HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 484 of 2025 Court No. - 1 HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J. HON'BLE INDRAJEET SHUKLA, J. 1. This is an appeal challenging the judgement and order dated 20.12.2024 passed by Writ Court in Writ-A No.12265 of 2024. The appeal has been filed under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 for which the limitation is 30 days as per Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963. The appeal as per the report is delayed by 310 days as on the date of filing that is 25.11.2025. 2. An application has been filed for condonation of the delay along with an affidavit in support thereof. We have perused the affidavit. The affidavit speaks about copy of the impugned order being furnished to the concerned official/appellant on 26.12.2024, whereupon the State Government directed the Commissioner, Rural Development, U.P. Lucknow to obtain legal opinion from the Chief Standing Counsel vide letter dated 28.01.2025 and the said officer in turn referred the matter to the Chief Standing Counsel on 30.01.2025. The Chief Standing Counsel provided legal opinion on 13.02.2025. The legal opinion was sent by the Commissioner, Rural Development, U.P. Lucknow to the State Government on 19.02.2025 whereupon the law department granted permission to file Special Appeal on 04.03.2025. However, thereafter, inspite of the State Government having communicated the said permission to file appeal vide letter dated 05.03.2025 to the Commissioner, Rural Development, who in turn communicated it to the Chief Standing Counsel for filing the appeal, the appeal came to be filed Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : C.S.C. Counsel for Respondent(s) : Mayankar Singh State Of U.P. Thru.Its Addl.Chief Secy./Prin.Secy. Deptt. Of Rural Development, Lko. And Another .....Appellant(s) Rajat Yadav .....Respondent(s) only on 25.11.2025. For the intervening period of more than 8 months have not been satisfactorily explained. All that has been said is that the pairokar kept meeting the Chief Standing Counsel for preparation of the appeal, who demanded certain papers, which were collected and provided. We fail to understand as to why 8 months should have been used only for providing papers and drafting of the appeal. The paper book was allotted to the Chief Standing Counsel on 17.03.2025 itself, who asked for some papers, which were made available to him only by the letter dated 16.06.2025 that is after almost 3 months for which there is no explanation, nor there can be any justification. Paragraph 16 of the affidavit then says that in September again some documents were provided. This hardly explains the delay. When the permission to contest was granted by the law department on 04.03.2025 and the file was allotted to the Additional Chief Standing Counsel on 17.03.2025 so much time should not have been consumed for collecting and providing documents.The State authorities have proceeded leisurely in the matter. The affidavit does not disclose any promptness, diligence or sincerity on the part of the appellant to prefer the appeal within the limitation prescribed or at least within the reasonable period of its expiry. 3. The explanation offered is not at all sufficient especially in view of the recent decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivomma (Dead) by LRS Vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025. 4. We have gone through the decision of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression sufficient cause is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression, sufficient cause, must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with SPLAD No. 484 of 2025 2 reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide , plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein-above. Preference of such appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of the opposite parties under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this is also relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra). 5. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ?sufficient cause? has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ?sufficient cause? cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the SPLAD No. 484 of 2025 3 court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage. 6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a sufficient cause for the purpose of SPLAD No. 484 of 2025 4 Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards. 7. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion, as already expressed, firstly that the delay is inordinate, secondly, the explanation offered in this regard is certainly not an acceptable one and is not satisfactory as there is no sufficient cause shown by the appellants for entertaining the appeal which has been filed with such delay. 8. In view of the above discussion, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. 9. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 11, 2025 S.P. SPLAD No. 484 of 2025 5 (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) Digitally signed by :- SANJAY PURI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench