2025:HHC:17749 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 743 of 2024 Reserved on: 28.05.2025 Date of Decision: 05.06.2025. Ankush Mehta alias Rinku ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Vinod Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 186 of 2012, dated 2.11.2012, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 447, 427, 143 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 32 and 33 of Indian Forest Act (in short ‘the Act’) at Police Station Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P. and consequent proceedings pending before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:17749 Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P., in Case No. 1113 of 2013, titled State of H.P. Vs. Suresh Kumar and others. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a compliant to the police that Krishan Chand, Suresh son of Tulsi Ram, Suresh son of Hari Ram, Rinku (present petitioner), and Goldi were found digging the Jungle C-182 on 1.11.2012 at 1.00 AM with the help of JCB. The informant tried to stop them, but they threatened him and Chowkidar Sukhdev. The informant called the police. Suresh, son of Tulsi Ram, Suresh, son of Hari Ram and Goldi ran away from the spot, however, the informant seized the JCB on the spot. Krishan Chand was also present on the spot. The police registered the FIR and filed the charge sheet before the Court. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition, asserting that he belongs to a respectable family and has nothing to do with the commission of crime. He was not present at the spot at the time of the occurrence. He was residing 3 2025:HHC:17749 in Chandigarh and returned to his native place on the same day after the incident. He was falsely implicated due to personal enmity in the village. Nothing incriminating was found against him at the time of the investigation. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and FIR No. 186 of 2012, dated 2.11.2012, and the consequent proceedings arising out of the same be ordered to be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by a filing status report reproducing the contents of the petition. It was asserted that the police filed a charge sheet before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The trial is fixed on 18.11.2024 for recording the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses. The summons was issued to the petitioner repeatedly, but he failed to appear before the Court. 06 witnesses out of 18 have been examined, and 12 witnesses are yet to be examined. The FIR was registered regarding the violation of the forest laws, which protect the public interest by preserving biodiversity, maintaining ecological balance and ensuring sustainable resource management. The quashing of the FIR will go against the public interest. The petitioner cannot escape the consequences of the 4 2025:HHC:17749 crime committed by him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr. Vinod Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 6. Mr. Vinod Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. He was not present at the place of the incident, and his name was wrongly mentioned due to the enmity in the village. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequent proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 7. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the name of the petitioner was specifically mentioned in the FIR. The Court cannot determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. The FIR was registered in the year 2012, and the petition was filed in the year 2024 after much delay. The learned Trial Court has framed 5 2025:HHC:17749 charges, and the matter is listed for prosecution evidence. This Court should allow the learned Trial Court to decide the matter and should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be 6 2025:HHC:17749 possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is 7 2025:HHC:17749 instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes 8 2025:HHC:17749 or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the petitioner, along with other co-accused, was digging the forest land C-182. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - 9 2025:HHC:17749 “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 13. It was submitted that the petitioner was not present at the spot, and he was residing in Chandigarh on the date of the incident. This Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the 10 2025:HHC:17749 considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 11 2025:HHC:17749 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 15. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 16. The status report shows that the charges have been framed and the matter is pending for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the 12 2025:HHC:17749 Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in the rare cases. It was observed on page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has 13 2025:HHC:17749 been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 18. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 19. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 5th June, 2025 (Chander)