissions in the investigation: The trial Court also examined the investigation conducted by the police. It was found that there were significant lapses in the investigation, including delay in recording statements, non-recovery of key evidence, and failure to examine crucial witnesses. These lapses cast further doubt on the reliability of the prosecution’s case. g). Principle of benefit of doubt: Applying the well- settled principle that in criminal jurisprudence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt if any reasonable doubt exists, the trial Court held that the 13 prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 18. On this basis, the trial Court held that the respondents could not be held guilty of the charges levelled against them. Consequently, the respondents were acquitted of all charges. The Court emphasized that the acquittal was not a reflection of their character but a reflection of the prosecution’s failure to discharge its burden of proof. 19. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram" reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 20. In the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in Para-25 as under: “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal 14 by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 21. Applying these principles and in light of the observation made by the learned trial Court, we proceed to examine the matter. 22. The trial Court meticulously examined the evidence of multiple witnesses, including police officials and medical personnel. So far medical and forensic evidence is concerned, G.N. Dubey (PW-1) and Shivram Ahirwar (PW-4) confirmed the registration of the case immediately after T.K. Singh’s death. A.K. Behar (PW-13) supported by Shailendra Singh (PW-8), provided a postmortem report (Ex.P-4), which revealed that the deceased had sustained multiple external and internal injuries, including severe head trauma, lacerations, fractures in hands, and internal hemorrhage. Dr. V.R. Meshram (PW-5) concluded that the cause of death was shock and hemorrhage resulting from head injuries. The postmortem was conducted within 24 hours of death. The forensic 15 evidence clearly indicated that the death was not natural but homicidal in nature. 23. So far as eye-witnesses are concerned, several prosecution witnesses, including ASI Anupama Singh (PW-2) and O.S. Parihar (PW-6), testified regarding the circumstances at Power House Railway Station, Bhilai, where a large gathering of 3-4 thousand members of Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha had assembled and engaged in stone pelting at the police. Witness statements, however, contained contradictions regarding the timing, location, and identity of individuals allegedly involved in assaulting T.K. Singh. The trial Court noted the impossibility of accurately identifying the assailants in a crowd of thousands during a stampede and confirmed the absence of proper identification proceedings for the accused. 24. So far as police investigation is concerned, S.L. Dholpuria (PW- 12) conducted the investigation but failed to record statements of independent witnesses or seize crucial items from the scene, such as blood-stained stones, broken glass, and weapons. The investigation relied heavily on statements of police personnel, many of which were internally inconsistent or delayed, diminishing their credibility. The FIR (Ex.P.10) was registered after the diary entry (Roznamcha No. 53, Ex.D.2) documenting the incident. Legal precedent establishes that the first recorded information (Ex.D.2) holds primacy, further undermining reliance on Ex.P.10 for incriminating the accused. 16 25. In view of the above observation, we find deficiencies and contradictions in the statements recorded as the witnesses failed to directly implicate any specific accused in the assault on T.K. Singh (deceased). Conflicting accounts regarding the time of the incident and the positioning of police personnel and the accused raised substantial doubt about the prosecution’s narrative. Medical reports of injured protesters and independent witnesses were not collected or presented, weakening the prosecution case. The trial court correctly observed that mere probabilities or conjectures cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. 26. Having carefully reviewed the evidence as recorded by the Trial Court and the arguments advanced by both parties, this Court finds that: A). The death of T.K. Singh was indeed homicidal in nature, as established by postmortem and medical evidence. B). However, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, individually or collectively, committed the offence of culpable homicide or murder under Sections 302/149, 147, 148, or 353 of the Indian Penal Code. C). The statements of eyewitnesses were inconsistent and unreliable due to the chaotic circumstances, large crowd size, and lack of proper identification procedures. D). Investigative lapses, non-collection of crucial evidence, and reliance on internally contradictory police testimony further cast doubt on the prosecution’s case. 17 27. Having regard to the above findings, the pivotal question is whether the acquittal recorded by the trial Court is perverse or unreasonable warranting interference. 28. The law in this point regarding appeals against acquittal is well settled. The appellate court has full power to reappreciate evidence but interference is limited. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Court held that if two views are possible, the appellate Court must not substitute its own view merely because it may be different, interference is permissible only if the trial Court’s findings are manifestly perverse. This principle has been followed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 258 whereby, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that acquittal can be interfered with only if the findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. 29. Applying these principles, this Court finds that the trial Court’s view is based on a plausible appreciation of evidence, and cannot be termed perverse or illegal. 30. After carefully going through all the evidence, this Court finds that the trial Court has meticulously examined the evidence, including the postmortem report, eyewitness testimony, and police investigation, and has applied the principles of criminal jurisprudence correctly. While the death of Sub-Inspector T.K. Singh was unquestionably homicidal in nature, the prosecution 18 has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the involvement of the accused in the commission of the offence. The inconsistencies and contradictions in eyewitness accounts, the large scale and chaotic nature of the incident, and the investigative lapses particularly the failure to collect and preserve critical evidence have significantly impaired the prosecution’s case. The trial Court rightly observed that criminal liability cannot rest on conjecture, suspicion, or probabilities, and that the burden of proof lies squarely on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Considering the totality of evidence and the legal standards governing criminal accountability, this Court is of the firm view that the acquittal of the accused by the trial Court is both just and legally sound. There is, therefore, no compelling reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 31. As the Supreme Court has held in the matter of Kistoora Ram (supra), Jafarudheen (supra), Chandrappa (supra), Rajesh Prasad (supra), Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund (supra), an appellate Court should interfere with an acquittal only if the trial Court’s judgment is perverse, clearly illegal, or results in miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the trial Court’s findings are reasonable and based on proper appreciation of the evidence. 19 32. It is also pertinent to note that the matter pertains to the year 2005, and after the lapse of considerable time, no compelling reason has been demonstrated to disturb the well-reasoned acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the State under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, being devoid of substance and merit, stands dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is affirmed and maintained. 33. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet