1 2025:CGHC:8265-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 619 of 2021 Mukesh Pujhar S/o Rohit Pujhar, Aged About 19 Years R/o Village Jamha Damgeetar Dadva, Police Station Chandramandi, District Jamul (Bihar), District : Jamui (Bihar). ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Mulmula, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Vikas Kumar Pandey, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Hariom Rai, Penal Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgement on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 18/02/2025 1. The present criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 22.03.2021, passed by learned Special Judge (Protection of Children from Sexual Digitally signed by VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN 2 Offences Act, 2012) Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), in Special Sessions Case No. 28 of 2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner: Conviction Sentence U/s. 363 of IPC R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 01 month. U/s. 366A of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 01 month. U/s. 376(2)(n) of IPC R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 02 months. All sentences are directed to be run concurrently. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 06.06.2019, the maternal uncle of the victim/PW-3 lodged a missing report to the police that his minor niece is missing since 29.05.2019, when she left her house to go to her maternal grandmother's house, but she has not reached there. Despite her search in nearby places and relative's house, her whereabouts could not be traced out. The police has registered the FIR/Exhibit P-3 for the offence under Section 363 of IPC against unknown person. During the investigation, the victim was recovered on 10.06.2019 from the house of the appellant and the recovery Panchanama/Exhibit P-20 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to Community Health Centre, Pamgarh, where she was being medically examined by PW- 1/Dr. Rashmi Dahire, who gave her report/Exhibit P-1. While examining the victim, the doctor has not noticed any external injuries 3 on her body and opined that on above finding, evidence suggestive of sexual contact. For confirmation, FSL report is advised. The underwear of the victim and one mobile phone has been seized vide seizure memo/Exhibit P-7. With respect to the date of birth and age of the victim, the police has seized the school register from Government Primary School, Konar vide seizure memo/Exhibit P-9 and after retaining the attested true copy of the school register/Exhibit P-10C, the original register was returned back to the school. A certificate issued by the headmaster of the school/Exhibit P-11 has also been seized by the police. Spot map/Exhibit P-13 was prepared by the police. Progress report card of Primary School of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo/Exhibit P-14. The appellant was arrested on 10.06.2019 from Chandramandi, Bihar and after obtaining the transit remand, he was taken to police station, Mulmula. The appellant was also sent for his medical examination to Community Health Centre, Pamgarh, where PW-2/Dr. K.K. Dahire has medically examined him and gave his report/Exhibit P-2. While examining the appellant, the doctor has found the appellant capable to perform sexual intercourse. The vaginal slide and underwear of the victim as well as the underwear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to Regional FSL, Bilaspur, from where report/Exhibit P-18 was received and according to the FSL report, semen and sperm were found on the vaginal slide and underwear of the victim. However, no semen and sperm were found on the underwear of the appellant. Statement under Section 161 of 4 CRPC of the witnesses have been recorded and Statement under Section 164 of CRPC of the victim has also been recorded. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366A and 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act. The appellant abjured his guilt and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses. Statement under Section 313 of CRPC of the appellant has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, plead innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgement. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, there are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which cannot be made basis for conviction of the appellant in the offence in question. There is no legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth and age of the victim as to she was minor on the date of incident. The school register has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance with law and except that there is no other 5 documentary evidence regarding the age of the victim, there is no birth certificate or ossification test report of the victim to determine her age. He would further submit that the victim being a major girl having love affair with the appellant and she herself on her own will eloped with him, both of them have traveled up to Bihar and resided with him without raising any objection. During the travel up to Bihar, she has not made any complaint to anyone and even while making the physical relation with the appellant, she has not raised any objection and not protested. The conduct of the appellant would reveal that she was the consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant and therefore no offences either of kidnapping and rape has been made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, but for minor omissions or contradictions, there are sufficient evidence against the appellant to convict the appellant in the offence in question. The school record produced by the prosecution is proved by PW-6, who is the In-charge headmaster of the school. From the school record, the victim is found to be minor on the date of incident and she was being kidnapped by the appellant, he took her up to Bihar and kept her away from her for lawful guardianship and made physical relation with her, which does constitute the offence of kidnapping and procuring the minor girl for illicit intercourse and the offence of rape. Even if, no injuries have been found on the body of the victim, the 6 case of the prosecution cannot be diluted, as the injury in every case is not required to be received by the victim in the offence of rape, therefore there is overwhelming evidence available on record against the appellant and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced him, which needs no interference. 8. We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 9. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim, as to whether she was minor on the date of incident or not ? 10. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register/Exhibit P- 10C and certificate/Exhibit P-11, which are sought to be proved by PW-6, who is the In-charge headmaster of the school. He stated in his evidence that he is posted as In-charge headmaster of the Government Primary School, Indira Awas, Konar since 1998. The police has seized the school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo/Exhibit P-9 and after retaining the attested to copy of the school register/Exhibit P-10C, the original register/Exhibit P-10 was returned back to the school. On the basis of the school register, he also issued a certificate/Exhibit P-11. 11. According to the school record, the date of birth of the victim is 05.11.2005. In cross-examination, he admitted that the school register, the entries made in the school register is not in his handwriting. He issued the certificate/Exhibit P-11 on the basis of the school register. Admittedly, the PW-6 is not the author of the school register. Further, 7 the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register is not produced by the prosecution. Except this, no other documentary evidence led by the prosecution, though vide seizure memo/Exhibit P- 14, the primary school progress report card has been seized, but the prosecution could not rely on that document during the recording of evidence. Except the school register and certificate/Exhibit P-11, no other documentary evidence produced by the prosecution. 12. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385. In Para 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in 8 the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in Issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere 9 production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue". 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be 10 applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 13. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. xxxx xxxx xxxx 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3) (a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the 33 Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption 11 of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub- section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper. technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that 12 the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, Inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the 33 Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 14. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under: "14, Section 94 (2)(iii) of the 33 Act clearly Indicates 13 that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, l.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been. fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of 14 age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (1) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent 15 certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(1) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted In order of preference." 15. The victim/PW-4 has stated that her date of birth is 05.11.2005. In cross-examination, though she denied that she disclosed her age to the appellant as 18 years, but she has not disclosed anything further that on what basis she is disclosing her date of birth. 16. PW-5, the mother of the victim, has not disclosed her date of birth, but stated that she is aged about 14 years. In cross-examination, she stated that she has not gone to the school for her admission, but her grandfather had gone to school for the same. Her daughter is having birth certificate and at the time of her admission in the school, the birth certificate was submitted in the school. The police has asked her for the birth certificate of the victim, but she did not know as to what documents they have given to the police. 17. From the evidence, which has been produced by the prosecution, it would be difficult for this Court to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident and the prosecution has proved her age in absence of 16 any cogent and clinching evidence. In the facts of the present case, she cannot be held to be minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor. 18. So far as the offence of kidnapping, procuring a minor girl and commission of rape is concerned, we again examine the evidence produced by the prosecution. 19. PW-4, the victim has stated in her evidence that she was using Facebook in her mobile phone and the appellant has made a telephonic call on her mobile phone and asked her to come to Mayyar and he assured her that he will engage her in job. She, on her own will, without informing anyone of her family member, had gone to bus stand from where she came to Bilaspur railway station and then had gone to Mayyar by train. The appellant came there at Mayyar railway station and took her to the room, where he was residing. Thereafter, he took her to his house at Bihar and made physical relation with her. She stayed with him for about one week and thereafter her maternal uncle and police persons came there and took her back. 20. In cross examination, she admitted that since she was heavily used the mobile phone, therefore her grandmother had regularly scolded her for heavily use of mobile phone. She became annoyed by the behaviour of her grandmother and in that condition she left her house. When she left her house and till reaching up to Bilaspur, she has not informed to any of her family members. Though she denied that she had gone to Bihar alone, but she voluntarily stated that she had gone to Bihar along with the appellant. From the evidence of the victim, it is 17 quite vivid that she herself has left her house without informing to her family members, came to Bilaspur by bus and had gone to Mayyar by train. From Mayyar, she had gone to Bihar along with the appellant and all the way, she has not made any complaint and has not raised any objection that the appellant is kidnapping her. When she herself has stated that she alone had gone to Mayyar, it cannot be said that she was being kidnapped by the appellant, particularly when she was not found to be minor. 21. In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: "9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part 18 was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 22. From the conduct of the victim and in view of the aforesaid judgment of S. Vardarajan (supra), it cannot be said that the appellant has kidnapped the victim and procured the minor girl, as the victim is not found to be minor and no offence of either kidnapping or procuring a minor girl is made out against the appellant. 23. It is also not the case of the victim that when the appellant made physical relation with her, she protested or tried to save herself. Even while residing in the house of the appellant at Bihar, when she allegedly subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, she has not raised any alarm and has not made any complaint to anyone of the vicinity where she was residing with the appellant. It is also not the case of the victim that she has given nail scratch mark or teeth bite on the body of the appellant to came out from his clutches. All the conduct of the victim clearly reflects that she was the consenting party in 19 making physical relation with the appellant and well aware about the status of the appellant. Particularly when she had traveled up to Mayyar alone, it cannot be said that she was allured or enticed by the appellant to go there. 24. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 25. PW-5, the mother of the victim, has stated in her evidence that her daughter was residing with her grandparents in the village and she along with her husband had gone to Allahabad to earn their livelihood. When she made telephonic call to her daughter and her mobile phone was found switched off, she sent her mother to see the victim, but she was not found in her house. Thereafter, they returned back from Allahabad and lodged the missing report to the police. After about 1 ½ 20 month, the victim informed her and shown her desire to came back to her house and thereafter they had gone to Bihar and took her back. 26. PW-3, who is the maternal uncle of the victim, has stated that when the victim missing from her house, they have lodged the missing report which is Exhibit P-3. After some time, the police persons have informed him that the location of the victim is found to be at Bihar and he along with police persons went to Bihar and took the victim back with them. 27. PW-1/Dr. Rashmi Dahire, who medically examined the victim has not found any external injuries on her body and no sign of any struggle have been found. From all these evidence, it would not be safe to uphold the conviction of the appellant for the alleged offences of kidnapping, procuring a minor girl for illicit intercourse and for offence of rape. 28. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgement of conviction and sentence are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the offences. 29. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 10.06.2019. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 30. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special 21 Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 31. Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved