APHC010233262013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI FRIDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 301 OF 2013 BETWEEN: 1. Smt Mutyala Seetha Mahalakshmi, W/o. Suryanarayana, Occ: Housewife, R/o. Yerrampallem Village Gandepalli Mandal, Peddapuram JCJ Court Limits. 2. Mutyala Suryanarayana, S/o. Sathiraju, R/o. Yerrampallem Village Gandepalli Mandal, Peddapuram JCJ Court Limits. 3. Smt Parimi Satyadevi, W/o. Ravikumar, Housewife, R/o. Vetlapalem Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits. ...Appit/Petitioners AND 1. Akula Srinivas, S/o. Bhadram, Driver of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o. D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits. 2. Jana Srinu, S/o. Venkatarao, Owner of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o. D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits. 3. M/s Bajaj Allianz Insurance Co Ltd Vijayawada, Rep. by its Divisional Manager, Vijayawada VZA JCJ Limits. ...Respondents/Respondents Appeal filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated; 21-11-2012 in M.V. O.P. No. 149 of 2011 on file of the Motor Accidents Cum Tribunal VIII Additional District Court, East Godavari District. Appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the Memorandum of Appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the lower Court and the material evidence on record and upon hearing the arguments of Sri. T.G.S. Srivatsava, Advocate for the Appellant and Sri N.Siva Reddy for the Respondent No.2 and for the Appellant and Sri Naresh Byrapaneni for the Respondent No.3. This Court doth order and decree as follows: 1. That the MACMA.NO.301 of 2013 be and is hereby Allowed in part. 2. That the Judgment and Decree dated 21/11/2012 passed by the MACT dismissing the M.V.O.P.NO. 149 of 2011 be and is hereby set-aside. 3. That the M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 be and is hereby allowed. 4. That the claimants be and hereby are entitled for a compensation of Rs.4,87,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till deposit or realization. 5. That Rs.2,50,000/- be and hereby is apportioned to the share of claimant No. 1/the mother of the deceased with proportionate interest and total costs. 6. That Rs.1,50,000/- be and hereby is apportioned to the share of claimant No.2 the father of the deceased with proportionate interest. 7. That Rs.87,000/- be and hereby is apportioned to the share of claimant no.3/ the sister of the deceased with proportionate interest. 8. That all the claimants be and hereby are entitled to withdraw the amount at once on deposit. 9. That the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 be and are hereby jointly and severally liable. But Respondent No.3 is liable in view of the Insurance Policy. 10. That the time for deposit is two months. 11. That there be no order as to costs in this appeal. Sd/- G HELA NAIDU ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// ^ O' ' SECTION OFFICER To. 1. The Chairman, Motor Accidents Cum Tribunal VIII Additional District Court, East Godavari District. 2. Two C.D Copies. Ssl vna HIGH COURT DATED:01/08/2025 <3 1Q AUG 2m g*i ^ Current aeciion ^ ^ e? DECREE (( O'. :x: WIA.CMA. NO. 301 OF 2013 PARTLY ALLOWING THE WIA.CMA. WITHOUT COSTS APHC010233262013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI FRIDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 301 OF 2013 Appeal filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1973, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated: 21-11-2012 in M.V. O.P. No. 149 of 2011 on file of the Motor Accidents Cum Tribunal VIII Additional District Court, East Godavari District. BETWEEN: 1. Smt. Mutyala Seetha Mahalakshmi, W/o. Suryanarayana, Occ; Housewife, Peddapuram JCJ Court Limits. 2. Mutyala Suryanarayana, S/o. Sathiraju, R/o. Yerrampallem Village Gandepalli Mandal, Peddapuram JCJ Court Limits. 3. Smt. Parimi Satyadevi, W/o. Ravikumar, Housewife, R/o. Vetiapalem Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits. R/o. Yerrampallem Village Gandepalli Mandal ...Appit/Petitioners AND 1. Akula Srinivas, S/o. Bhadram, Driver of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o. D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits. 2. Jana Srinu, S/o. Venkatarao, Owner of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o. D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits. r A . M/s Bajaj Allianz Insurance Co Ltd Vijayawada, Rep. by its Divisional Manager, Vijayawada VZA JCJ Limits. ...Respondents/Respondents % : >•' Counsel for the Petitioners:- SRI. T.G.S. SRIVATSAVA Counsel for the Respondent No.2 SRI N. SIVA REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.3 SRI. NARESH BYRAPANENI The Court made the following Order: 1 APHC010233262013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3520] FRIDAY,THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 301/2013 Between: 1.SMT MUTYALA SEETHA MAHALAKSHMI & 2 OTHERS, W/0. SURYANARAYANA, OCC; HOUSEWIFE, R/0. YERRAMPALLEM VILLAGE GANDEPALLI MANDAL, PEDDAPURAM JCJ COURT LIMITS. 2. MUTYALA SURYANARAYANA,, S/0. SATHIRAJU, R/0. YERRAMPALLEM VILLAGE GANDEPALLI MANDAL, PEDDAPURAM JCJ COURT LIMITS. 3.SMT PARIMI SATYADEVI W/0. RAVIKUMAR, HOUSEWIFE, R/0. VETLAPALEM SAMALKOTA (M), KAKINADA JCJ LIMITS. ...APPELLANT(S) AND 1.AKULA SRINIVAS 2 OTHERS, S/0. BHADRAM, DRIVER OF ELCHER VAN AP 5 Y 7141 R/0. D.NO. 11-132 G MEDAPADU (V) SAMALKOTA (M), KAKINADA JCJ LIMITS. 2.JANA SRINU, S/0. VENKATARAO, OWNER OF ELCHER VAN AP 5 Y R/0. D.NO. 11-132 G MEDAPADU (V) SAMALKOTA (M), KAKINADA JCJ LIMITS. 7141 3.M/S BAJAJ ALLIANZ INSURANCE CO LTD VIJAYAWADA, REP. BY ITS DIVISIONAL MANAGER, VIJAYAWADA VZA JCJ LIMITS. E' ' 2 ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Appellant(S): 1.TG S SRIVATSAVA Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.N SIVA REDDY 2.. 3.NARESH BYRAPANENI The Court made the following: fca 3 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA M.A.C.M.A.No.301 of 2013 JUDGMENT: Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim petition, claimants in 1. M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum- III Additional District Judge, Kakinada (for short 'the MACT’) filed the present appeal Respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein were the driver and owner of the Elcher Van bearing No.AP 5 Y 7141 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle") 2. involved in the accident and Respondent No.3 is the Insurance Company with which the offending vehicle was insured. For the sake of convenience, parties will be hereinafter referred to as the 3. claimants and the respondents, with reference to their status before the learned MACT. Case of the Claimants: 4(i). One Mutyala Venkata Satya Ravi Kumar(hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) is the son of Claimant Nos.1 and 2 and the brother of Claimant No.3. 4(ii). On 13.06.2009, at about 07:30 p.m., the deceased, while proceeding to Samalkota from Vetapalem on his Hero Honda Passion Pius motorcycle and when he was near Hussainpuram Village, respondent No.1 / driver of the 4 offending vehicle reversed the same in a rash and negligent manner to main road from Ceramic shop to main road and dashed the motorcycle deceased was travelling. As a result, the accident occurred. The deceased on which the was shifted to Government General Hospital. Kakinada Emergency Hospital, Kakinada, but while undergoing treatment, to injuries on 15.06.2009. and from there to Safe he succumbed 4(iii). The accident occurred due to rash and vehicle by respondent No.1. against respondent No.1 in Samalkota Police Station negligent driving of the offending A case in Crime No. 144 of 2009 was registered initially for the offenses under Section 338 IPC and subsequently, it was altered to Section 304-A IPC. The deceased was hale and healthy, aged about 25 years, earnings Rs. 11,000/- per month and working as Marketing Manager-cum-Team Leader. The claimants lost valuable financial support and every hope, including love and affection of the deceased. Hence, claimants are entitled for just and reasonable compensation. 4(iv). The offending vehicle was owned by Respondent No.2 insured with Respondent No.3. Hence all the respondents are liable to pay the compensation. Case of the Respondents: 5. Respondent Nos.1 and 2, the driver vehicle, remained ex parte. Respondent No.3 alone and the owner of the offending contested the case. w- 1 5 Case of Respondent No.3-lnsurance Company: 6(i). The claimants shall prove the pleaded accident, negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, ownership of respondent No.2 over the offending vehicle and insuring the same with the Respondent No.3 is true. But, the compliance of the conditions of the policy shall be proved. 6(ii). The deceased himself was responsible for the accident by driving motorcycle at high speed. 6(iii). The driver of the offending vehicle did not possess a valid driving license, hence there is breach of conditions of policy. There are other violations. 6(iv). The claimants shall prove the age, occupation and income of the deceased and their dependency on the deceased. In any event, the quantum of compensation claimed is excessive and the petition is liable to be dismissed against the Insurance Company. 7. On the strength of pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial by the learned MACT; (i) Whether the accident occurred out of the use of Van bearing No.AP 05 Y 7141 and due to the rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle by the 1st respondent? (ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? If so, to what amount and from which of the respondents? (iii) To what relief? f 6 8. Evidence before the learned MACT: Description Remarks Oral evidence P.W.1: Mahalakshmi Mutyala Seetha 1st petitioner / Mother of deceased P.W.2: Reddy Abbulu Eye witness to the accident. Documentary evidence Ex.AI; Attested Photostat copy of F.I.R. in Cr.No.144 of 2009 of S.H.O., Samalkot P.S. for the offence under Section 338 I.P.C Ex.A2: Attested Photostat copy of altered F.I.R. in Cr.No.144 of 2009 of S.H.O., Samalkot Police Station for the offence under Section 304-A I.P.C. Ex.A3:Attested photostat copy of postmortem report Ex.A4; Attested photostat copy of charge sheet Ex.A5:Attested photostat copy of scene observation report Ex.A6: Attested Photostat copy of M.V.I. report EX.A7: On behalf of the petitioner(s). Salary certificate of deceased issued by Proprietor, Communications, Dhwani Kakinada. Ex.A8: Attested photostat copy of inquest report Ex.BI: Copy of Insurance Policy for the Eicher van bearing No.AP 05 Y 7141, which is valid from 19.07.2008 to 18.07.2009. On behalf of the respondents. \ \ V ' 7 Findings of the learned MACT: 9(i). P.W.1 is not an eye witness to the accident. P.W.2 is an eye witness. In chief examination, he has stated that negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle is the cause for the accident. In cross-examination, he has admitted that when the offending vehicle was being reversed, the motor cycle hit and dashed the offending vehicle and there was no fault on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle. Therefore, there is negligence on the part of the motorcyclists / deceased himself. 9(ii). Since the eye witness admitted the negligence of deceased, the charge sheet cannot be basis, even investigation officer is not examined. Therefore, the issue relating to negligence is answered against the claimants. 9(iii). The deceased was working as a Marketing Manager-cum-Team Leader and earning Rs.11,000/-. Ex.A7 does not show when the deceased was appointed. Ex.A7 is not proved. Ex.A8- inquest report stated that the deceased was working as a Manager in Nettel Gardens at Hyderabad. The claimant failed to prove the income of the deceased as Rs.11,000/- per month. 9(iv). Although, the policy was in force, the Insurance Company is not liable in view of the findings of the issue No.1. 8 Arguments in the appeal: For the appellants: 10(i). The learned MACT failed to note that the deceased was travelling from West to East. The accident occurred when the crime vehicle was reversing without following the required caution. Crime is registered against the driver of the offending vehicle. The driver of the vehicle was not examined to disbelieve the negligence. The findings of the learned MACT as to absence of negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle are not tenable. 10(ii). The learned MACT erred in taking note of age and income of the deceased etc. The deceased is a young man. The parents of the deceased are claimants and the claimants lost dependency. For the Respondent-Insurance Company: Evidence of P.W.2, the eye witness to the accident, is not supporting claimants and the findings of the learned MACT as to the absence of negligence are proper. They are no grounds to interfere. In any event, the contribution and negligence on the part of the deceased shall be taken as a substantial cause for the accident. In the light of the same, the aspect of liability of the respondents particularly the Insurance Company requires to be assessed. 11. \ 9 The points that arise for determination in this appeal are; 1) Whether the pleaded accident dated 13.06.2009 has occurred account of negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle or due to the negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the deceased himself? 2) Whether the claimants are entitled for compensation? If so, to what quantum and what is the liability of the respondents? 3) What is the result of the appeal? on Point No.1: Statutory and Precedential Guidance: 13(i). It is relevant to note that the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 are applicable in deciding the cases by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and they are made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows; 176. Power of State Government to make rules.—A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications; (b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal In holding an inquiry under this Chapter; *11 10 (c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal; (d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and (e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed. 13(ii). Chapter ‘11’ of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 commencing from Rule 455 to Rule 476A deals with the powers of the Tribunal and all other allied aspects like form of application, registration, notice to parties, appearance and examination of parties, local inspection, summary examination of parties, method of recording evidence, adjournments, framing and determination of issues, judgments and enforcements of awards. Court fee relating to claim petitions applicability of Civil Procedure Code and the application for claim basis to award the claim by the claims tribunal. Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 reads as follows: Rule 476: Application for claim (7) Basis to award the claim The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of;- (i) Registration Certificate of the Motor Vehicle involved in the accident; (ii) Insurance Certificate or Policy relating to the insurance of the Motor Vehicle against the Third party risk; (Hi) Copy of First Information Report; 11 (iv) Post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the Medical Officer; and (v) The nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim. (7A) Specification of amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to each victim:- Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them. 13(iii). It is relevant to note that in view of the summary nature and mode of enquiry contemplated under Motor Vehicles Act and social welfare nature of legislation the Tribunal shall have holistic view with reference to facts and circumstances of each case. It is sufficient if there is probability. The principle of standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering a claim seeking compensation for the death or the injury on account of road accident. The touch stone of the case, the claimants shall have to establish is preponderance of probability only. The legal position to this extent is settled and consistent. 13(iv). The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation\ in para 15 observed as follows: In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard 15. ' 2009 (13) see 530 12 Of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties..’’ 13(v). In a case between Bhagwan Ram and Ors. Vs. Deen Dayal and Ors.^, while considering the nature of proof is required for believing the negligent driving in Motor Accident Claims, the Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan found that Certificate and the copies of documents prepared by the Police on the spot, including the Challan, First Information Report etc. are admissible, even in the absence of statement of eye witnesses and the same can be the basis to believe the negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, vide para-11 which reads as follows: “11. The fact that any of the eye witness or the police personnel and authorities, who had prepared the documents - certified copies of challan Exhibit-1, First Information Report as Exhibit-2, Naksha Mauka as Exhibit-4, Halat Mauka as Exhibit-5, Postmortem Report as Exhibit-10 were not examined is of no consequence. The said documents being certified copies of public documents even In absence of such statements are admissible in evidence as held by this Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Devilal & Ors., reported at 1991 ACJ 230 and Shrwan Kumar v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., reported at 1995 ACJ 337. It was held by this Court In the case of Shrwan Kumar as under- "18. Public documents like the first information report and the report of the mechanical inspection of the bus can be taken into consideration and this point is no longer res Integra so far as this court is concerned. In ' 2013 (0) sc (Raj) 812 13 Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Devilal, 1991 ACJ 230 (Rajasthan) , it was observed that strictly speaking, provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable before the Tribunal; if a document is a certified copy of a public document it need not be proved by calling a witness or the person who prepared it. ” 13(vi). In Anitha Sarma and Others Vs. New Indian Assurance Company Ltd.^, the Honble Apex Court observed that in Motor Accident Claims, standard of proof is one of the preponderance of possibilities render beyond reasonable doubt; approach and role of the Courts, while examining the evidence in accident cases, ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of the best eye witnesses, as may happen in criminal Trial, but instead should be only to analyse the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant’s version is more likely than not true. The observations in para-17 are as follows:- “fZ. Unfortunately, the approach of the High Court was not sensitive enough to appreciate the turn of events at the spot, or the appellant-claimants' hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information for an accident which took place many hundreds of kilometers away In an altogether different State. Close to the facts of the case in hand, this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605], viewed that: (SCC p. 638, para 12) “12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed [Amir Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself We are constrained to repeat our ^ 2021(1) see 171 14 obsen/ation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitized enough to appreciate the plight of the victim. ‘15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. >99 In a case between New India Assurance Company Ltd., Vs. Kethavarapu Sathyavathi and Ors/, the Hon’ble Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh has referred to Section 168, 169 of M.V. Act and Rule 476(7) 13(vii). of A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules and also catena of decisions. The point for consideration before the Hon’ble Division Bench was that in holding an inquiry in terms of Motor Vehicles Act, what is the procedure to be followed and whether the F.I.R. can be basis for considering the claim. Observations in para 5 to 7 are as follows: '5. Point: Under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"), the Claims Tribunal shall give the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining just compensation, etc. In holding any such inquiry. Section 169 of the Act mandates the Tribunal to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit subject to rules. The Tribunal was conferred with the powers of a civil Court for the specified purposes and under Rule 476 of the Rules, the Claims Tribunal was directed to follow the procedure of summary trial as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal was cautioned not to reject any application on the ground of any technical flaw and was also obligated to obtain whatever information necessary from the police, medical and other authorities. It is true that sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules states that the Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of registration certificate of the motor vehicle. Insurance certificate or Policy, copy of first 2009 Supreme (AP) 136=2010(2) ALD 403=2009(3) ALT 260 15 information report, post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the medical officer and the nature of treatment given by the medical Officer. 6. The said sub-rule obviously refers to the relevant dependable criteria for assessment of the compensation, which Is patently illustrative and can never be considered to be exhaustive. This Sub-rule stating the basis to award the claim, is obviously subject to the prohibition against depending on any technical flaw and the procedure for summary trial to be followed by the Tribunal. The said sub-rule cannot travel beyond the statutory obligation imposed on the Tribunal to determine the just compensation after an inquiry, in which an opportunity of being heard is given to the parties. The judicial determination of the questions In controversy before the Tribunal in terms of Sections 168 and 169 of the Act cannot be confined to consideration of the five documents referred to in sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules alone and exclude any other oral or documentary evidence. The procedure of summary trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure which the Tribunal shall follow under Rule 476 of the Rules itself mandates taking all such evidence as may be produced by both sides In support of their respective versions, apart from the evidence which the Court, of its own motion, causes to be produced as per Section 262 read with Sections 254 and 255 of the said Code. Sub-rule (7) to be understood in the light of the object and scheme of the Act, is a directory provision referring to some of the documents which can offer guidance to the Tribunal in discharge of its statutory duty and the word "shall" used In the said: subrule has to be necessarily understood as "may". 7. That apart, to say that the, first information report alone should be the conclusive basis for determining the manner of the accident, even in spite of the availability of other dependable evidence on record on that aspect, will be offending the plain language of the statute and if that were the purport of sub rule (7), it cannot be considered valid, as any such delegated legislation cannot travel beyond the legislation itself." 13(viii). In Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz^, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed in Para 7 to 9, as follows:- " 7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13 SCO 530] ^ (2013) 10 see 646 16 8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [(2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10) “10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu Initiated by the Tribunal. (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation. It does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. ... (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry. ” 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note : (Shila Datta case [(2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328], SCC p. 519) “10. ...We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry. In accordance with the statute. ’’ Analysis of Evidence as to Negligence: 14(i). The evidence of P.W.2 failed to gain positive nod from the learned MACT. During chief examination, P.W.2 categorically stated that he witnessed the accident and that the deceased sustained injuries and was shifted to hospital. There was negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. It is relevant to note that P.W.2 is a rustic villager and he affixed thumb impression during his evidence, both chief and cross examination. Major importance to the evidence of 17 P.W.2 in cross examination is given by the learned MACT. Therefore, the same requires scrutiny. 14(ii) P.W.2 evidence and analysis: (i) P.W.2 do not know the deceased prior to the accident- this suggests his neutrality. (ii). P.W.2 has came to Court at the request of relatives of deceased- this suggests about the knowledge of proceedings through the relatives of the deceased. (iii). P.W.2 stated that, there are shops by the side of the road where the accident took place- this suggests his knowledge and acguaintance about the accident spot. (iv). P.W.2 stated that, when Van was being reversed, a motorcycle came from behind it and dashed to the Van. It is relevant to note that in what direction the offending vehicle was coming and which direction the deceased was travelling on motorcycle is not elicited. (v). P.W.2 stated that, the driver of the van was not at fault. This depends on what was the Question that was put to the witness. This further suggest that driver of the offending vehicle was taking reverse and the motor cycle came from behind. 18 (vi). Whether the accident took place due to the negligent riding of the motorcycle depends on the question, if the motorcycle was moving on the road in usual speed and if the offending vehicle was taking reverse who must be careful? It is pertinent to note that P.W.2 is an eye witness but, other record FIR and charge sheet are indicating that the driver of the offending vehicle was charge sheeted. No doubt the evidence of eye witness produced by the claimant plays important role but at the same time, the other material cannot be completely ignored. (vii). Even according to the evidence of P.W.2, Reddy Abbulu, it is not the case that the offending vehicle did not involve in the accident. During chief examination, P.W.2 has stated that, without blowing horn, the driver of the offending vehicle was taking reverse from the Ceramic shop into the main road. This suggests that the offending vehicle was coming into the main road by taking reverse and the motor cycle was going on main road. If there was sudden taking of reverse without any horn it will make the person going on main road to hit the vehicle coming into the road that does not mean that there was total negligence on the part of the person going on straight road and that there was no negligence of person enter into main road particularly taking reverse that without blowing horn. i . 19 (viii). Further, it is relevant to note that the accident taken place 13.06.2009. Examination of witness taken place on 13.08.2012. There was more than three years gap. The witness is a rustic villager and illiterate. Photographic memory of the incident and narration of incident with mathematical accuracy cannot be expected that too during cross examination before a district Court. on (ix). It if further relevant to note that no steps are taken to examine the driver of the offending vehicle. It is also relevant to note that he remained parte. The evidence of P.W.2, appears to be true as to the offending vehicle taking reverse and the motorcycle on which the deceased was travelling on straight road hitting the offending vehicle. Therefore, the deceased should have been more careful in riding the motorcycle. But this does not make the motorcycle rider completely responsible for accident. A person taking reverse and facing the criminal trial being a tortfeasor in respect of civil liability cannot totally stay away from the proceedings, and play hide and seek through total blame on the victim party and take advantage of the evidence of the innocent witness. (X). (xi). In any view of the matter, upon consideration entire material throwing total fault on the part of the deceased and giving a clean chit to the driver of the offending vehicle a tortfeasor who faced criminal trial found not convincing and in 15. 20 the facts and circumstances of the case, negligence found attributable to the both driver of the offending vehicle and the deceased and accordingly contribution apportioned at 50% each taking aid of evidence and precedential guidance referred above vide: (i) Bimla Devi and Others vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation (1 supra), (ii) Bhagwan Ram and Ors. vs. Deen Dayal and Ors.{2 supra), (iii) Anitha Sarma and Others vs. New Indian Assurance Company Lfc/.(3supra), (iv) New India Assurance Company Ltd., vs. Kethavarapu Sathyavathi and Ors (4 supra) and (v) Dulcina Fernandes vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz (5 supra). IS 16. In view of the discussion made above, the point No.1 is answered concluding that the accident is the result of contribution of negligence by both the deceased and the driver of the offending vehicle at the rate of 50% each. Point No.2: Quantum of Compensation: Precedential auidance:- a) Adoption of Multiplier. Multiplicand and Calculation: 17(i). Hon’ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Sarla Verma (Smt.) in wrr^ W [S' 21 f and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.^ vide paragraph Nos. 18 and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment the claimants have to establish the following; 1. Age of the deceased. 2. Income of the deceased. 3. Number of dependents, (ii). Hon’ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the compensation, they are; Step No.1: Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he / she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased. Step No.2: Ascertaining Multiplier. This shall be with reference to the table provided and table is provided in judgment itself. Step No.3: Calculation of the compensation. Final Step: After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport. ® 2009 (6) see 121 22 cost Of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. advised. are b) Adding of future prospects: 18(i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon’ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others^ guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50% where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 years and 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years. case (ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes, respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years, at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years, compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral Further, in Further, adding of expenses at Rs. 15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively is recommended by Hon’ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for Sethi’s case. every three years in Pranay c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium: 19. Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable compensation in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Others^, ’ 2017(16) see 680 *(2018) 18 sec 130 F 23 Hon’ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under the heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children and parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium. d) Just Compensation: 20. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others^, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para Nos. 10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows: 10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation In excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 see 274 : 2003 SCC (eh) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , it was held as follows: (See p. 280) “10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the eiaims Tribunal to ‘make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just’. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be ‘just’. There is no other limitation or restriction on Its power for awarding just compensation. ’’ The principle was followed In the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 : (2009) 2 SCC (CrI) 987] and in NIngamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1213] 11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions Is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim. ® (2013) 9 see 54 24 21. As per the evidence of P.W.1, the deceased was working as Marketing Manager and getting a salary of Rs.11,000/- per month. He was aged about 25 years by the date of accident. Ex.A7 is the salary certificate. 22. Learned MACT observed that Ex.A7 is not proved. The contents of Ex.A7 are showing that M.V.S. Ravi Kumar worked as team leader and earning salary of Rs.11,000/- per month and certificate was issued to the parents of M.V.S.Ravi Kumar, Empathetic concern of the learned MACT is found missinr, in thk ugpn examination of the wav in which the case is dealt Parents of and his sister lost their sole bread a young man winner who was reportedly working as Marketing Manager. They were before the learned MACT for legal redressal. 23. The difficulties of the victims i - in procuring evidence and their deoendenry so many are reguired to be keot in view, in handling was properly produced If thP on the counsels, doctors and cases relating to social welfare legislatives. Ex A7 auantum of salary mentioned in Ex.A7 is doubtful it need not hr. reasons^If the employment itself is not believahls at least nn nntinn^i some income can be considered. Even in respect of a vega bond, snmp inpnma is, contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act IntereetinnI', did not accept any income in this case and declined to naimiato compensation MACT any 25 24. Interestingly, the objections of the learned MACT are: (i). P.W.1 did not say the name of the Company in which the deceased was working. Ans:- Ex.A7 is reflecting the name of the company in which the deceased was working. (ii). Ex.A7 is reflecting the capacity in which the deceased was working that he was a team manager, but it is not reflecting when he was appointed? and when he joined the service? and how much service the deceased was putting? and details of salary, pay, allowances and deductions etc.? Ans:- This way of unjustly invalidating a document is painful that too in a claim for compensation in MACT case without there being any cross examination on those aspects. This reflecting oddness instead of fairness on the part of the learned MACT. (iii). Learned MACT refers the inquest report states that deceased was working as Manager in Nettle Garden at Hyderabad and observes that Ex.A7 is indicating that he is working at Kakinada. Therefore, there is contradiction. Ans;- Either at Kakinada or at Hyderabad, some working is reflected. The age could have been accepted and at least notional income should have 26 't been taken by the learned MACT, but the learned MACT did not accept any income and recused from quantifying the compensation, (iv). Learned MACT interestingly observed that petitioners are parents and they cannot be said as dependents. Ans:- When the law recognizes the right of maintenance of parents against children by way of maintenance proceedings in terms of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C or in terms of personal laws, it is not known how, without there being any material, the learned MACT concluded that parents are not dependents. It is relevant to note that the Insurance Company suggested during the 25. cross examination of P.W.2 that the claim of the claimants is excessive. During cross examination of PW.1, Ex.A7 was disputed but during re-examination, the inquest report was got marked as Ex.A8. During further cross examination, the working status of the deceased as reflected in Ex.A8 was not denied and it was simply suggested that he was not getting the salary of Rs.11,000/- per month. Since the claimant Nos.1 and 2 are the parents this Court finds that, they 26. are entitled to compensation. Claimant No.3, the married sister of the deceased entitled for a nominal amount as she is not shown as the dependent. From the material on record and in view of the discussion made above. 27. upon considering the age of the deceased, it is found reasonable to adopt the V 27 Of the deceased at Rs.6.000/- per month, upon taking note of socio- Adding of 1/3'^'^ towards future prospects is income economic status of the year 2009. also found reasonable in the context of the case, whereby the income can be to Rs.96,000/- per annum. The liable to be deducted towards personal to Rs.48,000/-. The same can be considered taken at Rs.8,000/- per month which comes deceased was unmarried; hence, 50% is expenses. 50% of the same comes the multiplicand. The deceased was aged about '25' years by the date of as accident. Multiplier applicable is '18'. Then, the loss of dependency of claimants to Rs.8,64,000/-. Claimant Nos.1 and 2 are entitled for Rs.40,000/- each comes towards loss of consortium. The claimants are of estate and Rs.15,000/- towards funeral expenditure. also entitled for Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of the reasons and entitlement of the claimants for reasonable In the light of the precedential guidance and in view evidence referred above, the compensation is as follows: 28. Fixed by this Appellate Court Rs.8,64,000/- Head SI. No. Loss of dependency 1. Rs.80,000/- Loss of consortium 2. Rs.15,000/- Loss of estate 3. Rs.15,000/- Funeral expenses 4. Rs.9,74,000/- Total; 28 29. Since the negligence is apportioned at 50%, the entitlement of claimants for compensation against Respondents concerned with the offended vehicle be fixed at Rs.4,87,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% can per annum from the date of petition till deposit or realization. Point No.2 is answered accordingly. Point No.3: 30. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings of point Nos.1 and 2, point No.3 is answered as follows: In the result, (i) The appeal is allowed-in-part. (ii) The decree and judgment dated 21.11.2012 passed by the learned MACT dismissing the M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 is hereby set-aside, (iii) M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 is allowed as follows: a) Claimants are entitled for a compensation of Rs.4,87,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till deposit or realization, b) Rs.2,50,000/- is apportioned to the share of claimant No.1/ the mother of the deceased with proportionate interest and costs, c) Rs.1,50,000/- is apportioned to the share of claimant No.2/ the father of the deceased with proportionate interest. total 29 d) Rs.87,000/- is apportioned to the share of claimant No.3/ the sister of the deceased with proportionate interest. e) All the claimants are entitled to withdraw the amount at once on deposit. f) Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are jointly and severally liable. But Respondent No.3 is liable in view of the Insurance Policy. g) Time for deposit is two months. (iv) There shall be no order as to costs, in this appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand closed. Sd/- G HELA NAIDU ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the Hon’ble Sri Justice A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA (For His Lordship’s Kind Perusal) To, 1. The Chairman, Motor Accidents-Cum-Tribunal VIII Additional District Court, East Godavari District. 2. One CC to Sri. T G S Srivatsava, Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC to Sri. N Siva Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] 4. One CC to Sri. Naresh Byrapaneni, Advocate [OPUC] 5. Nine(09) L.R Copies. 6. The Union Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi. 7. The Secretary, A.P., Advocates Association Library, High Court Buildings, Nelapadu, Amaravati, Guntu District, A.P., 8. Two C.D Copies. Ssl VNA HIGH COURT DATED:01/08/2025 * 1 § AUG 2025 m JUDGMENT + DECREE MA.CMA. NO. 301 OF 2013 eo. . Current Section PARTLY ALLOWING THE MA.CMA. WITHOUT COSTS f' r \ r